Diamonds and War by De Vries, David
Berghahn Books
N E W  Y O R K  .  O X F O R D 
www.berghahnbooks.com
ISBN 978-1-84545-633-7


































State, Capital, and Labor in British-Ruled Palestine 
David De Vries
The mining of diamonds, their trading mechanisms, their financial institutions, 
and, not least, their cultural expressions as luxury items have engaged the 
work of historians, economists, and international relations experts. Based on 
previously unexamined historical documents found in archives in Belgium, 
England, Israel, the Netherlands, and the United States, this book is the first 
encompassing analysis of the formation in Mandate Palestine of what has 
become one of the world’s strongholds of diamond production and trade. The 
history of the diamond-cutting industry, characterized by a long-standing 
Jewish presence, is discussed as a social history embedded in international 
political economy. The genesis of the industry is placed within a broad 
continuum of geographic and economic dislocation and relocation of Dutch, 
Belgian, and German diamond-cutting centers. In providing a micro-historical 
and interdisciplinary perspective, the story of the diamond industry in Mandate 
Palestine proposes a more nuanced picture of the uncritical approach to the 
formation of occupational communities. This book unravels the Middle Eastern 
pattern of state intervention in the empowerment of private capital and recasts 
the inseparability of this craft’s culture from international politics during a 
period of war and transformation of empire.
David De Vries  is Professor of history at the Department of Labor Studies 
at Tel Aviv University, Israel. His publications include Idealism and Bureaucracy 
in 1920s Palestine: The Origins of ‘Red Haifa’ (1999, in Hebrew); Dock Workers: 
International Explorations in Labor History, 1790–1970 (2000, co-edited); and the 
republication of Henya Pekelman, The life of a Woman-Worker in her Homeland 
(2007, co-edited, in Hebrew).
COVER IMAGE: The polishing department at a Tel Aviv Diamond Factory, 1950. Photograph by 
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Introduction
GLOBAL AND NATIONAL
War, Diamonds, and the Colonial State

“Processes” do not imply that different spheres of life are marching in 
step like soldiers on a parade. Although the term may conjure up some 
picture of nonlinearity, the concept of process does not imply such an 
unrealistic idea. The opposite is true: trends are multifarious. Hence all 
kinds of crises and all kinds of surprises: deep retreats and setbacks, the 
sturdiness of historical traditions even in and despite hectic changes, con-
siderable fl ux and fogginess produce occasions and circumstances when 
actions by an individual can make a difference—or be entirely futile.
—Moshe Lewin, “Agency and Process in Russian and Soviet History,” in 
Extending the Borders of Russian History (2003).
Global and National
The book was triggered not by the usual reasons that produce books on 
diamonds. After years of research in the social and urban histories of Pal-
estine during the fi rst half of the twentieth century, I found myself fo-
cusing on labor strikes. I was puzzled by the intensity of labor disputes 
during British rule, the centrality of strikes in Palestine towns in shaping 
relations between labor and capital and their use, with a strong national 
sentiment, in both anticolonialist struggles and in state building. While 
examining the peak levels of labor militancy during World War II and the 
concurrent cooperation in strikes between Arabs and Jews, I noticed that 
the most vocal and militant among strikers were Jewish diamond cutters 
and polishers. At fi rst I imagined this group of highly skilled workers to 
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be an untypical segment of Palestine’s industrial force. They seemed an 
unlikely candidate for widespread workers’ solidarity and co-organizing 
with unskilled industrial workers, a “labor aristocracy” of a sort enclosed 
in small ateliers and cutting workshops.
As a social historian I have always seen the potential in researching 
strike action in history to bring forth workers’ unheard voices and sub-
jectivities. I began searching for a clue for this propensity. I quickly real-
ized, however, that accounting for the wartime salience of these skilled 
craftsmen in labor disputes was nothing but a corridor to a wider under-
standing of some central features of Israel’s early capitalism; in particular 
the close association of the evolution of the private sector with exogenous 
factors—the rise of European Fascism, British colonialism, and the war 
against Germany. Salient among these features were the umbrella given 
by the British Mandate to private capital, the growing legitimacy Jewish 
society in Palestine gave the capitalists, and last but not least the increas-
ing power of the Jewish middle class vis-à-vis the politically hegemonic 
Zionist Labor movement. Furthermore, looking closely into the dynamic 
world of the diamond industry during the 1930s and 1940s and its trans-
plantation into Mandate Palestine unraveled some wider historical con-
tinuities—the longstanding global presence of Jews in the occupational 
niche of diamond production and trading, the centrality of the Low Coun-
tries in the history of diamonds and diamond workers’ unionization, the 
transnational nature of the trade, and the winding path that the spread of 
diamond-polishing centers in the modern era has taken. The result is this 
book, which explores the intense ripening of capitalism in Palestine un-
der British rule through the complex formation of what has become—and 
still is—one of the world’s main strongholds of diamond production and 
trade.
Diamond cutters and polishers are situated on a commodity chain that 
starts with the mining and collecting of rough diamonds. Before World 
War II, these raw materials were sent primarily from South Africa, the 
Belgian Congo, and Sierra Leone to the London-based Diamond Trading 
Company (DTC), the sales and marketing subsidiary of the De Beers mo-
nopolistic diamond-mining cartel (the Diamond Syndicate).1 At the DTC 
the stones were allocated, through a traditional distribution ritual, to sight-
holders, who passed the sorted rough merchandise on to other middle-
men. The stones then found their place on the tables of the cleavers, saw-
yers, cutters, and polishers. After a highly skilled labor process they would 
be returned to middlemen and then to the diamond exchanges—notably 
in Antwerp and Amsterdam—where they would be evaluated and sold. 
At the end of the commodity chain the polished diamonds would reach 
the jewelry shops and the consumers, the latter seeking symbols of ever-
lasting love, marital bond, status, or investments. They would also reach 
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countries and companies that used them industrially for abrasives and 
drilling, and even rebel armies who bartered them for arms.2
This commodity chain has persisted since the start of the take-off in 
diamond mining, trading, and fi nishing in 1870s until quite recently, with-
out national borders seriously bounding it. The swift cross-country move-
ment of the gem dealers matched the minute size and easy mobility of 
the merchandise. Ethnic networks of Jews and Palanpuri Jains families 
among which the diamond trade has been fl ourishing drew alternative 
coordinates to geopolitical boundaries. And the itineraries mapped by the 
diamond commodity chain easily blurred accepted political and economic 
divisions. This transnational mobility, in addition to diamond cutting be-
ing historically outside the traditional guild system, was perhaps one of 
the main preconditions that enabled Jews from North Africa and Europe 
to occupy so decidedly the occupational niche of the diamond trade. After 
all it was a niche they were allowed by rulers and states to hold, that fi tted 
well their conditions as migrants and intermediaries, and one in which 
they could cultivate a business culture based on such classic ingredients of 
social capital—informal communal arrangements, reputation, and trust.3
At the same time, however, diamond cutting and polishing has always 
been attached to localities; and it has often been colored by national adap-
tations and local diversifi cations of traditional cutting and polishing skills. 
Like other consumer goods (as Leonard Helfgott reminded us in his work 
on the Iranian carpets),4 diamonds never moved only through the contin-
uum of production, distribution, and use in what might seem a historical 
vacuum. Each stage of their social existence was shaped by political, cul-
tural, economic, and technological factors within the region of their initial 
production and within their national and international socioeconomic and 
political contexts. If in recent years the transnational perspective has been 
encouraging labor and business historians to think in terms of commod-
ity chains, diamond production demonstrates also the need to interlace 
international linkages with local and state specifi cities and examine the 
extent to which the interactions between them have been formative and 
mutually infl uential.5
In the history of the diamond industry, the state and local bureaucracies 
were present in each of the different phases of the diamond commodity 
chain. Moreover, national wars, imperial rivalries, and state interests made 
use of locally diamond-producing communities, fi nancially and militarily, 
and the economic impact of national and civil wars has strongly affected 
diamond sales and distribution. One cannot imagine the mining activity 
in South Africa, Belgian Congo, and Sierra Leone without the close rela-
tions between the De Beers cartel, its mining subsidiary companies, and 
British colonialism. The operation of the diamond exchanges in the Low 
Countries was overseen by the latter’s governments and always been per-
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ceived by them as necessary components of their national economies. Dia-
mond cutting has often seen attempts of state regulation and more often 
competition between states over the exporting capacities of the diamond 
production centers.6 The Netherlands and Belgium traditionally placed 
their diamond industry and business as a central asset of their economic 
nationalism, and Nazi Germany purposefully adapted diamond produc-
tion to its 1930s remilitarization. As will be demonstrated in this book, 
during World War II diamonds were not just a means in the Allies’ anti-
German economic warfare. Rather, they were a turbulent site of national 
competitiveness in Europe over the great income diamonds could accrue 
from the American market. As much as diamond mining, cutting, trad-
ing, and selling was a capitalist venture, initiated and driven by private 
entrepreneurs, fi rms, and capital, they were no less structured by states, 
national movements and confl icts, and tense international relations.7
In the historical presence of Jews in diamond production and trade, 
states and national bureaucracies have played a prominent role. The inter-
mediary position Jews played in the diamond trade centers of Amsterdam 
and Antwerp cannot be explained without the blessing of their respective 
rulers, and without these rulers and elite groups practically using the mid-
dling minority function to promote commerce in luxury goods such as 
gems and precious stones. State-like intervention in the formation of this 
ethnic occupational niche was explicit in the diamond-mining history of 
South Africa, where the presence of Jews in the early De Beers cartel struc-
ture was favored by the British and by the state-backed activities of the 
London City in the trade. The decline after World War I of Amsterdam as 
a diamond-cutting center in favor of Antwerp, and the related passage of 
Jews in the diamond trade from one city to the other, was regarded in the 
Netherlands as harming the national economy. In Belgium it was likewise 
supported for the same reasons. Nazi Germany’s advancement in the lat-
ter part of the 1930s of the German diamond-cutting industry impacted 
not only the diamond industry but specifi cally also the Jews in Europe 
who were directly associated with it. As will be argued below, the creation 
of a diamond-cutting and -polishing industry in Palestine and the migra-
tion of the craft on which it was based was a product of a multifaceted 
change and dislocation in which the specifi c qualities of its social carriers 
intersected with imperial and state structures and interests. The process 
started with the fl ourishing of the cutting center in Amsterdam in the last 
third of the nineteenth century. It was then followed by Antwerp’s hege-
mony after World War I, and continued with the spread of fi erce competi-
tion among the European cutting centers by Nazi Germany. Antwerp’s fall 
in spring 1940 brought this spatial dislocation and relocation to a climax.8
The duality of the national and the transnational that has come to char-
acterize the modern diamond industry in the fi rst third of the twentieth 
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century was dramatically enhanced by World War II. First and foremost 
the war paralyzed signifi cant parts of the international diamond trade, in 
particular those that linked the Low Countries with mining posts in Africa 
and marketing targets in the US. The breakdown of these connecting links 
strongly impacted localities of mining, making, and trading—in particular 
their capacity to thrive on international resources and on their traditional 
dependence of world production on them. Secondly, the proliferation the 
war caused in diamond-cutting centers—largely stemming from the fl ight 
of Jews out of Antwerp and Amsterdam—was in itself a signal of the in-
creasing splintering of the system of diamond making and trading into 
nationally and locally based production centers. The competition between 
these centers emphasized the interplay in the diamond industry between 
global business systems and economic nationalism. Finally, the war also 
kept alive the international system. In mobilizing the diamond industry to 
the economic warfare against Germany and in solidifying the ties between 
the warring states and the diamond business, it sustained the infrastruc-
ture of linkages between the cutting and trading centers and of a system 
that did not (and could not) collapse into totally estranged producing and 
commercial units.9
War, Diamonds, and the Colonial State
These processes bore specifi c relevance to the historical centrality of Jews 
in diamonds and the impact of the relocations of the industry on them. 
The decline of the diamond industry in Amsterdam was closely associated 
with the migration of Jews to Antwerp. The Nazi from-above engineering 
of a diamond-cutting industry was a direct response to the departure of 
many Jews from Germany in the 1930s. And the paralysis of the industry 
in Antwerp at the turn of the decade was a blatant expression of the terri-
ble fate of the Jews, their uprooting, spoliation, and decimation. Evidently, 
the “diamond diasporas” that sprang out of the Belgian mother-center 
and sprouted in South Africa, Palestine, Brazil, Puerto Rico, Havana, New 
York, and the United Kingdom were almost entirely established by Jews 
and depended on the diamond manufacturing they cultivated and on the 
ethnic-occupational enclaves they created.10
The impact of the war on the diamond industry raises two historio-
graphical problems. Diamonds have for long attracted scholarly attention. 
The mining of diamonds, their trading mechanisms, their fi nancial institu-
tions, and not least their cultural expressions as luxury items have engaged 
the work of historians, economists, social scientists, and international rela-
tions experts. However, manufacturing and the social history of diamond 
cutting and polishing have been relatively neglected and were often left to 
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the technical writings of gemologists and diamond inductors. This is cor-
rect also with regard to the massive presence of Jews in diamonds. Their 
history has largely centered on Jewish merchants, the ethnic foundation in 
their capacity to become hegemonic in the occupational niche of diamond 
making and trading, and their particular noncontractual arrangements 
that allowed them to save on trading transaction costs. Much less atten-
tion has been paid to the social history of the manufacturers and the cut-
ters, their prominence among the laboring and low-middle classes in the 
Low Countries, and above all their experience as immigrants. Palestine, 
which developed during World War II one of the world’s largest and fast-
est-growing polishing centers, received equally uneven treatment. Over-
due emphasis has been laid in the literature on explaining the spectacu-
lar performance of diamond manufacturing in Palestine during the war, 
while the nature of the manufacturers and their organization, the workers 
and their unions, the production culture, and the close association of the 
industry with Europe have been largely ignored.11
These lacunae harbor a second and much thornier problem. It has long 
been recognized that communities and socially distinct groups create in-
stitutions and mechanisms of trust, reliability, accountability, and reputa-
tion, and that these further propel their social formation and create for 
them economic advantages and occupational niches. This was well dem-
onstrated in the historical and contemporary example of Jewish diamond 
merchants that has featured widely in the economic and legal literature 
since the early 1980s. Basing themselves on the thought-provoking work 
of Avner Greif on the eleventh-century Maghreb traders, legal and busi-
ness scholars such as Lisa Bernstein and Barak Richman have carefully dis-
sected the social and legal institutions that for many years helped Jewish 
diamond merchants to distance themselves from formal state and public 
legal institutions; and through reputation, community institutions, famil-
ial connections, and trust to gain hegemony in the diamond industry and 
to get selected by forces of capital as effi cient carriers of low-cost transac-
tions. In recent years the interests in such mechanisms increased because 
of the success in globalization of groups to use their inner trust systems 
and social capital to move freely in the economic networks, and sustain 
private governance systems that fi t the so-called waning of the state.12
In most of this literature, however, the state’s positive reaction to the 
kind of social activity the diamond communities and networks operated 
is assumed as fi xed and continuous; a mere bystander and a contextual 
framework for the real activity that goes on in this particular industry and 
trade. Signifi cantly, this distancing from state intervention has also been 
the picture that the diamond merchants themselves and the networks they 
are immersed in promoted through their secrecy, trading rituals, informal 
justice system, and their enclave-like noncontractual understandings.13
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In focusing on the diamond industry in Mandate Palestine, this book 
aims to provide a more nuanced picture to this approach that takes the 
impervious boundaries of such communities and groupings too uncriti-
cally. In this picture the state is brought into the discussion as a primary 
force that enables the existence and operation of such occupational com-
munities, well embedded in their quotidian routines, business strategies, 
and future calculations, to the point that the boundaries between state and 
capital become often blurred.14
That Palestine was transformed between the late 1930s and the late 
1940s has been for long an acknowledged wisdom. The rise of Fascism 
in Europe and World War II changed the character of the country’s econ-
omy. The Holocaust transformed its demographic and cultural horizons. 
The retreat of the British Empire impacted Palestine politically, and by 
the decade’s end a bloody war resulted in the birth of the state of Israel 
and the uprooting of thousands of Palestinians. Historians have fi ttingly 
dedicated enormous efforts to unravel these vicissitudes. However, only 
in recent years economic and social historians began to draw attention to 
the fact that the British-backed maturation of capitalism in Palestine, and 
in particular British-backed empowerment of private capital in the Jewish 
polity (the Yishuv), was a major part of the transformation.
Indeed, after years of capital import and slow-paced economic growth, 
the 1940s saw a remarkable economic boom, a fl ourishing of industry 
largely at the expense of agriculture, and unprecedented activity of private 
manufacture aided by the economic policies of the Palestine government. 
As contemporaries readily recognized, this industrialization phase was 
also expressed in strengthening the organizations of manufacturers and 
merchants who aspired to translate the economic achievement into social 
and political power, and in the destabilization of Jewish organized labor 
(represented mostly by the Histadrut) and its relative power in the Jew-
ish industrial sector. Furthermore, an unprecedented upsurge of workers’ 
strike-action in 1941–1946 (partly independent of and occasionally against 
the authority of the organized Labor movement) signaled that capital was 
indeed on the rise. State-espoused strengthening of private capital was 
a contemporary Middle Eastern pattern, and the social unrest it brought 
forth in Palestine as elsewhere exposed an infrastructure for subsequent 
social change.15
Even less noticed, however, was the growing integration of private 
capital and entrepreneurship in the life of Jewish society in Palestine 
by groups seeking to enhance the legitimization of capitalism as a way 
of thinking and social practice. Built on the assimilation in the 1930s of 
capital’s national role in Zionist state building, and pushed further to the 
center of economic activity by Palestine’s economic boom and British war-
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time protective economic policies, Jewish industrialists and manufactur-
ers could in the 1940s claim a victory over the suspicion, even derogation, 
they had experienced earlier regarding their social and Zionist roles—their 
“national egoism” as Labor’s leader David Ben-Gurion phrased it in the 
mid-1920s.16
The central economic role of private capital in Palestine and its social 
acceptance has been gradually advancing since the early rise of manufac-
turing in the mid-1920s despite contemporary ambivalence towards the 
Jewish participation in a capitalist economy and towards the urbaniza-
tion of the Zionist project. It further intensifi ed during the invigorated 
industrialization of the fi rst half of the 1930s, as refl ected in the paral-
lel ripening of the industrial activity of the private sector in Palestine’s 
towns, the rhetoric of the national role capitalism came now to fulfi ll, and 
the recognized capacity of capital to work for the “Zionist social good.” 
What was novel in the latter part of the Mandate period was that capi-
talism and its legitimization were gradually becoming far from an inter-
nal Jewish affair and much more tightly linked to exogenous forces and 
events. Furthermore, during the war particular standard bearers of the 
process could grow, operate, and struggle to carve a recognized place in 
society because they were located at the juncture of local and international 
contexts created and shaped by changes wrought in Europe by Fascism 
and war. In both senses the economic and social boundaries of Palestine’s 
Zionist polity were blurred, assimilating not only in larger political and 
military systems, but also in imperial networks and rivaling international 
economic interests.
Capitalism as a way of thinking and a practice in business and society 
was making a headway in Palestine well before the 1940s. It could be seen 
emerging in the Palestinian villages, in the coastal mixed towns and even 
up in the hillier areas. The increasing presence of foreign capital and pow-
ers since the late nineteenth century and involvement of imperial powers 
in the regions acted as agents of capitalism no less than the minority social 
groups that had by the 1920s and 1930s accumulated capital and led more 
comfortable lives. But in the course of the latter part of the Mandate pe-
riod under discussion here, new possibilities opened and spaces created 
for the transformation in thinking and action to start taking place. The 
signifi cance of this process in the formation and advancement of capital-
ism in modern Palestine would seem self-evident. But only by analyzing 
the specifi city of the ties woven by these groups in the context of the war 
can we uncover the meaning of this blurring and explain its relation to 
the British presence. The formation of the diamond industry in the late 
1930s and in the course of the 1940s is aptly instructive in unraveling this 
process.17
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The history of relations between state, capital, and labor in Palestine 
during the British Mandate is one of the most understudied phenomena 
that have shaped the country, its social make-up, and the politics of the 
Arab-Jewish national confl ict. While the ideological and political founda-
tions of these relations have been explicated long ago, the ways they have 
unfolded in practice, their multifaceted materialization at the branch and 
workplace level, and their diversity across economic sectors and occupa-
tions have yet to be researched. This is true in particular in the case of the 
Yishuv, the Zionist polity in Palestine, where capital-labor relations were a 
key factor in determining its internal cohesion, power, and political path, 
and therefore its relations with Palestinian society. The fi rm, the factory, 
and the offi ce, no less than the citrus plantation or the building sites, the 
shops, and home as a place of work—all these have been hidden in the Yi-
shuv’s economic and social histories as if they were silent and fragmented 
components of a highly politicized and ideological civil society. They were 
masked, however, more by the historians than by the politicians and ideo-
logues of the period who saw the signifi cance of their mobilization, their 
importance as arenas of social tension.18
The little that has been written about the social history of these relations 
told a story of exchange of political hegemony for economic liberalism. 
The Labor movement grew through this exchange to become in the 1930s 
the politically hegemonic force in the Yishuv while the capital owners and 
private employers enjoyed the liberty to pursue their capitalist enterprise. 
Both sides espoused Zionism but they differed in their conceptions of the 
social order in the Yishuv and the path to Zionist state building—the for-
mer upholding a collectivist approach and the latter a more individualistic 
and liberal one. Private capital, the stronger economic force in the Yishuv, 
gave Labor its way because of the latter’s national functions. Labor, repre-
senting a larger electorate, allowed capital to maintain its enclaves of Arab 
cheap labor.19
Signifi cantly, British colonial rule had a crucial role to play in this sys-
tem. Since the early 1920s the authorities supported the “strong” sectors of 
the economy, gave half-hearted recognition to trade-unionism, and shied 
away from protecting workers through labor legislation. The relatively 
low colonial presence in the Jewish community in the early Mandate pe-
riod was therefore buttressing a system of relations that was perceived as 
low-cost for the Empire and the British taxpayer and as a barrier against 
social disorder. Evidently, as long as the Mandate state kept relatively low 
levels of intervention in civil society, the exchange relations between capi-
tal and labor remained stable. The fi erce political and ideological confl ict 
between the Mapai party, Labor’s main political power, and the Revision-
ist Movement in the 1930s did not destabilize the exchange system either. 
When in 1935 David Ben-Gurion became head of the Jewish Agency, the 
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leading Zionist national institution, nothing changed in Labor’s power to 
impact the capital owners. On the contrary, capital’s liberty of operation 
only increased.
In fact little could hamper the growing centrality of capitalism in the 
Yishuv economy and society to the point that it hardly needed expres-
sion of political power. The dependence of the Yishuv economy on the 
import of private capital was one reason for this growth. Another was the 
orientation of the Jewish population, mostly increasing through massive 
immigration in the mid-1920s and early 1930s to settle in Palestine’s towns 
and advance the Yishuv’s urbanization. On the eve of World War II the 
Yishuv, a small polity of half a million inhabitants, was already on the path 
that distanced it from Labor’s earlier conceptions of a Socialist society and 
closer to becoming a capitalist society. As the emergence of the diamond 
industry demonstrates, World War II and the dramatic intervention of the 
British Mandate state in Palestine’s civil society and in the Yishuv in par-
ticular made the process irreversible.20
This argument touches fi rst and foremost upon the marked contrast in 
the economic historiography of the region: the accepted notion of the role of 
colonial rule in the development of capitalist structures in Middle Eastern 
countries on the one hand, and the older perception of relatively weaker 
British intervention (mainly until World War II) in Palestine’s economy on 
the other. More recent literature has demonstrated clearly the centrality of 
the Colonial Offi ce and the Palestine government to economic develop-
ments and relations in Palestine’s civil society. However, understanding 
the myriad interventions and involvement of the British Mandate state in 
the diamond industry from the late 1930s to the end of the Mandate in the 
late 1940s pinpoints the need to soften this contrast. This is clearly borne 
out by the centrality of the British Mandate rule and the Colonial Offi ce in 
London in shaping the Jewish control of the diamond industry and thus 
in the segmentation of Palestine’s urban labor market which was tradi-
tionally thought of as driven and operated by ethnic groups and market 
mechanisms.21
Furthermore, these arguments concern the puzzling confl ation in the 
Palestine/Israel historiography between two state structures. Because of 
the embryonic state-like bureaucracy developed by the Yishuv, the Jewish 
polity in Palestine before 1948, and because of the dramatic emergence of 
the state of Israel as a Jewish sovereignty during the 1948 war and after, 
the state of Israel was read back into the Mandate period as the reference 
point for Jewish private capital and the main apparatus with which it was 
in relation. Consequently the role of the more signifi cant authority of the 
British Mandate that impacted Jewish capital owners and its later substi-
tution by Zionist institutions was underrated. Even the recognition of the 
intensifi ed intervention of the British in the economy during World War 
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II still left the Mandate state as a contextual and external force, deeply in-
volved in regulating security, immigration and land transactions but for-
eign to and distant from local civil society. The evolution of the diamond 
industry clarifi es this confl ation between the two state structures. First, 
it pinpoints the need to reposition British colonial regime (the ‘Mandate 
state’) in its proper place in the fl ourishing of private capital, in the forma-
tion of Palestine’s industrial and business environments, its deeply felt 
presence in Palestine’s social fabric. Secondly, it unravels the foundations 
of state-capital relations laid during the Mandate and which were repro-
duced upon the establishment of the state of Israel.22
*   *   *
To account for the emergence of the diamond industry in 1930s–1940s Pal-
estine and its complex interlacing with international history and with the 
history of diamond production, I followed its principal actors, the frame-
works in which they intersected, and the perceptions they conveyed on the 
realities and forces they encountered. Ample material on states’ interests 
and policies regarding diamonds and their fi nancial and industrial use 
were found in archive material in the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and Israel. The centrality and involvement of the De Beers diamond car-
tel and its central selling organization in London were drawn on the rich 
correspondence between the cartel, the British Ministry of Economic War-
fare, the Palestine Diamond Manufacturers’ Association, the offi ce of the 
economic advisor and light industries in the Palestine government and 
with the Ministry of Trade and Industry of the State of Israel. The rich 
archive of the Palestine Diamond Manufacturers’ Association in Netanya 
enabled a thick description of the business world of the diamond owners 
and manufacturers. Finally the portrait of the diamond workers and the 
analysis of the actions of their unions were well explicated by the archives 
of The General Dutch Diamond Workers Union (the ANDB) in Amster-
dam and of the Zionist Labor movement in Israel. I followed also the rich 
press that accompanied the actors and often served them—from the daily 
press in Palestine to the labor press of the diamond workers and ending 
with the rich occupational and business bulletins of the diamond industry 
itself. Equally signifi cant were the treasures of books on diamonds in Am-
sterdam, Antwerp, and Ramat Gan, and the expanding internet sites of 
diamond companies and of the diamond industry and bourse in Israel.23
On the basis of the letters, reports, protocols, quantitative evidence, 
and biographical and memoirist texts, I drew a narrative of the making 
of the diamond industry in Palestine and its myriad relations within its 
own boundaries, and with the international contexts and forces in which 
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the industry was embedded. The discussion is divided into three parts. 
The fi rst (chapters 1–3) focuses on the emergence of the industry in the 
context of the Belgian hegemony. It unravels the inherent tension between 
development and delimitation that characterized British policy towards 
the industry and looks at the organizational implications of that tension. 
The second part (chapters 4–5) looks at the spurt of diamond production 
in Palestine during the war. It explores the challenges this take-off posed 
both to internal Yishuv arrangements and norms, and to the exogenous at-
tempts to limit its competitiveness. The third part (chapters 6–8) discusses 
the harsh effects of the liberation of Belgium on the industry in Palestine 
and the crisis that beset the industry on the eve of British withdrawal. The 
narrative closes with the re-emergence of the pact between capital and 
state during the 1948 war and the recuperation of the industry in the wake 
of the establishment of Israel.
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Chapter 1
PALESTINE AS AN ALTERNATIVE

I cannot see any reason why a prosperous secondary industry in the cut-
ting and polishing of diamonds should not be developed in Palestine, 
but if the scheme is to succeed, there should be a very strict limit to its 
immediate extension. It is not only a matter of establishing an industry 
by setting up factories and plant, obtaining labour, raw materials, and the 
selling of the manufactured articles; involved in this question are politics, 
the co-operation of diamond producing countries and the necessity of 
safeguarding that control of marketing now exercised by the Diamond 
Corporation. I doubt very much whether it would be politic to give of-
fi cial support to any unrestricted scheme, as such support might have the 
effect of repercussions most harmful to the industry as a whole
—Frederick A. Mathias, “Palestine–Diamond Cutting Industry,” Report, 
27 March 1940, TNA: PRO CO 852/289/1.
Preconditions
The story of the birth of the diamond industry in Palestine has been told 
many times before.1 The industry’s collective memory has always been 
part of its distinct sense of an ethnically based business network and a 
highly skilled occupational community. Its foundation on noncontractual 
business culture and on social and personal trust—themselves maintained 
by long-standing norms and shared memories of the diamond dealers, 
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manufacturers, and workers—encouraged a popularization of the indus-
try’s history and fascination with its mysteries. Adding to this appeal were 
stories of the initiative and valor of the founding fathers that succeeded in 
establishing an industry against all odds.
This personalized and heroic approach to the history of the industry 
was also associated with the embryonic nature of pre-state Palestine in 
which the all-powerful image of the leader, politician, and intellectual 
as social shapers was cultivated. The diamond Zionist immigrant-entre-
preneur, the national-capitalist diamond manufacturer, or the diamond 
expert who for years inducted the young apprentices—was part of this 
constructivist and entrepreneurial culture. Further enhancing the heroic 
ethos were features that singled out the diamond industry as the locus 
of smuggling, wartime espionage, and illicit world trade. This imagined 
“exceptionalism” of the diamond industry also sparked the imagination 
of historians and novelists who for long have been lured by the business 
acumen of the diamond dealers, their trading rituals, and occupational 
culture. However, evoking similar personalized foundational stories, the 
beginning of the diamond industry in Palestine also demonstrated the ex-
tent to which individual agency ought to be contextualized within an in-
terplay of myriad interests and key forces of international politics, global 
fi nance, and local entrepreneurial energy, of which the participating actors 
were only partly aware.2
The emergence of some of these forces dates back hundreds of years. 
For many centuries Palestine had been situated on main Middle Eastern 
trading routes, often frequented by Arab and Jewish diamond merchants. 
Since the Middle Ages, and more intensively since the sixteenth century, 
Middle Eastern dealers in precious stones were involved in trading net-
works that stretched from Africa eastward. In Ottoman Palestine the crafts 
of jewelry making and silversmithery primarily of religious artifacts were 
fairly widespread. Early initiatives to develop diamond cutting and pol-
ishing emerged at the dawn of the twentieth century. In the eighth Zionist 
Congress in The Hague in 1907 a scheme was drawn to apprentice or-
phans of the Kishinev Pogrom to diamond cutters in Jerusalem. In 1908 
the Bezalel Art Academy in Jerusalem suggested to combine the tradi-
tional Yemenite art work with jewelry making and diamond cutting, but 
the idea failed because the Ottoman authorities objected to waiving cus-
toms on the import of diamonds. During World War I Chaim F. Friedman, 
an Antwerp diamantaire, and Jean Fisher (1871–1929), a prominent leader 
of Belgian Zionism, formed a group of Belgian Jewish diamond entrepre-
neurs whose businesses were harmed by the war to negotiate with the Ot-
toman rulers of Palestine the creation of a polishing industry.3 In 1910 the 
group, now organized by the Polish Rabbi Shlomo Weinstein (1898–1976) 
and greatly assisted by the recently created Zionist institutions in Jerusa-
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lem, began to transfer part of their manufacturing activities from Antwerp 
to Palestine. In 1915 Max Bodenheimer—the German Zionist leader and 
founder of the Komitee fuer den Osten (Committee for the East) for the wel-
fare of Jewish Russian communities under German and Austrian occupa-
tion—outlined a scheme to weave a network of diamond cutting centers 
in Cologne, Warsaw, and Jerusalem. None of these projects struck root 
and the main diamond-cutting centers of Amsterdam, Antwerp, and—on 
a smaller scale—New York remained unchallenged.4
In principle diamond cutting could have been considered an ideal can-
didate for the autonomous Jewish economy that the Zionist enterprise 
sought to create in Palestine through the migration of Jewish manpower, 
capital, and skill. Diamond cutting was associated, after all, with a key 
Jewish occupational niche, and Jews had been for long the main force in 
the development of the diamond industry in Amsterdam and Antwerp 
(and one of the main causes for the success of the integration of east Euro-
pean Jews in Dutch and Belgian societies).5 Furthermore diamond cutting 
in Belgium was partly based on domestic work and familial apprentice-
ship, which, as some of the initiators mentioned above believed, could 
have well fi tted the artisanal character of Palestine’s manufacture. How-
ever, Palestine’s geoeconomic location, the ethnic-occupational traditions 
of Jews, even the concerted efforts made by the Zionist Movement and 
Belgian diamond merchants in the 1920s were not powerful enough to 
induce the establishment of a local diamond industry.6
The reasons for Palestine’s absence from the world’s “diamond scene” 
may shed light on the context in which the industry fi nally did emerge. 
First and foremost, until the late 1930s Palestine had not been part of the 
diamond commodity chain7 chiefl y because of patterns of Jewish immi-
gration. Palestine was hardly an attractive destination for the Russian, 
Polish, Rumanian, and German Jewish immigrants who had settled in the 
Netherlands and Belgium between the 1880s and the 1930s.8
Furthermore, while the Zionist Movement sought to encourage the im-
migration of skilled workers to Palestine, in the interwar period diamond 
cutters and dealers were largely overlooked, possibly because of the in-
fl uence of Labor Zionism on the preselecting of Jewish immigrants and 
the clear preference for agricultural and construction workers. Labor’s 
constructivist ideology may have infl uenced the reluctance of the skilled 
diamond polishers and dealers to replace their integration in the tolerant 
Low Countries with the realization of Zionist settlement in Palestine.9
The second reason for the slow start of the diamond industry in Pal-
estine was Belgium’s hegemony over the international diamond scene. 
Dominant since the decline of diamond cutting in Amsterdam after World 
War I, the industry in Antwerp hardly encouraged the development of ri-
val cutting centers. The De Beers diamond cartel reinforced this hegemony 
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because Belgium and Belgian companies (mainly Forminière) controlled 
the Belgian Congo and its diamond mines on which the cartel’s work de-
pended. Antwerp, both a cutting and a trade center, housed thousands of 
workers, merchants, and dealers who swarmed the diamond clubs and 
exchanges, linking Antwerp with the Diamond Syndicate in London, and 
the main exporting destinations of the polished stones in the United States 
and India.10
Furthermore, though Antwerp cut and traded in a variety of sizes and 
shapes of diamonds, it specialized in cutting very small stones—Sand 
and Melees.11 The specialization was maintained by the high wages Bel-
gian employers paid their expert cutters and polishers, and it could be 
endangered by low-wage cutting offered by new cutting centers. The 
only signifi cant center to have advanced during the 1930s that surpassed 
Amsterdam12 and turned into Antwerp’s main competitor was Nazi Ger-
many, and it too aimed at specializing in small diamonds. Other centers, 
dependent on skilled workers from the Low Countries and on the sup-
ply of rough stones from the De Beers cartel, did not have much chance 
to expand, nor could they thrive without the blessing of the cartel that 
monopolized almost the entire mining of raw materials and their distribu-
tion. Moreover, in 1932–1934 the cartel was recovering from a slump in 
world sales of rough diamonds, partly by meeting the rising world de-
mand for industrial diamonds and partly through expanding its mining 
activities in Africa. Its ties with the British imperial presence in South Af-
rica and Sierra Leone were enhancing, as indicated by the mining conces-
sion given in 1935 to one of its subsidiary companies—the Sierra Leone 
Selection Trust (SLST). Deeply involved in diamond politics since the dis-
covery of the mining fi elds in South Africa in 1870, Britain agreed in this 
concession to give SLST exclusive mining and prospecting rights in Sierra 
Leone, thereby cementing the ties between the Empire and the cartel. The 
Belgium-De Beers axis, which the British were now part of and advanced, 
was suspicious of competing cutting centers that might threaten the ac-
cepted patterns of the politics of the diamonds industry.13
The third factor hindering the establishment of a diamond industry in 
Palestine was the absence of a substantial middle class, traditionally the 
potential consumers of diamonds. This social stratifi cation, unaltered by 
rapid urbanization in Palestine 1925–1935, was accompanied by a culture 
of asceticism and modesty that was hardly conducive to the growth of 
a luxury industry. Diamonds for engagement rings or for industrial us-
age were mainly consumed in the United States, India, and Europe. In 
interwar Palestine industrialization and the expansion of commerce were 
largely based on agricultural and building products (such as citrus and ce-
ment). Its exporting destinations were largely confi ned to Middle Eastern 
countries and the United Kingdom, and the tempo of urban social forma-
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tion could not signifi cantly alter local consumption patterns. The absence 
of diamond merchants and manufacturers in Palestine’s social scene, and 
the scarcity of well-paid, skilled experts and cutters, added to the climate 
of small social distances and thrift culture prevalent amongst the local 
lower and middle classes.14
The fourth and more signifi cant factor was the economic obstacle. Dom-
inating the diamond trade in the Low Countries as experts or capital own-
ers, Jews did not conceive Palestine as a viable option for an industry that 
was wholly dependent on ethnic and commercial networks and on Eu-
rope as the entrepôt of international diamond trade. The greater diffi culty 
was the high custom rates placed by the British Mandate on the import of 
rough diamonds from Europe. The exorbitant rates, which the Ottoman 
rule instigated as a source of local revenue for the Palestine government, 
served to lower the value added (the sum of profi ts minus all inputs and 
expenses) of the fi nished product. Local diamond cutting thus became a 
costly business, with the rates supplemented by the high prices paid for 
the raw materials and the length of time needed to train cutters and pol-
ishers. The custom rates thus added to British fi nancial considerations, 
and the understanding with De Beers that alternative diamond cutting 
centers should be discouraged, in making diamond polishing in Palestine 
quite an unprofi table business.15 In sum, none of the historical forces that 
shaped the centrality of Jews in the European diamond production and 
business as a middlemen minority and occupiers of an occupational niche 
were therefore present in Palestine. Despite traditional Jewish concentra-
tion in the diamond industry, Palestine lacked the fi nancial resources, the 
required skill, and the ties that the Zionist institutions and private dealers 
needed to have with De Beers that were necessary for sustaining a dia-
mond industry. The change came only when a tremendous shift began to 
crack Belgium’s long-standing domination.16
The main process that constituted this shift was the rise of Fascism in 
Europe. On Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933 the world diamond in-
dustry was in midst of a recovery from the economic slump of the early 
1930s. De Beers’s sales were growing again and the diamond industry in 
Antwerp was expanding, partly due to the movement in Europe of mer-
chants, capital, and expertise that National Socialism and its racial poli-
cies were pushing. More signifi cant was Germany’s policy to enlarge its 
diamond industry.
After World War I cutting of small stones were offered in the traditional 
jewelry centers of Hanau and Idar-Oberstein to Dutch and Belgian deal-
ers in cheaper prices than those offered in Amsterdam and Antwerp. The 
Germans obtained in this way a cheaper source of rough stones and the 
diamond manufacturers in the Low Countries could cut their labor costs 
and increase their profi ts.17 The advance of National Socialism in Ger-
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many provoked a Dutch and Belgian embargo on this reciprocal system, 
but to no avail. Since 1936 the German Reichsbank paid high export pre-
miums and subsidies to keep the difference between the German and Bel-
gian wage levels, and once it was realized in Belgium that Nazi rule was 
not temporary, the arrangement with the German factories was renewed. 
Intentionally supported by the Nazi regime, the production of stones in 
Germany became ever cheaper. The Belgian-German network included 
Jewish dealers as well, notwithstanding the fact that at the same time in 
New York, the Jewish anti-Nazi boycott movement called diamond deal-
ers in Europe and the US to cease trading with the Germans. Encouraged 
by the imperviousness of the diamond trade to the burgeoning interna-
tional confl ict, the Nazi regime stepped up the local industry’s produc-
tion of diamonds for industrial-military use. No wonder that in 1938 the 
Belgians expressed the fear that British appeasement policy towards Ger-
many might lose the Belgian Congo—coveted for its diamond-mining 
sources—to the Germans.18
Germany’s growing diamond power was justly feared because it cou-
pled its amassing of rough diamonds for industrial use with the introduc-
tion of Taylor-inspired effi ciency work methods. By cutting down wages 
and prices, the fl ourishing of the diamond-cutting centers in Germany in 
the latter part of the 1930s caused unemployment among diamond work-
ers in the Low Countries, and despite replenishment by Jewish migration 
from Germany to Belgium it signifi cantly brought down the number of 
active diamond workers in Antwerp. The weakening of Belgium’s hege-
mony was a crucial background for the concerted search in the world dia-
mond industry in 1939–1940 for alternatives.19
Figure 1.1 Employed in the diamond industry in early 1939
Included are diamond cutters, polish-
ers, administrative staff in the factories, 
and diamond dealers. Diamond miners 
in South Africa were excluded. In 
Palestine the number of employed 
would rise in a few months to 180. In 
autumn 1939 it was estimated that only 
14,000–15,000 of the 25,000 workers in 
Belgium were working.
Sources: Avraham Friedman, “The Dia-
mond Industry in Palestine’s Econ-
omy,” Hameshek Hashitufi  (23 February 
1947); “On the Crisis in the Industry,” 
Niv Poaeli Hayahalomim (January 1947): 
6; Laureys, Meesters, 131–32.
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The shift was further affected by the instability experienced by the Jews 
of Belgium and the increase in anti-Semitic sentiment in Europe. Though 
the majority of the 90,000 Belgian Jews in the late 1930s (about 65,000 of 
whom lived in Antwerp) were not Belgian citizens, their social and eco-
nomic status refl ected a relatively successful integration into Belgian so-
ciety. This was demonstrated by the role of the Jews in diamond cutting 
and trading—in early 1939 constituting 350 of the 400 diamond brokers, 
6,000 diamond manufacturers and some 80 percent of the 25,000 diamond 
workers. While destabilization of Jewish life did not immediately propel 
cessation of trading relations with dealers and workshops in Germany or 
large-scale fl ight of Jews from the country, after anti-Jewish riots in Au-
gust 1939 and the outbreak of the war Jews began to move, mainly to 
Southern France and to London. Increasingly the diamond community in 
Antwerp became aware that diamond capital and skill might have to seek 
alternative locations.20
More crucial, however, was the concern of the British and De Beers over 
Nazi advances. De Beers’s sales, which had only recently recovered, plum-
meted again as a result of the German threat over the Belgian Congo, and 
in 1938 the cartel’s sales were a mere third of what they had been the pre-
vious year. De Beers’s decline, in turn, jeopardized British business inter-
ests in Africa and thus the De Beers-Britain connection became ever stron-
ger. De Beers’s work depended on Britain’s imperial hold over the Belgian 
Congo and its policy towards Germany, while Britain needed De Beers’s 
reserve of rough diamonds for industrial use and subsequently its assis-
tance in recruiting the diamond industry in the war against Hitler. Their 
interests thus intertwined, De Beers and the British government could not 
afford to have the Belgian industry crumble and its hegemony pass into 
the hands of Germany, and on the outbreak of the war they launched a 
worldwide search for an alternative to Antwerp’s diamond center. This 
was a crucial precondition for the part diamonds played in the Allied eco-
nomic warfare against Germany and, ultimately, for the emergence of the 
diamond industry in Palestine.21 
Local Initiatives
The changing political atmosphere in Europe and the search for a stand-
in for Antwerp’s diamond center revitalized the then stagnant attempts 
to create a local industry in Palestine. Recognizing the rare window of 
opportunity, the Department of Trade and Industry of the Jewish Agency 
(the formal representative of the Jewish community in Palestine vis-à-vis 
the British government) sought to encourage the migration of Belgian dia-
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mond manufacturers and cutters to Palestine. Emissaries from the Zion-
ist Organization in London tried to persuade Belgian diamond experts 
to transfer their business to the Middle East. The Histadrut (the General 
Federation of Jewish Labor) for its part set about gathering information 
on the wages of the Belgian diamond industry, assessing the feasibility 
of creating an industry in Palestine. Both undertakings were carried out 
clandestinely, for fear of raising the suspicion of the ADB, the Belgian 
Diamond Workers Union (which opposed another low-wage cutting cen-
ter) and provoking anti-Jewish reactions from Flemish Nazi supporters 
in Antwerp. At the same time, the Jabotinsky-led Revisionist Movement, 
often with stronger ties with the Zionist Organization in Belgium than the 
Histadrut, organized fi nancial assistance for would-be immigrants from 
Antwerp to Tel Aviv. Attempts were even made by the Jewish Agency to 
induce the immigration of expert polishers from Nazi Germany, a pros-
pect that could have well enraged the Belgians who bore the main burden 
of German competition in the cutting of small stones.22
However, only few immigrants followed these schemes and relocated 
their business to Palestine in 1934–1937. Among these were Romanian-born 
Zvi Rosenberg (1902–2005) and Asher Daskal (1908–1990), who opened 
the fi rst cutting workshops in Tel Aviv and in the plantation town of Petah 
Tikva in early 1937. Both learned the craft of diamond polishing in Ant-
werp in the 1920s and never quite relinquished their Belgian business and 
occupational sources. Another newcomer, the internationally renowned 
diamond expert Joseph Nadel (1914–2002), was born in Poland and ap-
prenticed to a diamond polisher in Antwerp. In 1934 he came to Palestine 
to join a kibbutz, and three years later established a small diamond atelier 
in Tel Aviv, where he became a model trainer of the polishing methods he 
had learned in Antwerp. The brothers Carol [Akiva] Pickel (1909–1996) 
and Arieh Pickel (1910–2003), were born in Hungary, and in 1927 moved 
to Antwerp to learn diamond cleaving. In 1936 Arieh Pickel opened a fac-
tory in Tel Aviv, whose chief craftsman, the Belgian diamond expert Aha-
ron Moritz (1887-1967), attracted many young apprentices. Carol Pickel, 
who remained in Antwerp to guarantee the provision of rough stones, fi -
nally joined the factory in 1939.23 Heinrich (Chaim) Goldmann (1882-1974) 
was born in Hungary, studied mining engineering in Germany and from 
1905 was trained in diamond cutting in Antwerp. In 1907 he joined Jean 
Fisher in proposing the Ottoman representative in Brussels to establish a 
diamond industry in Palestine, and after they were rejected Goldmann 
opened a diamond factory in Antwerp and later also in Vienna. He immi-
grated to Palestine in 1934 and three years later opened a diamond factory 
in Tel Aviv in which many of the fi rst workers of the industry in Palestine 
were apprenticed. Similarly, both Shmuel (Sam) Moed (1875-1952) and 
Moshe Offen (1900–1969) had had many years of experience in diamond 
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manufacturing in Antwerp, and the factories they established in Tel Aviv 
later turned into central training centers, entirely depended on the deliv-
ery of rough diamonds from Belgium.24
By 1939 the factories in Palestine, supporting scarcely sixty workers 
(0.03 percent of the 192,000 earners in the Yishuv), were still little more 
than an extension of the Antwerp mother-center and too dependent on 
Belgium for the supply of raw stones and commercial outlets to achieve 
any international standing. The history of the traditional cutting centers 
in Europe showed that the establishment of a viable diamond industry 
entirely depended on factors Palestine was still lacking: a steady supply of 
rough stones, entrepreneurial initiative, an expanding skilled labor force, 
a favorable customs environment, and a capacity for competition.25
The fi rst change originated in a joint pressure by the founders of the in-
dustry and the Jewish Agency on the British to reduce customs. The pres-
sure was based on an understanding between the diamond manufacturers 
and the Jewish Agency that none of the preconditions listed above could 
be achieved but through collaboration of public funding of the Zionist 
Movement with the privately owned factories. The latter would have to 
cooperate with the Jewish Agency for facilitating the immigration of dia-
mond experts and for backing fi nancially the apprentices, and with the 
Histadrut, which was needed for allocating young workers to training in 
workshops and for keeping the factories free of labor disputes. Like many 
industries in the Yishuv, so the understanding assumed, diamond cutting 
had to become a national-capitalist-oriented enterprise, marrying Jewish 
immigration, economic advance, and Zionist capital-labor partnership on 
the lines molded in the Yishuv since the mid-1920s.26
The fi rst to follow this model of partnership of public and private forces 
and a key factor in the anti-customs campaign was the Diamond Club 
(Mo’adon Hayahalom)—a private initiative supported by the Trade and 
Industry Department of the Jewish Agency. Established in Tel Aviv in No-
vember 1937, the club was run by Akiva Weiss (1868–1947), a clockmaker 
and trader in precious stones who was one of the founders of Tel Aviv 
early in the century. Not unlike the older Diamantclub van Antwerpen, 
which was a society of diamond traders, or the Diamant Raad (Diamond 
Council), which administered the entire diamond sector in Antwerp, or 
the New York Diamond Dealers’ Club (established in 1931), the club in Tel 
Aviv brought together diamond merchants and manufacturers to transact 
business, socialize, and determine the sector’s ethical code. “To become a 
member,” maintained the “Internal Regime of the Club,” “one must have 
a good repute [Shem Tov], negotiate in good faith and behave toward oth-
ers as comrades [Rei’m].” Only individuals engaged directly in dealing 
or manufacturing precious stones were eligible to join, and it was only 
they who were granted licenses by the British authorities to import rough 
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stones and export polished diamonds. The location of the club in Tel Aviv 
(with forty members in 1938) under the leadership of the distinguished 
Akiva Weiss made the city the fi rst diamond center in the country and the 
locus of the pressure on the British authorities.27
The Jewish Agency, recognizing the nascent diamond industry as a 
valuable national resource, took the club under its wing and, similar to 
the protection the Belgian government afforded the Jewish workers of An-
twerp’s lucrative diamond industry, provided it with both fi nancial and 
political support. This institutional backing made the club a sort of a Zi-
onist middle-class pressure group, marking the formidable custom taxes 
imposed by the British authorities on various species of unset diamonds 
as its main target.28
Intending to nurture the diamond industry, the British fi nally bowed to 
the pressure and in September 1938 drastically reduced the custom duties. 
The reduction was a turning point in the development of the diamond 
industry. Not only did it lower manufacturers’ expenses on the import 
of rough diamonds, thereby creating a fi nancial climate conducive to the 
industry’s growth, but it also served as a clear indication of the British 
intention to support the industry—adding to Belgian fears that Palestine 
was aiming at cutting diamonds at competitive prices. It demonstrated 
the British interest to counter the growth of the German cutting industry 
and to use the export of diamonds from Palestine as a source of income for 
the treasury of the Palestine government. Clearly the British involvement 
turned local diamond manufacturing more appealing to diamond deal-
ers from Europe, but mostly to entrepreneurs and investors in Palestine 
itself.29
Among those fascinated by the new prospects of diamond cutting in 
Palestine was Oved Ben-Ami (1905–1988), the chairman of the small ur-
banizing plantation of Netanya. An entrepreneur dealing in agriculture 
and land transactions, Ben-Ami had no background in diamonds. He was 
born in Palestine to an East European family and rose to power in local 
Zionist circles in the 1920s. Land deals and urban planning in the 1930s 
acquainted him well with British offi cials.30 From early on Ben-Ami was 
drawn to a liberal version of Zionism that espoused the establishment of 
a Jewish state in Palestine on private capital and individual initiative. He 
expressed his Zionist liberalism in numerous articles in the right-wing 
press in which he was active. It was in this period that his insistence on 
individualism and capital-based nation building was shaped. In his two 
functions as an activist in Bnei Binyamin (the young militants of the farm-
ers’ organization in the Yishuv), and in the Hebrew moderate–right-wing 
journal Doar Hayom, he traveled abroad extensively attempting to per-
suade Jews to invest capital in Palestine, in land purchase and in planting 
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citrus orchards to be farmed by local Jewish farmers. In 1929 he was one of 
the founders of Netanya, a plantation some 30 km north of Tel Aviv.31
Seeking to establish the plantation as a model for capital-based nation 
building, Ben-Ami envisioned Netanya as the spearhead of the Zionist 
urbanization of the coastal region on the principles of private initiative, 
close relations with the British authorities, the disengagement of the plan-
tation from neighboring Arab settlements, and the formation of Netanya 
as an economic and political nerve center for adjacent Jewish settlements. 
The purchase of the lands and the actual development of the town were 
to express entirely these tenets of the capitalist road to Zionist state build-
ing. In rejecting the Zionist-Socialist road espoused by the Zionist Labor 
movement and the interventionist policies of the Jewish Agency (which 
Labor’s leading party, Mapai, controlled) he accorded the town’s people 
to take its development as a private investment and individual risk. Little 
help was asked from the Zionist national institutions, public investment 
was rejected, and independent initiative was cherished. At the same time, 
however, Ben-Ami’s conception was Zionist and national, and the insti-
tutional backing of the national institutions was welcomed as long they 
refrained from intervention. Moreover, close cooperation between the 
town’s leaders and the British authorities struck root, associating the gov-
ernment with capital, local politics, and land transfers. Signifi cantly these 
principles would be subsequently reproduced in Ben-Ami’s taking over of 
the development of the diamond industry.32
Though not a diamantaire himself, Ben-Ami was well aware of the fi -
nancial possibilities of such an industry (especially now, with the lifting of 
import customs), of Jews’ historical association with the diamond trade, 
and of the deteriorating conditions of the Jews in the Low Countries.33 
A local diamond industry seemed a natural choice for his Zionist vision 
to urbanize and industrialize his plantation town and for personal gain. 
Focusing less on diamond merchants and trade and more on actual dia-
mond manufacturing, Ben-Ami’s fi rst step was to attract manufacturers 
from Petah Tikva and Tel Aviv to Netanya. In 1939 he established a mu-
nicipal fund that guaranteed manufacturers free land and factory space 
in return for their commitment to build their factories in Netanya and 
become the town’s citizens. Providing the main entrepreneurial drive, 
Ben-Ami’s early involvement in the diamond industry therefore charac-
terized the strengthening in Palestine of agents of economic change whose 
capitalist orientation was immersed in their liberal nationalism, the vi-
sion of Zionist Jewish industrialization, and the claim for entrepreneurial 
independence.34
The signifi cance of Ben-Ami’s scheme was in planning an alternative 
to the concentration of the diamond factories in Tel Aviv and Petah Tikva, 
and in attracting entrepreneurs who had no previous background in the 
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diamond industry.35 Moreover, it created (soon with the help of the Pales-
tine government) an alternative path to the efforts of the Jewish Agency 
and the Diamond Club in Tel Aviv to regulate from above the prospected 
movement of the diamond people from Antwerp to Palestine. Ben-Ami’s 
success hinged, however, on the ability to challenge Belgium’s supremacy 
in diamond cutting and on forcing a way into Antwerp’s traditional niche 
of small-stone polishing over which Antwerp competed with the Ger-
mans. Moreover, dealers in Belgium were still Palestine’s sole suppliers 
of rough stones, and to materialize the challenge, skill and supply were 
paramount. To overcome these obstacles, and secure for his center the 
necessary skilled labor force and raw material, Ben-Ami would need to 
connect himself with the De Beers diamond cartel and the decision mak-
ers in the Colonial Offi ce in London. What seemed like an impossible feat 
suddenly became feasible with the outbreak of World War II, when the 
British and the cartel’s search for a substitute for Antwerp’s diamond cen-
ter climaxed.
The Pressure of the War
During the fi rst months of the war the fear of German invasion of the 
Low Countries increased. In addition to disrupting the international dia-
mond trade, the onset of war gave rise to the fear that Germany might 
appropriate the Belgian industry and its reserves, a fear that decisively 
shaped British economic warfare strategies. As far as Britain was con-
cerned, all diamonds were now potentially industrial and therefore of 
strategic value. British colonies were expected to support the war effort by 
producing more and consuming less; the export of goods such as rough 
diamonds from London to the Low Countries was suspended by law; and 
maintaining good relations with De Beers, the supplier of diamonds to the 
Allies, became a crucial interest. Accordingly, the British Board of Trade 
established a Diamond Export Committee consisting of government of-
fi cials and De Beers representatives. Among the latter was Frederick Al-
bert Mathias (1891-1981), director of the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, who 
would become a key fi gure in shaping British policy regarding Palestine’s 
diamond industry.36
At fi rst blush, the war did not seem to do the budding industry in Pal-
estine any good. The situation of Belgian Jews became even more pre-
carious. The growing anxiety over a possible German invasion and the 
outburst of anti-Semitic attacks in December 1939 and January 1940 
caused many Jews, including the more wealthy diamond manufactur-
ers and dealers, to escape to Southern France. At the same time, Camille 
Huysmans (1871–1968), Antwerp’s Socialist mayor, and Romi Goldmuntz 
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(1882–1960), a senior Jewish diamond dealer and one of the leaders of the 
Jewish community, began directing Jews to England, believing this to be 
the best way of guaranteeing the recuperation of Antwerp’s diamond cen-
ter after the war. The idea was initially resisted by some who thought the 
danger was temporary and that a German invasion was unlikely. Others 
claimed diamond workforce and capital would be best guarded in neigh-
boring France, not across the channel, where an imminent German attack 
was expected. German military advances fi nally put an end to the dispute, 
prompting large-scale immigration of diamond manufacturers, dealers, 
and workers to England and Portugal—and from there to Cuba, New 
York, South Africa, and South America.37
Palestine was hardly a favored destination and its factories were se-
verely harmed by the disintegration of the Belgian-Jewish diamond com-
munity, its chief supplier. By January 1940 the supply routes of rough 
diamonds from Belgium to Palestine were cut off. In what seemed a 
deepening intervention of the Palestine government in the industry, the 
diamond manufacturers in Tel Aviv were forced to buy collectively their 
raw materials from the London-based DTC, to obtain special authoriza-
tion from the government to export the fi nished diamonds, and to direct 
the exports exclusively to the US in order to secure income in American 
dollars.38
The effect of the spread of the war was wider, however. The deterio-
ration of international relations before the outbreak of the war affected 
the industry more in terms of trade relations between states, and between 
states and the De Beers cartel, and less in terms of personal trust among 
diamond merchants. The negative responses to the spurt of the German 
cutting industry hardly harmed the vitality of the trade and the trustwor-
thy relations among the dealers on which this vitality fed. No embargo 
in New York (conducted at the time by a boycott committee), nor the 
distribution by British intelligence of “black lists” of those dealing dia-
monds with the Germans, could destabilize the delicate mechanics of this 
long-established trust network. After the outbreak of war, however, this 
all changed. The industry was beset by an atmosphere of animosity and 
suspicion, undermining the working relations between Jewish and Chris-
tian dealers, even amongst Jews themselves. It was in this context that 
the various forces that played key roles in initiating the manufacturing of 
diamonds in Palestine gradually perceived the latter as an alternative to 
Antwerp. The trust system on which the ethnic-economic complex of the 
diamond industry and trade had been built turned a chief factor in the 
choice of Palestine for the role it was going to fulfi ll.39
The effect on the British and De Beers was crucial. The increasing pa-
ralysis of diamond production in Belgium hit the diamond cartel, but it 
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also tightened the British-De Beers coalescence of interests. Good relations 
between England and Belgium (and later with the Belgian government-
in-exile in London) seemed essential now because of the dependence on 
diamonds mined in the Belgian Congo. Opting for Palestine as an alter-
native center was regarded by the diamond cartel as providing continu-
ity in diamond production necessary for guaranteeing the future return 
of the Low Countries to their prewar status as leaders of the industry. 
Realizing the increasing importance of diamonds for the war effort, the 
British government saw in Palestine a convenient lever to counter the Ger-
man effort to increase diamond production and to prevent diamonds from 
reaching them. Palestine could serve as a lucrative export industry to the 
US, a source of fi nancing for England’s colonies and warfare, and an ef-
fective stumbling block to the expansion of the German diamond indus-
try—drawing diamonds that might otherwise reach its factories.
The British needed American dollars to maintain their colonies and fi -
nance the war effort, and the cultivation of a diamond-exporting industry 
to the US seemed to fi t. The De Beers cartel, on the other hand, feared 
that decreasing demand of the Low Countries for rough stones due to the 
war would harm its sales. Belgian Congo, one of the chief sources of dia-
monds, could be in danger now. The reserves of rough diamonds mined in 
Sierra Leone were dwindling. Both the British government and De Beers 
urgently needed an alternative to the increasingly paralyzed diamond 
trade in Europe. For both entities, Palestine seemed an obvious choice: it 
was far from the European front, Jews for centuries have dominated dia-
mond cutting and trading, Zionism fervently opposed Nazi Germany, and 
Palestine’s exports were controlled by British rule and its recently issued 
White Paper.40
Against the joint search for alternative diamond production center, in 
winter 1940 all those involved in the small diamond industry in prewar 
Palestine focused their energy on persuading the British Government and 
De Beers that Palestine was indeed what they were looking for. The pres-
sure provoked some thorny issues, however. The fi rst concerned the sup-
ply of the rough stones. As Palestine received most of its raw material 
before the war directly from dealers in Belgium, how could the Diamond 
Syndicate would be convinced to consider Palestine and its few diamond 
workshops to be one of its new alternative targets? Moreover, as the fac-
tories in Palestine focused their production on small stones (or Sand), and 
as the syndicate persisted with its decision of mid-1938 to sell small stones 
only to those who worked also Melees (the slightly bigger stones)—how 
would the syndicate be convinced to adapt itself to Palestine’s new special-
ization? The second issue was graver. How the British government could 
be assured that the diamond industry in Palestine was secure enough so 
as to prevent diamonds from reaching the Germans through their Middle 
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Eastern connections (mainly in Syria and Egypt)? Moreover, would not 
the immigration of Jewish experts from Belgium, and the growth of a lo-
cal industry, threaten the future return of Belgium to full production in 
which the British were keen to secure? And fi nally, as the British wanted 
diamonds to be exported from Palestine to the US in exchange for dollars 
to be earned by the Sterling Bloc, how could they be convinced that the 
export would not be oriented elsewhere?41
That the challenge these problems posed split those involved with the 
diamond industry into two competing factions is essential for our under-
standing of the shaping of Palestine as an alternative production center. 
One faction, the Tishby-Weiss camp, comprised the Jewish Agency in Je-
rusalem, its Trade and Industry Department headed by Nachum Tishby, 
and leaders of the Diamond Club in Tel Aviv, among whom Akiva Weiss 
was the most prominent. The second faction consisted of Oved Ben-Ami, 
fellow bureaucrats in the Netanya town council and the owners of the 
newly established diamond factories in Netanya who were drawn by 
Ben-Ami to the town. The division between the two camps emerged al-
ready in 1939 when Ben-Ami and his entrepreneurs, who lacked previ-
ous experience in diamond manufacturing, entered the scene—much to 
the chagrin of the professionally restrictive Diamond Club. The growing 
paralysis of the industry in Belgium and the consequent window of op-
portunity for Palestine drove the two camps in the winter of 1940 to a 
head-on confrontation.42
Though differing in tactics, the two factions shared many common 
ideals. Both groups were dedicated to Zionist state building in Palestine. 
Both were keen to see Palestine’s diamond industry accelerate, absorb as 
many immigrants and experts, contribute to the fi nances of the Yishuv, 
and serve fi nancially the Zionist State-building enterprise. Indeed, neither 
faction intended for the new industry to remain a temporary alternative to 
Belgium. Also both camps upheld a liberal economic approach and at the 
same time both were dependent on the Jewish Agency to secure the im-
migration certifi cates for the Jewish experts and capital owners expected 
to arrive from Antwerp and Amsterdam.
The two factions differed, however, in concept and tactics. Advocating 
a national-liberal approach, the Tishby-Weiss camp envisioned Palestine’s 
diamond center as a private industry, run by expert dealers and diamond 
manufacturers. Its factories would be spread throughout the country, op-
erating under the auspices of the Zionist institutions and backed by banks 
connected to the Zionist Movement. Most importantly, the Diamond Club 
would serve as its sole organizing body—working in conjunction with 
the Palestine Manufacturers’ Association (PMA), the long-established um-
brella organization of manufacturers in the Yishuv under the leadership 
of industrialist Arieh Shenkar—of the diamond manufacturers and mer-
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chants, though without restricting their freedom of action. In many ways 
these conceptions were reminiscent of what was known in Zionist liberal-
ism as the national-liberal approach.43
Ben-Ami’s group maintained a far more radical approach. It presented 
a decentralized concept of a private industry based mainly in Netanya 
(Ben-Ami’s small urbanizing fi ef), and involving both experienced dia-
mond experts and capitalists with more background in agriculture and 
construction than in diamonds. Accordingly, the group contended, the in-
dustry should be based on a monopolistic organization, closely inspected 
by the government and not the Jewish Agency or any other Zionist insti-
tution, and totally free of the intervention of either the Jewish Agency or 
PMA. The British were promised in this scheme more presence and power 
over the industry than Jewish national institutions. Moreover, in defi ance 
of national-bureaucratic incursions from the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem 
and from the Diamond Club or PMA in Tel Aviv, control of the diamond 
manufacturing and trade would be secured by a strong hierarchical or-
ganization under Ben-Ami’s management. The two factions represented, 
therefore, within the Zionist Movement different concepts of the organiza-
tion of the industry, its control structure, and internal hierarchy. The dif-
ference testifi ed also to the extent to which the involvement of the colonial 
state could impact contestations within the local elite.44
The campaign of the two groups in winter 1940 to secure the recogni-
tion of the Palestine diamond industry by De Beers and the British dem-
onstrated the intersection of colonial politics, ethnic networks and mili-
tary considerations. Knowing that Palestine was a serious candidate for 
replacing Antwerp’s diamond center, each faction did everything in its 
power to convince offi cials of the British-De Beers coalition to establish 
a full-fl edged industry in Palestine—according to its vision and strategy. 
The Diamond Club in Tel Aviv (the Tishby-Weiss camp) organized the 
diamond manufacturers to present their case before Geoffrey Walsh, the 
economic advisor of the Palestine government and John Fletcher of the 
Customs department.45 Nachum Tishby and Dr. Emil Schmorak of the De-
partment of Trade and Industry of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem lobbied 
at the offi ces of the Zionist Organization in Johannesburg, Antwerp, and 
London. Ethel Hayman, a Zionist activist in Johannesburg, was asked to 
approach Sir Ernst Oppenheimer, the chairman of De Beers, in order to 
secure his consent to provide Palestine with rough diamonds and small 
stones. Chaim Friedman of the Zionist Federation in Antwerp was sup-
posed to coordinate contacts with Jewish diamond circles and with the 
Belgian authorities regarding immigration permits, and Joseph Linton, a 
pivotal fi gure working under Selig Brodetsky at the London Offi ce of the 
Jewish Agency, was asked to contact the DTC and the Colonial Offi ce. 
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If the efforts of this camp, and the Diamond Club as its main voice, fo-
cused before the war on the Palestine government to reduce the customs 
on the import of rough diamonds, now the orientation was on wider po-
litical pressure and on mobilizing Jewish and Zionist networks. Further-
more, as a countermeasure against the Ben-Ami Netanya-based faction, 
in February 1940 Tishby and the Jewish Agency started to organize the 
Tel Aviv diamond experts and entrepreneurs as a section in the Agency’s 
Trade and Industry Department. The group believed that they had gained 
the upper hand, unaware of the detour Ben-Ami and the British Ministry 
of Economic Warfare prepared for them.46
The Ben-Ami group was indeed no less active. Despite the objections 
voiced by the Jewish Agency that he strongly criticized, Ben-Ami made 
separate contacts with Walsh, the government’s advisor, and with John 
Fletcher of Customs, in order to pull them to his own line of reasoning. 
Through them, and without the blessing of the Jewish Agency, he con-
tacted the Colonial Offi ce and Ministry for Economic Warfare. The experts 
Ben-Ami attracted to Netanya before the war acquainted him with dia-
mond experts and dealers in Antwerp who would soon help him to se-
lect diamond experts and manufacturing for settlement in Netanya. More 
crucially, the Antwerp people recommended him to contact George Prins 
(1889-1973) in London, one of the owners of the Hennig & Co. diamond 
brokerage company, and a long-time dealing associate with De Beers. As 
we shall soon see, Prins and the Hennig brokerage would play a crucial 
role in the evolution of the Palestine diamond industry.47
Naturally Ben-Ami’s independent moves were strongly objected to by 
the national faction who claimed that at a period of sensitive relations 
between the Zionist Movement and the British government all projects in 
the Yishuv ought to be coordinated by the Zionist institutions. The rivalry 
came to a head in March 1940 when Ben-Ami traveled for a month-long 
visit to London, Antwerp, and Amsterdam, disregarding the efforts made 
in parallel in Antwerp to bring diamond manufacturers to Palestine by 
Asher Daskal, who since 1936 was one of the leading diamond manu-
facturers in Palestine and now the emissary of the Tishby-Weiss national 
camp. Both groups sought now to make a diamond-cutting center in Pal-
estine viable, and both had to obtain the same assets Palestine lacked—
raw materials, capital, and expertise.48
On his way from London to Antwerp Ben-Ami thought that he would 
be met by many in the diamond industry and trade that would be craving 
to fl ee from Europe. Before his trip he asked the Netanya town council to 
fi le applications for the immigration for about 150 candidates of whom he 
has been informed by diamond and Zionist activists, and he expected now 
to fi nalize the arrangements. However, in Antwerp he heard “a wholly 
different song,” as he later told. Only a few were willing to leave Europe. 
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Most wished to move to Southern France for what they believed would be 
a close and temporary sojourn. Among them were many from Poland and 
Romania who had arrived in Belgium in the mid-1920s and early 1930s 
and hardly considered Palestine an option. They would have preferred 
New York, Cuba, or Brazil but were persuaded now by the Belgian gov-
ernment and Huysmans, the mayor of Antwerp, that France was safer. 
To Ben-Ami’s disappointment, only fi fteen diamond manufacturers and 
some experts were willing to commit themselves to emigrate.
The commitment the applicants signed was instructive. They testifi ed 
that they were capital owners and wished to immigrate to Palestine “to es-
tablish and develop the trade of diamond polishing.” In joining the project 
the immigrant committed himself not to go to any other place but to settle 
in Palestine within two months of receiving the immigration certifi cate 
from the government’s immigration department. More signifi cantly the 
newcomer pledged himself to a specifi c destination and occupation: “To 
settle in the town of Netanya and to use and invest my capital in construc-
tion of a factory and arranging the tools and all the machines necessary 
for cutting and polishing gem stones.” These selective and regimenting 
aspects climaxed in expression of loyalty to the project—“I take it upon 
myself to materialize the above project in three months from my arrival in 
Palestine in accordance with agreed plans of, and under the supervision 
of, the industry department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the 
head of Netanya’s town council.” To Ben-Ami’s dismay some of the mer-
chants in Antwerp maintained trading relations with German diamond 
dealers and factories. Now they would all have to be screened by the Brit-
ish intelligence, and once affi rmed to be trustworthy that they would not 
sell diamonds to the Germans, their immigration was authorized. The 
project therefore entailed close cooperation with the government.49
The most important thing Ben-Ami learned in Antwerp in winter 1940 
was not diamond cutting and polishing techniques he knew little about, 
or the secrets of the noncontractual culture of diamond dealing and trad-
ing he read about in popular sources, but how political everything was. 
Politics was at the heart of the industry because it determined the supply 
of the rough diamonds, and politics was needed because the key for ob-
taining rough diamonds for cutting was at the DTC, depicted by Ben-Ami 
as the “citadel in London.” It was here that the Ben-Ami victory over the 
Tishby-Weiss faction was secured.
The reason was not a drastic difference in argumentation. After all, both 
groups argued in British ears that Palestine did not mean to compete with 
Belgium but to harm Germany, which had developed a competitive dia-
mond industry before the war and aimed to capture the diamonds of Bel-
gium and the Netherlands. If the Germans were buying diamonds freely 
in South Africa, so the argument ran, why was not Palestine permitted 
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to buy diamonds directly from the DTC in London? Furthermore, both 
Tishby and Ben-Ami promised the British authorities that Palestine would 
export the polished diamonds chiefl y to the US, thus demonstrating the 
future fi nancial usefulness of the industry to the British. And fi nally, both 
camps promised that the industry in Palestine would be organized and 
operate under supervision, so that diamonds would not reach the enemy. 
What determined the British preference for Ben-Ami encapsulated a much 
more thoughtful logic.50
The Logic of Limited Expansion
The most infl uential fi gure on diamond issues on the British side, and prac-
tically the shaper of the colonial framework that made the development of 
the diamond industry in Palestine possible, was the economic advisor at 
the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, Frederick Albert Mathias. Born 
in 1891 in Australia, with a long history of working in subsidiary compa-
nies of De Beers and in British colonial service, Mathias was well experi-
enced in the diamond business. His position since 1934 as the government 
director of the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a De Beers subsidiary 
with deep British involvement, and his experience in diamond deals in 
his own company (Diamond Realisations), made him a fi tting participant 
in the steering committee established jointly by the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare and De Beers in early 1940.
Though the operation of diamond mining, as that in Sierra Leone, and 
the operation of the cutting and polishing of diamonds, as that planned for 
Palestine, entailed completely different tasks and organization, Mathias’s 
earlier experience in working through a local chief in the Kono District 
in Sierra Leone was quite consistent with the idea of working through 
the representation of a local entrepreneur such as Oved Ben-Ami of Ne-
tanya. If in Sierra Leone an on-hand supervisor was needed to prevent 
illicit mining, in the Middle East one was needed to prohibit uncontrolled 
trade. Ben-Ami was destined to play the position of an economic interme-
diary between the British colonial power, the experts that were destined 
to be brought over from Antwerp, and capital investors. Seen from this 
perspective of the way colonialism and business worked together, it was 
Mathias and the understandings he reached with Ben-Ami in March 1940 
that made him a sort of a private entrepreneur in the service of the colonial 
state, and the latter a formative instrument in the advance of Zionist capi-
talism. He was not simply a “comprador” working against the interest of 
his own community and country in the service of the business interests of 
a foreign entity, but a pivotal intermediary in a system that both harnessed 
political power and resources for capitalist and Zionist goals, and at the 
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same time mobilized for imperial and business interests that coalesced in 
the specifi c conditions of a war.51
The imminent danger of a German invasion of the Low Countries im-
pelled Mathias to devise a step-by-step plan for the establishment of an 
alternative to Antwerp’s diamond center. Following his meeting with 
Ben-Ami, Mathias prepared a proposal that he subsequently presented to 
the MEW. According to the proposal Palestine was ripe for a diamond in-
dustry. It had a skilled labor force, initial capital, and a host of experienced 
diamond traders organized under the Diamond Club. It was of utmost 
importance, however, that the industry not be developed too quickly, “be-
cause not all those involved there are certain to be ‘men of integrity’” and 
may smuggle their diamonds to Germany—a danger exacerbated by the 
industry’s proximity to Syria, whose diamond traders, closely connected 
to Lebanese dealers in Sierra Leone, were suspected of illicit trading.52
Second, Mathias reasoned, the establishment of diamond factories, the 
recruitment of cutters and polishers, and the obtaining of rough diamonds 
for polishing were economic issues, but also deeply political. It involved 
the cooperation of other diamond-producing countries (e.g., Belgium, the 
Netherlands, South Africa, and Germany), and it also necessitated, from a 
political standpoint, the safeguarding of the control of diamond market-
ing exercised by the De Beers. Accordingly, as unrestricted development 
might have harmful repercussions on the industry in other parts of the 
world, any development in Palestine should be limited.
The third point in Mathias’s proposal was that the diamond industry 
was inherently sensitive to fl uctuating world conditions, and the demand 
for diamonds greatly affected the number of workers employed in the in-
dustry. This was true in particular for Belgium, which, despite the varied 
types of stones polished, specialized also in a particular type of small stone 
(Sand). When world demand for all types of diamonds declined in the 
early 1930s, the marketing of Sand became, in Mathias’s words, the “life’s 
blood of the people engaged in the cutting industry in Belgium,” because 
“the principal element of cost in this particular class of diamond is not the 
cost of the raw material but the cost of manufacture.” Belgian Congo was 
the largest producer of Sand and therefore Belgian producers, supported 
by their government, could contract to sell to the DTC their entire produc-
tion on condition that the Belgian cutting industry would be kept fully 
supplied in its demand for this particular type of raw material. This also 
meant that the Belgian government and diamond producers sought good 
relations with the British because diamonds were economically crucial in 
British colonies and dominions, and the increase in the demand of Sand 
affected prices of other types of diamonds mined and polished in these 
colonies. Therefore, the value of good political relations, European and 
imperial, was closely associated with the economic aspects and trade rela-
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tions. Furthermore, Mathias argued, the US, being the largest purchaser of 
small stones, was interested in developing the diamond industry in Pal-
estine (partly pressured by American Jews) because its stones would be 
cheaper than the European ones. This meant that Palestine, developing 
a Jewish-centered industry that might have to be based on cheap Jewish 
labor, would become not only a competitor for Belgium but also a threat 
to the level of employment of Christian diamond workers in Europe. The 
fear was that the cutting industry in Palestine might grow to such an ex-
tent that its competition with Belgium may have the effect of antagonizing 
the Belgian government and thereby causing friction amongst the produc-
ers—the Belgian Congo being the large producer. According to Mathias 
this association between the problem of demand and the “Jewish ques-
tion” was another reason why “progress must be slow and patience exer-
cised by those in Palestine,” and why “people in Palestine must appreci-
ate that the policy adopted by those controlling distribution must not be 
infl uenced by creed.”53
Mathias’s logic thus integrated interests with war. The fear that dia-
monds would reach the enemy through Palestine was closely associated 
the fear that Palestine’s use of sweated labor (including cheap Arab labor) 
and paying lower wages would compete with the Belgians. If Palestine 
expanded beyond a limit not only would there be too many diamonds 
around to be picked by the enemy but Palestine competitiveness would 
also pose a serious menace to Belgium’s economic recuperation in the fu-
ture. Moreover, these developments would be anathema with wanting to 
keep good relations with Belgian Congo. This seemingly economic–inter-
national relations argument for the need for Palestine to be a “contained 
alternative” legitimized British preference for an entrepreneur who would 
be totally dependent on them and on the DTC, and would not dare to chal-
lenge these arguments. Working with Zionist national institutions would 
be a totally different matter altogether.
After detailing the reasons for the limited expansion of the industry, 
Mathias went on to enumerate his recommendations for the industry’s 
economic and organizational structure. Wholly unaware of the reality in 
Palestine, Mathias based his suggestions on his extensive experience in 
the diamond world in general and in SLST in particular. The precarious 
situation of the trust relations between dealers and the threat of diamonds 
falling into German hands warranted careful scrutiny of potential dealers 
and manufacturers in Palestine—particularly of those considered “most 
undesirable citizens” (men suspected of illicit trade, blacklisted by trad-
ing and insurance companies, or of otherwise questionable reputation). A 
fi rm believer in the bureaucracy and centralization he developed in Sierra 
Leone, Mathias was in favor of applying a similar control system to Pales-
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tine, where the local Palestine government under the high commissioner 
was already running a complex bureaucracy.54
Mathias therefore recommended that the Mandate government appoint 
a committee of government offi cials and industry representatives, “so as 
to leave no loophole whereby diamonds could pass from Palestine directly 
or indirectly to Germany”; a Jewish-only organization must be formed 
under Ben-Ami’s strict management, confederating all diamond manu-
facturers—both veterans and newcomers; diamonds should be imported 
only under government license, through a joint purchase (coordinated by 
the organization) and from a single source in London, namely, the DTC; 
representing the industry in London would be a trustworthy broker, a 
man of outstanding integrity and professionalism who would ensure the 
steady supply of raw material, putting the interests of the budding indus-
try before his own; and upon receiving the diamonds, the organization 
would issue them to its members, closely supervising their work methods. 
This monopolistic scheme would guarantee not only the complete control 
of the industry by the organization (a proxy for the Mandate government), 
but also the exclusion of diamond dealers from the import-export process, 
reducing the likelihood of illicit trade with German and Syrian dealers. 
Furthermore, in order to prevent Palestine from developing a cheap or 
sweated labor–based industry, Mathias recommended that all cutting and 
polishing should comply with the ILO Labor Code (issued in the early 
1930s), which asked employers to provide reasonable conditions for the 
diamond workers. This meant the fi xing of a minimum wage established 
by the government itself on the lines fi xed for the workers in Belgium (i.e., 
250 francs a week). It also meant, however, barring the possibility that 
Jewish manufacturers would employ cheap Arab labor.55
In order that the diamond-cutting industry in Palestine would not be-
come competition for Belgium, antagonize the Belgian Government, and 
thereby cause friction amongst the producers, the control system according 
to Mathias ought to carry the confi dence and support of all other produc-
ers and assure that Belgian diamond producers would continue to work 
with the producers in the British Empire. Practically this meant that the 
growth of the industry in Palestine during the war should be kept within 
limits. This should be done either by restricting the number of workers 
employed, by limiting the supply of raw material, by not allowing Pales-
tine to specialize exclusively in small stones, or simply by the government 
restricting the industry from purchasing rough diamonds from wherever 
it wished. The restriction of further migration of workers aimed to prevent 
the antagonism of the Belgian government and the people in the trade. 
Belgium, Mathias contended, in any case would not permit men of mili-
tary age to leave the country, irrespective of the question of competition. 
Thus there should be a limit placed on the number of workmen allowed 
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to migrate, and natural development should be fostered within Palestine. 
Finally, Mathias’s recommended that in view of the danger of illicit dia-
mond trade by Syrian traders, partly enabled by the proximity to Palestine, 
the Palestine government should, through its import and export system, 
prevent attempts to establish a market for the disposal of illicit diamonds. 
The elimination of the dealers and the introduction of a system whereby 
the cutters are directly provided with supply from their broker in London, 
should further assist in this.56
In the fi nal analysis diamond experts, who were fi nally recruited for 
the project with the Colonial Offi ce and the Palestine government taking 
care of the necessary certifi cates, were destined to form an organization 
of Jewish diamond producers, to be joined also by the existing Jewish 
manufacturers in Palestine and to adhere to Ben-Ami’s regime. In return 
for being granted this monopoly over all Palestine’s current and future 
diamond manufacturing, Ben-Ami reiterated his commitment to purchase 
raw material only from the DTC, to bow to any regulation by the British 
authorities, and to export all polished product to the US. Furthermore, 
the central principle on which Mathias and the British insisted and Ben-
Ami reluctantly accepted, was the limitation of expansion, namely, not to 
threaten Belgium’s postwar recuperation.57
In this way the scheme, fi nalized in spring 1940, not only created a 
temporary alternative to Belgium, but was incorporated into the Allies’ 
war against the Germans. Accordingly, in late April 1940 the High Com-
missioner of Palestine Sir Harold MacMichael (1882-1969), ordered that 
no imports of rough diamonds would be allowed into Palestine but from 
the Diamond Trading Company and through Hennig & Co. As a prospec-
tive buyer of diamonds, the achievement of Ben-Ami’s group was to have 
already in 1940 Hennig & Co. as brokers that obtained rough diamonds 
directly from the DTC. This should not be considered lightly. The DTC, 
established in 1934 as a sole selling agency for all diamonds mined by De 
Beers and its subsidiary companies, was selective in its choice of those 
privileged to buy diamonds directly from it. The brokerage company 
(founded in 1890 by Isadore Hennig) was since the establishment of the 
DTC in 1934 one of the most renowned sightholder companies in mediat-
ing between De Beers and its clients, and its association with Palestine 
and the Ben-Ami group expressed the importance of trust in diamond 
circles. But it also signaled the political goodwill of the Colonial Offi ce 
and Ministry for Economic Warfare, both of which were highly suspicious 
of unreliable brokers during these times of war. George Prins, one of the 
leading associates in the company, was instrumental in persuading Ernst 
Oppenheimer to supply Palestine with diamonds. In being promised by 
De Beers a continuous supply of diamonds, the undoing of Belgian long-
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standing resistance to the creation of competitive diamond-cutting centers 
was now complete. 58
The British decision to promote the industry in Palestine, not through 
the representative national institutions of the Yishuv but through the capi-
talist private sector, was much more dramatic than they had envisioned. 
For the Colonial Offi ce and the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London, 
and no less for the high commissioner of Palestine, it was a logical corol-
lary of the British experience with diamond mining in South Africa and 
Sierra Leone, and of what turned into an imperial tradition of the state 
associating itself with transnational fi rms, local chiefs, and entrepreneurs 
of sorts. Frederick Mathias, who gave the initial shape to the Palestine dia-
mond industry, embodied this transfer of the model. But the decision was 
also a product of the British eighteen-year-long experience with Palestine 
politics in which they habituated themselves to indirect involvement and 
manipulation of religious, political, and economic groups. Why trust the 
national institutions of the Yishuv when a small group of unoffi cial entre-
preneurs could deliver the best results without the cost (during the cur-
rent White Paper regime) of supporting a Zionist-oriented project? Why 
associate the British government with the Trade and Industry Department 
of the Jewish Agency and thus entangle a project driven by the necessities 
of the war with Palestine’s national politics and Arab opposition? More so, 
how would it be accepted as legitimate to support an all-Jewish industry 
while Jewish immigration to Palestine and land transfers in Palestine were 
barred? Answers to such questions were at the heart of the British move to 
entrust the diamond project in the hands of Oved Ben-Ami.59 
Ben-Ami’s advantage was that his intermediary position made it pos-
sible, much more than formal Zionist institutions, to secure real British 
control over the private industry. This control was necessary in order to 
prevent diamonds from reaching the enemy, to maintain controlled and 
gradual pace of development so Belgium’s future return would not be 
threatened, and in order to promise export to the US for dollars. Central-
izing imports and exports and the administrative presence of the British in 
the organization refl ected these goals. And this meant, of course, involve-
ment in the selection of members and control in daily activities. A deeper 
colonial intervention was marked therefore in the Yishuv’s national 
politics. The fact that the British gave Ben-Ami precedence meant that 
Yishuv national institutions would lack the power to control the indus-
try, the selection of its members, and its development. It also meant that 
the founders of the industry, the fi rst experts who established factories 
in Petah Tikva and Tel Aviv in 1936–1937, were robbed of their indepen-
dence and would have to seek inclusion in Ben-Ami’s organization. The 
fact that Ben-Ami represented entrepreneurs that had no prior experience 
in the diamond trade was crucial in this regard because it demonstrated 
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the British preference for controlled organization over expertise as such. 
In return Ben-Ami was expected to give the British presence and a sense of 
control, something that would not have been possible if the entrepreneurs 
were acting freely and independently and the national institutions were 
running things. The British, driven by the needs of the war and American 
dollars, set in this way a precedent—using Ben-Ami as an external force to 
the Yishuv without for a moment him shirking his Zionist orientations.60
The Tishby-Weiss faction was furious at Ben-Ami’s triumph. Seeing it 
as a direct affront to the Zionist Movement, members of the faction exerted 
pressure wherever they could to have the decision reversed: Joseph Lin-
ton approached the Colonial Offi ce in London, Zionist activists appealed 
to Ernst Oppenheimer in Johannesburg, and Jewish Agency offi cials peti-
tioned Geoffrey Walsh in Jerusalem. Attempts to infl uence Oppenheimer 
to endorse the Tishby-Weiss faction persisted even after the agreement 
between Ben-Ami and Mathias became known. The outraged Tishby tried 
to rally the diamond manufacturers already operating in Tel Aviv against 
what was described as Ben-Ami’s imperious and domineering scheme. 
All, however, was to no avail. The failure of these pressures refl ected the 
new British interventionist style of rule in Palestine. In accordance with 
the role assigned to Palestine in the larger Middle Eastern scheme of the 
war against the Germans, the advisors on economic warfare to the Colo-
nial Offi ce and the British functionaries in Jerusalem would not succumb 
to local political machinations that might endanger the larger scheme of 
fi nding a temporary alternative to Belgium. The government functionar-
ies in Jerusalem did not mind very much who was destined to materialize 
the scheme to fi nd a reliable temporary alternative to Antwerp, and in 
any case its opinion was less weighty now after few months of war. The 
fact that Ben-Ami won the day despite mounting efforts exerted by the 
Jewish Agency in England and South Africa demonstrated the extent of 
the intervention of the Colonial Offi ce in Zionist local politics. More sig-
nifi cantly, in distancing Zionist national institutions from involvement in 
the diamond industry, the British strengthened the capitalist camp in the 
Zionist state-building debate.61
In a wider perspective, the choice of Palestine as an alternative dia-
mond-cutting center to Antwerp demonstrated how the outbreak of the 
war intertwined with economic interests and European imperial politics, 
and how private capital and entrepreneurship were thought of by the Brit-
ish authorities as favorable agents. Evidently the latter refl ected British 
economic policy in Palestine since the early 1920s of favoring strong eco-
nomic sectors so as to reduce the fi nancial burden Palestine exerted on the 
British taxpayer. However, the designed creation of the diamond industry 
in Palestine on the eve of the German invasion of the Low Countries pin-
pointed to actual British intervention. It would now provide a facilitating 
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framework for the industry and it would be deeply involved in shaping 
its organization and its organizational culture.
The agreement between the Colonial Offi ce and the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Warfare on the British side and the entrepreneurs in Palestine that 
the industry would be open only for Jewish manufacturers and work-
ers was not a rare understanding in the British Empire. State and capital 
agreed here formally not only on maintaining an ethnic occupational tra-
dition but also on ethnic segregation and Arab exclusion, which impacted 
labor market tensions between Arabs and Jews. The diamond cutters were 
therefore to become Britain’s and De Beers’s “special natives,” similar to 
the tribal groups and chiefs chosen to mine diamonds in Sierra Leone by 
the British-backed Selection Trust company. The Jews were tasked with a 
particular role, and relying on them was based on the perception of their 
historical occupational niche and on the application of the ethnic trust sys-
tem in trade to production itself. In this way a complex coalescence of 
interest was created by Britain and Zionism, in which Palestine was serv-
ing the needs of the war by replacing paralyzed Belgium on the one hand, 
and Britain was serving the economic foundations of the Zionist polity in 
Palestine on the other. Much of what was happening in the workshops 
closely followed the vicissitudes in these relations.62
Furthermore, the coalescence of international and local interests that in 
spring 1940 began to transform the small number of workshops in Pales-
tine into a full-fl edged diamond cutting and polishing industry indicated 
a shift in the structure and dynamics of the industry. Up to the war most 
developments in the diamond industry and its world spatial location oc-
curred as a result of geological fi ndings, movements of fi nance, state-fi rms 
cooperation in investment, and migrations of know-how and skill. Now it 
was a designed creation, a state-sponsored planning to artifi cially reallocate 
an industry as a temporary wartime measure. This quality of the Palestine 
diamond industry determined British protection and continuous wartime 
involvement, an economic parenthood that would be undone only by later 
political events. From a long-term perspective it demonstrated the deep 
involvement of colonial powers since the 1870s in enabling the diamond 
industry to overcome the stumbling blocks like wars, regime change, and 
population movements that it occasionally encountered.63
The Palestine diamond industry was thus established at the nexus of 
three momentous enterprises: the British war effort, which it was to serve 
fi nancially, industrially, and as a controlling countermeasure against the 
German diamond industry; De Beers’s economic survival, for which it 
was a temporary alternative to the occupied Low Countries; and the Zion-
ist project, which saw it as a means of industrializing an agriculturally de-
pendent town, saving the persecuted Jews of the Low Countries and de-
veloping a local, private, and Jewish-only industry. Historically, therefore, 
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the laying of an infrastructure for a diamond industry in 1937–1940 repre-
sented the maturation, within the climate of world war and local national 
confl ict, of the cooperative efforts of the Mandate government and Jewish 
capital. While the former was guided by a novel interventionist approach, 
which would become extremely conducive to the Zionist economic build-
up, the latter was chartering new avenues of capital’s infl uence on Pales-
tine’s social reality. That the Colonial Offi ce and the Palestine government 
enabled that novelty would prove to be one of Mandate’s long-lasting leg-
acies. The next chapter shows how this presence would fi nd an expression 
also in the organization of the diamond manufacturers.64
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Illustration 1.1. Alamz diamond factory in Netanya, 1944.
Source: Government of Palestine, Palestine Trade Catalogue. Part IV. Jerusalem, 1944.
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Chapter 2
THE MAKING OF A MONOPOLY

The diamond industry is destined to become the most important branch 
of our industry, to feed tens of thousands, to tie us to wide world markets 
and bring the name of our country to distant corners. It is in our hands 
whether the future of this industry is for thriving and fl ourishing or for 
liquidation and loss. Worker, industrialist—guard this important branch. 
Know at all times that your fate and the fate of the industry is in your 
hands. Remember! It is not only for us that we toil and construct and 
build, we are the pioneers of moaning and suffering brothers. We build 
for ourselves and prepare for them a livelihood, those that starve and on 
whom hell fell, but whose redemption is near.
—David Rothblum, “Wish Them Godspeed!” Dapei Hamenahel
 (January 1944): 6–7
Effects of the Occupation
The political and economic historiography of Mandate Palestine has long 
recognized the presence and power of private capital, in the Jewish sector 
in particular. It was refl ected fi rst and foremost in the centrality of small 
businesses and larger privately owned manufacturing units in the eco-
nomic life of the country compared with the parts played by the British 
government sector and Jewish national Zionist institutions.1 Despite the 
relative political weakness of the Jewish middle classes during the Man-
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date, it found further social expression in the delimitation by private em-
ployers of the capacity of organized labor (the Histadrut) to achieve wide-
spread acceptance and coverage of collective bargaining. Culturally this 
power could be seen in as varied aspects as in the proximity of capital and 
industrial owners to British offi cial circles, in their respected status in the 
towns such as Tel Aviv and Netanya, and in the paternalistic atmosphere 
they created in their workplaces and offi ces.2 
The Mandate colonial state since the 1920s played a key role in these ex-
pressions of power: the support it provided Jewish private industry, and 
their perception of the Yishuv economy as a leading economic sector that 
could save on their imperial expenses and justify British colonial devel-
opmental approaches.3 However, the deep involvement of the Palestine 
government and the Colonial Offi ce in defi ning the public functions of the 
private diamond industry as a “war industry” reaffi rmed the change the 
British brought to Palestine in previous patterns of state intervention.
Indeed, since the outbreak of World War II, and in particular in the wake 
of the growing fear in Belgium of German invasion, an urgent sense arose 
that the project required institutional power and authority. The diamond 
industry in Palestine needed to be controlled so that no diamonds (rough, 
polished, or for industrial use) would reach the Germans. All production 
should be exported so that, apart from owners’ and manufacturers’ prof-
its, ample income of American dollars to the Palestine government and 
the Sterling Bloc would be assured. All rough diamonds destined to be cut 
and polished in Palestine ought to arrive from a single source, the DTC 
(the Diamond Syndicate), so that De Beers could dispose of its reserves 
and London could maintain its position as the nerve center of diamond 
trading and distribution. Effective control was also needed to safeguard 
the Jewish-only character of the industry, to make certain that Ben-Ami’s 
town Netanya would be the project’s capital, and not least to prevent the 
Jewish Agency from meddling in the affairs of the diamond manufactur-
ers and their economic aspirations. It was therefore a social engineering of 
capital and labor, a from-above project through which the Palestine gov-
ernment and Ben-Ami as their entrepreneurial emissary sought to struc-
ture the framework of all diamond activities in Palestine. In the eyes of 
the functionaries at Ministry of Economic Warfare, Palestine was not that 
different from the subcontractors in diamond mining in Sierra Leone. The 
status they accorded to the “special natives” who established the diamond 
industry under their supervision allowed a reproduction of the model. 
Moreover, the model fi tted well the system of concessions and monopolies 
that colonial Britain routinely used to govern across its empire and also 
the Middle East.4
The urgency to grant the nascent industry institutional power was fur-
ther aggravated by events in Europe. In May 1940, in the midst of the 
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preparations in London, Antwerp, and Netanya for the immigration of 
the diamond experts and for the fi rst shipments of rough diamonds, the 
Germans occupied Belgium and Holland. German military rule (under 
Alexander von Falkenhausen) paralyzed the economic functioning of 
Antwerp, drastically decreased the number of employed in the diamond 
industry, and the city’s communication with main markets for polished 
stones in the US and India was cut off. The activity of Belgian Jews in the 
diamond business was curtailed and would soon be mobilized for German 
interests. The meager supply of rough diamonds that arrived in Palestine 
from dealers in Belgium now totally ceased. Belgium was therefore placed 
outside the system of competition among the world’s diamond-cutting 
centers and the hegemony it acquired after World War I was abruptly cur-
tailed. This was one of the main reasons why new centers in Cuba, Costa 
Rica, England, British Guiana, and Palestine could thrive. Moreover, the 
occupation of Belgium also nipped in the bud the scheme to bring over 
to Palestine the manufacturers and experts, and the local initiators of the 
industry were forced to search for and select entrepreneurs and investors 
in Palestine itself.5
The sense of pressure had another effect. During negotiations in early 
1940 in London Ben-Ami suggested to Mathias that Palestine should spe-
cialize in the cutting of small stones, just as Belgium and Germany did 
before the war. Mathias and Ernst Oppenheimer opposed the idea. Pales-
tine’s specialization, they argued, would harm the young diamond indus-
try because it could not guarantee full employment during fl uctuations 
in demand for diamonds and periodic downturns in supplies and sales. 
Moreover, if Palestine specialized in small stones, Belgium’s recuperation 
after the war might be endangered. The argument was far from resolved 
at the time despite De Beers’s consent on direct supply of rough diamonds 
and on the representation of Palestine at the DTC by Hennig & Co. Ben-
Ami’s quest for small-stone specialization was accepted only because of 
the pressing need created by the German occupation to continue with 
diamond production outside Belgium. The Germans were getting hold of 
diamonds after all and Belgium needed to be quickly replaced.6
Another effect of the occupation was on the spatial structure of the 
industry. In the early summer of 1940 it was still assumed that because 
Britain controlled the South African sources of rough diamonds, and the 
syndicate managed their distribution, London would become the world 
center of the industry. The assumption was strengthened by the arrival in 
London of Dutch and Belgian refugees, among them diamond manufac-
turers, dealers, and skilled diamond workers, who would contribute to 
the small cutting industry in England but expected to return to Belgium 
after the war. The German occupation thus aggravated the British di-
lemma of how to encourage the new industry in Palestine and at the same 
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time adhere to Mathias’s principle of a “temporary alternative,” which 
purported to secure Belgium’s recovery after the war. It was imperative 
now, both the British and the Palestine entrepreneurs felt, to hurry up with 
the establishment of the diamond industry in Netanya and place it under 
much stricter control than diamond cutting in England itself. The occupa-
tion of Belgium turned therefore a catalyst not just for Palestine’s quick 
replacement of Antwerp but also for its molding as a controlled venture 
so that diamonds would not reach the Germans and the expansion of the 
industry in Palestine would be limited.7
The establishment of the Palestine Diamond Manufacturers’ Associa-
tion (hereafter PDMA) began in Netanya on the morrow of the German 
occupation of Belgium and the Netherlands.8 The drawing of its regula-
tions followed suit and in late July 1940, with six diamond-cutting facto-
ries in operation, the government gave the association its authorization 
in accordance with the Ottoman Law of Societies.9 The process was con-
ducted by Ben-Ami, who placed himself as the PDMA’s president, and 
Chaim Friedman, the former Antwerpian diamond merchant and Zionist 
activist who became the PDMA’s administrative secretary. Advised by di-
amond experts such as Zvi Rosenberg and Asher Daskal, and by PDMA’s 
“Responsible Directors,” the two drew a draft of the organization’s regu-
lations that required government affi rmation.10
In summer 1940 they began the screening of the candidates who as 
PDMA members would be allowed to receive rough diamonds, operate 
factories, and export the polished stones. The process was closely watched 
over by John L. Fetcher, the assistant director of the Customs Department 
in Haifa, and Geoffrey Walsh, the economic advisor to the high commis-
sioner in Jerusalem who reported to the Colonial Offi ce in London on 
every move. Practically, the shaping of the PDMA took place in the dis-
cussions in the government-nominated Control Committee of Rough and 
Polished Diamonds in Palestine, of which Fletcher, Ben-Ami, and Fried-
man were members. The committee took care to obtain the initial permits 
to import the raw material from the DTC and export the products abroad. 
However, it also assisted the PDMA in determining, as written into its 
regulations, how to protect the interests of the manufacturers, how to op-
erate the industry, and how to make it certain that in no circumstances 
would imported rough diamonds be disposed of in an improper man-
ner. In this way government control over the new industry, based as it 
was on the need to prevent diamonds from reaching German hands, was 
assured. Moreover, it determined the deep dependence of the industry 
on the colonial government, both in Palestine’s relations with De Beers 
and in its from-above management of the individual factories. In August 
1940 the fi rst shipment of small-sized rough stones arrived from Hennig & 
Co., the brokerage company in London. Shortly after, the British affi rmed 
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PDMA’s regulations and the formal joining of the members of the Associa-
tion began.11
Organizing Capital
The history of the diamond industry could have provided ample models of 
organization—from diamond exchanges, administrative and ethical coun-
cils, of manufacturers’ associations, clubs of merchants and dealers, and 
even craft unions. They could teach the organizers of the separation be-
tween the various phases along the diamond commodity chain and on the 
separate networks of producers’ associations and dealers’ organizations. 
However, because of the way the industry was initiated, its informal char-
acter as a “war industry,” and the direct engagement of the colonial state 
with private capital, this rich and varied legacy was hardly infl uential. The 
monopoly character of the De Beers cartel and the centralized structure of 
activity in the diamond mines could have been sources of principles of 
hierarchy and dependence that could fi t well the from-above design of the 
Palestine industry. But these too were less relevant because of the focus-
ing of Palestine at this stage on cutting and polishing and not on trading. 
Moreover, while diamond industries in the Low Countries did not lack 
institutional restraints or politicians who promoted their national import, 
they were incomparably less centralized, received much less stately atten-
tion, and were, as the Jewish concentration in the diamond industries of 
Amsterdam and Antwerp demonstrated, much more pluralistic.12
The second tradition stemmed from the organizations of manufactur-
ers and employers that emerged in Palestine itself twenty years earlier, 
following the shift from Ottoman to British rule. These organizations were 
mostly focused on the citrus plantations and on the small commercial 
businesses in the urbanizing centers of the country. One type was a totally 
independent initiative, stretching from home industries to factory-based 
productions, from piecework contractors in various branches to profes-
sional services. Another was cooperative industries, practically within 
(and fi nancially supported by) the roof-structure of the General Federa-
tion of Labor. Still another type of organization was of a more protected 
kind, usually through protective tariffs introduced by the Palestine gov-
ernment since the 1920s.13
More infl uential perhaps were the few industrialists who pressed for 
larger unifying structures (reminiscent of the individualist and liberal ap-
proaches of citrus growers, merchants and small- scale manufacturers). In 
1921 the Palestine Manufacturers’ Association (PMA) began to represent 
manufacturers and industrialists, but it was a loose organization and could 
little inspire action in specifi c branches. Ben-Ami himself was active in 
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the 1920s in Bnei Binyamin—an association dealing with land acquisition 
and assistance to citrus growers—and his experience in the organization 
undoubtedly affected his later diamond project. More solid organizations 
(such as the electricity, oil, and potash concessions and, from another an-
gle, the Histadrut’s holding company) comprised only a small part of the 
industry. The points of contact among this plurality of organizations were 
largely based on the Zionist orientation of private capital and support it 
sought from Zionist national capital. Still, the organization of business in 
Palestine was quite frail and the power of capital was more explicitly ex-
pressed by individual industrialists and small family fi rms. The legacy of 
hierarchy and centralization among capital owners, manufacturers, and 
employers that came to characterize the diamond industry was there, but 
the extent of these infl uences was quite limited.14
The diamond industry introduced a novel type of organization: an as-
sociation of manufacturers and capital owners that operated as a private 
monopoly under close government inspection and control. Compared 
with existing employers’ associations in Palestine, the association became 
during the war the most powerful and regimented, and practically exem-
plifi ed a new phase in relations between state and capital. The novelty lay 
in the degree of state interventionism in the private sector of Palestine’s 
economy, and in the scale of protection and support of private capital, 
Jewish and Zionist in particular. Furthermore the negotiated state-capital 
organization of the business created a new atmosphere of mutuality and 
reciprocity. It was for this reason that the victory of the Ben-Ami faction 
over the Tishby-cum-Zionist institutions faction was crucial. Once the Pal-
estine government was defi ned as the source of power and legitimacy of 
the diamond manufacturers’ organization, the Zionist institutions that ran 
the Yishuv and their close ally the Palestine Manufacturers’ Association 
were kept distant. This refl ected the liberal tradition of institutional inde-
pendence that Ben-Ami and many capitalists in the Yishuv represented. It 
also served the British, who aspired for economic cooperation with Jewish 
capital without wanting to be seen as siding with the Yishuv and the Zion-
ist Movement during this period of the White Paper regime. That such a 
possibility was incarnated in the government’s special relations with Ben-
Ami enraged the Jewish Agency and would later serve to challenge the 
PDMA’s leadership.15
The PDMA was defi ned as a monopoly in six senses. First, it was de-
clared as the sole importer of rough diamonds to Palestine. All diamond 
merchants in Palestine and all manufacturers who chose not to join the 
PDMA were not allowed to import diamonds independently. Even PDMA 
members themselves could not. The members of the Diamond Club, on 
the other hand, who for years cultivated trading ties with Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Germany, were placed outside this controlled system. 
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Declared as the sole channel through which diamonds could be distrib-
uted, the PDMA was therefore made part of the system of British eco-
nomic warfare against the Germans.16
Second, joining the PDMA was open for Jewish applicants only. This 
discrimination leaned on the long-standing association of Jews with the 
diamond trade and on the centrality of Jews in the diamond industry in 
the Low Countries. The notion that an ethnic community would be the best 
guardian and effi cient agent of the diamond business mixed here with the 
Zionist contribution to the Allied war effort and the British support of the 
Yishuv industry. Moreover, an informal understanding between the Brit-
ish government, the Syndicate, Hennig & Co., and Ben-Ami determined 
this principle to be an essential prerequisite to the attainment of American 
dollars for the British war effort.17
Third, any manufacturers wishing to cut and polish diamonds in Pal-
estine would have from now on to be members of the PDMA. Otherwise 
they would not be able to obtain the authorization from the British author-
ities to import or operate the equipment needed to run a factory; neither 
would they be able to place with the PDMA orders of rough diamonds 
from London. British intelligence and the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
kept “black lists” of European and American diamond dealers suspected 
of trading with the Germans and were therefore involved in the PDMA’s 
screening of applicants for membership.18 Furthermore, factories would 
always be owned by PDMA members. Therefore, cutting and polishing 
at home was not permitted and the entire putting-out and domestic-labor 
system that developed in the Belgian countryside was transformed in Pal-
estine into factory-based production. The implication of this defi nition of 
a PDMA member would be clearly refl ected in employment relations, in 
organizational and workers control, and in relations among the workers 
themselves.19
Fourth, De Beers and the Diamond Syndicate were defi ned as the single 
authorized source of rough diamonds, and Hennig & Co. was fi xed as 
Palestine’s sole representative or “sightholder.” The PDMA was not al-
lowed to purchase rough diamonds in any other country and from other 
dealers, and non-PDMA dealers who kept trading relations with the Low 
Countries, South Africa, and South America were closely watched. The 
PDMA’s accounts of its imports and allocation of raw material to its mem-
bers were closely inspected by the government and the MEW, and the en-
tire correspondence (including transaction telegrams) between the PDMA 
and Hennig was either reported or screened by the British censor. The ar-
rangement that gave Hennig & Co. exclusive representational rights also 
assured Ben-Ami, as the PDMA’s president, 1 percent of all import orders. 
The moneys were transferred to what was defi ned as the President’s Fund 
and formally declared as needed for the president’s expenses. The ties be-
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tween Ben-Ami and George Prins, the leading manager at Hennig & Co., 
practically turned into the backbone of the system.20
The fi fth distinctive aspect of this control system was the orientation 
of all polished stones to export, and the barring of free marketing of the 
stones in Palestine itself. Clearly this combined the British interest in in-
creasing the income of American dollars to the Sterling Bloc countries, 
and, at the same time, attempted to decrease as much as possible the po-
tential of stones reaching the Germans. Thus, from the moment of the 
PDMA’s birth the British authorities were present in almost every move 
made by the new organization, and through the joint control committee 
(later developed into Diamond Control) this presence made the incipient 
industry a war-related one. More than anything else it came to express the 
new interventionist orientation of the colonial government in Palestine’s 
economy.21
Exporting the polished stones was to be based on a twofold system. The 
manufacturer (the factory owner and PDMA member) would make con-
tacts with authorized dealers, mostly in New York, and he would export 
an authorized amount of polished stones through the PDMA’s offi ces. In 
this way the manufacturer was also an exporter but he would not be able 
to digress from the exporting quotas determined by the PDMA, neither 
would he be able to export freely on the open market. In this way the 
British hoped polished diamonds would not reach the Germans, either 
through their agents in occupied European countries or through Middle-
Eastern dealers operating from Syria. Moreover, the system totally by-
passed the exporter-members of the Diamond Club in Tel Aviv and the 
national institutions of the Yishuv and further tightened the unity of func-
tions of import and export held by the PDMA.22
The fi nal aspect related to ownership. In Belgium the production unit 
was owned by a diamond entrepreneur, and it could either be his home, 
an atelier, or a factory. The rough diamonds were bought by dealers who 
handed them over to the entrepreneur for cutting and polishing. The latter 
would employ workers, usually on a piecework basis, and on comple-
tion of the polishing he would hand the product back to the dealer. In 
Palestine the functions of buying and owning the rough stones and of 
producing the stones were to be united and centralized in a factory. In 
compliance with the designed prevention of free trade and exporting, the 
factory owners were also supposed to be their own exporters. Practically 
a diamond manufacturer in Palestine was therefore an integral entity, im-
porter-cum-industrialist-cum-exporter, an integrity that was to serve as a 
source of power that in the last instance was expressed in the manufactur-
ers’ organization.23
In sum, therefore, even before the gathering of the manufacturer-mem-
bers, the PDMA’s monopoly created an infrastructure of a highly central-
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ized and hierarchical organization. In contrast to the organizations and 
clubs of the industry in the Low Countries, and the often familial charac-
ter of the diamond-cutting production unit in Belgium in particular, the 
organization of the manufacturers and the centralization of their activities 
in the factories were given preference over the independence of the manu-
facturer and the freedoms diamond manufacturers and traders enjoyed 
in the traditional cutting centers before the war. Ben-Ami, as the head of 
the hierarchy, was entrusted with enormous power. Hardly anyone be-
fore him in Palestine’s economy was turned by the colonial government 
into such a linchpin of an entire import, production, and export system. 
Likewise Netanya, still in transition from a plantation to town, was des-
tined to become the nerve center of the organization, surpass the older 
trading locations in Tel Aviv, and serve as an attraction point for further 
expansion of the industry (see appendix tables A.1 and A.2). The intended 
spatial concentration in Netanya seemed to promise control from above, 
similar to the intended focusing on a single entrepreneurial and municipal 
bureaucrat. On Ben-Ami (both creator of the organization and created by 
it) would depend the politics of supply of raw material from London, the 
production and labor relations policies of the manufacturers, and obvi-
ously the selection of the PDMA’s future members. Naturally this position 
would defi ne Ben-Ami’s allegiance to the British but also the clientele-like 
dependence of the selected members on him.24
This allegiance was crucial because it followed the severance of Pales-
tine from the intermediary dealers in the Low Countries and because the 
diamond merchants in Palestine itself were taken out of the trading chain. 
Forced by the British to accept De Beers’s exclusive supplying position, 
Ben-Ami and the PDMA turned into the sole clients of De Beers in the 
Middle East. In diversifying supply routes and organizational traditions 
in the diamond industry of the Low Countries, these instructions shaped 
the high degree of centralization of the manufacturers’ and employers’ or-
ganization and seriously limited the freedom of action of the manufactur-
ers within the industry. No less formative was the decision that all work 
was to be centralized in the framework of a factory. Home work and famil-
ial induction systems—among the hallmarks of the industry in Belgium 
before the war—were barred, and the free movement of expert cutters and 
inductors between the workshops was equally restricted.25
The myriad aspects of regimentation of the nascent industry and its 
mobilization for the war effort made the diamond manufacturers’ asso-
ciation extremely powerful. It was selective in accepting new member 
manufacturers, it controlled the wages paid, and it practically turned into 
an entrepreneurial community espousing a cultural mélange of profi t, na-
tionalism, and a sense of participation in the fi ght against Fascism. It was 
an organization of capitalists that succeeded to make the Mandate govern-
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ment an ally, and at the same time to present itself as serving Zionism and 
Empire. Zionist capital supplied the British with an alternative to Belgium, 
and the British supplied Jewish private capital with power and opportu-
nity. This reciprocity further impacted the social relations among the dia-
mond manufacturers and between them, the diamond cutters, and their 
representative organizations, and it demonstrated the extent to which the 
British became part of and deeply impacted Palestine’s social body.26
The formative role of states and governments in the world history of 
the diamond industry was in impacting and intervening in one of its main 
features, its relocation. The genesis of the center in Palestine in the wake 
of Fascism and war demonstrated how these intervention patterns of the 
state in the diamond industry have now been further activated. Moreover, 
it was not merely a change of the degree of intervention, but a blurring of 
the boundaries between sectors with state offi cials taking part in running 
the industry; diamond manufacturers, dealers, and experts participating 
in shaping national policies on usages of minerals and their military-in-
dustrial uses; and both cultivating mutual interests, trust, and coopera-
tion. It is this further phase of the state moving from a position of being 
a midwife of capitalism to actually cementing its foundational position in 
local society that the diamond industry in Palestine illuminates.27
Power and Contestation
On the PDMA’s establishment only a few diamond factories were in op-
eration. Home-work was already announced as forbidden and, in contrast 
to tradition in the Low Countries, all diamond cutting was forced from 
above to be concentrated in licensed factories. An entirely new group of 
factory owners had to be created from the immigrants from Belgium and 
the locals, and the drawing up of the PDMA’s regulations was therefore 
followed by the urgent task of recruiting the member-manufacturers, of 
assuring the workings of the monopoly by providing the new organiza-
tion with a social base. Furthermore, as many of those destined to arrive 
from Belgium were hampered by the German occupation, the capital own-
ers and investors had to be selected locally. In the next two years the PD-
MA’s social basis was created and by mid-1942 it consisted of thirty-three 
factories, many of which were owned by two and three owners.28 
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Table 2.1 Palestine diamond factories and their employees, 1936–1942
June 1936 Aug. 1937 Aug. 1938 Aug. 1939 Aug. 1940* Nov. 1941 May 1942
Factories 1 2 3 5 9 26 32
Employees 10 30 60 200 700 1820 2500 
* Since summer 1940 all diamond factories in Palestine had to be members of the PDMA.
Sources: CZA, S40/269/2; Jewish Agency, Census of Palestine Industry, Compiled by David 
Gurevich (Jerusalem, 1943), 210–19.
The recruitment of members was entirely controlled, and the activity 
of members in their individual workshops had to be closely watched. In 
practice it meant that member-manufacturers had to be authorized by the 
government, a process that was not only conducive to the centralization 
of the PDMA but effectively turned it into an informal department of the 
government, and which encouraged among the new members and factory 
owners the cultivation of a language that espoused the service of an em-
pire at war. The trust that the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Dia-
mond Syndicate developed in Oved Ben-Ami in the fi rst months of 1940 
was now to be extended to the candidate members, those whose capital 
and initiative were necessary to make the project viable, but whose integ-
rity and self-harnessing to the project’s cause were potentially suspicious. 
Therefore, while the granting of a monopoly drew the structural features 
of the PDMA’s centralization, the involvement in the selection of members 
and in the individual operation of the factories turned the British presence 
in the industry dynamic and thus overtly political.29
An examination of the PDMA’s members, the application letters of 
those accepted and of those rejected, and the association’s formal defi ni-
tions of qualifi ed membership reveals a complex picture.30 Some of the 
applicants had had some background in the diamond industry in Belgium 
and Holland and wanted to pursue their trade after immigrating to Pal-
estine. Among these were a few who immigrated to Palestine in the late 
1930s and opened workshops in Petah Tikva and Tel Aviv, and some dia-
mond dealers and polishers who were able to fl ee Antwerp between the 
outbreak of the war and the occupation of the Low Countries in May 1940. 
These two groups were characterized as having a substantial expertise in 
the diamond trade, but mostly in cutting and polishing. Some managed 
to bring with them equipment and tools, they might have had some dia-
monds in their pockets or a certain amount of capital, but they based their 
quest for membership mainly on their know-how. The latter consisted not 
only of actual expertise but also of their prestige as experienced diamond 
manufacturers in their countries of origin and their status as having famil-
ial and communal connections. Actual capital involved with social capital 
strengthened their application. The fact that they were in demand and 
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that the new organization sought to base itself on them, made their ac-
ceptance as members a relatively straightforward process. That is, unless 
they had had some problems regarding their reputation (connections with 
Germany or illicit dealings), as some clearly did.31
A second group of applicants were cutting and polishing workers who 
acquired the necessary skills either in the Low Countries or already in 
Palestine—either in the few workshops that operated before the establish-
ment of the PDMA or during its fi rst year of existence. They usually lacked 
the capital to start a venture on their own and thus gathered a number of 
experts, workers, and capital owners in order to fi ll in the membership 
application. In contrast to the fi rst group they were a sort of a transitory 
group, moving from being workers and employees into ownership, man-
agement, and employing others. This group was too in demand by the 
association, both for their proven skills and for their dependence on the 
centralized sources of supply of rough diamonds.
The third group consisted of applicants with no background in the dia-
mond industry and trade who therefore based their application on either 
having the necessary capital to open a workshop or the willingness to 
transfer their fi nancial operations from one branch to another. They could 
be veteran immigrants, Palestine-born, or recent immigrants, but what 
made them a distinct group was their economic perception of the oppor-
tunities opened by the fast-growing industry. Investing the capital they 
accrued in Palestine’s building, commercial, and agricultural sectors in 
a diamond venture would usually entail gathering experts and workers, 
buying or renting the necessary equipment, and proving their fi nancial 
viability. While the fi rst two groups could base legitimacy on expertise 
and experience, this group was potentially suspicious, in British eyes in 
particular, because they were perceived as not being previously part of the 
trust system so prevalent in the diamond world.32
Moreover, the “diamondless” background of the owners would have 
long-term effects. “The majority of the [diamond] industrial owners in 
Palestine,” wrote one expert “is made of groups of capital owners that 
only a part of their wealth and investments is invested in the diamond in-
dustry, and they were attracted during the boom of the war days in order 
to make easy profi ts. In general there are a few groups of owners in each 
enterprise there and most of them not only lack any knowledge of the 
profession but they are actively engaged in another work and participate 
only in management meetings or stock-holders assemblies.”33
Beyond the proven fi nancial viability and the capacity to employ capi-
tal and expertise, three signifi cant aspects gave these groups a homog-
enous character. The fi rst was that all applicants were Jews. This ethnic 
exclusion, a clear corollary of the project’s planning, was partly an un-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
The Making of a Monopoly   |   57
spoken assumption by the applications of the membership policy jointly 
designed by the British and the PDMA, and partly a self-selection process. 
The traditions of the diamond trade and the perception of the Palestine 
diamond industry as an exclusive ethnic agent made certain that a Jewish 
business-ethnic complex would be the rule. And as far as can be gauged 
from the sources, no Arabs applied until after the war ended, and the few 
who would were mostly merchants, not manufacturers.34
The second aspect was that in terms of class and status they perceived 
themselves as middle or low-middle class. All applicants, even those who 
might have been once members or fellow-travelers of the Zionist Labor 
movement, and even those who were once part of the urbanized lower 
classes in Mandate Palestine, appeared distinctively as belonging, eco-
nomically or politically, to what was known in Palestine during this pe-
riod as the Civic Circles. Thirdly, through  their fi nancial, skill, and net-
working capacities they formed, in the eyes of both the British and the 
association’s organizers, a group that did not harbor a risk. Credible, un-
scathed background and a reputation of reliability in either trade or work 
were often as important as the material requirements. This third aspect 
was the most diffi cult for the association to screen, and during the fi rst 
years of its existence it confronted a series of cases in which formal mem-
bership was questioned. Contesting an existing member was in part based 
on information supplied by the British authorities whose intelligence dis-
covered among merchants in Belgium or New York unknown facts about 
a member.35
Selection of members was mainly based on expertise, good name, and 
the proven resources of self-capital. “I have been interested for quite a 
while in the diamond industry,” wrote one applicant in affi rmation of 
these expectations. “I am in the profession of diamond polishing and as a 
capital owner I wish to open a workshop on the model of the workshops 
in Netanya and Tel Aviv. . . . As far as I know I have the fi nancial means 
needed for the profession. More so, I have under my hand experts in saw-
ing and polishing who have been working in the industry for two and 
more years (their names I would not detail here). I have the capacity to 
organize among my relatives and acquaintances workers who would not 
be affi liated with any organization or association of workers (so as to pre-
vent employment disputes). In the building I am about to construct at the 
center of Tel Aviv I could offer a part for a coffee-place or a club well fi tting 
to an important business of this type.”36
Clearly the selection process conformed to the principles and guide-
lines set up by British policies, in particular those that referred to limited 
expansion alongside a controlled and trusted membership. “The politi-
cal situation then prevailing had in a certain measure moved capitalists 
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to invest in new establishments,” wrote Oved Ben-Ami to the British in 
October 1942. 
It was natural in such circumstances that the Association should have been 
fl ooded with offers of investment in new or existing establishments. Rather 
than accept such offers indiscriminately, however, we preferred the safer and 
more circumspect attitude both as to the commercial and other “bona fi des” of 
the persons and fi rms making these offers, and, more important, as to the tech-
nical skill available at their disposal. We realized that we faced the danger of 
a mushroom growth of new establishments, with its inevitable concomitant of 
serious loss to existing factories and, worse still, of the defi nite injury that it was 
likely to cause to the good name that the young industry had won for itself; fur-
ther, the few trained experts and cutters at the disposal of the young industry 
were inclined to a tendency of greed which was beyond the capacity of a young 
industry to pay for. A policy of realistic caution enabled the Association to rise 
to the occasion, discharging the disagreeable task of putting severe checks on 
any hasty development and resisting the heavy pressure exercised on us for the 
opening of new establishments. With the complete accord of the Competent 
Authority (Diamonds) the principles were then laid down which have since 
governed the authorization of new establishments on the basis of a fi xed six-
monthly quota. On the strength of that quota sixteen new establishments were 
authorized in 1941, in addition to the seventeen already in existence, thus mak-
ing a total of thirty-three diamond cutting establishments in Palestine.37
Some of those accepted wished to develop their manufacture in Tel 
Aviv, perceived at the time as Palestine’s main business center. Ben-Ami 
was interested, however, in luring them to Netanya, and as he controlled 
the local land company and the town council he could promise them land 
and credit for investment. The image of security and permanency of land 
ownership balanced the reputed risks of the diamond business. Moreover, 
a share of the profi ts made in the industry by the Netanya-based manu-
facturers would be later invested in further land expansion and housing 
projects. This was the reason why capitalists without prior background in 
diamonds became part of the community that evolved around the PDMA, 
and why the number of the factories in Netanya increased during the war 
no less than those in the main commercial center of Tel Aviv.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
The Making of a Monopoly   |   59
Table 2.2. Distribution of diamond factories in Palestine, 1939–1944 
Dec. 1939 Nov. 1941 Oct. 1942 Nov. 1944
Petah Tikva 1
Netanya 2 12 14 13
Tel Aviv 3 14 16 16
Ramat Gan 2 2
Jerusalem 1 2
Total 5 26 33 33
Sources: Oved Ben-Ami, “The Diamond Cutting Industry in Palestine: A Report presented 
to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies,” October 1942, TNA: PRO 
CO 852/457/2; CZA, S40/269/2 and S8/315; Report, 11 October 1942, LA IV250–72–1-
335; NCA, G/66/379 and G/117/960; Government of Palestine, Palestine Trade Catalogue, 
Jerusalem, 1944.
In the context of the halt of Zionist expansion following the restrictions of 
the 1939 White Paper, and in the more specifi c context of Netanya’s trans-
formation into a full-fl edged urban center, this complex private capital 
investment in diamonds, land, and construction was crucial.38
The approved members39 entered a framework that aspired to a mea-
sure of collectivity. The letter of approval taught the new member-manu-
facturer the rules of the association, mode of operation, and the industry’s 
structure of authority. The manufacturers—as the correspondence with the 
factories demonstrated—committed themselves to minute bookkeeping, 
refraining from free sales of polished diamonds, and having the PDMA 
approve the destined purchasing dealers abroad.40
The president, Oved Ben-Ami, put himself at the top of the hierarchy 
and saw to it that he would be repeatedly reelected by the members. To-
gether with Chaim Friedman, the PDMA’s administrative secretary who 
functioned also as Ben-Ami’s personal assistant, he led what many consid-
ered a “dictatorship.” He conducted the annual meetings, was personally 
involved in selecting new members and corresponding with them, and 
all the functioning committees were accountable to him. Because of the 
hierarchical nature of the organization, the small number of members, and 
the narrow geographical distribution of the industry (mostly Netanya, Tel 
Aviv, and Jerusalem) the members were expected to take part in the work-
ing of the PDMA’s committees (in particular the executive and the labor 
committee) and in their decision-making processes. As the mayor of Ne-
tanya, Ben-Ami ran the association from his town offi ce. British customs 
and light-industry offi cials had often to come to Netanya to discuss the 
conditions in the industry and its prospects, thus extending the Manda-
tory seat of power in Jerusalem to the government-sponsored operations 
elsewhere. The bureaucratic structure Ben-Ami cultivated was based on a 
detailed and systematic archive (on which this book is partly based) and 
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on a minute system of personal members’ and employees’ cards. No won-
der he was often accused of turning Netanya into the main focus of the 
industry and neglecting the local interests of the workshops in Tel Aviv 
and Jerusalem.41
Perhaps more signifi cant were Ben-Ami’s privileges. In principle the 
PDMA fi nanced its activities partly by membership dues and partly by the 
costs paid by a manufacturer for ordering rough diamonds from London. 
From the start 1 percent of all the orders went to the President’s Fund. 
Formally the fund was meant to fi nance Ben-Ami’s pay and expenses. In 
practice only Ben-Ami had full control of the fund’s expenses, and it thus 
sustained him personally and blatantly expressed his perception of his 
role as founder. The British promise to Ben-Ami of the gain he would per-
sonally accrue from the industry was never formally recorded but their 
consent was never doubted. The centralized character of the PDMA was 
Ben-Ami’s creation, and was a corollary of the role he was entrusted with 
by the British and De Beers. The material gain that accompanied the pro-
cess turned in reality into a crucial lever of power and infl uence.42
The British soon realized that the economic and institutional power 
the monopoly was entrusted with could well challenge the policy of re-
strained development. One reason was contestation from within. The at-
traction of the new industry to investors who lacked prior experience in 
diamond-factory production intensifi ed the competition over experts, in-
ductors for apprentices, and skilled workers. A shortage of experts, caused 
by the German occupation of Belgium, endangered the investment of a 
capital owner who was totally distant from the know-how of the industry. 
Competition even spread to obtaining apprentices. From early on experts 
were offered higher pay and apprentices were promised assistance in sus-
taining fi nancially the apprenticeship period.43 The rush and competition 
inevitably threatened to destabilize the orderliness and image of the obe-
dient economic agents envisioned a few months earlier by the British and 
the founders of the industry. Some of the investors sought quick profi ts 
and were less interested in industrial infrastructure, in producing high-
quality polished diamonds, and in long-term Zionist industrialization. 
Others would not waive their independence (as expressed in this compe-
tition and attempting to sell diamonds locally) for the sake of British war 
efforts. Moreover, additional factories sprouted, in Tel Aviv in particular, 
and the formal registration of the member-manufacturers in the PDMA 
had to advance quickly and even be less selective. Increasing numbers 
of entrepreneurs wished to open workshops and become members of the 
PDMA to a much greater degree than allowed by the quantities of sup-
plies of rough stones from the syndicate in London and on which the en-
tire operation depended.44 The British, worried that local diamond mar-
keting would end in diamonds reaching the Germans, counted on their 
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arrangement with Ben-Ami but did not expect the confl icts over resources 
and space the diamond venture provoked. Ben-Ami, on whom the new 
member-manufacturers were so dependent, conceived the industry as a 
monopoly but took for granted their restraint. It was an enterprise under 
state auspices and strict hierarchy but impregnated with entrepreneurial 
energies and driven by motivations and quest for quick gain that could 
not be easily streamlined.45
However, the more serious contestation to developments in Palestine 
came from without. As we saw earlier, the plan to bring diamond experts 
from Antwerp to Netanya brought in spring 1940 meagre results, and 
many found their way during 1940–1941 to other cutting centers. The Lon-
don center in particular became ever more associated with developments 
in Palestine as rough stones from the DTC replaced the prewar Belgian 
dealers as the source of Palestine’s supplies. By the fi rst year following the 
German occupation, some fi fteen thousand Belgian refugees gathered in 
England, and in October 1940 a Belgian government-in-exile was estab-
lished in London. From spring 1941 the confi scation of diamonds in Ant-
werp and the exploitation of the cutters’ and polishers’ labor force intensi-
fi ed. In London itself refugee diamond cutters were mobilized for the war 
effort and they were joined by the silversmith and jewelry infrastructure 
of Birmingham and other British cities. For the exiled Belgians and their 
government the problem now was how to save their diamond industry 
and secure its recovery after the war. The information on Palestine’s ad-
vance spread very quickly and the other cutting centers seemed to prog-
ress too quickly—in Palestine with British support and in New York with 
the help of the Diamond Dealers’ Club.46
In this context two renowned diamond merchants from Antwerp, Romi 
Goldmuntz and Herman Schamisso, conceived of the COFDI idea.47 The 
two, who were also involved in winter 1940 in the plan to send diamond 
experts to Palestine, knew how to read the challenge posed by Palestine’s 
specialization in small stones and the growing American demand of stones 
cut and polished there. In responding to the emergence of the Palestine 
challenge and in order to secure the support of De Beers for a scheme to 
safeguard Belgian postwar interests, they established in October, with the 
help of Antwerp mayor Camille Huysmans and Camille Gutt, the fi nance 
minister of the Belgian government-in-exile, the Correspondent Offi ce of 
the Belgian Diamond Industry (COFDI). Using the enormous amount of 
diamonds the British seized during the 1940 sea blockade, and relying on 
the common interests of England and Belgium in future diamond produc-
tion and trade, the project installed diamonds at De Beers vaults to be 
guarded until the end of the war.48
Aiming to save the Antwerp diamond industry from total disaster, 
COFDI’s way of working was not only to reserve diamonds for polishing 
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but also to maintain contacts among the refugees in the various centers and 
help them materially and mentally so they would return to Belgium after 
the war. Diamond experts in Palestine and New York were expected to do 
so as well. COFDI became therefore a sort of a diaspora organization that 
lobbied persistently against enlarging rough-diamond supplies to these 
centers, and in the last resort entailed also a Belgian national stance.49 In 
a strange way both in Netanya and in London the same pattern emerged, 
of capital and state cooperating to advance a business from which both 
benefi ted. In London Goldmuntz represented capital and Huysmans the 
state; in Palestine, Ben-Ami and Walsh respectively. The two projects were 
linked together by the MEW (and the Royal Navy) pursuing smuggled, 
black-market, and confi scated diamonds that multiplied during the war 
conditions, and were partly sent by Germans from Portugal and Spain for 
sale on the American market.50
It was against the threat of confl ict among the member-manufacturers 
and the impact on the British of the pressure from London that the PDMA 
moved in 1941 to enhance control over the factories. The free movement 
of experts between the factories was further restricted, and the regulation 
of the recruitment policies of its members and the production of their fac-
tories was tightened. Evidently, the British authorities were not blind to 
the challenge Palestine began to pose to the “limited expansion” principle 
and to the logic behind COFDI’s response; and Fletcher and Walsh, who 
oversaw the industry on behalf of the government, took care to make Ben-
Ami and the PDMA aware of the limits they were on the verge of crossing. 
PDMA members would now be repeatedly reminded that they should 
conform to the rules laid down in summer 1940 and, no less signifi cant 
for the freedom of action, avoid the temptation to buy diamonds directly 
from dealers in South Africa or to market polished diamonds in Palestine 
and the Middle East. “In its infant stages,” Fletcher ordered the PDMA in 
June 1941, “the industry shall be strictly controlled, not only in respect of 
supplies of raw material, but also in the disposal of fi nished products.” 
Manufacturers were therefore “required to keep accurate records of all 
stages of manufacture,” and warned that “in the interests of the manufac-
turers themselves it is not desirable, so long as adequate demand exists in 
the U.S.A. for diamonds manufactured in Palestine which can be supplied 
by the manufacturers themselves, that any such diamonds should be dis-
posed of on the local market and this is accordingly prohibited.”51
Without the regimentation by the PDMA, steady supplies from the 
DTC—where COFDI focused its lobbying—was endangered and Pales-
tine was threatened with a “diamond famine.”52 Consequently in spring 
1941, while the screening of new members was still on its way, the PDMA 
decided to clarify the defi nition of its membership. At the heart of the re-
worked defi nition was the wish to prevent the industry from splintering 
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into small workshops, and therefore the ideal member was fi xed to have 
no less than fi fteen diamond-cutting machines. Signifi cantly for the corpo-
rate culture, Ben-Ami stated that the new rules aimed to encourage new 
factories, know personally the members and their work experience, and 
more signifi cantly assure high quality of production. While the regula-
tions allowed new members to join the PDMA and accept all the privileges 
without discrimination, they also fi xed a transition period of two months’ 
candidacy before becoming permanent members. The new regulations, 
well inspected by the government, also redefi ned the power relations in 
the PDMA and voting procedures. As the factories were partnerships (an 
average of three owners per factory in mid-1943) each factory was given 
the right for two votes in the PDMA’s assemblies. Moreover, in September 
1941 PDMA screening of new candidates stopped completely. The offi cial 
reason given was the need to fi nish the training of the apprentices already 
admitted. In reality the halt, which was to last until winter 1942, refl ected 
the signals Palestine had been receiving from Jerusalem and London that 
the industry was pushing its accepted limits of expansion.53
Looking back at their industrial and managerial experiences in Ant-
werp, the experts and manufacturers who took part in establishing the 
new diamond-cutting center in Palestine could outright sense a difference 
in the extent of government intervention and the power of the monopoly. 
Managerial hierarchy, organizational centralization, and disciplining of 
the individual member-manufacturers were becoming the hallmark of the 
monopoly of the PDMA and a divergence from the tradition to which they 
were loyal. If through the establishment of the industry the Colonial Of-
fi ce and the British government explicated a new phase of intervention in 
Palestine’s economy, in the PDMA’s monopoly, and in its underlying logic 
of limited expansion, their impact was wider. Under their auspices and in 
service of the needs of an empire in war sprouted a capitalist project that 
could use the colonial umbrella to control an economic niche and attain 
extensive organizational power. Palestine had hardly known before such 
a type of employers’ association or manufacturers’ conglomerate. It was 
not surprising perhaps that the locus of the project was in the Netanya 
area, a sort of local frontier that was itself in transition from plantation to 
town, where new forms of relations between state and capital could be 
experimented with.54
The corporate organization of capital served well the forces that asked 
to shape this protected industry in accordance with their interests. More-
over it catered to the aims of Ben-Ami, who asked to harness the diamonds 
to his goals of municipal development. Despite the scathing criticism by 
some members of the PDMA over centralization and over the constrain-
ing of their principled economic liberalism and their freedom of business 
action, it nevertheless served them well. It provided their ventures with 
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British protection and organizational backing. It tied them to steady sup-
plies of raw materials and external sources of demand for their produce. 
Moreover, it shaped for them an organizational and club-like cultural en-
vironment that transformed them, at least in self-image, from ordinary 
investors and manufacturers into a distinct group of nation-builders and 
respected businessmen. Above all the organizational power of the PDMA 
set novel international and local standards—internationally, in inventing 
a new business tradition; locally, in setting a precedent. In Ben-Ami’s per-
ception he was building not just a powerful association of manufacturers 
vis-à-vis the market and the authorities, but, as we shall see later, also 
against labor.55
As a regimented grouping of capital-owners and manufacturers, the 
PDMA also harbored a potential threat to Britain’s and De Beers’s concept 
of restrained development. Its monopoly enabled the PDMA to frame a 
manufacturing system that was authoritarian but also conducive to fo-
cused economic performance. Though the British began to enjoy the in-
come of dollars gained from Palestine’s gradually increasing export of 
polished diamonds to the US, they never imagined the profi tability rates 
and the personal gains that would soon be accrued by the PDMA’s mem-
bers, and so close to the birth of the industry. While deeply involved in 
the PDMA’s organization and culture of regulations and restrictions, the 
British suddenly realized that the organizational entity they gave birth to 
was turning into an uneasily tamed creature that used the British shield 
but also disliked its fetters. This challenge to Mathias’s original notion 
of limited expansion will be better understood by turning now from the 
diamond manufacturers to the labor process in the factories, and to the 
diamond-cutting experience itself.56
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Illustration 2.2. a diamond factory in Tel Aviv, 1945.
Source: Emil Schmorak, Palestine’s Industrial Future. Jerusalem, 1946.
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Chapter 3
DIAMOND WORK AND ZIONIST TIME 

In our country the kind of system called “conveyor system” is usual. Ev-
ery worker does only a small part of the work to begin with preparing 
the stone for cutting up till the cutting itself. Whereas the worker in Am-
sterdam and Antwerp completed the polishing from beginning to end, 
his Palestine colleague does only part of it and than hands the stone on 
to the next worker and so on, till the stone is fi nished. And since cutting a 
single-cut is rather uncomplicated thing and every worker does only part 
of it, it is clear that the necessary skill is easily acquired.
—David Rothblum, “Memorandum on the Prospects of the Diamond 
Industry in Palestine,” submitted to the Jewish Agency, 
21 September 1943, CZA, S40/269/2.
The Reign of the Small Stone
It would have been expected that the traditional organization of diamond 
production as it had evolved for centuries in Amsterdam and Antwerp 
would be maintained in its new locations in Netanya and Tel Aviv. After 
all, the know-how of the craft, the methods of cutting and polishing, and 
the manner of enumerating the workers stood on deeply rooted norms 
and expectations, some of which were institutionalized in the nineteenth 
century in Amsterdam and after the First World War in Antwerp. Further-
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more, the few diamond experts in Palestine who prior 1939 were already 
apprenticing the new workers carried with them from Belgium their cut-
ting and polishing tools, know-how, traditions of induction, and also their 
notions of hierarchy and authority. Perhaps this burden of tradition and 
strict occupational-cultural norms were partly the reason why the British, 
advised as they were by such experienced fi gures in the diamond busi-
ness as Ernst Oppenheimer, George Prins, Frederick Mathias, and Romi 
Goldmuntz, placed so much expectation on the “limited expansion” prin-
ciple and on the adherence to it by Palestine’s diamond manufacturers. 
Limiting the expansion of Palestine’s and other centers’ diamond indus-
tries was perceived by these interested fi gures as guaranteeing Belgian 
postwar recuperation and a Jewish central role in it, and the maintenance 
of institutional traditions could well serve this purpose. In reality, how-
ever, the transplantation of the diamond industry to Palestine was more 
complex. It turned into a negotiation between tradition and novelty in 
which some occupational and organizational forms of operation were re-
produced while others underwent an adaptation that was shaped by and 
catered to a variety of interests.1
The context in which this negotiation developed was the restructur-
ing of the map of the diamond commodity chain by the swift occupa-
tion of Antwerp and Amsterdam in spring 1940. Diamond mining could 
continue in countries yet untouched by the war, including in the Belgian 
Congo, which despite Belgium’s fall remained free and remained loyal to 
the Belgian government-in-exile in London. Diamond trading was, how-
ever, severely hit by the shutting down of the diamond exchanges in the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Business focused now on London and Johan-
nesburg and was kept alive primarily by the distributive mechanisms of 
the De Beers cartel, by the American Diamond Dealers’ Club and by the 
shops on 47th street in New York. The decrease in trading by individual 
dealers caused by the paralysis of the Low Countries was now replaced by 
the invigoration of the purchasing activity of industrial diamonds by the 
warring governments.2
No less signifi cant were illicit trade in diamonds and smuggling, which 
substituted formal business channels. The latter were evidently enhanced 
by the fervent search of the Axis countries to bypass the blockades im-
posed on them by the Allies, and by individual dealers who wished to 
profi t from the war and challenge the boycott campaigns against the Ger-
mans. The map of cutting and polishing centers was thus redrawn. The 
cutting centers in Antwerp and Amsterdam were paralyzed by the oc-
cupation. Those in Hanau and Idar-Oberstein lost the contacts they had 
had with those centers that Germany attacked. The Germans occasionally 
revived diamond-cutting activity by forcing Jewish diamond workers to 
continue working. This was mainly done in the occupied countries; but 
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also in transition camps (such as Vught in the Netherlands), and from 
1943, in the Star Camp in Bergen-Belsen in Lower Saxony, where skilled 
diamond craftsmen, mainly from the Netherlands, were forced to operate 
a diamond industry. Balancing the decline of the veteran polishing centers 
was the sprouting, in relatively short time, of the new centers in Palestine, 
England, Wales, Cuba, the US, South Africa, Brazil, and Puerto Rico.3
The spatial relocation and redistribution of the diamond-cutting cen-
ters evolved in different time spans, depending on the arrival of the refu-
gees, the attitude of the governments, and the capacity of private capital to 
sustain the purchase of the rough diamonds and the labor cost of the dia-
mond experts and workers. In the early years of the war Palestine seemed 
to have taken the lead as the fastest growing center (as demonstrated by 
the table below) because of the war-associated roles it was assigned to: 
to temporarily replace Antwerp, to keep the sales of De Beers going, to 
prevent the Germans from getting diamonds, to earn dollars for the war 
economies, and so on.
Figure 3.1 Palestine diamond employees, 1936–1943
Note: The total 3,759 in September 1943 consisted of 92 owners, 165 technical personnel, 154 
clerks, 2,806 male workers, and 354 female workers. The technical personnel consisted of 
experts and work managers or foremen who considered themselves independent employ-
ees and apart from the workers and clerks.
Sources: CZA, S40/269/2; Jewish Agency, Census of Palestine Industry, Compiled by David 
Gurevich (Jerusalem, 1943), 210–19.
The sense of urgency in Palestine was fed also by the failure to bring 
over as many diamond experts because of the swift conquest of Belgium, 
and by the fear that an insuffi cient number of diamond workers could 
be duly inducted to sustain an industrial center. The “politics of limited 
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expansion” the Belgians and COFDI were practicing in London further fu-
eled this sense of urgency, and they would keep up the tense atmosphere 
around Belgium’s “return” until late 1944. For the Palestine capitalist ven-
ture to succeed, the PDMA and the diamond manufacturers needed there-
fore not only steady supplies of raw material from the DTC, government 
backing in London and Jerusalem, and persistent demand for diamonds 
on the American market, but also time. The hurried selection of the new 
PDMA members, the consequent entry of investors lacking background 
in diamond production, and the prompt eruption of competition among 
the factories over experts refl ected a sense of anxiety (less recognizable 
in other centers) over the short time given to the industry to strike root. 
No wonder therefore that the British, who needed nothing but disobedi-
ent capital owners and investors in Palestine, were quick to convey to the 
president of the PDMA Ben-Ami that the number of factories was reach-
ing its limit, and that the expansion of the diamond industry in Palestine 
seemed already a challenging transgression.4
Time pressure affected, as we saw earlier, also the structure of the 
PDMA. The need to quickly establish a mechanism that would organize 
the industry, select its member-manufacturers, and negotiate the purchase 
of the rough diamonds in London, contributed to the PDMA’s hierarchical 
and centralized character. Ben-Ami’s authoritarian handling of the indus-
try, and the network he wove among the manufacturers that was to de-
pend on him, were partly a result of the pressure to act hurriedly in view 
of the German advance in Europe, COFDI’s pressures to limit Palestine’s 
advance, and even the attempts of the Department of Trade and Indus-
try at the Jewish Agency to expand its infl uence over the manufacturers. 
This was one of the reasons why for many months to come the diamond 
manufacturers, who felt loyal to their occupational traditions in Antwerp 
and to the traditional relations in the industry, would revere Ben-Ami for 
his leadership and the business opportunity he created for them, and at 
the same time criticize him for the highly centralized orientation and regi-
mentation the diamond organization was taking. The criticism was also 
the basis on which an internal opposition was gathering in the PDMA 
that would insistently call for a more liberal and pluralist employers’ as-
sociation along the prewar Belgian model. This negotiation between tra-
dition and adaptation, typical of the transplantation of the industry from 
Belgium, would focus, however, mainly on the labor process—the nature 
of work, the creation of the labor force, and, in the last instance, over em-
ployment relations.5
Any discussion of the labor process in Palestine’s diamond-cutting in-
dustry must start with what can be called the “reign of the small stone.” 
When the fi rst factories began cutting diamonds in Petah Tikva and Tel 
Aviv in 1936–1938, rough diamonds did not arrive from the Diamond 
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Syndicate in London but from secondary middlemen and dealers in An-
twerp. The latter kept close ties with the founders of the industry whom 
they knew from Belgium, and they were responsive to their demand for 
what they were accustomed to—a varied supply of all types of stones such 
as Sand, Melees, and Baguettes.6 The cutting and polishing of the small 
stones was Belgium’s specialty in the 1920s and 1930s, and the mix of 
rough stones that was sent to Palestine did not seem to the Belgians a seri-
ous threat to their hegemony. Maintaining good trading relations with the 
Belgian dealers was more important for the few Palestine manufacturers 
than competing with the mother-center and the source of their supplies. 
When the war broke out the supplies from the Belgian sources dramati-
cally decreased, and in winter 1940 the issue of the dried-up reserves of 
rough diamonds intersected with the turning of the syndicate in London 
into Palestine’s sole source of supplies. It was during these negotiations 
that Ben-Ami and the manufacturers who joined his project began calling 
for a change of stone.7
The idea that Palestine should specialize in cutting and polishing small 
stones (and not in all types of stones) seemed to fi t the notion of an alter-
native center to Antwerp that Mathias and Ben-Ami concocted in spring 
1940. The paralysis of Antwerp could place De Beers in the trouble of un-
sold reserves of small stones. The American market was craving not only 
for industrial diamonds but also for small stones, which were perceived 
as a good investment for times of war. More signifi cantly, in order to make 
a quick start (so the argument went) the Palestine industry should focus 
the induction of new workers on a narrower mix of stones, in particular 
on the small stones that required less expertise and training. The German 
success in competing with Belgium in the 1930s was, after all, based on a 
similar specialization.8
Mathias and Oppenheimer initially opposed the idea, contending that 
a new cutting center could not survive for long on a narrow selection of 
stones. They also suspected that Palestine’s specialization in small stones 
would compromise the principle of “limited expansion” and harm Bel-
gium’s future recovery. What seemed to convince them to agree to Pales-
tine’s request was fi rst that a variety of stones reaching Palestine would 
made it diffi cult to prevent some of them reaching the Germans (allegedly 
via Syria). Second, focusing on small stones allowed a smoother transition 
from Palestine’s dependency on individual Belgian middlemen, to direct 
maintenance by the DTC and therefore greater regulation and control ca-
pacity by De Beers. Finally, Palestine needed a quick start, quick training 
of as many workers as possible, and the relatively quickly inducted small-
stone specialization could well serve these purposes.9
The decision to focus on small stones that Ben-Ami and his leading 
manufacturers advanced was crucial. It was made before the establish-
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ment of the PDMA and the selection of its member-manufacturers and 
thus impinged on the few existing factories, and on the future character of 
the industry. Palestine was now placed in a specifi c slot in an international 
division of labor, a slot occupied before the war by Belgium and fought 
over in the late 1930s by the Belgians against the advancing cutting centers 
in Germany. As the production of small diamonds was chiefl y oriented 
to American consumers and to obtaining American dollars, the decision 
mixed the aims of British economic warfare with the economic needs of 
the government of Palestine and no less so with capitalist profi t. Further-
more, the small stone gave Palestine an advantage over other centers that 
developed early in the war and did not have the institutional capacity to 
enforce such specialization. As we shall see later this specialization was 
indeed to play a crucial role in the industry’s spurt and in Belgian appre-
hension of that spurt. At the same time, however, the small stone special-
ization determined Palestine’s dependence on the DTC. After all, it would 
have to live off De Beers’s reserves of small stones and the DTC channel 
was the only source of supply the British allowed Palestine to buy from. 
In turn this dependence harbored many risks. Any small-scale fl uctua-
tion in the supply of small stones (a routine phenomenon in the diamond 
trade) could hamper the smooth continuity of production in Palestine’s 
new diamond factories, and any decision by De Beers to withhold (for a 
variety of fi nancial pr political considerations) such supply could well de-
stabilize the relations in the factories. The diamond workers were mostly 
employed on a piecework basis and recurrent cessations of work due to 
this instability could fuel much anger. This is clarifi ed by examining the 
labor process.10
The implications of the decision on small-stone specialization and its 
imposition on the factories shaped the labor process. Modern diamond 
cutting consists of four basic stages: assorting, sawing, cutting (or “brut-
ing”) and polishing.11 The task of the fi rst phase is to sort between rough 
stones (the raw material) that can be sawn and those that cannot. “Unsaw-
able” stones (known as Kappes) would then undergo hand cleaving, cut-
ting, and polishing. In contrast, the “sawable” stones (Seigers) would need 
fi rst to be sawn and only then be cut and polished.
In the sawing phase that follows the assortment the stone is made a 
suitable shape. The rough stones are sawed into halves (or more work-
able pieces) by a sawing machine, usually with one worker-sawyer op-
erating ten to fi fteen sawing machines. The direction in which the stone 
is to be sawn is determined by the manager who takes into consideration 
the shape of the stone and the position of any fl aws that may be in it. He 
marks on the stone a guiding line that shows the place at which it is sawn 
and the direction in which it would be sawn. The stone is then passed to 
the sawyer. The sawyer fi xes the stone in cement, places the cement in a 
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sort of vice, and works through it with a power-driven saw in the direc-
tion marked out for him.
Then comes another phase in which the stones are cut into various 
forms suitable for polishing, and here one cutter is employed at one cut-
ting machine. The cutter (or “bruter”) places the stone on a high-speed 
lathe and cuts the stone with another diamond. The cutter literally grinds 
away the edges until the stone has a round or circular base. These pro-
cesses require great accuracy in the adjustment of the stone, steadiness 
of hand, and knowledge of the proper degree of pressure to be applied. 
An inexperienced hand might shiver a stone by applying undue pressure, 
and thus the main requirements are manual skill and knowledge of how 
to apply it.
In the fi nal phase the facets of the diamond are polished or faceted, 
literally making the surfaces fl at. Each facet is created by grinding the dia-
mond on a horizontal blade as it spins with diamond dust and oil. The 
phase consists of four subphases. First, the large facet at the top is ground 
until level and smooth. Then the major facets are created on the bottom 
(the pavilion, the lower half below the girdle, which is the middle of the 
stone). This is followed by the large facets on top (the crown, the top half 
above the girdle). Then the pavilion facets are refi ned into more facets, 
followed by the crown facets. The fi nal touch is often the tiny fl at facet at 
the point of the pavilion (the culet).12 These four subphases are applied in 
small stones, while in the slightly bigger ones another two are applied. A 
typical diamond worker in Amsterdam and Antwerp had to learn all the 
stones and all the phases, and even if he specialized as a sawyer, cutter, 
or polisher he would still need to learn all the four or six polishing sub-
phases. It was for these reasons that apprenticeship in the Low Countries 
was a lengthy process, often up to three years, with the apprentice usually 
bound—by various material and nonmaterial ties—to the factory where 
he was apprenticed or directly to the trainer.13
In 1937–1940 the fi rst diamond workshops in Petah Tikva and Tel 
Aviv taught their young apprentices the entire process. The experts—Zvi 
Rosenberg, Yosef Nadel, Sam Moed, Heinrich Goldmann, Moshe Offen, 
and Aharon Moritz—insisted on reproducing the traditions they them-
selves had acquired and taught in Antwerp. However, as we saw earlier, 
the outbreak of the war and the urgency felt by the British and in Palestine 
to quickly replace Antwerp and train new diamond workers in cutting of 
small stones determined that 70–80 percent of the stones supplied to Pal-
estine was Sand, about 20 percent the slightly bigger Melees, and the rest 
big stones such as Baguettes. In the small stones there are 70–80 stones in 1 
carat, while in the bigger ones 5–18 stones in 1 carat. Palestine’s concentra-
tion on the small stones meant therefore that the nascent industry needed 
and could absorb hundreds of workers. Moreover, the two main shapes 
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or cuts applied to the small diamonds were the single-cut and the full-cut. 
The single-cut (or eight-cut) shape (Acht-Kant in German or Metuman in 
Hebrew) has eighteen facets and it is often used for very small diamonds, 
Sand in particular. While the full-cuts (fi fty-eight facets) have more bril-
liance and liveliness than the single-cuts, the latter have fewer facets and 
therefore are easier and less expensive to cut. Clearly, the concentration in 
single-cuts allowed greater industrial productivity.14
Finally and more signifi cantly the logic that determined the concentra-
tion in the small stones and in single-cuts was refl ected also in the restruc-
turing the production process. The process was divided into a chain of 
specialized work stages (literally the “conveyor system,” in Hebrew Shitat 
Ha-Sharsheret), with each worker learning just one phase of the cutting, 
polishing, or even the subphases of polishing and the workers at each stage 
depending on the speed and quality of the workers in the former stage. 
A sort of an Adam Smith principle of the division of labor was adopted 
here, where instead of a factory based on working diamonds from start to 
fi nish and producing small amounts of fi nished diamonds, factories with 
workers allotted specialized tasks would produce many more diamonds. 
Thus compared to Antwerp, in Palestine four to six more workers were 
required to complete the polishing.15
This emphasis on the need for increased effi ciency, productivity, and 
minute exploitation of time, and therefore on separating actual work from 
its planning and supervision was reminiscent of the principles of scientifi c 
management popularized by Frederick Taylor on the eve of World War I. 
Here again the time factor was behind the change in tradition: the need to 
quickly establish a cutting center, to preempt Belgium’s return to competi-
tion, and to prove the capacity of the new industry in Palestine to sustain 
its advancement. Similar to other areas of Zionist activity in interwar Pal-
estine, also here the time factor became strongly associated with economic 
practice. Notions of increased effi ciency, productivity, and Taylorization 
greatly advanced in Palestine during the Second World War and diamond 
fi nishing was certainly one of its leading carriers.16
The specialization and intensifi cation of the labor process received the 
blessing of the British authorities and were effected from early on while 
the formation of the labor force had been still in progress. Geoffrey Walsh 
and John Fletcher learned fi rst hand the difference that the new diamond 
factories were creating from the traditional centers and their support of 
the process was demonstrated by the pride the authorities felt and made 
known of the country’s new industry and new employment opportuni-
ties. The British interest in the issue stemmed from the contribution of 
the specialization and fragmentation of the labor process to the quickened 
turning of the Palestine diamond industry into a viable (albeit limited) al-
ternative to Antwerp. No less signifi cant was the prospect of more Ameri-
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can dollars expected to be accrued from an intensely expanding industry. 
The British did not take part in the inner debates among the manufactur-
ers on the problems that the fragmentation gave rise to. Neither did the 
British deal with the effects of the process on the work loads and working 
conditions of the individual worker. But the fact that the colonial state 
supported the process was as signifi cant as its support of the industry’s 
exclusion of Arabs. In both cases the British demonstrated a formative in-
fl uence over the internal structure and relations in the industry.17
The implications of the conveyor system were obvious from the start. 
The increased number of workers that the division of production required 
brought about greater inspection. More crucially, the duration of train-
ing of the workers was drastically shortened from the three-year Antwerp 
model to three months. Small-stone specialization and chain production 
therefore needed an extensive system of induction, a great number of new 
apprentices, and adaptation of the manufacturers to the local model and 
to the contraction of the master-apprentice relations system.18
The shortening of the apprentice period dictated another change in tra-
dition and in the occupational culture of the industry. An apprentice in 
Belgium would start his or her training by getting intimate knowledge 
of the cutting machine as well as from cloven stones, but not from sawn 
stones. This required the apprentice to get to know the stone very deeply 
and what effects the cutting machine could have on it. In Palestine the 
start of training was only from the “sawable” stones, thus neglecting deep 
knowledge of the quality of the stone and the intricate impacts of the cut-
ting machine.19 The long apprenticeship in Belgium required extensive 
fi nancing of the apprentice and his upkeep, and it also prolonged the pe-
riod before he was able to start earning on his own. The system of bond-
age and obligation tied the apprentice and worker to the master and the 
factory and delayed his entry to the labor market. 
In Palestine the apprentice became an earning worker after three months 
and could in a relatively short span of time turn into an ordinary factory 
worker. Workers’ independence received therefore a new meaning. In Bel-
gium independence was expressed in know-how and skill, in home work, 
in the respect of the arduous training process, and in the quality of work 
that stemmed from the long apprenticeship. These seemed to ease or bal-
ance the bondage. In Palestine the worker fi rst achieved material inde-
pendence. He was freer from the dependency on the factory owner or the 
labor unions to maintain his upkeep during training and he could become 
an earner at a quicker pace.20
The chain or conveyor system of the labor process accentuated the sup-
planting of home work by the factory, did away with the integral char-
acter of the worker, and seriously impinged on the autonomy the dia-
mond workers enjoyed in their traditional set up in the Low Countries. 
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Taylorization could add to profi t and to quick expansion but it could also 
narrow the knowledge and multiple skills of the apprenticed worker. The 
body of the estranged worker became the extension of effi ciency, as wrote 
one diamond worker in 1943: “The specialization of the worker in one 
part of the diamond processing which acquires the worker dexterity and 
great speed in a narrow and limited part of the profession, and consider-
ing that this is piecework—reduced the worker to the level of a machine 
without him being able to acquire for himself full and wide knowledge of 
the profession.”21
Thus, an entire work culture was undergoing a transformation, weak-
ening the prewar linkages between old and new cutting centers. Notions 
of time, of the wholeness and totality of the skill, of the character of those 
initiated into the craft and of the traditional solidarities created by the old 
system—all these were changing now, blending technological change and 
effi ciency for the sake of profi t maximization with Zionist time consider-
ations. The “Zionization” of the labor process, the merging of capitalist 
effi ciency with quickened development and international competitive-
ness interested the Zionist economists who propounded the association 
between Herzl and Taylor, between national home for the Jews and ef-
fi ciency. It also attracted the attention of the diamond people in London, 
some of them Jewish Belgian exiles, who feared that Palestine’s conse-
quent specialization in small stones would not only surpass Belgium’s 
prewar supremacy but practically hamper its postwar recuperation. It was 
not therefore merely the German occupation of the Low Countries, their 
diamond industry being cut off from the Allied countries, and the fate of 
the Jewish diamond cutters that turned these worlds so distant in such 
a short time. It was also the diversifi cation in Palestine of the traditional 
production process and its adaptation to local needs and interests that 
temporarily destabilized the continuity.22 
Gain and Discipline
The composition of the stones and the labor process determined the need 
for a large number of employees and thus quickened the selection of the 
labor force. The latter could be derived entirely from the Yishuv popula-
tion as hardly any diamond workers were able to immigrate to Palestine 
after Germany occupied Antwerp. Young workers, male and female, who 
would be willing to be trained and to experience the intensive single-phase 
induction and the long hours of hard work that the expectation for high 
productivity dictated, were sought after. The young age of the apprentices 
(and consequently the high proportion of bachelors) was also infl uenced 
by the fact that the industry was new and that its novelty might have 
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deterred older workers in the Yishuv from risking moving to a new and 
unknown occupation and being treated as apprentices. This could also 
infl uence the majority of male workers. The fact that throughout the war 
about a quarter of all the workers was women indicated the extent of the 
industry’s attraction and also the search of the industry for workers to 
whom it could pay less. It could well be that the new diamond manufac-
turers searched for workers with no previous affi liation to organized labor, 
and the young would therefore be preferred in particular when about 70 
percent of the Jewish labor force in Palestine was part of the Histadrut.23 
Table 3.1 Employment in the Palestine diamond industry, late 1943
Workers Clerks Foremen Various All Employed
Total 3,110 160 130 200 3,600
Tel Aviv 1,701 90 80 120 1,991
Netanya 1,181 60 40 70 1,351
Jerusalem 228 10 10 10 258
Note: Analysis was based on 32 factories: 17 factories in Tel Aviv, 13 in Netanya, 1 in Ramat 
Gan (included here in Tel Aviv) and 1 in Jerusalem. Of the 3,110 workers only 304 were 
women. 
Source: D. Gurevich, Workers’ Wages in the Jewish Diamond-Polishing Industry in Palestine, 
1944 (Jerusalem, 1945), 6. 
In accordance with the ethnic character of the manufacturer member-
ship, all the selected apprentices were Jews. The principled exclusion of 
Arabs refl ected the joint British-PDMA consent on what they perceived 
as the need to create a trustworthy labor force, based on ethnic specifi ca-
tion and ethnic solidarity, respect for the longstanding Jewish association 
with the diamond industry, and loyalty to the Jewish manufacturers. To 
create a Jewish-only industry was to strengthen the economy of the Yi-
shuv and decrease unemployment among Jewish workers.24 The ethnic 
and age selection drew many to the new industry and in turn added more 
to its sheer attraction among Yishuv workers. A wave of Jewish workers, 
Ashkenazi and Sephardi alike, from the Histadrut’s youth organization 
to other labor organizations, fl ooded Histadrut-affi liated labor councils 
in Tel Aviv and Netanya in demand for a place in the new factories and 
training in diamond cutting. Many claimed they were willing to enter 
training in any condition, prepared to pay for the training and endure 
the hardships that the hasty apprenticeship entailed. The perceived profi t 
was an equally important cause of attraction. The expected earnings of 
the individual worker, the promise it entailed even to support the parents, 
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and the expectation for material independence quickly overshadowed the 
training hardships.25
Once the perception of the tempo of the industry’s development be-
came widespread, the supply of workers increased exponentially. Soon 
diamond cutting became Palestine’s fastest growing industry with ex-
ports of polished diamonds increasing from LP 700 in 1940 to LP 2,600,000 
in 1943. Other cutting centers, the industrial diasporas of the Belgian and 
Dutch diamond industries, could hardly match this growth. Moreover, 
hardly any industry in Palestine saw such dramatic increase in the size of 
its production units and average personnel.
Table 3.2 Employment in the Palestine diamond industry, 1940–1945
Factories Workers Other Employees Total Employed
1940 5 400 100 500
1941 May 12 1,000 200 1,200
1942 May 23 2,100 400 2,500
1943 September 33 3,341 418 3,759
1944 March 32 2,875 455 3,330
1945 May 33 3,650 399 4,043
Note: On the eve of the German occupation there were 23,000–25,000 diamond workers 
in Belgium, of whom 18,000 were members of the Algemene Diamantbewerkersbond van 
België (ADB).
Source: “The Diamond Industry,” The Israel Economist Annual 1949–1950 (Jerusalem, 1950): 
148.
Figure 3.2 Employment in the Palestine diamond industry, 1940–1945
Source: “The Diamond Industry,” The Israel Economist Annual 1949–1950 (Jerusalem, 1950): 
148.
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The employment arrangements in the factories were similarly associ-
ated with the consideration of control, time, and international division 
of labor. While home work in diamond cutting and the employment of 
domestic and familial labor were historically predominant, factory work 
became widespread in the Dutch and Belgian diamond scene already in 
the last third of the nineteenth century. Antwerp’s increasing hegemony in 
diamond production and Germany’s competitiveness were partly based 
on factory work, and in Palestine itself initial work was done in work-
shops that quickly developed into small electrical-driven manufacturing 
houses. At the same time, however, factory-focused cutting in Netanya 
and Tel Aviv was a built-in principle of the PDMA monopoly, and as a de-
signed policy should be seen as another aspect of the cooperation between 
the manufacturers and the British. Home work was largely perceived as 
uncontrollable and thus exposed to the main danger the British feared in 
transplanting the industry to Palestine, namely, that stones would reach 
the Germans. Furthermore, the concentration of work in factories allowed 
the Ben-Ami monopoly to function, enforce the chain system and pur-
chasing and exporting policies, reach generalized pay levels, and promise 
single-channel representation of the industry vis-à-vis the authorities and 
the diamond cartel in London.26
The concentration of workers in factories and the associated prohibition 
of home work increased the PDMA’s control of the manufacturers and en-
abled unifi ed labor policy and remuneration. This was further enabled by 
the concentration of almost the entire diamond cutting workforce in Tel 
Aviv and Netanya.
Table 3.3 Diamond workers in Palestine by town, November 1943*
Town Total %




* Excluding clerks and managers.
Sources: NCA, G/131/1117; Gurevich, Workers’ Wages, 6.
Second, factory concentration created a potential for workers’ solidarity 
and collective action, which domestic production discouraged. This was 
true in particular for the small factories, the majority, where 70–100 dia-
mond workers on average were employed, and where by 1943 some 2,000 
workers were employed in total each month. Third, it contributed to level-
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ing of pay structures among large groups of workers, to restraint of further 
individual gain, and thus to common sources of complaint, collective ac-
tion, and even militancy. The emergence of the large-sized establishment 
in the Palestine diamond industry in the early 1940s, the relatively high 
average number of employees per establishment (to other industries), and 
the fact that by 1942 one-third of the employees were concentrated in one-
third of the factories, demonstrated these unities and how conducive the 
atmosphere was for further control, which both Ben-Ami and the British 
desired. However, as we shall see later it was also favorable to the expan-
sion of the industry, which in the last instance would challenge exactly 
these regimentation principles.27
The system of factory employment was two tiered. On the individual 
level, piecework was the predominant form, as was the case in the Low 
Countries. A worker would enter his factory and fi rst encounter a clerk or 
work manager who handed him a small white envelope (Briefke, in Flem-
ish means “small piece of paper”, or “banknote” in Frisian). On the piece 
of paper would be written the name of the worker, the types of stones 
(sawable or unsawables), and their weight. After each phase of work the 
clerk evaluated the number of the stones in the envelope and their weight 
so as to calculate the loss, and then the envelopes were handed over to the 
work manager for further evaluation and registration. The worker would 
then work the stones and get paid in accordance with the amount of stones 
he fi nished, regardless of the time spent and the damage he might have 
caused the stone (or its loss). This was the tradition in diamond cutting in 
the Low Countries, and it was adapted in Palestine mainly because this 
was the best way work could be evaluated by the managers. Moreover, it 
safeguarded the factory from loss of stones or harmed ones, a typical (and 
costly) hazard that an inexperienced worker had to face.28
The second tier of the employment system was the collective agreement 
that was introduced in the factories by the PDMA already in autumn 1940. 
Its stipulations were largely conformed to by the member manufactur-
ers and owners. The agreement was quite unprecedented in the world of 
diamond cutting, and it contrasted with the Low Countries’ traditions by 
demonstrating again the adaptations the industry in Palestine was un-
dergoing. First collective contracts (known also as “work-constitutions”) 
emerged in the Yishuv in the 1920s. They expressed understandings be-
tween the Zionist institutions as employers and the Histadrut on working 
conditions, but they were hardly applied in the private-capital sector of 
the Jewish economy—in agriculture, industry, and small-scale manufac-
ture. Despite pressures from the Labor movement to widen the use of the 
collective agreement in the Yishuv, the private sector succeeded in pre-
venting the Histadrut, its affi liated unions, and the workers’ committees 
in the workplaces from impacting the labor market and the workplaces 
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through collective bargaining. Furthermore, Ben-Ami belonged to the lib-
eral camp in the Yishuv that espoused the independence of the employers 
to hire workers, fi x their pay, and dismiss them without consulting work-
ers’ representatives. While not a fi erce enemy of labor and the Histadrut 
(from which many young apprentices were recruited to the diamond in-
dustry), the liberal approach Ben-Ami subscribed to was hardly condu-
cive for widespread consensual relations between capital and labor.29
The early and purposeful introduction of collective bargaining in the 
diamond industry by Ben-Ami and his fellow manufacturers had to do 
with its perceived advantages in securing a peaceful industrial atmo-
sphere. From the PDMA’s perspective the collective agreement was meant 
to achieve two objectives. One was to appease the Histadrut, which, as 
will be explained in the next chapter, had great diffi culty in spreading its 
infl uence in the industry. The second was to allow other unions in the Yi-
shuv to become signatories on the agreement and thereby promise that the 
Histadrut would not be the sole representative of the diamond workers. 
Furthermore, the British, who never applied collective agreements in the 
Mandate state sector (e.g., railways, government offi ces), and were much 
closer to Ben-Ami’s liberal approach of industrial relations than to that of 
the Labor movement, gave their blessing to this means of achieving social 
peace during these troubled times of war. To the workers the collective 
agreement promised minimal security of pay and conditions (sick days, 
annual leave, provident fund, and cost-of-living increase) when the dia-
mond market was fl uctuating downwards and put in danger their piece-
work gains. In practice a diamond worker was promised that when there 
was insuffi cient supply of rough stones to work he would still receive a 
minimal pay. Though seldom applied in full and though manufacturers 
varied in their consent to this from-above directive, it signaled again the 
adaptation of diamond industry traditions to local circumstances.30
Enforcement of this advantage was evidently problematic and the in-
tense spurt of the industry hampered a smooth accommodation of the 
dual system of piecework and collective bargaining. As not all the fac-
tories ordered similar amounts of rough diamonds and as the quality of 
stones distributed to the factories varied, different wage levels had to be 
applied and consequently the collective agreements, which were signed at 
the peak level between the PDMA and the unions, differed in application. 
Moreover, the factories worked the raw material in different ways—some 
were better skilled than others in their capacity to extract the most from a 
rough stone, and workers had to be rewarded respectively. When it came 
to prices and wage policy, the PDMA had from the beginning a hard time 
convincing manufacturers that collective agreements were worth their 
while, and many workers were therefore exposed to insecurity and un-
certainty in their pay levels. This was one of reasons why the PDMA’s 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
82   |   Diamonds and War
quest for industrial peace and the British expectation that the diamond 
war-industry would remain obedient to the initial objects for which it was 
established were challenged from quite early on.31
The increasingly spreading perception among Yishuv youth and work-
seekers of the high earnings expected from working in diamonds, which 
attracted so many and so quickly to the factories, was justifi ed, however. 
As the apprenticeship was shortened and the pressure to free oneself from 
the debts accumulated during the training was burdensome, the passage 
of the apprenticeship to full-scale earning was short relative to what was 
customary in Antwerp. This meant that after an average of three months 
a young cutter and polisher could earn very well (e.g. LP 2.5–3 per week 
and LP 3–4 after six months), in comparison to wages paid in the Yishuv’s 
industries and to wages paid to workers at the same age cohort. More-
over, differentiation in the overall income of the workers was increasingly 
growing, with the income of three-quarters of the workers in 1943 spread-
ing between LP 20 and 50 per month. A comparison made in July 1943 
showed that the average daily wage of a diamond worker could reach 
LP 1.3; workers in the food industry (LP 0.8), workers in the metal and 
wood industries (LP 0.9) and textiles (LP 0.85) lagged behind. In the fol-
lowing year (mid-1944) the average daily wage of a diamond worker was 
estimated as LP 1.43 compared to LP 0.98 for a Jewish industrial worker 
and to LP 0.4 for an Arab industrial worker. Consequently the diamond 
worker could claim that while the luxury industry of cutting diamonds 
for export was not on the Zionist occupational prestige scale, it was still a 
serious skill to acquire, it allowed him to support his parents, and even to 
surpass the earning levels they had experienced since their immigration 
to Palestine.32
At the same time, however, the reproduction in Palestine of workplace 
arrangements that had been maintained for many years in the traditional 
centers resulted in material diffi culties. Such was the case with the fee 
for use of the cutting table at the workplace (Platzgeld, “seat-money”), or 
the need to pay for hiring the cutting machine from the owner (known as 
Mula, from the Flemish Molen, “mill”). These expenses reduced the earn-
ings of the diamond worker and signifi cantly widened the earning gap 
between him and a more skilled worker or the work manager. More cru-
cially, as most workers could pay these fees only after they started earning 
(usually after three to four months), they were kept tied to the factory 
where they were admitted as apprentices. The fi rst months of apprentice-
ship and shortly after were dedicated to adapting to the new occupation, 
and thus workers in this stage had lower productivity and earned less 
piecework wages. A year after entering the factory the workers demon-
strated totally other kinds of quality and productivity and therefore their 
earnings rose, with the manufacturers and the workers consenting on the 
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centrality of seniority in calculating pay. This was another symptom of the 
differentiation that the workers in the industry experienced.33
True, in comparison to diamond workers in prewar Antwerp the Pales-
tine diamond worker might have been considered cheaply paid. The low 
costs on labor certainly made the Palestine industry in a longer perspective 
more economically viable. Moreover, the focusing of production on small 
stones (and on Sand in particular) was certainly infl uential because their 
cutting required relatively less know-how and shorter induction. How-
ever, compared to other manufacturing workers in Palestine, the gains of 
the average diamond worker were high, they persisted in drawing more 
workers to the industry, and manufacturers incessantly complained in 
the PDMA’s meetings on the low added value in the industry and high 
costs paid for labor. Furthermore, high earnings allowed workers to with-
stand periods of dearth in supply of raw stones they were given to cut 
and polish. During business downturns they often provided the worker 
with more comfort than the promises written in the collective agreements. 
This was the reason why union activists would often criticize the diamond 
workers for succumbing themselves to an industrial climate in which high 
gain compensated for lack of job insecurity. They were deferent to their 
employers because they taught them the skill and provided them with oc-
cupational pride, but more probably because there was hardly in Palestine 
such a similar option for high material rewards.34
Conditions of work further emphasized this duality. The physically de-
manding aspects of the diamond industry are usually associated with the 
initial phase of the “commodity chain,” that is, with the mining of the dia-
monds. Ample sources tell this side of the history of diamond production, 
in the Belgian Congo and Sierra Leone in particular, and the historiogra-
phy of diamond mining has well explicated the human and social cost 
involved. The harsh aspects of the further phase along the chain, namely, 
diamond cutting and polishing, received much less publicity and schol-
arly attention, despite their illumination of the diamond labor experience 
and the contrast they present to the traditional image of diamond workers 
in the Low Countries as a sort of labor aristocracy. Like many diamond 
apprentices in interwar Antwerp and Flanders and the thousands of new 
diamond cutters and polishers in 1930s Germany, the Palestine diamond 
workers were attracted to new workplaces that promised not only gain 
but also signifi cant material diffi culties.35
One aspect of this work ecology was the exertion of bodily strain as-
sociated with the long working hours of sitting at the polishing table. This 
was causally related to the piecework nature of the labor process. As the 
cutter and polisher received their pay according to the number of stones 
they completed, additional stone fi nishing would add to their earnings. 
Furthermore, the routine fl uctuations in supply of rough stones from the 
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DTC in London to the PDMA and the factories in Palestine created an 
atmosphere of time pressure to exploit as much of the working day and 
the available supplies. The norm of eight hours per work day, partially 
maintained in the diamond industry in the Low Countries and even less 
so in many of Palestine’s industries, was in sheer contrast to the piece-
work arrangements in the industry, and as we shall see later were hardly 
a cause for labor struggle. The physical effort exerted by the long work-
ing hours (partly released in loud singing incantations during work), and 
the pressure to complete as many stones as possible in order to increase 
profi ts or demonstrate expertise to the managers was naturally related to 
the tendency by the diamond manufacturers to select young apprentices 
and workers who they perceived as willing to withstand the diffi cult labor 
process. This was clearly demonstrated in the recurrent phenomenon of 
workers shortening their careers in diamond production because of the 
demanding physical aspects of the labor process.36
A closely relevant feature of this work ecology was the prolonged ex-
posure of the polishers and diamond grinders to diamond dust and cobalt 
dust, which were known to be formative agents in breathing problems 
and in occupational lung disease. Contemporary depictions of a typical 
diamond factory provided a contrasted mix of cleanliness and dusty en-
vironment. The sitting position of the polishers seemed to make them di-
rectly exposed to the dust from the grinding process and in the absence 
of dust-masks (which were introduced in a much later stage) respiratory 
protection was minimal. Some apprentices reported that it was a suffi -
cient cause to cease their apprenticeship abruptly, leave jobs quite early 
after completing their training, or simply shorten their diamond-cutting 
careers.37 A related aspect, again closely associated with the propensity of 
the industry to attract young workers, was eye strain. The need to focus 
on minute-sized stones for long hours, and the diffi culty of preventing 
diamond dust from contaminating the eyes, evoked recurrent requests 
to change place and jobs within the trade, often to clerical positions. The 
smallness of the stones, lengthy work hours, and the related ophthalmo-
logic pressure was related often in the workers’ bulletins though they 
were consistently denied by the manufacturers and experts as a real work 
hazard. Their effects were not always immediate and were therefore borne 
lightly by the young workers.38
The mental aspect was perhaps the most exacting. From quite early on, 
workers complained extensively of the association between long hours 
of work and mental fatigue. Nerve-wrecking working days, boredom as-
sociated with the repetitive work, and the diffi culty of sustaining a neur-
asthenic condition may have added to the desire to cut careers short. A 
less-known aspect, but one vocally referred to by contemporaries, was 
what could be termed the anxiety over the lost stone. The small size of the 
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stones the workers had to handle, the slow acquisition of hand dexterity, 
the misuse of the fast-turning disk, and the sheer lack of intimate knowl-
edge of the stones made it easy for the stones to hop out of the tools and 
fall under the cutting tables. The sight of young workers in the diamond 
factories on their knees looking anxiously after the falling stones became a 
routine. If stones were not found, the workers had to reimburse the own-
ers and consequently entered a cycle of debts that placed a heavy toll on 
those who actually lived on apprenticeship loans.39 In one poetic gesture 
written by a diamond polisher, the words of a known poem, “Tsil Tslil” 
(Ring, Ring, 1909) by the national poet Hayim Nahman Bialik, were sub-
stituted with the diamonds he was polishing: 
It is Gone . . . (by Binyamin Kosowsky)
Pink Pank—she’s gone, Pink Pank—gone off,
Pink Pank—and from the Cenga she took off.
Sweet one, why did you away so rushed?
And my hand had more than half left to cut.
It’s a shame! Before time parting came
And on my feet had me standing again.
Broom I took and looked for her
And in grains of sand found her.
And suddenly you said: farewell my dear,
Voice of whip, noise of wheels,
And once again I am solitaire.
In a cloud of dust you distant fl y 
And again with broom disheartened I.
And from the garbage in the sand
The mocking sound is dancing heard
Pink Pank—she’s gone, Pink Pank—gone off
Pink Pank—and from the Cenga she took off. 
The beloved woman in the original poem, symbolizing the word the 
poet gives birth to, was replaced with the uncut stone; though the cutter 
loved, was attracted to, and was possessive of it, it yet sought freedom. 
The stone deserts the lonely cutter like a poetic invention secularized by 
its mass use, and has to be sought after in a similar vein. The stone that 
fell began having a life of its own like the poet’s word in the mouths of 
the users of language, with the cutter needing to bend on his knees and 
crawl fervently after the hidden stone, which may not even be willing to 
be found and would shine glaringly only to be further sought after. The 
cutter who loves and needs the stone wants to harbor her so as to avoid 
grave fi nancial danger. The closeness of the cutter to the stone, his depen-
dence on her, is akin to a disappointed love, and thus the fear of losing the 
stone, of going down on one’s knees. The panic over the lost stone thus 
added to the time pressure, effi ciency, and obsession with productivity 
that emerged as routine characteristics of the new diamond workplaces.40
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The care for the stone, safeguarding it from any harm during cutting, 
and the quality of the fi nished product structured an environment of dis-
cipline and regimentation. One disciplinary aspect was the premature ces-
sation of the apprenticeship by the manufacturers, which hovered over 
the young workers as a persistent menace throughout their training. An-
other aspect was the disallowing of unauthorized movement of workers 
between the factories. Workers’ wandering, as it was often called, could 
improve pay, distance the worker from an overly authoritarian manger, 
or simply express the wish of the young worker to be nearer to his fam-
ily and neighborhood he left for apprenticeship in Tel Aviv and Netanya. 
Moreover, factories often lacked enough skilled workers and had to “bor-
row” workers, with the effect of a fl uid and frequently a chaotic workplace 
system. Interdicting and regulating this movement were essential for the 
manufacturers who opposed it because they felt that their investment in 
training might be futile and that their fellow manufacturers were compet-
ing with them over the better foremen and more-skilled workers. After 
two years the problem seemed uncontrollable and no wonder the PDMA 
had to press the manufacturers in August 1941: “Please pay attention. The 
worker who today left your friend’s manufacturing-house—might leave 
you tomorrow! Wanderings have no justifi cation. Conditions and prices 
are identical!” For the workers, however, the prohibition meant strength-
ened bondage to the factory. They had to formally commit themselves to it 
and they thus felt harnessed to a workplace that was not always amicable. 
The prohibition stood therefore in sharp contrast to the material rewards, 
hampered stratifi cation among the workers, and often evoked a sense of 
deferred independence. Such control of the labor force mirrored the cen-
tralized and disciplinary character of the manufacturers’ organization and 
was thought to serve both the British quest for acquiescent workers and 
the PDMA design to shape a new type of industrial culture in a society ac-
customed since the 1920s to the powerful presence of organized labor.41
It was assumed by contemporaries in the early 1940s that only about 
a quarter of the trained apprentices were fully absorbed in the industry. 
Together with the high earnings this meant that the diamond workers 
showed some characteristics that differentiated them from other workers, 
a sort of an artisan-workers’ elite group. Many signs pinpointed that par-
ticularity: pride in one’s skill, the feeling of being needed by the manufac-
turers, the efforts the workers invested in acquisition of the special skill, 
the economic dependency of parents on their children’s work, and even 
the prohibition of free movement between the factories that enhanced a 
sense of pride of the factory in them. The skills employed in the diamond 
industry certainly formed the workers’ reputation as dexterous, quick, 
capable of enduring concentration, members of a long-standing and re-
spectful tradition, and willing to invest a lot to survive in the industry. 
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Aspiring for expertise (and not just for gain) and being inducted by a 
particular, known master assigned the worker a role in the continuity of 
tradition and encouraged adaptation in a new location and in different 
circumstances. As we saw earlier, the diamond industry was from the start 
replete with notions of time, rapidity, precision, and effi ciency, and the 
workers, through their hard work and regimentation, were gradually im-
mersed in this craft-cultural environment.42
The aspects of the employers’ control over the labor process were at the 
last resort associated with the nature of the PDMA’s control of its mem-
bers. The same logic that dictated a single and enclosed import-export 
path also dictated a close watch over the process of the small stone from 
its entry into the envelope to its fi nal return as a polished product to the 
hands of the manager. The loss of a stone by an inexperienced polisher, en-
tailing as it did economic sanctions or delegitimization (with far-fetched 
personal consequences), was a localized symptom of a much wider anxi-
ety of the entire system regarding the free movement (and smuggling) of 
stones. Harming a stone or low-quality cutting pressured the individual 
worker and created a stressed atmosphere in the workshop, but also were 
perceived as harboring a wider economic signifi cance. These associations 
refl ected cracks in the centralized system and the limitation of control, but 
in turn they also legitimized the need for further control and for further 
formal means for enhancing the lacking trust. This was why it became 
imperative to seal off the membership ranks, to increase the supervision 
of the members, to prevent domestic production as a space disconnected 
from factory life, and to enhance the regimentation of the workers by the 
experts and the managers. If the PDMA had fi rst established a sort of “col-
lectivization” of capital and manufacturers, it now turned into a central-
ized and regimented labor process in which workers were streamlined 
and constrained by solid boundaries of action.43
The diamond industry was therefore undergoing an adaptation process 
that was in line with the centralization and power-building that character-
ized the structuring of the PDMA. Both the chain system and the regi-
mentation of the apprentices and the skilled workers made the new cut-
ting center not only different from its Belgian origins but also much more 
powerful and challenging. In this sense the PDMA used to the full the 
British umbrella to construct a new industrial branch with unprecedented 
powers. At the same time it did not just serve the building of an alterna-
tive to Antwerp. It quickly demonstrated a mix of capital, traits of an oc-
cupational community, and Zionist ideology that aspired to much more 
than serving the needs of the war and the interests of the British and De 
Beers. Indeed, when we distance ourselves from the daily mechanics of 
the cutting process, and attempt to grasp the atmosphere that this nascent 
industry and its practitioners were experiencing, a vivid sense and pres-
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ence of power emerges. It was fi rst and foremost the power of profi t—of 
the great potential for further profi tability, of the personal gain of both the 
manufacturers as owners and the workers as skilled craftsmen. The sense 
of success that hovered above the industry, which was made apparent by 
both the persistent attraction to the industry and by the tight sealing of its 
boundaries from more newcomers, made for the climate of energy, power, 
motivation, and a trajectory of advance. It was no less than the power to 
enforce differentiation between workers and segregate the profi cient and 
skilled from the lesser workers, the loyal to the factory and to the manu-
facturer from the transgressor. Evidently the power expressed itself also 
in discipline and regimentation, of capital and organized ownership that 
could act freely and powerfully under the auspices of the Mandate state 
and the sheltering imperatives of the war. An industry that made such a 
quick and expressive start—that so early on became the most attractive 
industry and profi table industries in the Yishuv, that managed so quickly 
to transgress the limitations enforced upon its expansion on its birth, and 
that so early on created sophisticated routines of control, remuneration, 
and regimentation—was bound to convey an emphatic sense of a new 
power phase for local capital.44
The intensity of the regimented work process, its young age structure, 
and the common expectation for high earnings created a web of links and 
associations among the workers and mirrored capital’s power. These link-
ages expressed themselves in the collective opposition to the manufactur-
ers and obviously in the striking activity of the diamond workers—but 
also culturally, in the shared panic of the young apprentices and workers 
over the lost stones, the collective search for it and the incessant singing 
incantations during work. Personal rage vented against the employers and 
individual makeshift strategies such as illegal domestic diamond cutting, 
moonlighting, and petty theft also expressed these shared experiences. 
However, what mostly linked the diamond workers to each other was the 
threat on earnings harbored in the piecework employment system, and in 
the dependence of the entire industry on supplies from London. The ex-
tent of the dependence will be better understood later when the industry’s 
take-off and the politics behind the supply of the rough diamonds are dis-
cussed. But before that we should turn our attention to reactions in Yishuv 
society to the dual emergence of this new power of British-sheltered capi-
tal and centralized monopoly that PDMA represented on the one hand, 
and the new and growing group of workers whose living was so heavily 
dependent on the exogenous forces of supply in London and demand in 
New York on the other. These reactions were pertinent because, no less 
than the tradition and legacy of diamond cutting in the Low Counties, it 
was Yishuv society and its political and ideological languages that was 
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the environment in which the diamond industry sprouted and had to take 
account of.45 
Facing the “Triangular Thread”
The preceding discussion of the foundations of the diamond industry 
demonstrated the extent to which the transplantation of the diamond 
industry mixed state action with capitalist agency. One foundation, the 
umbrella provided by the colonial government, was a key to all devel-
opments. But it could not materialize without the second—the lifeline of 
small, rough diamonds steadily maintained by the Diamond Syndicate 
in London. The third foundation, the PDMA’s institutional regimentation 
of the member-manufacturers and the factories, equally intersected with 
the fourth, the adaptations in the traditional labor process. These features 
conveyed an aura of audacity and self-confi dence, an atmosphere of self-
assurance and economic success that in turn could bring the PDMA and 
the manufacturers to further decide on maintaining or diverging from the 
traditions of diamond-cutting and organization.
Sensing themselves as emissaries of the Jewish nation and an empire at 
war, part of a world industry and local economy, convinced in their roles 
as capitalists with a clear Zionist orientation, the state-backed manufactur-
ers indeed felt unrestrained. This capitalist institutional and ideological 
power-building evolved however, in friction with a particular set of social 
and political norms that had predominated Yishuv life since World War I 
and the onset of the British Mandate. This normative context was aptly de-
scribed by one of the PDMA’s members in a discussion over the industry’s 
relations with the Yishuv’s institutions as the “triangular thread.” The 
term referred to a three-armed, national-based coalition of ideology and 
interest. One arm was that of the Zionist institutions that ran the Yishuv 
and led by the Jewish Agency and by Mapai, its majority political party. 
For the diamond industry the expression of this national presence was the 
Department of Trade and Industry, which was usually at the hands of the 
liberal General Zionists Party. The second arm was the Palestine Manufac-
turers’ Association (PMA)—the loose umbrella organization of Jewish in-
dustrialists and manufacturers. The PDMA was not a member of the PMA 
until 1943, and its independence often strained relations between the two 
bodies. The third arm was the Labor movement. It was led by Mapai, Ben-
Gurion’s Zionist-Socialist political party that dominated the Histadrut—
the umbrella organization of labor’s economic institutions and unions that 
since 1933 also controlled the Jewish Agency. From early on it was clear 
that the Histadrut, representing around 70 percent of Jewish workers in 
Palestine, could not control the diamond industry, as it did other indus-
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tries in the Jewish private sector, and its aspiration to have a strong union 
presence in the diamond factories materialized only partially.46
Zionist state building was the primary set of ideas and practices that 
during the two decades before World War II held the parts of the triad 
together. In this agenda the Jewish Agency was the institution that ran 
the affairs of the Zionist Movement in Palestine, towering over a system 
of institutions that dealt with the absorption of Jewish immigrants, land 
purchase and settlement activities, economic investment and social plan-
ning, and the like. While it operated in parallel to the National Committee 
(Ha-Vaad Ha-Leumi), the body that conducted Jewish communal affairs 
in Palestine, for all intents and purposes it was the dominant political 
body and the main force that shaped Zionist policies during Arab-Jew-
ish confl icts and in relations with the authorities. The PMA, the second 
arm of the triad, was since its establishment in the early 1920s an essential 
part of this agenda, cooperating closely as it did with the Jewish Agency, 
advancing (at least formally) the control of the Yishuv economy by Jewish 
labor, and mobilizing industry to national causes and not only to capital-
ist orientations. The Labor movement, the third arm, and in particular the 
Histadrut that was founded in December 1920, was to provide the social 
basis for the state-building project. In manning the Jewish settlements, in 
controlling and organizing the labor market, and in a variety of social and 
cultural functions it was to be an integral part of an agenda that necessi-
tated industrial calm and conciliatory relations.47
The most signifi cant aspect of the “triangular thread” was the under-
standing of the three organs that private capital, capital owners, and indi-
vidual entrepreneurs were free to operate, but at the same time be submis-
sive to the Zionist agenda. It was therefore a variant of national-capitalism, 
in which maximization of profi t and personal gain conveniently cohabited 
with thinking on and contributing to the Zionist social good, cultivating 
a common national vision, and actively participating in the Jewish state-
building project. In reality, however, it meant that Zionist institutions as-
pired to be present in and infl uence the practices of private capital—in 
particular when they were involved in sensitive Yishuv issues such as em-
ploying Arab workers, relations with the government during this complex 
period of war and the Holocaust, and contacts with the Colonial Offi ce. 
This interventionist approach of Zionist institutions became ever more 
emphatic in the wake of the boom that the World War II brought about 
in Palestine, the fl ourishing of private capital, and more signifi cantly the 
deepening intervention of the government in the country’s economy and 
civil society. At the economic departments of the Jewish Agency it was 
strongly felt that not only was British involvement necessitating a closer 
Yishuv coalescence between the public and private spheres of economic 
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and employment activities but that its infrastructure should be well pre-
pared for the new circumstances expected to emerge after the war.48
As the British granted the PDMA a status of monopoly, the relations 
between the Zionist institutions and the diamond manufacturers were 
problematic from the start. Ben-Ami’s victory of the national Tishby camp 
(discussed in chapter 2) made the designed public-Zionist presence in the 
diamond industry vaguely defi ned. As a war-born industry, the PDMA’s 
monopoly was created, inspected, and protected by the government and 
the Colonial Offi ce. It was closely tied to the British, to their war aims, to 
their fi nancial considerations and relations with other European countries. 
The British set limits on the industry’s expansion, membership, raw ma-
terial supplies, and freedom of trade. Unlike Palestine’s railways, which 
were run as a government department, the diamond factories were inde-
pendent capitalist institutions and members of an association that kept it-
self apart from the Palestine Manufacturers’ Association. Moreover, as Ne-
tanya’s mayor, Ben-Ami made the diamond industry one of the economic 
strongholds of his town and a pillar of his local power. At the same time 
diamond cutting was also a Yishuv industry. It was Jewish only, perceived 
itself as Zionist and an absorber of Jewish immigrants, and as a part of 
the state-building project it selected only Jewish workers, transformed the 
Jewish settlement of Netanya, and (as we shall see later) developed a keen 
national expression and culture. The identity of the diamond industry was 
clearly Zionist, but its leaders and member-owners and manufacturers 
sought freedom of economic action and institutional autonomy.49
The institutions that ran the Jewish community in Palestine, and in 
particular the Labor-Liberal coalition that dominated the Jewish Agency, 
were, as we saw earlier, instrumental in the birth of the industry. The De-
partment of Trade and Industry at the Jewish Agency had been in the 1930s 
involved in attempting to bring over from Antwerp to Palestine diamond 
capital and expertise and in persuading the government to reduce the cus-
toms on rough diamonds. The department was also in close contact with 
dealers in Tel Aviv who ran a small exchange (the Diamond Club), and 
with Zionist activists in London and Johannesburg who helped with con-
tacts with De Beers. A the same time, however, the British and the manu-
facturers around Ben-Ami destined the diamond industry to be a private 
affair, an independent capitalist venture under government auspices and 
free from Zionist institutional control. No matter how involved the na-
tional institutions in Jewish industry were, and how industrialization of 
the Yishuv economy was crucial in their eyes, they were kept outside the 
orbit of decision making and control over diamond production.50
In the institutional sense the industry indeed wished to remain distant 
and autonomous. Its birth was a challenge to the Department of Trade and 
Industry, which attempted to lead the project, and it was never expected 
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that the Jewish Agency would support the industry fi nancially. The ties of 
the industry with the Zionist Offi ce in London weakened after mid-1940 
when the PDMA formed direct contact with De Beers and with Hennig 
and Co., the brokerage company that represented the industry at the DTC. 
In Palestine the main link the PDMA created with the national institutions 
was through the banking system, namely, the Palestine Corporation (later 
Bank Igud) and the Anglo-Palestine Bank (later part of Bank Leumi). These 
gave the diamond industry credit to purchase rough diamonds, keep them 
and the fi nished stones for export in safes, and fi nance the mechanism of 
exporting the polished product.51 
In late 1940 and early 1941 negotiations were on the way between the 
Department of Trade and Industry at the Jewish Agency, the PMA, the 
Histadrut, and the PDMA on creating a joint fund to fi nance apprentices 
in the factories, but they only accentuated how limited national interven-
tion could be. The Diamond Club, which kept close ties with the Jewish 
Agency and reestablished itself in December 1940 to provide trading ser-
vices to diamond and precious stones merchants, was of little signifi cance 
now because of the British directive to export all fi nished diamonds and 
have the PDMA’s member-factories serve as exporting units as well. Fur-
thermore, the Jewish Agency occasionally offered its services as an arbi-
trator in labor disputes in the diamond factories, in particular when it was 
asked to by the Histadrut or even by manufacturers who wished to get 
the functionaries at the Department of Trade and Industry or Labor De-
partment more involved in the industry. The PDMA saw to it that such 
involvement would be kept to a minimum.52
The capacity of the diamond industry to carve itself an autonomous 
niche within the institutional constraints customary in the Jewish polity 
in Palestine could not have materialized without the help of the British 
and direct ties (again through British mediation) with the Diamond Syn-
dicate. For Ben-Ami the autonomy was crucial. It proved the capacity of 
his liberal-capitalist ideals to materialize without the help of the Zionist 
funds and institutions. The latter, even more menacingly, could in his eyes 
meddle in the affairs of the diamond industry in London, and may even 
endanger its sensitive position at the DTC in the wake of growing pres-
sure from the exiled Belgians against the expansion of Palestine diamond 
industry. Ben-Ami’s success in founding a private venture under British 
auspices, and the consequent furor it caused among the political and eco-
nomic leadership of the Jewish Agency, created further distance. In such 
circumstances it was expected that criticism would follow. It came from 
various corners—the Department of Trade and Industry that supported 
the Tishby camp; Arieh Shenkar, the PMA’s president and one of the chief 
leaders of the Jewish industrialists; even Zionist activists in the UK (such 
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as Joseph Linton) who dreaded the lack of contact between the diamond 
industry and the Zionist executive in London. 53
But it ran deeper than that. It was a criticism against the lack of direct 
ties with the Zionist institutions, against the concentration of the indus-
try in Netanya where Ben-Ami was running the affairs, and on denying 
the advice of the economic experts of the Jewish Agency that there was 
a limit to the industry’s viability and success. The PDMA monopoly and 
the way it was run were blamed for what these experts perceived as too 
slow growth, little variety of suboccupations and types of stones pol-
ished, and a narrow range of exporting market destinations. Furthermore, 
continuing earlier tensions between the Ben-Ami and Tishby factions, 
a serious criticism against the PDMA’s autonomy sprang up within the 
PDMA itself. Among the new oppositionists were diamond manufactur-
ers such as Moshe Offen, the Schein brothers, and Carol Pickel. Ben-Ami 
was too dictatorial for their taste, they despised the Netanya stronghold, 
and the PDMA’s disconnection from Zionist national institutions seemed 
to them to be taken too far. Some manufacturers even attempted in reac-
tion to develop a freer, home-based cutting industry; others tried opening 
workshops in Beirut and Cairo. Rumors reached the Jewish Agency that 
Ben-Ami was personally profi ting from the PDMA’s President Fund, that 
the Diamond Syndicate itself was paying him for securing purchases of 
rough diamonds, and that he informally was a partner (and thus favored 
materially) in one of the factories. Furthermore, the manufacturers were 
so dependent on his distributional policies for rough diamonds that they 
feared criticizing him openly or destabilizing the lifeline he had so well 
cultivated with De Beers and the syndicate in London since 1940.54
The internal opposition was at this stage quite weak and it lacked a 
solid social basis in the PDMA. Divergence from long-standing traditions 
in the diamond industry in Belgium that could potentially raise signifi -
cant opposition on a professional base was only at its initial stage. Indi-
rect ties some of the manufacturers did establish with the PMA and its 
President Shenkar exerted some pressure on Ben-Ami to soften his objec-
tion to closer relations between the PDMA and the PMA, but relations 
remained cool and mutually suspicious. Short of challenging the central-
ized structure of the PDMA by turning to the British or by attempting to 
create indirect ties with the Diamond Syndicate, there was not much in 
the institutional sense that the Jewish Agency could do to curtail this au-
tonomy and freedom of action. Attempts to coordinate the activities of the 
PDMA with Zionist institutional structures, and infl uence the government 
to liberalize the PDMA’s monopoly by allowing the importation of rough 
diamonds from sources other than the DTC (such as British Guiana), were 
to no avail. The only strategy left to the opposition was to question the 
industry’s pretension to consider itself of such immense contribution to 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
94   |   Diamonds and War
Zionism, to challenge what was perceived as Ben-Ami’s disrespect for the 
national institutions, and attempt to marginalize the industry culturally 
and ideologically by mobilizing the Yishuv’s industrialists to “socialize” 
the diamond industry to the Zionist ideals expounded by the “triangular 
thread.” The impact of these attempts was, as we shall see in a moment, 
to create a suspicious atmosphere around the monopoly and the interests 
Ben-Ami was advancing as Britain’s special industrial “envoy.” However, 
we should fi rst examine another front against which the PDMA was build-
ing its power and autonomy of action and which in the long run would 
prove to be even more crucial.55 
Splintering Labor’s Voice
In its rigid regimentation of its well-paid workers, the diamond industry 
was not unique. Since its establishment in the early 1920s, the Histadrut 
had focused much of its organizational efforts and campaigns against 
Jewish capital owners and employers in the Yishuv’s private sector who 
enjoyed the absence of legal protection over workers, paid little regard to 
improving workers’ pay and conditions, and dismissed workers at will 
and without compensation. The entire Histadrut infrastructure in Pales-
tine’s towns, based as it was on labor councils, unions, cooperatives, and 
economic enterprises, was built in close relation to this urban context; as 
much as employers and workers in the Yishuv shared basic Zionist tenets, 
they were busy in daily battles over employment arrangements and work-
ing conditions.56 Whenever a new industry was established, this routine 
set of issues reemerged without, however, the legal climate harboring a 
message of change and without the intensity of employment disputes 
waning. The diamond industry emerged on a very small scale during the 
Arab rebellion of 1936–1939 when the national coalescence in the Yishuv 
brought some relaxation to industrial tension. The slow pace of the indus-
try’s growth before 1940 produced little unrest. However, in the context 
of the economic boom of the war this climate quickly changed, diamond 
cutting turning into one of the most turbulent foci of industrial tension 
and dispute.57
At the heart of the tripled Zionist-based alliance of the Jewish Agency, 
PMA, and the Labor movement was a long-established norm that the 
Histadrut was a central actor in the industrial relations system and, that 
it played a key role in the project to materialize the shared Zionist ideal 
of the predominance of Jewish employment in Palestine’s Jewish polity. 
Challenging the hegemony of the Histadrut in representing the workers 
in Jewish industrial enterprises tied traditional anti-Labor stances in the 
Yishuv with the manufacturers’ claim for autonomy and supremacy. In 
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fact, in contesting the power of the Histadrut the diamond manufacturers 
were able to put into practice one of the cherished quests of the liberals 
and the right wing in the Yishuv.58
Before the PDMA’s entry to the scene the Histadrut was involved in the 
diamond industry in two ways. First it served in 1937–1940 as the labor 
exchange for young workers who were admitted to the few factories as 
apprentices. In some factories in Petah Tikva and Tel Aviv this contact was 
also expressed in representation of the workers in contracts and working 
conditions. The second aspect of Histadrut presence in the industry was 
in the contacts it created on the eve of the war with the diamond union 
leaders in Amsterdam (Herni Polak of the ANDB, Algemene Nederlandse 
Diamantbewerkersbond, the Dutch diamond workers’ union) and in An-
twerp (W. Daems of the ADB, Antwerpse Diamantbewerkers Bond). The 
contact revolved around claims expressed against Palestine that it tried to 
compete with Antwerp by employing low-wage workers or in demand-
ing that the Histadrut, through affi liating with the Universal Alliance of 
Diamond Workers (UADW) should see to it that an international wage 
balance was kept, a forty-hour workweek maintained, and competition be 
prevented. In this way Palestine was asked to join an international work-
ers’ front against the Germans, whose diamond-cutting industry fl our-
ished exactly because it reduced wages.59
From the start of his project Ben-Ami, a staunch liberal, disliked the ties 
of the diamond workshops with the Histadrut and the latter’s contacts 
with the unions in the Low Countries. In drawing manufacturers to Ne-
tanya he made it clear to the manufacturers that a too-powerful presence 
of the Histadrut in their factories was unwelcome. Furthermore, in the 
calls published in the Antwerp press for diamond experts and workers 
to apply for the Palestine project (partly fi nanced by the Tel Hai Fund of 
the Revisionist Movement) a proviso was added that they would give up 
membership in the UADW, and that their trip ought to be fi nanced by the 
Zionist Federation in Belgium. The criticism against these calls by union 
leaders in the Low Countries on the grounds that this was an antiunion 
act, and their demand from the Histadrut to oppose it, did not amount to 
much. The Ben-Ami project was built, among other things, on rejecting 
such union intervention.60
On the establishment of the PDMA Ben-Ami and his fellow manufac-
turers introduced a paradoxical novelty to the politics of employment in 
the Yishuv. On the one hand they saw to it that the workers recruited to 
the industry would be Jews. They therefore fulfi lled a long-standing “He-
brew Labor” tenet regarding the national segregation of the labor market 
that the Labor movement was advancing and fi ghting for throughout the 
1920s and 1930s. This was a crucial point of coalescence between Jew-
ish capital and Jewish labor—a consensus, in ideology and in practice, 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
96   |   Diamonds and War
over the ethnic and national character of the diamond industry. On the 
other hand the PDMA rejected in principle the long-standing hegemony 
of the Histadrut in the industrial sector of the Yishuv that was expressed 
in union representation, and in the relatively high number of Jewish in-
dustrial workers affi liated to the Histadrut compared to unions affi liated 
to other political parties such the Revisionists, the Religious Zionists, and 
the Orthodox Jews. Ben-Ami’s approach to labor that this duality demon-
strated has to be considered through the prism of a Zionist liberal whose 
social philosophy was shaped in the particular context of the Zionist 
state-building project and Labor’s centrality in that project. Though sel-
dom an employer of workers himself, Ben-Ami evolved as an entrepre-
neur in various fi elds such as agriculture and journalism and as a power-
ful land developer and municipal bureaucrat in which the conception of 
and relation to labor questions were central. Authoritarian in character 
and paternalist in practice, Ben-Ami upheld the notion that workers were 
to be protected and that any workers’ organization had to be cooperated 
with, but that both should be limited in power and infl uence. Alliance be-
tween classes, either for the national cause or for running a business, was 
a means through which a free, liberal society should run. Consequently 
and in accordance with the Zionist liberal approach to industrial relations, 
the preference in the labor selection was for workers with a variety of or-
ganizational and union affi liations so as to prevent a single and powerful 
Histadrut-led representation.61
Ben-Ami’s scheme to focus diamond production in Netanya worked 
well to forestall encroachments by the Histadrut. Netanya was not on the 
map of the Histadrut’s power centers, and the town’s Histadrut-affi liated 
Labor Council was if anything a frail labor exchange. Furthermore, from 
his seat in the Netanya town council Ben-Ami saw to it that the presence 
of the Histadrut in the new industry would be limited by the presence of 
other labor organizations. While anchored in the Yishuv’s liberal politics 
and pluralist ideology of liberal Zionism, the anti-Histadrut stance was 
also an expression of Ben-Ami’s sense of hierarchy. The workers in the cut-
ting factories could be organized and represented, but they ought to see 
themselves as part of the factories and committed to the product, and the 
investment in them through apprenticing and promise of high earnings 
ought to be paid back fully by limiting their voice. In a sense the multitude 
of representational voices mirrored the division of labor and the fragmen-
tation of the integrated worker.62
The way the PDMA made union splintering certain was, fi rst, to recruit 
the apprentices from various workers’ organizations and parties (see be-
low) and, second, to demand that each individual union would be a for-
mal signatory to any labor contract. This forced the Histadrut to cooperate 
with the other unions on the formulation of the contracts and thus assured 
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the PDMA that the power of the Histadrut would be contained. Moreover, 
the PDMA ordered the diamond manufacturers not to negotiate individu-
ally with the workers and the unions. Splintering the union voice equaled 
centralization in labor policy.63
Consequently the formation of the diamond workforce was coupled 
with splitting its representation among fi ve unions. The largest was the 
Histadrut though it was not large enough to achieve majority among the 
entire diamond labor force. Second was the Revisionist-backed Histadrut 
Ha-Ovdim Ha-Leumit (National Workers’ Federation). The two religious 
unions represented Hapoel Hamizrahi (religious Zionists) and the Ortho-
dox Poalei Agudat Israel. Finally the liberals, Ben-Ami’s own party Gen-
eral Zionists, were represented by Haoved Hatzioni. In a later stage the 
Communist Party would have a small representation as well. In contrast 
to many other industries in the Yishuv, the Histadrut, the largest union, 
found it impossible therefore to have its say automatically, and that the 
“minority organizations” could well challenge its policies and tactics. Fur-
thermore, as the table below demonstrates, splintering was dynamic. The 
intensive increase in the number of diamond workers was not matched 
by a similar increase in the number of those affi liated with the Histadrut. 
In Netanya the Histadrut’s position was even worse and though a local 
labor council operated in the small town as a labor exchange under the 
auspices of the Histadrut, its presence in the labor politics of the town was 
quite frail, at least compared to the main Histadrut strongholds in Haifa 
and Tel Aviv.64 
Table 3.4 Trade union structure in Palestine’s diamond industry, 1941–194665
Note: In 1943 72.5% of the 137,000 Jewish workers in Palestine were members of the 
Histadrut.
Sources: Pinchas Smagarinsky, “Review of the Situation in the Diamond Industry,” 11 Feb-
ruary 1942, LA/IV-208–1-2941; Report of the Secretariat of the Diamond Workers Unions in 
Netanya, 14 November 1944, LA/IV-250–49–175-b; First Meeting of the Central Committee 
of the Union of Diamond Workers, 9 December 1946, LA IV208–1-4551.













Histadrut 410 650 1,750 500 150 480
Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit 250 300–320 550 100–120 200 250
Hapoel Hamizrahi 200 500 270 150
100
105
Poalei Agudat Israel 120 50 200 150 -
Haoved Hatzioni - 100 120 50 100 30
Nonaffi liated 220 350
1,400–
1,700 350 100 450
Total 1,200 1,950 4,590 1,300 650 1,315
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The fragmentation of union structure in the local diamond industry 
was not simply a corollary of the strategy of the diamond manufacturers 
to prevent a recurrence of the Histadrut hegemony in industrial sector 
of the Yishuv. The variety of suboccupations comprising the cutting and 
polishing processes was no less infl uential, and so too was the tendency 
of some diamond workers to guarantee themselves from downturns in 
the industry by holding to another occupation or alternative source of in-
come. If the variety of suboccupations resulted in a nonunitary structure 
of pay and benefi ts and in a variety of workplace solidarities, extra jobs 
or home work destabilized union membership. Unionization among the 
diamond workers was therefore a complex issue, partly structured from 
above by the PDMA’s labor policies, partly by the organizational capaci-
ties of the various political parties, and partly by workers’ strategies from 
below. The diamond manufacturers thought union multiplicity would 
weaken workers’ collective representation, and in turn the pressure on 
pay increases. Many workers thought unions to be cumbersome and of-
ten antithetical to the relative freedom provided by the piecework system. 
Furthermore, the large number of unaffi liated workers testifi ed both to 
the feeling of many of the more-skilled workers that representation was 
simply redundant; and to the fear—prevalent among many of apprentices 
and new workers—that affi liation was disfavored by the employers and 
may lead to dismissals.66
The splintering of worker representation harbored three implications. 
First, many workers chose not to affi liate to any of the unions and there-
fore were potentially a diffi cult sector to mobilize for collective action, or 
alternatively an easy prey for manipulation of the manufacturers against 
the unions. As we shall see later, in labor disputes this unaffi liated con-
tingent would be crucial. The second implication was that many workers 
sensed that as highly skilled workers on which the manufacturers came 
gradually to depend, they were as individuals entitled to better pay and 
improved working conditions. This “noncollective” strategy of the indi-
vidual workers would cause a great deal of trouble to union activists later 
when the industry underwent technological adaptation and consequent 
reshuffl ing of the labor force. Finally, the fragmentation of the organized 
workers’ voice further tarnished the image of the Histadrut among both 
workers and manufacturers, and it was feared in Histadrut circles that it 
was beginning to affect other expanding industrial sectors as well. The 
diamond industry signaled therefore the existence of a wider challenge 
to the Histadrut’s hegemony in the Jewish industrial sector and practi-
cally to the entire system and understanding at the heart of the “triangular 
thread.”67
It took the Histadrut a long time to react to its containment. Taking 
for granted its hegemony among industrial workers in the Yishuv its ac-
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tivists were late to discern the implications of the economic boom of the 
war period on union organization. More signifi cantly, the Histadrut could 
hardly respond to the PDMA’s policy of union plurality. It did not control 
the entry of the new apprentices to the factories and the transition of the 
apprentices to fully employed workers, and it lacked the money to fi nance 
and feed the trainees. The Revisionists ran their own apprenticeship fund 
and the religious unions operated another separate scheme. The fund that 
the Tel Aviv Labor Council (a Histadrut organ) established together with 
the Jewish Agency to support the trainees could not adequately match 
the massive wave of young workers entering the industry. The collective 
agreement signed in the industry in late 1940, on which the Histadrut as 
one of the signatories could take pride in, did not result from its pressure 
on the PDMA to improve working conditions, but rather from the manu-
facturers’ strategy to quell potential labor unrest.68
The weakness of union presence was refl ected also in the fact that only 
in spring 1941, when the industry already employed some 1,300 workers 
and dozens of apprentices, would the Histadrut appoint a union bureau-
crat to coordinate activities in the factories in both Netanya and Tel Aviv. 
Pinchas Smagarinsky (1900–1966) had no background in diamond cutting, 
he had to depend on a Histadrut committee that handled the negotiations, 
and it took some time before he could command the respect of the young 
workers or that of the PDMA negotiators. The activists representing the 
other “minority organizations” were as pale, and their presence in the fac-
tories was often overshadowed by workers’ independent protest against 
the high apprentices’ fees paid for a place in the factory and for tools, and 
the barring of free movement between the factories. The pressure to make 
the representation of workers more felt would hardly come from these 
unions, whose activists seemed overwhelmed by the dramatic material 
success of the diamond industry, but rather from the workers themselves. 
The restraint of the workers’ collective power that the splintered union 
system aimed to achieve harbored therefore also the curtailment of the 
power that could restrain them. The strong propensity of the diamond 
workers to strike (discussed in chapter 5) was closely associated with this 
paradox.69
The differentiation in the workforce that followed the initial expansion 
of the industry in 1941–1942 deepened the impact of union splintering. 
The young apprentices who expected to start earning after three months 
of training were in dire need of fi nancing and care during the training 
period, and they felt exposed in particular when they lost or damaged 
the diamonds. They differed, however, from the larger group of accom-
plished diamond workers in their specialized functions, the hours they 
could work each day, and their distinct pay. The demands of these work-
ers varied from improving items on the collective agreement to freedom 
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of movement among the factories, easing the paternalistic atmosphere in 
the factories, holding back wages, ending with prevention of dismissals.70 
Finally, the expanding group of expert foremen, clerks, and work manag-
ers tended to organize independently and formed, through differentia-
tion from the cutters and polishers, particular interests and material de-
mands to fi t them. Clearly, the PDMA’s success in preventing Histadrut 
supremacy among the workers meant that the pay differentiation among 
the groups of workers would potentially be higher.71
The collective agreement in the industry could hardly satisfy the in-
creasingly diversifying needs of these groups. Moreover, their criticism 
against the unions of their organizational inadequacy added to the pres-
sure by the manufacturers against cohesive union power. Sporadic strikes 
in individual factories in 1941–1942 refl ected this criticism, as well as the 
growing number of nonaffi liated workers and their gathering in an or-
ganization of their own. The organization, the Supreme Committee (Ha-
Vaad Ha-Elion, established in early 1941), was a mixture of individual 
workers and Communists, and it turned into a serious source of opposi-
tion to the politically affi liated unions and a mouthpiece of the seething 
unrest in the factories. The pressure to respond to workers’ demands and 
the emergence of the Supreme Committee therefore forced the Histadrut 
and the “minority unions” to turn from mere accommodation with the 
PDMA’s union-splintering policy to a more active coalescence of interest 
and action.72
Less than a year passed since the establishment of the PDMA, and the 
Histadrut was facing three fronts—the manufacturers that prevented its 
hegemony in representing the workers, the “minority organizations” who 
also opposed the hegemony of the Histadrut among the workers, and the 
unaffi liated who criticized the Histadrut for its lack of action. The His-
tadrut tried in response to convince the other unions that its supremacy 
was worth their while. Once the idea was rejected, the Histadrut began 
a campaign to portray the “minority unions” as enemies of the diamond 
workers. Furthermore, it sought contact with the expert work managers 
and factories’ offi ce clerks so as to distance them from the manufactur-
ers and organize them independently from the workers. Needy workers 
were taken care of—by fi nancing their training, by loans to sustain the 
workers until apprenticeship was over, and by provision of temporary 
accommodation. A professional school for training diamond workers was 
planned by the Histadrut with the backing of the Jewish Agency so as to 
decrease the control of the manufacturers over the apprentices. Workers 
loyal to the Histadrut, usually those who originated in the Yishuv’s ag-
ricultural sector, were encouraged to apply for apprenticeship, and the 
selection of Histadrut youth was tightened so as to implant Histadrut cells 
in the factories. Hoping to weaken the manufacturers’ advantage in union 
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splintering, the Histadrut even tried to advance collective bargaining in 
individual factories without the PDMA’s intervention.73
Though most of these Histadrut plans and strategies were yet to ma-
terialize, they already at this early stage signaled the adaptation of or-
ganized labor to the PDMA’s show of force. It recognized that capital’s 
British-backed power ought to be contained by creating direct inroads to 
particular groups of workers in the factories who would then be mobiliz-
ing the rest of the workers. Moreover, recruiting the Jewish Agency and 
the PMA, whose intervention in the diamond industry the PDMA success-
fully pushed aside, seemed crucial. Such recruitment would put in prac-
tice the notion of the “triangular thread”; it would focus on joint national-
based fi nancial backing of the apprentices, on exerting pressure on the 
Colonial Offi ce in London, and on the Palestine government in Jerusalem, 
or even in provoking the Yishuv’s industrialists to alienate Ben-Ami and 
denounce the manner in which the PDMA was structured and operated. 
This was the context in which the contestation between capital and labor 
in the diamond industry and the Yishuv unraveled itself also as a battle 
over norms and images.
Zionist Legitimacy
The PDMA’s autonomous stances vis-à-vis the “triangular thread” and its 
backing by the colonial state provoked among the Zionist political and in-
dustrial elites a barrage of historical and social stereotypes against the dia-
mond manufacturers and the nature of their project. The independence of 
the diamond capitalists was criticized as lacking allegiance to the national 
institutions, preferring their profi ts and independence over Zionist state 
building and over cooperation with the more Zionist-obedient Manufac-
turers’ Association. The diamond industry was criticized for producing 
luxury items (mainly for the American middle class) and for threatening 
to create an anomalous structure of the Yishuv’s industry and export. The 
workers were blinded by the expected gain, they were nonproductive in 
the Zionist sense of norms of agricultural and industrial production, and 
they were steeped in unbridled indulgence of the acquisitive spirit and 
thus anathema to Zionist values. “The only Kosher person in this occupa-
tion is the worker,” remarked one writer in one of the periodicals of Labor 
movement in summer 1942 in a telling Hebrew wordplay between cleanli-
ness, legitimacy, and skillfulness. 
First he is the miner in enslaved conditions, and then he is the cutter and pol-
isher who for days on end lean their backs over the machines, inhale the dust 
which pierces their lungs, tone up their eye muscles and take blisters of burns 
on their fi ngers—and though they eat bread, plenty at times, in distress at oth-
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ers, at crisis they are fi rst to suffer hunger and unemployment. Evidently some-
thing of this atmosphere sneaks into Labor too, into the workers’ organizations 
and to their mentality. At times the deceptive glare of the diamond dazzles 
them too, many haste to get richer, as if in a “gold panic,” wishing to precede 
their friends, to tread on them, all regarding their work as a jumping board into 
the obscure mystery of the systems of great, swift and easy profi t.74
The meaning of such adversarial expressions was clear. If the profi ts 
accrued from exporting fi nished diamonds were harnessed to the Zionist 
project, if they would benefi t not solely the capitalists and the British, the 
industry would be legitimate and the derogatory imagery would become 
irrelevant. Moreover, the problem was less with the capitalist nature of 
the industry but rather with its mirroring the incapacity of Zionism to 
fully engineer its social forces and control their acts, in particular when 
their autonomous action was supported by the Palestine government and 
economically by growing demand in the US for stones polished in Pales-
tine. The resonance of these marginalizing images, springing mainly from 
the Department of Trade and Industry at the Jewish Agency and from the 
trade union department of the Histadrut, seemed to affi rm that the state-
backed capitalism that the diamond industry came to symbolize was in-
deed taking root in Palestine.75
The central economic role of private capital in Palestine and its social 
acceptance in the Yishuv had been gradually advancing since the early 
rise of manufacturing in the mid-1920s, despite contemporary ambiva-
lence towards Jewish participation in a capitalist economy and towards 
the urbanization of the Zionist project. These intertwined economic and 
cultural processes further intensifi ed during the invigorated industrializa-
tion of the fi rst half of the 1930s, as refl ected in the parallel ripening of the 
industrial activity of the private sector in Palestine’s towns, the rhetoric of 
the national role capitalism came now to fulfi ll, and the recognized capac-
ity of capital to work for the “Zionist social good.” Built on the assimila-
tion of capital’s national role in Zionist state building, and pushed further 
to the center of economic activity by Palestine’s economic boom and Brit-
ish wartime protective economic policies, Jewish industrialists and manu-
facturers overcame the suspicion and even derogation they experienced 
in earlier decades regarding their social and Zionist roles—their “national 
egoism” as Labor’s leader David Ben-Gurion phrased it in the mid-1920s. 
As a part of its formation the diamond industry was now reproducing 
this battle, and during the fi rst half of the war period became one of its 
primary carriers.76
The “Zionization” of the historically Jewish-dominated diamond in-
dustry was indeed hard to advance. The Labor movement was politically 
a dominant force in the Yishuv but it accepted capitalist Zionism as long as 
in some measure it corresponded to the state-building policies of national 
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institutions and to tripartite economic and political cooperation between 
the Jewish Agency, the Palestine Manufacturers’ Association, and the His-
tadrut. As a national-oriented labor movement, however, the latter only 
objected to capital’s quest for total institutional independence (and in that 
joined forces with many of the Yishuv’s industrialists), but also couched 
it in an exclusionist terminology that made some diamond manufacturers 
sense that they were political and socially marginalized. “The reception 
accorded to this young industry both by the business community and by 
the authorities cannot be said to have been invariably friendly or encour-
aging,” Ben-Ami reported to the British in October 1942. “Some viewed 
it with disfavor as a ‘bastard industry,’ rather off the beaten track of ‘nor-
mal’ industrial development, while there were many who regarded such 
an industry in times of war as a ‘luxury’ venture. But results and solid 
achievements belied the worst fears of the skeptics as well as the gloomy 
prophecies of the critics.”77
The “anti-diamond” rhetoric seemed to the circle of diamond manu-
facturers and diamond factory owners an empty diatribe that could be 
overturned swiftly once their autonomy was compromised. And indeed, 
the more the Jewish Agency realized the powerful economic performance 
of the industry during the war, the more it was willing to relax its es-
trangement from the industry. For Ben-Ami the introduction of a diamond 
industry to his small town of Netanya was to industrialize it, to attract 
the young, to urbanize. This was part and parcel of his Zionism, earlier 
founded on land acquisition, territorial expansion, and the designation of 
land and rural plantations to Jewish ethnic exclusiveness. But while the 
earlier vision was local, within the confi nes of Palestine, the diamonds 
widened the horizons. They could serve a national cause by modern-
ization, international networking, and world trade. The earlier sense of 
the capitalist road to Zionist realization could now ripen in the Yishuv 
by springing out of the narrow locality and joining successfully in world 
capitalist competition. That was why according to the PDMA’s logic all 
was to be harnessed to the cause—effi ciency, productivity, regimentation. 
Indeed, the long-standing traditions of skilled cutting, cleaving, and pol-
ishing were nothing but a basis upon which organizational novelty and 
technological advancement could fl ourish.78
The PDMA’s pride in technological innovation was indeed part of the 
Zionist discourse it increasingly cultivated. As we saw earlier, the German 
occupation of Belgium in May 1940 abruptly curtailed the scheme to trans-
plant a more massive part of the industry from Antwerp, and the number 
of diamond merchants, experts, and workers who arrived in Palestine was 
small. Consequently capital owners and a substantial amount of capital 
had to be recruited locally, apprentices had to be selected from the local 
young labor force, and, no less signifi cant, the cutting machines and other 
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cutting and polishing devices had to be produced locally. Technological 
innovation followed suit, and it joined the specialized division of the pro-
duction process in enabling the leaps the Palestine diamond industry was 
making and in cementing its world reputation. These developments were 
now couched in a national vocabulary, in legitimating the luxury industry 
in the context of Zionist state building, and in placing those employed in 
diamonds on a similar footing with other social contributors to the Zionist 
economic cause.79
The presence of Zionist discourse in the diamond industry was an ob-
vious corollary of its transplantation to Palestine. Jews in diamonds from 
Antwerp were directed to Palestine, to the Yishuv, and away from other 
diamond-cutting centers. Before the German occupation those who com-
mitted themselves to the project signed an obligation to settle in Netanya, 
and their diamond operation was oriented towards industrializing a Jew-
ish and a Zionist spot. During the war Jewish refugees were sought af-
ter to reach Palestine and the transplantation of the industry increasingly 
meant the enhancement of the Zionist project in Palestine. The industry’s 
social structure played an essential role, as well as the industry’s national 
character. No Arabs, Muslims, or Christians, no other ethnic or religious 
group, found its way into the ranks of manufacturers and workers. 
Netanya, destined by Ben-Ami and the British to serve as the center 
of the industry, was a Jewish townlet, and its chief industry would carry 
similar social traits. This ethnic selection contrasted with the social mix 
prevalent in the prewar diamond industries in the Low Countries. How-
ever, it also conformed to the pattern of Jewish refugees in the US, Cuba, 
and London in setting up diamond businesses. In Palestine such ethnic 
closure was directly related to the national splitting of the economy be-
tween Arabs and Jews, to the national divide the Arab-Jewish confl ict had 
been shaping in the country, and to the British role in sustaining these 
divisions. Moreover, the richness of cultural techniques employed by the 
industry to associate itself with Zionist culture testifi ed to the need to have 
this association manufactured and even forced as part of larger power 
struggle for recognition and social advancement. Some were overt, as in 
the case of the names the manufacturers gave their factories (see appendix 
A.1). Ophir and Tarshish anchored the factories in the biblical landscape. 
Yahalom, Nofekh, and Bahat were various expressions of diamonds in He-
brew and stressed the stones on the Ephod, the cloth of the great Cohen 
in the temple, thus widening the biblical landscape to include a deeper 
religious association. The association of the industry with the Biblical, He-
brew, and Zionist resources of images and metaphors was clearly an ad-
ditional cultural statement on the nature of the industry as an integral part 
of the Jewish community. Moreover, it added to the manufacturers’ sense 
of being members of a collective. There were factories that carried the 
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names of the owners. This was imperative because of changes of owner-
ship. However, there seemed to be interplay between this individualistic 
form and the masking of the individuals by the factory’s self-association 
with the national tradition. Interestingly it added another layer to the col-
lective memory in the industry as those employed in the industry in the 
past often referred to their old workplaces by the names of the owners and 
not by the real names of the factories.80
The most formal of all was the translation into Hebrew of tools and pro-
cesses. It pointed to the cultural orientation propounded by the industry’s 
captains, and Ben-Ami in particular, to join the “Hebrew revolution” that 
he was so close to when coediting Doar Hayom with the Hebrew renewal-
ist Eliezer Ben Yehuda in the 1920s. Moreover, the national transliteration 
of the industry’s vocabulary was far from confi ned to the manufactur-
ers. The few bulletins produced by workers themselves in the factories, 
such as Hatzohar (the Aperture) and Hasapir (the Sapphire), testifi ed to the 
cross-class nature of the phenomenon.81
The terminology the manufacturers used to challenge Labor’s negative 
images of the diamond industry, as can be gauged from the PDMA’s meet-
ings and correspondence, alluded evidently to a twenty-year-old contro-
versy in the Zionist Movement on the correct road (public or private) to 
Zionist state building. In focusing on the effi ciency of private capital and 
on the imperative to postpone socialist experimentation to the period af-
ter a Zionist entity in Palestine materialized, the diamond manufacturers 
reproduced those elements of the 1920s debate that provided the diamond 
industry with an image of a fi tting economic project, risky and success-
ful, promising and real. Their independence was justifi ed only because 
it was part of the Zionist project. The adaptation of the labor process, the 
plurality of union representation, and the consequent paternalism at the 
workplace were justifi ed economically and nationally. It was a paternal-
ism based not on the owner and employer just as a capitalist, but also 
as the source of inspiration for the linking of capital and nation, and the 
harnessing of capital accumulation to the Zionist cause. As was argued 
earlier, this combination of capitalist-driven effi ciency and time, played 
a role in a sort of “Zionization” of the labor process that would later be 
perceived and advanced as a lever of international competition.82
The language of the diamond manufacturers expressed in the rich min-
utes of the PDMA, its correspondence with various institutions, and the 
press revealed, however, also utilitarian conceptions that aimed to legiti-
mize capital’s roles in the wartime economy. The argumentation, partly 
novel in the Yishuv’s capitalist discourse, focused on the industry’s high 
productivity and the expected income from foreign trade. They were part 
of the Allies’ war effort and had a role to play in absorbing refugee cut-
ters and polishers from the Low Countries who were otherwise turned 
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into forced labor in the diamond-cutting workshops in Europe. They ad-
vanced the moral legitimacy of the Zionist economy in Palestine to in-
herit the German diamond industry (which competed with the Belgians 
in the 1930s), and played a key role in relaxing economic competition with 
Belgium through weaving international connections among the manufac-
turers and the diamond workers unions. The diamond industry in Pales-
tine was a legitimate heir to Amsterdam and Antwerp, standard-bearer 
of long-standing European traditions in cutting and polishing and of the 
continuous presence of Jews in this particular niche. In this self presen-
tation the diamond industry imagined therefore a world in which Zion-
ism—despite the war and the persecution of Jews—did not reject its Jew-
ish and European pasts but continued them through transplantation and 
adaptation. In this local politics of identity negotiated between the PDMA 
and the “triangular thread,” the reality in Europe came to play a key role, 
and the more economically successful the industry in Palestine became on 
the international level (as it did) the more legitimate it would become in 
Yishuv society itself.83
The diamond industry did not merely reproduce the ideological con-
tention in the Yishuv over the proper way to Zionist state building, but 
adapted and equipped it with a new vocabulary. The language the manu-
facturers and the diamond entrepreneurial organizers used created essen-
tial slots of meanings that would later legitimize the unshackling of capital 
and the weakening of the Zionist Labor movement. The terminology ide-
alized both the private-capital road to the materialization of Zionism, and 
service to the British Empire as a cultural means for securing the state’s 
sheltering and espousal of capital. More specifi cally it revered entrepre-
neurial capital and its independence, to the point of actually presuming 
to surpass other social forces as main builders of Zionist sovereignty. Not 
interrupting capital’s way; enabling its ambitious search for markets and 
skilled work; culturally legitimizing its social individualism, institutional 
independence, and high living standards—these were increasingly becom-
ing their routine claims and accepted norms.84 Furthermore, the battles of 
the diamond industry stressed that capitalism and its legitimization were 
both an internal Yishuv affair and, because of the manner of its formation, 
tightly linked to exogenous forces and events. Through the prism of the 
diamond industry the economic and social boundaries of Palestine’s Zi-
onist polity seemed blurred, assimilating not only in larger political and 
military systems, but also in imperial economic networks and rival inter-
national interests.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Illustration 3.1. Diamond cutting. Illustrations from the 1940s.
Source: Heinrich Goldmann, The Diamond and its Making. Tel Aviv, 1946.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Illustration 3.2. A diamond expert polisher in Tel Aviv in the late 1930s.
Source: J.B. Hobman, Editor, Palestine’s Economic Future: 
A Review of Progress and Prospects. London, 1946.
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Chapter 4
THE CHALLENGE AND ITS CONSTRAINTS

Under the pressure of the Belgian diamond interests concerned active 
machinery has been set up in London for the defense of Belgian diamond 
interests. We submit that it would be only fair if we too were afforded 
similar facilities for maintaining direct personal contact with all the fac-
tors concerned, especially with a view to convincing the Belgians that our 
own industry in Palestine will not be a rival of theirs, and that in post-
war plans we could cooperate to the benefi t of both of us.
—Oved Ben-Ami to John L. Fletcher, 12 January 1944, 
ISA/RG 5/1463/19.
In Antwerp’s Absence
The PDMA’s steadfast guarding of its autonomy and right for social incor-
poration in the Yishuv would not have been possible but for the dramatic 
performance of the nascent industry. Indeed the take-off of diamond cut-
ting during the war gave the manufacturers an economic confi dence in 
such a short span of time that they often seemed too self-assured to the 
bureaucrats at the Jewish Agency and to the workers’ unions and were 
occasionally disparaged. This imagery, cultivated by the enclosed ecology 
of the diamond-cutting workplace and the secretive aura of the PDMA’s 
inner deliberations and ties with the Diamond Syndicate, was perhaps the 
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clearest symptom of the penetration of capitalist culture. The confi dence 
of the manufacturers found expression also in the Hebrew and English 
press, while outside Palestine it evoked praise and amazement, partly be-
cause of the reputed fl uctuations of the diamond business.1
In London, in particular, where exiled Belgian circles were planning 
their postwar future, the information coming out of Palestine on the ex-
pansion of its export of polished diamonds to the US seemed menacing. 
This was indeed puzzling. If upon the birth of the industry the British and 
De Beers imposed on the diamond industry in Palestine the principle of 
“limited expansion,” and if COFDI’s activity in London was a constant 
reminder to the authorities in the United Kingdom that Belgium’s future 
recovery should not be compromised—how could the spurt of the Pales-
tine diamond industry that these reactions testifi ed to be explained?
The historian is fortunate that the swift expansion of the industry in the 
early 1940s has been accounted for and interpreted over and over again by 
contemporaries. The industry itself felt a persistent need to shape its pur-
chasing and selling policies on the basis of daily analysis of the American 
market and the demand capacities of places such as India and Canada. Re-
porting to the British on exports was an essential component in relations 
between the PDMA, the DTC, and the authorities. The committees occa-
sionally established in Palestine and London to regulate the diamond in-
dustry and plan its future amassed an enormous amount of testimonies of 
manufacturers, merchants, workers, and bankers on the industry and its 
peculiarities. Above all, the distinct image contemporaries held—abroad, 
no less than in Palestine itself—of the sudden and breathtaking progress 
of the industry popularized the affairs of the manufacturers and workers, 
made the daily press a consistent reporter of its changing motions, and 
produced a climate of both curiosity and suspicion. Mostly emphasized in 
these sources was the extent to which the spurt was a multifaceted phe-
nomenon, originating in a complex of intersecting material and political 
contexts and forces and continuously depending on market fl uctuations 
and political circumstance.2
Let us begin with resources. The occupation of Belgium created the cru-
cial precondition for the growth of the Palestine diamond industry dur-
ing the war—the absence of Belgian competition. Long before all other 
causes for the spurt emerged, the paralysis of the Belgian diamond trade 
and industry was the key factor enabling the proliferation of other centers 
including Palestine’s. The creation of COFDI in London in autumn 1940 
aimed to bring back Antwerp into the competitive scene after the termina-
tion of the occupation, but it could only attempt at containing Palestine’s 
advance, not its total thwarting. Thus as a replacement for Belgium’s pre-
war hegemony the industry in Palestine could thrive on the noncompeti-
tive climate that the German occupation of the Low Countries created. 
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German diamond products also disappeared temporarily from the Ameri-
can markets following aggressive Allied economic warfare and trading 
embargoes. Other countries (South Africa and Brazil, for example) could 
achieve a marketing advantage in America if they exported industrial dia-
monds; but in cutting small stones they could hardly surpass the quality 
of the Palestine product, nor its competitive price. These were the advan-
tages Palestine enjoyed during the war—and as we shall see in a later 
chapter would lose on Belgium’s return to business.3
In such a climate Palestine could use to the full the success of De Beers 
and its selling organization. World War II marked a continuous rise in 
world sales of rough diamonds by the DTC, and close links evolved be-
tween the needs created by the warring countries and the profi ts of the 
cartel. As can be seen in the table below, from the establishment of the Dia-
mond Syndicate in the mid-1930s until the end of the war in 1945 the cartel 
was a tremendously successful business giant on which many entrepre-
neurs and countries depended. Moreover, the supply of rough diamonds 
arriving from the syndicate, and on which Palestine was dependent (de-
spite a fl ourishing Middle Eastern black market in diamonds), was part of 
this signifi cant upturn in De Beers’s world sales. By mid-1942 sales were 
almost double the prewar quantities, and compared to 1939 they increased 
at the end of the war in 1945 by almost 300 percent.4









1941 5.4 2.0 7.4
1942 6.25 4.25 10.7
1943 15.0 5.4 20.4
Source: Albert Ehrenfeld, “Israel Diamond Industry,” Israel Economist Annual—1952 (Je-
rusalem, 1953): 137; Albert Ehrenfeld, “Israel Diamond Industry in 1953 and 1954,” Israel 
Economist Annual—1954 (Jerusalem, 1955): 113.
Behind this increase were the war, the economy the warring countries 
ran, and the war-related individual consumption of diamonds. States’ 
policies revealed a twofold picture. On the one hand the industrial uses 
of rough diamonds were crucial to the warring and nonwarring countries 
alike. The properties of hardness and durability made diamonds important 
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for the automotive and aircraft industries. Diamond tools were known to 
last long, work fast, and offer precision in cutting various substances, and 
their use in optical manufacturing and in drilling gas and oil turned them 
indispensable. On the other hand states advanced and protected their dia-
mond industries in order to expand exports and gain the American dollars 
so direly needed during these times of war and economic warfare. And 
they could do so partly because of the reserves of high-quality rough dia-
monds the syndicate accumulated during the depression of the 1930s that 
allowed their sale at low prices.
This mix of state and business sources for growth was greatly assisted 
by the fact that the Belgian Congo, Sierra Leone, and South Africa were 
kept outside the orbit of the war, and their mined and alluvial diamonds 
could be sent continuously to London for sorting and distribution. But-
tressing this continuity was Forminière, the Belgian group of producers of 
diamonds in the Kasai province in the Belgian Congo, which maintained 
the arrangement with De Beers to market the diamonds mostly through 
the syndicate. So was the De Beers’s subsidiary, the Sierra Leone Selection 
Trust. As we saw earlier, one of SLST’s directors, Mathias, played a crucial 
role in diamond advising at the Ministry of Economic Warfare and in the 
development of the industry in Palestine.5
In this diamond production scene, Palestine had a clear role. Its dia-
mond industry was part of the gem-quality diamond business, not of 
the industrial one. And it was perceived by the British as an exporting 
mechanism of fi nished diamonds for obtaining American dollars, and 
thereby maintaining the economic war effort—in the Middle East and be-
yond. Stones of less quality and fi t for industrial uses, or crushed diamond 
powder used in the cutting process, were excluded, and were ordered by 
the British to be sent from Palestine back to the syndicate.6 Moreover, the 
small stones the syndicate sent through Hennig & Co. were drawn from 
De Beers reserves accumulated during the 1930s. This made the industry 
in Palestine a “designed customer” of rough diamonds, feeding directly 
from the London selling mechanism, and only indirectly from the mines 
in Africa.7
In the absence of the purchasing activity of Antwerp, the Diamond Syn-
dicate’s sales to Palestine during the war grew dramatically. One estimate 
pointed to an annual LP1.5 million purchase of the total quantity of gem 
stones the syndicate sold of LP15 Million during 1942–1943. Of the total 
turnover of the syndicate of small stones (Sand and Melees), Palestine’s 
share was 30–50 percent annually.
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1940 11 25 80.74
1941 58 154 69.21
1942 179 372 69.56
1943 472 1,139 64.17
Note: Eight-cut is also known as “old single-cut.”
Source: Editor, “The Diamond Industry,” The Israel Economist Annual 1949–1950 (Jerusalem, 
1950): 149. 
This tremendous increase—and the predominant share of small stones 
therein—testifi ed to the policy of the British and De Beers to assure steady 
supplies. However, they also demonstrated the reciprocity created be-
tween De Beers’s needs to sell their reserves on the one hand, and the 
industry in Palestine to stand on its feet on the other. The reciprocity was 
greatly assisted by the favorable attitude of the British, as was refl ected in 
the absence of customs duties. As a typical wartime industry, the steady 
supply of the raw material was a crucially determinant factor in the rate 
of growth. Evidently speedy development was achieved by a noted differ-
ence from the prewar Belgian diamond industry where polishing owners 
bought the rough diamonds not directly from the syndicate but from Bel-
gian dealers. The direct link between the PDMA and the syndicate that the 
British encouraged cancelled out this problem and signifi cantly lowered 
the purchasing costs for the owners and manufacturers—in particular, as 
the prices in America for polished stones rose during the war by almost 70 
percent. Consequently, compared to 10 percent average profi t for a single 
diamond manufacturer in prewar Belgium, in Palestine profi ts soared to 
30 percent and even to 40 percent. No wonder the nascent industry was 
so attractive for capital owners in Tel Aviv, Netanya, and Jerusalem, and 
for many who had no previous stake or background in diamond cutting 
and trading.8
The increase in the Diamond Syndicate’s sales and the fact that all Pales-
tine’s fi nished stones were destined (by a government directive) for export 
draws our attention to consumption and in particular to the American 
consumer. Individual consumption of jewelry diamonds has been mostly 
based on the demand for diamond-set engagement rings—the consumers 
seeking symbols of everlasting love, marital bond, or investment. As a lux-
ury item (which included also small stones set in watches and bracelets) 
diamonds have always been valued by individual consumers because of 
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their cost, their utility deriving from showing off wealth, from using dia-
monds as a store of value, and by giving them as a gift of value. This has 
been known to all involved in the industry as the “diamond effect”—its 
value counting much more than the diamond itself or its size. That was 
why during economic boom the consumers’ demand for diamonds rose 
and during crises (economic depressions and wars)—when currency was 
restricted or foreign exchange rates were destabilized—speculators joined 
in and further increased the demand.9 The consumption of diamonds in 
the United States in 1940–1943 followed this pattern.
Palestine’s dependency on demand for polished diamonds in the US 
was grounded, however, in a wider historical tradition. The demand for 
diamonds in America after the Civil War of 1861–1865, and the discover-
ies of diamond mines in South Africa and Brazil in the late 1860s, were 
infl uential factors in the boom of the Dutch diamond industry after 1870 
(known as the Cape period). It also affected the large-scale absorption of 
Jews as diamond workers in Amsterdam and the fl ourishing of diamond 
trading in the Dutch Jewish community.10 American consumption of dia-
monds clearly affected the diamond industry of 1920s Antwerp, and the 
fall in American demand during the Great Depression equally impacted 
employment levels of the city’s diamond cutters and polishers.11
Moreover, parallel to the birth to the cutting and polishing industry in 
Palestine, a related and relevant process was taking place in the United 
States. In 1937–1938 the prices of diamonds in Europe were on the decline 
and De Beers was forced to improve its market strategy for the Ameri-
can consumer. This resulted in one of the more infl uential commercial 
campaigns in history, conducted by De Beers and the American Ayer & 
Son advertising company. Which focused on strengthening the associa-
tion between the engagement ritual and the diamond engagement ring 
in the minds of American consumers. Concurrently many speculators 
exploited the downturn of prices of diamonds in the late 1930s and ac-
cumulated stocks that they would sell now in better prices. Thus already 
before America’s entry to the war in December 1941 diamond acquisition 
by consumers and speculators increased, the price of diamonds soared, 
and it reached in the following years the peak that fi ttingly served Pal-
estine. Partly based on the increasing purchase of diamonds as a safer 
replacement for bonds and an infl ation hedge, and partly on the popular-
ization of the diamond ring in engagement rituals, the demand for pol-
ished diamonds rose, surpassing even the levels of the Allies’ demand for 
industrial diamonds.12
Palestine could benefi t therefore from the advancing of diamond con-
sumption in wartime—encapsulated, as noted in 1943 by a diamond ana-
lyst in Palestine, in the slogan “You cannot ration romance.” Be that as it 
may, the main reason why the growing American demand for fi nished 
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stones was oriented towards Palestine was the paralysis of the Low Coun-
tries and the severing of linkages between the American market from these 
traditional cutting centers. The demand also followed the quickly spread-
ing recognition that the industry in Netanya and Tel Aviv had successfully 
replaced Antwerp and the German centers of Hanau and Idar Oberstein. 
Palestine became known now for its specialization in the small stone, it 
could thrive on the image of the transplantation of the know-how and 
skill from Antwerp, it made all aware of the inventive adaptations of the 
cutting machines practiced in its factories, and it could benefi t from the fa-
vorable evaluation by international diamond circles of the fi ne workman-
ship of the Palestine industry in stones of small sizes. Other centers such 
as England, Puerto Rico, Rio de Janeiro, or Cuba lagged behind Palestine 
because of their size; the wider variety of stones they cut, which harmed 
cutting quality; and Palestine’s superior cutting technology.
There was, however, another reason for the American focus on Pales-
tine. While the offi cial rate of exchange between the American dollar and 
the British pound caused wages of diamond workers in Palestine to be 
considerably high, for the standards of living in the United States they 
were still considerably low. The gap excluded the possibility of competi-
tion between Palestine and the cutting centers in the US that cut small 
diamonds. Finally, Jewish diamond merchants and dealers in New York 
campaigned now to boycott diamond trading with the Germans and to 
focus on Palestine products instead. After all, the latter were known to be 
relatively cheap, steadily supplied by De Beers, and backed by the British 
authorities.13
The boom in the diamond industry should also be understood in a lo-
cal context. Since the beginning of British Mandate rule Palestine experi-
enced two economic upsurges—in the mid-1920s and early 1930s—but 
they were pale in comparison to the dimensions of the economic change 
brought about by World War II. Previous booms were associated with Jew-
ish immigration to Palestine and with the import of capital and skill. The 
boom of the early 1940s, which followed the cessation of immigration to 
Palestine, was entirely the result of the outbreak of the war. It was the de-
mand created by the British Army and the turning of the Middle East into 
the Allies’ supply center that allowed the capital and skill that had gath-
ered in Palestine in the 1930s to ripen and become operational. Industry 
surpassed agriculture as a leading sector, unemployment that had greatly 
troubled Palestine on the eve of the war disappeared, the living standards 
among both the working and the middle classes increased, and as usual in 
such periods, workers became more militant, sensing the opportunity to 
extract gains in wages and employment conditions from their employers. 
In all these parameters the diamond industry, which became by 1943 the 
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world’s largest single source of small gem diamonds, expanded incompa-
rably much higher and quicker.14












1940 August 6 420 60 500 120,000
1941 May 12 1,000 200 1,200 125,000
1942 May 33 2,100 400 2,500 132,000
1943 September 33 3,341 418 3,759 138,000
1944 March 32 2,875 455 3,601 143,000
1945 May 33 3,650 399 4,043 152,000
Sources: NCA, G/101/760 and 124/1027; Gurevich, Workers’ Wages; Oved Ben-Ami, “Die 
Diamantindustrie in Palastina,” Schweizer Goldschmied 5 (May 1948): 32–33; “The Diamond 
Industry,” The Israel Economist Annual 1949–1950 (Jerusalem, 1950): 148; Gershon Cwydrov-
ich, “Manpower and Working Age in the Yishuv,” Hameshek Hashitufi  (30 January 1948): 
8–11.
Figure 4.1 Diamond workers as percentage of Palestine’s Jewish workers
Sources: NCA, G/101/760 and 124/1027; Gurevich, Workers’ Wages; “Die Diamantindust-
rie in Palastina,” Schweizer Goldschmied, 5 (May 1948); “The Diamond Industry,” The Israel 
Economist Annual 1949–1950 (Jerusalem, 1950): 148; Gershon Cwydrovich, “Manpower and 
Working Age in the Yishuv,” Hameshek Hashitufi  (30 January 1948): 8–11.
What were the effects? The growth of the diamond industry refl ected 
the impact of the war on the booming of the Palestine economy: fi rst, 
the short span of time in which the factories and workforce were created 
and second, in coming very quickly to resemble other typical war-related 
industries such as food, clothing, and machinery in the high number of 
workers per plant. 
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Table 4.4 Growth of industry in Palestine’s Jewish sector, 1937 & 1943
          Plants           Personnel
Personnel 
per plant
1937 1943 1937 1943 1943
Food  290 383 3,676 7,377 19.7
Metal Works  178 191 1,957 5,716 29.9
Textiles  86 247 1,508 5,632 22.8
Chemical Products  71 180 2,002 4,795 26.6
Machinery  88 208 915 4,058 19.5
Diamonds  - 32 - 3,571 111.6
Clothes  124 184 1,264 2,802 15.2
Printing & Paper  157 193 2,282 2,226 11.5
Electrical Appliances  38 54 332 2,146 39.7
Stone & Cement  156 72 3,058 1,966 27.3
Leather  61 124 842 1,806 14.6
Woodwork  246 180 2,048 1,644 9.1
Miscellaneous  57 72 674 1,310 18.2
Total 1,552 2,120 20,594 45,049 21.2
Note: The fi rst two diamond workshops were established during 1937 and therefore were 
not recorded. At the end of 1940 there were 6 diamond plants, thus the bulk of the 32 plants 
were established in 1941–1942. In summer 1943 the number of factories was 33.
Sources: Industrial Census 1937 and 1943 according to David Gurevich, Aharon Gertz, and 
Arieh Zanker, Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine 1947 (Jerusalem, 1947); Shlomit Mishka, 
“Structural Changes in the Industry during 1939–1947,” Hamesehek Hashitufi  (5 August 
1948): 127–28.
Compared to the initiation of the diamond industry in the late 1930s, 
the extent of the phenomenon was indeed dramatic. In the four years be-
tween the end of 1939 and summer 1943 the number of diamond facto-
ries increased from 4 to 33, and the number of the employed from a mere 
100 to almost 3,800. Between 1941 and 1944 more than LP1.5 million was 
invested in the factories in purchase of raw material, wages, and acqui-
sition of machinery, and the number of sawing, cutting, and polishing 
machines increased from 2,937 to 6,841 respectively. These numbers may 
have concealed the characteristic lower added value of the diamond in-
dustry, namely, that the costs paid by the manufacturers on raw materials 
and labor decreased profi ts, but it hardly lessened the impact. Between 
1942 and 1945 the net labor productivity per worker employed in the dia-
mond industry increased from LP 244 to LP 718 and from LPP 676,000 
net branch productivity to LP 2,390,000. In 1945, only few years after its 
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establishment, the productivity of the diamond industry constituted some 
8 percent of all Palestine industry.15
The take-off was clearly seen in the increase in the export of the fi nished 
diamonds and in the central role the American market played in absorb-
ing these exports. While in 1941 the export of diamonds to the US and 
Egypt was largely similar, in the following year almost all exports were 
sent to New York, reaching in 1943 almost 90 percent of the entire export. 
The rest that year went from Palestine to Canada, Egypt, and India.
Table 4.5. Palestine’s diamond export, 1940–1943 (Carats and LP)
       Carats (% to USA)            LP (% to USA)
1940 1,032 (100.0) 25,000 (100.0)
1941 6,320 (98.6) 206,719 (96.7)
1942 25,280 (88.3) 926,156 (90.2)
1943 58,655 (88.3) 2,604,857 (88.6)
Sources: Government Report, 1946, 41; Ian W. Gaskin, “Palestine 1939–1945: A Study of 
Economic Colonial Policy,” D.Phil thesis (University of Oxford, 1992), table 6, 346; “The 
Diamond Industry,” The Israel Economist Annual 1949–1950 (Jerusalem, 1950): 148; Albert 
Eherenfeld, “Israel Diamond Industry,” Israel Economist Annual—1952 (Jerusalem 1953): 
138; Albert Eherenfeld, “Israel Diamond Industry,” Israel Economist Annual—1954 (Jerusa-
lem 1955): 113. 
The economic impact was decisive. In 1942 rough diamonds import 
was 7.5 percent of the entire value of imports of raw materials to Palestine 
and in 1943 it rose to 10.5 percent. The share of export of polished dia-
monds in Palestine’s entire export grew from 10.9 percent in mid-1942 to 
20.3 percent in late 1943. By 1944 the export value of polished diamonds 
surpassed the value of the entire export of Jewish industry and the value 
of the entire export of Palestine before the war. Its share in the overall 
world diamond export was growing steadily, thus making Palestine a 
world-class producer and exporter and a signifi cant actor in the war econ-
omy. Consequently, the dollar income of the British government and the 
Sterling Bloc expanded signifi cantly.16
Moreover, the shifting balance in the Yishuv from agriculture as leading 
sector on the eve of the war to diamonds as a chief exporting branch was 
one of the hallmarks of the war period. One estimate at the end of 1945 
was that the LP 300,000 accrued from the diamond industry was 3.5 per-
cent of all income in Palestine, above 5 percent of all income in the Yishuv, 
and much above 10 percent of the net income in the Jewish industry.17
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Table 4.6 Composition of Palestine’s merchandise export, 1939–1945 (%)








1939 74.5 4.1 78.6 - 21.4 21.4 100.0
1940 50.9 6.0 56.9 0.9 42.2 43.1 100.0
1941 1.8 16.6 18.4 10.0 71.6 81.6 100.0
1942 1.6 3.6 5.2 25.2 69.6 94.8 100.0
1943 4.3 2.3 6.6 35.5 57.9 93.4 100.0
1944 15.5 3.0 18.5 32.6 48.9 81.5 100.0
1945 14.8 5.8 20.6 42.3 37.1 79.4 100.0
Source: Based on the sources cited in Nachum Gross, Not by Spirit Alone: Studies in the Eco-
nomic History of Modern Palestine and Israel (Jerusalem 1999), 321. 
Figure 4.2 Composition of Palestine’s merchandise export, 1939–1945 (%)
Source: Based on the sources cited in Gross, Not by Spirit Alone, 321. 
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 Intermittent downturns could of course moderate the expansion. When 
in December 1941 the United States entered the war against Germany and 
Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the demand for engagement 
rings fell and prices dropped. In parallel, military recruitment in the United 
Kingdom reduced personnel at the syndicate, which were needed to sort 
the diamonds and care for their shipments. For these reasons Palestine 
experienced a temporary slowdown of production during the winter of 
1942, hitting some workshops quite badly and even provoking unrest and 
protest among the workers. However, if not for the restraints imposed on 
the industry—to which we will turn shortly—its expansion would have 
been much more intense. In a short time some 15,000 to 20,000 persons 
in Netanya, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem were fed by and made dependent 
on diamond production, changing Netanya’s social structure and urban 
landscape, and causing widespread amazement and baffl ement.18 
Table 4.7 Urban population in Palestine, 1931 and 1944
Total Jews
1931 1944 1931 1944
Total in Towns 420,940 825,880 145,334 415,380
Tel Aviv 47,431 166,660 46,363 166,000
Jaffa 55,346 94,310 7,749 28,000
Netanya 253 4,900 253 4,900
Jerusalem 90,503 157,080 51,222 97,000
Source: Government of Palestine. Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1944–1945. Jerusalem, 1945.
Among contemporaries there were those who were in favor of this 
“mushroom growth,” as some named it, stressed the industry’s absorptive 
capacity (of pre-1939 immigrants and unemployed), immense contribution 
to Palestine’s trade balance and to the war effort, and, no less so, its part in 
cementing the infrastructure for the Yishuv’s autonomous economy. But 
there were also those who suspected the speediness of the spurt, disliked 
the reliance of the Zionist polity and its industry on exogenous factors, or 
were simply saddened by the veering of the Yishuv towards manufactur-
ing of luxury goods for the world middle classes and towards capitalism 
per se. Hardly anyone failed to see the contrast between the exponential 
rise in standards of living in Palestine and the terrible fate of the Jews in 
Europe. The boom in production of a luxury item such as diamonds read-
ily seemed to be one of its blatant expressions.19
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The Politics of Supply 
The persistence of the expansion of the industry seemed certain as long as 
the Belgian diamond industry was paralyzed, the demand in New York 
for the Palestine-produced stones was unabated, and the chain system 
was eking out of the workers a high level of productivity in polishing 
small stones. Protected by the British, these factors coalesced into a rec-
ognized structure of activity that the Palestine manufacturers and work-
ers began to take for granted. However, weighty as these factors were in 
explaining the spurt, they could not be separated from a fundamental di-
mension on which the entire Palestine project depended—the supply of 
raw materials. As a dynamic system of relations and intersecting interests 
created by the conditions of the war, this dimension knew occasional fl uc-
tuations and much politics. The politics of supply was earlier explicated as 
a set of relations that unfolded in London between the PDMA, the MEW, 
and the DTC on the one hand, and the pressures exerted by the COFDI-
Belgian lobby on the other (see chapter 2). This politics was the arena of 
the industry’s “foreign relations” on which depended the decisions on the 
material lifeline of the industry, and which harbored the potential of the 
industry’s demise. 
Two vectors in this arena were clearly set on a path to clash. One was 
Palestine’s industry taking off and breaking the agreed-upon (but largely 
undefi ned) limitations on its expansion. The other was the quest of Bel-
gian diamond circles in London to see their industry in Antwerp recover 
the world supremacy it had enjoyed before being paralyzed by the Ger-
man occupation. The tension between the two forces was the reason why 
the PDMA’s president Ben-Ami spent so many months of the war in Lon-
don attempting to secure supplies of raw material. His telegrams to the 
PDMA, letters to his family, and the information he consistently took care 
to convey to the press revealed the extent to which the hard-fought cam-
paign for Palestine’s supplies, and by implication for its sustained growth, 
integrated the diamond factories and the PDMA’s offi ces in Netanya and 
Tel Aviv into a much larger geopolitical web.20
To reiterate—the main reasons why Palestine received supplies of raw 
diamonds from the Diamond Syndicate was Palestine's perceived role as 
an alternative to Antwerp, a barrier against diamonds reaching the Ger-
mans, a buyer of De Beers’s reserves, and a promising dollar-earner for 
the British. Once Palestine committed itself to buy rough diamonds only 
at the syndicate—and this commitment was guaranteed by the govern-
ment—stones began to arrive in Netanya and Tel Aviv. The Belgian gov-
ernment-in-exile and COFDI activists who often expressed their criticism 
of the cutting centers “taking advantage of Belgium’s misfortune” could 
not easily disrupt this new system. After all, they were hosted by the 
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country that led the anti-German campaign, and the British promised to 
regulate Palestine’s advancement. In a way, therefore, COFDI developed 
in confl ict with the active support the British gave the PDMA, a support 
that manifested itself, for example, in the British decision in late 1941 to 
include the Palestine diamond industry in the British-sponsored trade ex-
hibition in Cairo.21
Evidently, the attention of the Belgian government in London focused 
on building reserves for future recovery and less on the practical limita-
tion of Palestine’s advance—a role that the British took upon themselves 
and was expressed in supervising the selection of the PDMA’s members. 
In fact the exiled Belgians in London and the offi cials at the Foreign and 
Colonial Offi ces were never indifferent to Palestine’s advance, and, as we 
saw earlier, the slowdown at the turn of 1942 in admitting new manufac-
turers to the PDMA refl ected this international sensitivity. The “limited 
expansion” principle was never altered and was occasionally reiterated to 
the PDMA’s leaders as a precondition still in force for further supplies of 
raw material from the syndicate. However the stir that the spurt caused 
now was of a new scale because the context had changed.22
First and foremost was the entry of America to the war in late 1941, 
and its impact on relations with the Allies and the United Kingdom in 
particular. Matters relating to diamond production would now be part 
of the military and economic cooperation between the British and the 
Americans, and from 1943 onwards a joint Anglo-American diamond 
committee would intensively deal with the thorny issue of the wartime 
role and freedom of action of the De Beers cartel.23 The relevance of these 
contacts to Palestine was in the increasing importance of the minerals of 
the Belgian Congo (such as uranium, which was essential for the Manhat-
tan Project) to the American war economy, and consequently the need of 
the Allies to develop good relations with the Belgian government-in-exile 
in London.24
From this followed the second change—the splitting of the Belgian dia-
mond industry. One part was under German occupation and was swiftly 
adapted to the military, fi nancial, and ideological interests of Nazi Ger-
many. The other part was free. It consisted of the refugees in London, lead-
ing politicians such as Camille Huysmans who ran the exiled government 
and COFDI (see chapter 2), and activists in diamond production in the 
Belgian Congo, the resources of which were mobilized for the war effort. 
Palestine’s success seemed ominous to these actors, in particular because 
it specialized in the small stone, got hold of the American market, and 
turned into a regular customer of the syndicate. The argument the PDMA 
voiced since early on that it did not orient itself to compete with Belgium 
but rather to inherit the pre-1940 German diamond industry did not con-
vince the Belgians, who remembered well how much they had toiled to 
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reach their world supremacy in diamonds in the two decades before the 
war.25 Furthermore, what mattered most to the British and the Americans 
in view of the importance of the Belgian Congo was not to alienate the Bel-
gians. Any challenge to Belgium’s economic future was now sensitive, and 
the British dilemma between encouraging the production of diamonds in 
Palestine and limiting its expansion so as not to endanger the recovery of 
the Belgian diamond industry deepened.26
A third change raised the issue of regional control. By late 1941 the Ger-
mans already occupied most of Europe. As they were reaching the limits 
of their territorial expansion they began to prepare for a long war, aiming 
mainly to sustain the war against Russia. Consequently they increased 
the ruthless exploitation of the occupied countries, partly by hardening 
their attitude towards those who until the occupation were involved in 
the diamond industry. The “Aryanization” of the Belgian diamond in-
dustry advanced quickly during 1942, entailing confi scation of property, 
forced production, and completely excluding Jews from the rest of Belgian 
society. Similarly the proliferation of diamond-cutting centers (in Rio de 
Janeiro, Palestine, Puerto Rico, the Dutch East Indies, South Africa, the 
United States, Cuba, Venezuela, and British Guiana) widened the possi-
bilities open to the German to obtain diamonds and use them for either 
industrial needs or as a fi nancial resource. It was against this background 
that the Joint Boycott Council of the American Jewish Congress and the 
Jewish Labor Committee formed in late summer 1941 a committee to 
combat increasing German sales (of diamonds looted by the Nazis) in the 
US. Likewise, stricter control in Palestine aimed specifi cally against the 
emergence of what was defi ned as “uncontrolled” diamond trade and its 
spreading to the Middle East.27 Despite British efforts, large quantities of 
diamonds were informally traded in Egypt, Sudan, and Turkey, many of 
which reached the Germans.28
In this tense climate the challenge Palestine posed to “limited expan-
sion” was perceived in a new light. It not only posed a threat to the post-
war recovery of the Belgian diamond industry but also placed an addi-
tional burden on the British in their efforts to stem diamond traffi c from 
the Middle East to Germany. Moreover it menacingly provoked the Bel-
gians in London to use the Belgian Congo as a lever to press the Allies. As 
much as the diamond industry in Palestine served the war effort, it also 
seemed to harbor a price that was becoming too high for both the Belgians 
and the British to pay.29
The British authorities were not blind to the challenge Palestine was be-
ginning to pose both to “limited expansion” and to the logic of the COFDI 
response. Moreover, the industry continued to attract new capital owners 
and manufacturers and soon the British could witness the consequences 
of the rush—inner competitiveness over experts and supplies, overpro-
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duction in the factories, fl ourishing of home work, and deterioration of 
the quality of the polished stones. Fletcher and Walsh took care to make 
the PDMA aware of the limits they were about to cross. PDMA members 
were repeatedly reminded that they should conform to the rules laid on 
its establishment. They were warned in particular to avoid the temptation 
to buy diamonds not from the DTC but directly from dealers in diamond-
producing countries such as British Guiana and South Africa, or to market 
polished diamonds in Palestine and the Middle East. British worry that 
local, regional marketing would end in diamonds reaching the Germans 
tightened control over the factories as refl ected in the new insistence on 
accountability.30 Moreover, in August 1941 the PDMA and the British in-
spectors began to reject new applications for membership in the PDMA. 
“Honorable friends,” Ben-Ami wrote to the members in August 1941, 
“this decision does not intend to close ourselves, neither does it intend 
to prevent members as manufacturers to obtain monopolistic positions 
in this industry. Our branch is almost the only one that does not fear the 
competition and the growth in product quantities. However, this decision 
would serve as a shutter against many diffi culties and disturbances.”31 
None of these steps were fruitful, however, and for many international ob-
servers the growth of the diamond industry in Palestine seemed unstop-
pable. Indeed, the growth in production and exports during 1942 showed 
that what happened in Palestine since May 1940 was nothing less than 
spectacular, that the “limited expansion” principle was unrealizable, and 
that while Palestine served well the purposes set for it early in the war, it 
had to be further contained.32
In London the Belgians increased the pressure. The minerals in the Bel-
gian Congo were becoming so important for the British and the Americans 
that any signs that the Belgians would not market rough diamonds through 
London and the syndicate (based on the agreement that was about to be 
renewed in summer 1942) became a frightening prospect. Furthermore, 
the British noted that manufacturers in Palestine transgressed the rules set 
for the industry’s operation by accumulating a large stock of rough dia-
monds that were unsuitable for cutting and were supposed to be returned 
to London. The risk felt in London was that the rough diamonds would be 
traded illicitly and may even reach Middle Eastern markets and fi nally the 
Germans. Thus in July 1942 the CO ordered the government in Palestine to 
publish new Defense Regulations on diamond control. An elaborate sys-
tem of bookkeeping, complete with full monthly returns prepared under 
the supervision of chartered accountants, was introduced as compulsory 
in all the factories and at the PDMA’s offi ces. The system, placed under the 
new post in Palestine of the controller of Light Industries, and aimed in 
the fi nal instance to contain Palestine’s advance, applied a full control on 
each stone cut, from the moment of arrival in Palestine until its shipment 
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as a fi nished stone to world markets.33 The post of controller, held fi rst by 
John Leslie Fletcher, the Customs functionary who already in 1939–1940 
was instrumental in the establishment of the industry, formally intro-
duced Diamond Control in Palestine, refl ecting the British perception that 
the matter required special treatment and making all involved aware of 
the needed limitation. “The position today is extremely delicate,” warned 
Mathias in September 1942 at the MEW, “and every effort must be made 
to allay fears on the part of the Belgian Government that moves within 
the Empire may greatly interfere with the post-war industry in Antwerp 
(Palestine’s policy is rather frightening).” Indeed this was followed in the 
autumn by a clear British message to the PDMA that no additional facto-
ries would be approved from now on, no more manufacturing licenses 
would be issued, and no one would be allowed to become a shareholder 
in an existing factory without the approval of the light industries control-
ler. A standstill order was issued in November 1942 that set the number 
of manufacturers at a maximum of thirty-three—a ceiling that was to be 
maintained until the end of the war.34
In reality neither the formalization of British Diamond Control nor the 
restriction on local production pacifi ed the Belgians. CODFI, the represen-
tative of diamond interests, consequently became ever more vocal in 1943 
and openly used the lever of the minerals of Belgian Congo to curtail fur-
ther developments in the various cutting centers. Palestine was increas-
ingly caught in the politics of the rehabilitation in Europe after the war and 
part of a larger system that affected its factories. In this system the interest 
in keeping good relations with the Belgians gradually overshadowed the 
interest in Palestine’s role as a temporary alternative to Belgium or as an 
earner of foreign exchange. This was true both for the MEW and De Beers, 
the fi rst getting more involved in the periodic fl uctuations in supply of 
rough stones, the latter signaling its willingness to use the leverage of sup-
ply to avert Palestine’s becoming serious competition to postwar Belgium. 
The more the Palestine industry succeeded in the American market, the 
more the local means of its restraint seemed futile, the greater became the 
role of exogenous forces in responding to the challenges Palestine posed. 
That this entanglement occurred when the decimation of European Jewry 
was in full force and the Zionist Movement was decidedly demanding the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine deeply impacted the fate of the 
diamond industry.35
Adamant London
In August 1943 the Diamond Syndicate suddenly decreased the supply of 
the small stones to Palestine, and recommended that the diamond indus-
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try diversify the stones it was cutting from predominantly eight-cuts and 
Sand to Melees. If up to now eight-cuts were 75–80 percent of the output 
and Melees were the remainder, now the ratio would have to be changed 
to 80 percent Melees and 20 percent eight-cuts. Furthermore if the aver-
age size of the polished stones (in eight-cuts) was until now 70–80 stones 
per carat, now it would be 5–15 stones per carat (in Melees). This entailed 
obvious consequences—less labor needed to cut the stones, retraining 
workers to work on Melees, and higher prices of the Palestine stones for 
the American consumer. Three reasons were clearly behind this change 
of supply. First, the Sand on which the Palestine industry throve came 
in 1940–1943 from accumulated stocks from South African, Belgian Con-
golese, and Sierra Leonean mines, and these had dwindled. Second, the 
syndicate had obligations to the Belgian diamond-cutting industry and 
decided to take into consideration that what was mined in the Belgian 
Congo and sent to London would go mainly to them. Third, the supply of 
Sand to Palestine was a war measure and when the war was over, so it was 
argued, the quantities of Sand sent to Palestine would be negligible.36
The syndicate’s turnabout could have been anticipated. On the estab-
lishment of the industry in mid-1940, Palestine was recommended by 
Oppenheimer and Mathias not to specialize in a single type of stone and 
cut. Many voices were heard in those years from the experts and manag-
ers warning that specializing and too-speedy expansion were dangerous 
and problematic. All were aware of the fact that on Belgium’s liberation it 
would not tolerate the competition that this specialization harbored. How-
ever, when the change came, the shock was immense. It signaled that the 
trust the British had in the PDMA was cracking, and that they coalesced 
with the Belgians and the cartel to make the limitation of Palestine’s ex-
pansion more effective. The reign of the small stone, its overwhelming 
effect on production processes and employment relations, was about to 
end.37
To effect these changes, the Palestine government established in Au-
gust 1943 a Diamond Control Board (DCB), thus adding bureaucratization 
and formalization of the British presence in the industry to the change 
of supplies.38 The new institution had to report daily to the government 
on the regulation of the diamond industry, inspect its import and export 
activities, advise the PDMA on its internal affairs, and even deal with 
labor unrest. Its personnel told of its signifi cance—Geoffrey Walsh, the 
food controller and the government’s economic advisor, as its chair; John 
Fletcher of the Customs Department and controller of light industries, an-
other representative of the government’s fi nancial secretary; Oved Ben-
Ami and Yehoshua Mazur from the PDMA; Oscar Fischer, the diamond 
merchant and investor; and David Andreson of the Palestine Corporation. 
This group would soon be joined by Albert Ehrenfeld, one of the main 
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shapers of relations between the PDMA, the banks that backed the indus-
try, and the British authorities.39
If until summer 1943 the regimentation of the Palestine diamond indus-
try focused on selecting and licensing manufacturers and factories, now 
it would be enforced through the type of stones Palestine was allocated. 
It refl ected the conviction in London that effective control of the diamond 
industry was possible only through supply and a forced change in labor 
process, that is, the inevitable switch-over in production methods and labor 
training. As the US, Canada, and India relied heavily on Palestine’s output 
of small stones, their future purchases would have to orient themselves 
more to other centers (Brazil, Cuba, the US) and to postwar Antwerp. Fur-
thermore, Palestine diamond cutters would have now to improve quality 
and focus on a uniform standard of output. The change of stones ushered, 
therefore, also a new atmosphere of competition, long before the removal 
of protection that would take place two years later. As during this period 
the government also decided to allow marketing of stones in Palestine it-
self, an incipient sense of liberalization of controls and its use to moderate 
the power of the PDMA monopoly was equally emerging.40
The suddenness of De Beers’s change of supply policy took the PDMA’s 
members by surprise and effectively signaled a beginning of a breach in 
the trust in relations between Palestine and the DTC. Though Oppen-
heimer warned already in summer 1940 against Palestine’s objection to 
stone diversity and to its specialization in the cutting and polishing of 
Sand, the ambition and self-confi dence of the local manufacturers sealed 
their ears. Ben-Ami was from the start aware of the Belgian sensitivity 
regarding Palestine’s competitiveness but he heeded the warnings that 
the exiled Belgian government and diamantaires in London were power-
ful enough to steer the syndicate against Palestine’s challenge of “limited 
expansion.” Indeed, the Belgians made perfect use of their power in the 
Congo to let De Beers know that Belgian postwar recovery through Sand 
diamond cutting preconditioned Congo’s continuous supply of rough 
stones to De Beers. Palestine was part of this politics of supply and Ben-
Ami and George Prins (the PDMA’s great supporter among the syndicate 
and brokers’ circles in London) took it for granted in their business cal-
culations. The suddenness was therefore a calculated move. It prevented 
the activation of Zionist circles against the decision, and in creating an 
abrupt but real threat on diamond manufacturing in Palestine it stunned 
the PDMA out of a serious response. This was in fact the price Palestine 
had to pay for its dependence on De Beers, on British interests in Africa, 
and on the international politics of supply that placed on the chess board 
places as far away as Congo, Antwerp, London, and Netanya. Still, the 
radical change should be mainly ascribed to Belgian infl uence wishing to 
hamper any further competition in the production of small diamonds. It 
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was here, months before the end of the German occupation, that it planned 
its resumption of its prewar position.41
In a longer perspective the change of stone was as dramatic as the ini-
tial agreement by the DTC in winter 1940 to supply Palestine with Sand. 
First, it marked a deeper intervention of the British in Palestine’s industry. 
It left the PDMA no choice but to start adapting the labor process to a 
variety of stones, and through the DCB it formalized the control over the 
industry, which applied new means of pressure. All the means available to 
the PDMA to resist the change (the Zionist lobbies in London and Johan-
nesburg and the personal contacts with George Prins at Hennig & Co.) 
seemed weaker than the means of control and dependence employed by 
the MEW-DCB axis. It was not surprising therefore that the manufactur-
ers would soon start searching for alternative sources of Sand supply (in 
British Guiana for example) and that this search would turn in 1944–1945 
into a heated contention with the government.42
The second effect of the change was the adaptation in the factories. 
Many of the workers would have now to be retrained, adapt themselves to 
new types of stones and cuttings, and cultivate new specialization. Many 
workers would become unemployed in the process, some would have to 
leave the industry altogether, and new ones would have to be screened. 
Those workers who could handle a variety of stones and sizes would be-
come more secure and privileged than the less skilled and the newcomers. 
In turn relations with the unions would change and items in the collec-
tive agreement would have to be renegotiated with the Histadrut (which 
would be empowered by the process). Furthermore, the stone-diversifi ca-
tion process increased the signifi cance of the function of the work manager 
who sorted and distributed the stones to the workers and oversaw their 
work. The number of work managers would consequently increase and 
strengthen their separate professional organization. These effects accentu-
ated the extent to which policies decided upon in Europe could impact the 
furthest corners in Palestine’s civil society.43
The third corollary was refl ected in the PDMA itself and the organiza-
tion of the industry. The atmosphere in the PDMA was one of instability 
and anxiety. Many manufacturers sensed a reduction in production or a 
coming loss of business as a result of the Belgian threat. The opposition 
exploited the change to blame Ben-Ami and the executive for lack of fore-
sight and for not preparing the manufacturers for the coming change. The 
call to investigate Ben-Ami’s private share in the PDMA’s budget became 
ever more vocal. Furthermore, the demand for more freedom of action in-
tensifi ed, in particular the freedom of movement of experts from factory to 
factory to ease the diversifi cation. The DCB would now become an essen-
tial address of the discontented manufacturers who realized Ben-Ami’s 
dependence on London and deference to the government. The centraliza-
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tion in the PDMA was now spoken of not as an asset, a means to maintain 
the monopoly, but a burden, an outdated form of running the industry. 
This was true in particular with regard to export and marketing strategies. 
Many now felt the need to free Palestine of its dependence on the American 
market and relocate business to India, Brazil, and the Middle East itself. 
Diversifi cation in markets was closely associated with the demand that 
the PDMA should rid itself of its exporting function and with the freedom 
of trade. The stone change seemed now to begin undoing the suppression 
of individual trading and of the members of the Diamond Club that since 
its institution in spring 1940 was one of hallmarks of the opposition to the 
PDMA. No wonder that in late 1943 the DCB allowed the establishment of 
an independent organization of exporters and for the fi rst time after three 
years merchants who were not necessarily cutters or manufacturers were 
allowed to export diamonds. This was a signifi cant step towards liberal-
ization of controls that would take place after the war.44
Closely associated to foreign trade, the fourth effect of the stone change 
was on Palestine’s relations with Europe. In December 1943 CODFI an-
nounced great victories over the industries of Palestine and Brazil. The 
Palestine industry would need now to maintain the trust relations with 
the Diamond Syndicate in order to secure some quantities of Sand and 
further quantities of Melees. Searching for other sources of supply could 
disrupt relations in particular as the war was not yet over. Belgium’s favor 
among the managers of the syndicate was now a signifi cant factor in re-
vamping the language of Palestine’s moral right to inherit the Germans.
But were the stone change and its effects just restraining Palestine’s 
usurpation of Antwerp’s prewar hegemony in cutting and exporting 
small stones, or were they practically threatening to halt the intensive 
growth of the industry? The issue was crucial because it exposed the Ja-
nus-faced nature of British policy and its effects on capital and industry in 
Palestine. Evidently the various dimensions of the boom of the industry 
demonstrated that the attempts to regulate its advance were more effec-
tive in diversifying the stones and less in debilitating its growth potential. 
After all, the British refrained from harming their own creation—the great 
economic service that their “special native” was providing in terms of ac-
cruing American dollars and being a temporary substitute to Antwerp. 
Belgian circles also demonstrated sympathy for an industry built on their 
tradition and expertise and whose manufacturers and experts they ex-
pected to see back in Belgium after the war. Zionist circles in London and 
the United States, who supported the idea the PDMA advanced regard-
ing Palestine inheriting the German cutting industry, joined in providing 
some protection to Palestine among British government circles. More sig-
nifi cant though, among the reasons for the often ineffective pressures to 
contain Palestine’s advance were the adaptive capacity of the factories to 
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the changes in supply of stones and the capacity of the manufacturers and 
the PDMA to persist in expanding production, in increasing exports and 
even in diversifying export destinations. In impacting what was produced 
in Palestine, the politics of supply and the ambivalence they created be-
tween growth and containment determined the character of the industry 
during the war and after. It shaped the perceptions of the diamond man-
ufacturers of the unpredictability and instability of the world diamond 
business, and, as can be judged from the sense of alarm regarding the 
future of the industry in Palestine itself, it signifi cantly infl uenced the rela-
tions between them.45
The forcing of the diamond industry by the Ministry of Economic War-
fare and the DTC to reorganize its production in late 1943 was in fact only 
the start of procrastinating negotiations over supplies. At the background 
was fi rst and foremost the growing criticism in British military circles, fol-
lowing reports originating with American intelligence (Offi ce of Strategic 
Services), that the Palestine government failed to control the diamond in-
dustry and that despite assurances it gave to authorities in London, illegal 
and speculative trade in diamonds and diamond smuggling fl ourished. 
Various British government authorities in the Middle East were equally 
accused of slackened control that enabled the smuggling of gem and in-
dustrial diamonds from South Africa to Egypt, from there to Palestine, 
Syria, and Lebanon, arriving then in Turkey and ending fi nally in Ger-
many. As the Germans were running out of industrial diamonds, which 
they direly needed for their war machine, contraband diamond trade in 
the Middle East could serve them well. This was why in January 1944 
British strategists and the diamond control committee at the MEW set up 
a special control system in Egypt, and why Palestine’s diamonds seemed 
now not just a source of revenue but also a potential liability.46
The cry aired by CODFI in London undoubtedly impacted the new 
atmosphere. Operating as a mechanism of harboring diamonds in De 
Beers’s safes in London for the future recovery of the industry in Belgium, 
the organizers of COFDI sought at the turn of 1944 to step up pressure 
on the Belgian government-in-exile to accumulate more diamond reserves 
sent from the Belgian Congo. The various cutting centers that sprouted in 
the previous two years—and the one in Palestine in particular—seemed 
more threatening than ever. The reduction of Sand production in Palestine 
hardly assuaged the exiled Belgians who aspired to see former experts re-
turning from the “industrial diasporas” to Antwerp after the war. The Bel-
gians began therefore to threaten the DTC and the Allies that continuous 
supply of industrial diamonds originating from the Congo would from 
then on depend on further limiting of supplies to other diamond-cutting 
centers.47
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Furthermore, diamond manufacturers in Britain, among them many 
refugees from Belgium, were mobilized by the Board of Trade to the war 
effort. They were told to dedicate most of their products for export so as to 
help Britain’s foreign-exchange balances, and refrain from local marketing 
of polished stones so as not to risk the trade getting out of hand and stones 
reaching the Germans. This fi tted well with the larger British objective to 
assure the postwar revival of the diamond industry in Antwerp so that 
London could continue serving as a center of supplying raw materials. 
Uncontrolled cutting centers scattered around the globe could harm this 
objective, and Palestine, which from start was considered a war industry 
and part of a larger economic warfare system, seemed now closer than 
ever to violating this spirit.48
The tensions produced by these problems were encapsulated in win-
ter 1944 in what seemed as an ominous breakdown of trust between the 
MEW in London and the PDMA’s leadership in Netanya. The British sus-
pected that the PDMA and the factories were misreporting their exporting 
activities, and that rough diamonds and diamond dust that were required 
to be returned to the DTC after being excluded from polishing were ille-
gally maintained in Palestine. Control of the industry by the government 
was relatively tight. The books of every manufacturer and cutter were ex-
amined by government auditors and all diamonds found unsuitable for 
cutting were deposited in the PDMA’s safes in the Palestine Corporation, 
where they were held under the cutter’s name until they entered supervi-
sion. However, there were many loopholes. Illegal possession and stor-
age of diamonds seemed much more widespread than formally allowed. 
Palestine was thought by the offi cials of the Controller of Light Industries 
and the recently appointed Control Board (DCB) to accumulate too many 
diamonds that could reach the enemy or simply allow the industry to ex-
pand beyond the limits the British set for it. Because of the forced change 
from predominantly cutting Sand to Melees, the monopoly seemed less 
accountable and less trustworthy. Alarming rumors spread in government 
circles in Palestine and among the syndicate’s managers in London that 
many manufacturers who were troubled by the change of supplies and 
their effective reduction in early 1944 began purchasing rough diamonds 
outside the syndicate. COFDI’s arguments for curtailing the expansion of 
the Palestine industry that focused on the future of Antwerp’s diamond 
industry were now taken as a proof of the emerging reality in Palestine 
itself. To the British the industry seemed now to react more severely to its 
total dependence on the syndicate and to its exclusive treatment by the 
MEW through defi ance and collusion.49
The strategies the British employed to confront these problems varied 
from demanding stricter accountability to tightening bureaucratic con-
trol on the PDMA and the factories, to the harshest of all—the signifi cant 
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narrowing down of supplies and preconditioning future supplies on im-
maculate accounting of factories’ stock and refraining from accumulation 
of diamonds unsuitable for cutting. These measures refl ected not just con-
tinuous taming as made explicit in the stone change of autumn 1943 but 
a potential distancing from the unquestionable support the British had 
given the industry since winter 1940. As Colin Newbury, Eric Laureys and 
other scholars have shown, this should be understood against the grow-
ing importance for the British of the Belgian Congo mines and of indus-
trial diamonds for military and economic uses. From a Middle-Eastern 
perspective the distancing was even clearer because of the increasing sig-
nifi cance for the British of maintaining in the region a geopolitical system 
of alliances that gave preference to good relations with Arab interests over 
supporting the Jewish National Home.50
To ensure supplies the PDMA now needed to employ its entire London 
arsenal of the representatives of the Zionist Movement and of friends at 
the syndicate itself. The pressure would focus on delegitimating—in the 
ears of the worried offi cials at the Ministry of Economic Warfare—COF-
DI’s anti-Palestine politics and on convincing all involved that Antwerp’s 
future recovery was hardly compromised. Doubting that the British or 
the London brokers Hennig & Co. (e.g., George Prins) could advance 
Palestine’s interests regarding supplies, in mid-January 1944 Ben-Ami re-
newed the PDMA’s application (which had been rejected in November 
1943) to send representatives to London. The PDMA has been loyal and 
disciplined, Ben-Ami assured Fletcher, the controller of light industries, 
but it must have a fi rst-hand picture of the politics of supply in London. 
Ben-Ami realized that Palestine was too weak to face the coalescence of 
interest concocted in London between De Beers, the Diamond Syndicate, 
the Belgian government-in-exile, and the MEW. They all seemed to prefer 
Belgian diamond interests and COFDI’s activities on expanding diamond 
supplies to Palestine.
If Belgian diamond interests were allowed such powerful representation 
in London, Ben-Ami complained, why not Palestine? The Belgians needed 
to be convinced by the Palestine diamond experts themselves that Pales-
tine was not and would not be their rival. If any, their rival was Germany 
and its legacy of a powerful prewar diamond industry. The continuity of 
British gains from the trade system with the British Empire could not be 
assured without the active consultation provided by the diamond experts 
from Palestine. This continuity was essential as the diamond industry pro-
vided throughout the war the main exporting item of Palestine’s foreign 
trade, and had supplied the Sterling Bloc with a considerable amount of 
dollar exchange. Realizing that the thorniest issue was the postwar pe-
riod, Ben-Ami concluded, “It is clear that it will be seriously prejudicial to 
the Palestine diamond industry if present plans and post-war structures 
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are decided upon without associating us in the fi nal crystallization of the 
plans, and without giving us the opportunity to make our view heard for 
an appropriate and fair share in the new plan deal of world [diamond] 
industry.” In refl ecting on the close association between state and capital, 
the language Ben-Ami and the PDMA expounded tied together the inter-
ests of local capital with the interests of the British Empire. “We believe,” 
he continued, “that our mission can serve a very useful explanatory pur-
pose by bringing the facts home to the experts of the British Government 
themselves and convincing them defi nitively that what is at stake is in re-
ality the trade and industrial interest that transcends the narrow confi nes 
of this country.” British benevolence was not enough; only when defend-
ing the Palestine diamond industry was understood as defending British 
imperial interests would its future be secured. It was British colonialism, 
not the war as such, that had to be tied in everybody’s minds to the Pales-
tine diamond industry.51
By mid-February 1944 the MEW was still unresponsive to Palestine’s 
request. The industry fi rst had to undergo an accounting survey, intel-
ligence had to be convinced that the amount of diamonds in the regions 
was reduced to controllable quantities, and both the exiled Belgians and 
the syndicate had to be assured that Palestine was more submissive. The 
available supplies in Palestine were menacingly dwindling and some fac-
tories began to press the PDMA to start searching for alternative source of 
supplies, at least as a signal to the MEW and the syndicate that Palestine 
could not be starved of diamonds anymore. Other manufacturers feared 
that such a threat might further alienate the British from the industry and 
might cost Palestine a total disengagement from its supply arteries. Clearly 
the thirst for raw materials in winter 1944 caused a rift in the PDMA, an 
unintended consequence of the MEW-COFDI-Diamond Syndicate axis 
that had been evolving in London.52
To deal with this array of problems and sense of disintegration, the 
PDMA composed a lengthy (and confi dential) document in which it was 
explained to the British that its orientation and that of the syndicate on 
limiting the industry was tantamount to bringing its demise. Narrow-
ing the quantity of Sand and forcing the change to Melees was not the 
only problem. The Melees that Palestine was now receiving were not of 
high quality. They forced Palestine to reorient its marketing from the US 
to India, the chief buyer of this type of stone, and brought down profi ts. 
Less profi t would gradually harm the investment made in recent years 
in training, skill, and technological advancement. It would in turn cause 
widespread unemployment among those that had become so skillful in 
Sand, and deplete the advantage of the Palestine industry. Furthermore, 
there was no reason to allow this to happen just because Belgian diamond 
circles feared postwar competition.
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Palestine’s diamond experts revered the tradition and expertise devel-
oped in the Low Countries and practically throve on them. The experts 
and manufacturers who came from Antwerp to Palestine had no intention 
of returning to Belgium, and what they had created in Netanya and Tel 
Aviv should be regarded not as a threat to Antwerp but rather as an in-
heritor to the German prewar diamond industry that competed with Ant-
werp so fi ercely—and often with the help of the Belgians themselves (see 
chapter 1). The diamond industry in Palestine should therefore be thought 
of as part of a European system to forestall the recovery of the German 
industry, not the Belgian. If Palestine were further limited and harmed, 
it would be forced to buy rough diamonds outside the syndicate, and an 
important client of the syndicate’s goods would be lost with detrimen-
tal effects on the interests of the British Empire as a whole. Other cutting 
centers—e.g., Cuba and Brazil—would fl ourish without the British and 
the Belgians being able to respond to it as they could in Palestine. The 
latter founded the diamond industry on Jews, the report continued, and 
the diamond industry and trade were not just an international business 
but to a large extent in Jewish hands. Therefore, “Interested circles must 
take into consideration the facts that their behavior towards the Palestin-
ian industry will have repercussion within the diamond trade all over the 
world and that the growing diamond industry in Palestine develops new 
possibilities for the diamond trade and may create an enormous addi-
tional amount of goodwill for the diamond interests.” The employment of 
political, ethnic, and cultural arguments in the context of the decimation 
of European Jewry, and their coupling with economic argumentation that 
could not be thought of separately from race, ethnicity, and world politics, 
was astounding. It clearly asked to turn the blow that the diamond indus-
try in Palestine had experienced since the stone change of autumn 1943 
into defi ance.53
These arguments and efforts were, however, to no avail. The full trust 
the British had in the PDMA seemed to wane, and in particular the trust in 
Ben-Ami who was suspected now of personally meddling in the PDMA’s 
supply orders for personal gain. The MEW and the Diamond Syndicate 
allowed a small amount of Sand to be sent to Palestine, in addition to the 
ordinary Melee supplies, but it was far from what could keep the industry 
going when the adaptation to Melees was still in progress. In a series of 
urgent telegrams sent in late February and early March 1944 to the British, 
the PDMA conveyed a sense of a looming catastrophe and a growing rift 
within the PDMA.54
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Accountability and Vindication
The manner in which Ben-Ami was functioning in the London arena re-
minded many manufacturers of how centralist and hierarchical the PDMA 
had turned since its establishment in summer 1940. However, as long as 
the industry was expanding, the inner criticism against the distancing of 
local diamond polishing from tradition, the deteriorating quality of prod-
uct, and limited marketing and centralization remained frail. Ben-Ami’s 
many successes and few failures in London cultivated among the PDMA’s 
members the image of their president as an irreplaceable politician on an 
imperial scale with an unmatched maneuvering dexterity and diplomatic 
skill. Ben-Ami, serving also as Netanya's mayor, enjoyed this reverence of 
the members, in particular as criticism mounted from the Jewish Agency 
and its economists on the possible effects the industry’s problems might 
have on the Yishuv. At the same time, however, the intensive growth and 
intense politics of supply it provoked in London made their mark on a 
growing rift in the industry.
This contact point between the politics of supply in London and local 
organizational culture cannot be underestimated. In Palestine’s history ex-
ternal forces such as incoming migration, capital import, and the presence 
of foreign powers always played major formative roles, and historians 
have for long acknowledged their impact on the structuring of local so-
ciety and their presence in local social and political relations. Indeed, the 
diamond industry demonstrated how artifi cial the distinction between ex-
ogenous and endogenous factors was, and the extent to which the bound-
aries between the industry as a community and the worlds around it—lo-
cal and international—were blurred.
The tension in the PDMA refl ected this well. When in late 1941 and 
early 1942 Oved Ben-Ami and his close circle of manufacturers completed 
the structuring of the PDMA and selecting its members, they envisioned 
a sort of a collective of capitalists. I use the term collective instead of as-
sociation (as the PDMA was legally defi ned) because the members were 
expected to share a common corporate good, held together as a group of 
individualists but motivated to act collectively. They would defi ne them-
selves to the external world as capital entrepreneurs, expert in diamond 
making, committed to the Zionist national cause and independent from 
suppressing pressures either from local community institutions or from 
diamond circles abroad. Facing inward, the members would reach deci-
sions together in an egalitarian manner and jointly concede the execution 
of the decisions to the president at the top of the hierarchy, and to the 
bureaucracy he built around him. Ethical conduct and sharing supplies 
of raw diamonds, policies regarding piecework and wages and towards 
the change of the traditional cutting and polishing processes—all were 
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expected to be brought into the PDMA offi ces in Tel Aviv and Netanya, 
debated democratically, and remain accountable for later reference.55
This kind of “capitalist collectivity” was achieved through selection 
and regimentation, and by mobilizing the backing of the British authori-
ties for the group. Ben-Ami employed in fact a dual strategy. He cared not 
to intervene too deeply into the affairs of each factory so as not to compro-
mise the independence of the manufacturers. Often, however, Ben-Ami’s 
authoritarian personality and conduct made this climate of plurality only 
a semblance of reality. It was balanced, however, by the show of force 
the PDMA and Ben-Ami demonstrated to the world outside the indus-
try—the Zionist institutions, the British and the DTC in London. Ben-Ami 
recognized that without a sense of fi nancial and organizational freedom, 
the manufacturers would not provide the PDMA the social basis for its 
actions. At the same time all involved realized that without an assertive 
“foreign” policy in matters of supplies, the manufacturers would achieve 
nothing. The practice of this duality was to make the members of PDMA 
feel that they were well represented, their voices heard, that no one was 
thinking on their behalf; and that external threats on their economic activ-
ity and gain were contained.56
The centralized structure of the PDMA and its vision of a capitalist col-
lective revived the opposition. In fact the opposition organized in summer 
1940 in the wake of the Ben-Ami initiative did not dissolve completely. 
Because of the PDMA’s hierarchical structure and the allegiance of the 
members, the opposition’s focus of activity was transferred to the Dia-
mond Club and to the Zionist institutions—in particular to the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry of the Jewish Agency. However, as long as the 
industry expanded and received consistent backing from the government, 
the opposition remained frail. It did not have enough supporters and it 
chose to wait and see what sort of relations would develop between the 
diamond industry and the Yishuv and how it would conform to the na-
tional-oriented directives of the Jewish Agency, in particular in absorbing 
workers and resolving disputes through arbitration. The opposition also 
lacked the contacts in London that Ben-Ami cultivated and all attempts of 
the Department of Trade and Industry to recruit Zionist activists in Lon-
don against what they regarded as the overly independent initiative by 
Ben-Ami came to nothing. Further weakened by the mere success of the 
industry and the silent acquiescence of the British authorities in the exces-
sive centralization in the PDMA, the opposition turned now to exposing 
Ben-Ami as a liability to the entire project.57
Led by diamond experts and manufacturers such as Moshe Offen, Marc 
and Ferdinand Schein, and Eliyahu and Yehoshua Mazur, the focus of the 
opposition gradually veered from the Zionist institutions and the Diamond 
Club to the PDMA itself. In January 1942 it protested against Ben-Ami’s 
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preference of the Netanya manufacturers over the ones operating in Tel 
Aviv and against the customary practice to not consult members in deci-
sion making, in particular with regard to employment relations. A month 
later the opposition attempted to negate Ben-Ami’s move to strengthen 
the power of the PDMA’s executive by determining compulsory arbitra-
tion between disputing manufacturers. In another effort the opposition 
criticized the PDMA’s “totality of functions” and demanded a reversal to 
the traditional Belgian model that separated between diamond importers, 
manufacturers, and exporters.58
The suspicion of Ben-Ami’s managerial and ethical misconduct that 
emerged in mid-1942 gave the opposition a new opportunity. In May 
George Prins at Hennig & Co. proposed that the PDMA to buy LP 80,000 
worth of rough diamonds at LP 20 per carat. The PDMA fi rst declined 
the offer, because the looming general workers’ strike in the diamond in-
dustry (fi nally erupting in July) threatened to leave rough stones uncut. 
Two weeks later the brokers proposed again, this time at LP 27 per carat, 
and because of the strike Ben-Ami asked the order to be reserved for Sep-
tember, without protesting the rise of the price. When the time to pay for 
the order came, members of the PDMA executive noticed the change and 
pressed Ben-Ami to probe into the matter—the answer received from Lon-
don was that the earlier and cheaper price was a mistake. Rumors were 
quickly spread by the opposition that Ben-Ami and Prins had conspired 
to raise the price and personally profi ted by some LP 30,000. Ben-Ami 
denied the rumors, the Diamond Syndicate confi rmed that the LP 20 price 
was a mistake, and the PDMA decided to go on with the purchasing or-
der. In January 1943 the PDMA’s Audit and Inspection Committee, newly 
headed by the oppositionist Marc Schein, began suspecting irregularities 
again but to no avail.59
Tension hardly abated and Ben-Ami’s unaccountability to the PDMA’s 
institutions was increasingly associated with accusations of managerial 
misconduct and personal profi teering. In March 1943 the PDMA’s execu-
tive asked to rewrite the constitution and some members even resigned 
in protest of Ben-Ami’s “dictatorial regime.” “It is a well known fact,” the 
Jewish Agency was informed by a diamond expert in September 1943, 
that the chairman of the Association receives a brokerage of 2 percent from the 
value of each consignment, from the syndicate. One percent is supposed to go 
to the Association for covering expenses, and one percent goes to the chairman 
of the Association as his private profi t. Such a thing should not exist, and when 
it became known much resentment was caused among those connected with 
the industry in this country and even more so in America where at present 
many diamond traders from Holland and Belgium reside.
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Ben-Ami had all the merit for establishing the industry, the claim went 
on, but he must not continue after the war because he could also destroy 
it.60
As long as the industry expanded and was profi table the leadership of 
the PDMA could withstand the opposition, and it seemed that the exter-
nal pressures to limit the industry buttressed against disintegration from 
within. This was the reason why the atmosphere of instability and anxiety 
in the PDMA in the wake of the stone change in autumn 1943 was crucial. 
Many manufacturers experienced a reduction in production, and in the 
light of COFDI’s anti-Palestine moves in London, many sensed an ominous 
loss of business. The opposition exploited the change to blame Ben-Ami 
and the executive for lack of foresight and passivity. The call to investigate 
Ben-Ami’s private share in the PDMA’s budget became ever more vocal. 
Furthermore, the demand for the manufactures’ freedom of action intensi-
fi ed, in particular of the movement of experts from factory to factory so 
as to ease the adaptation to the stone diversifi cation. The DCB gradually 
became an essential address for the unsatisfi ed manufacturers who knew 
from fi rst hand Ben-Ami’s dependence on London and deference to the 
government. The centralization in the PDMA was now spoken of not as 
a means to maintain the monopoly, but as an overly bureaucratic form of 
running the industry. This was true in particular with regard to export and 
marketing strategies, to the need to free Palestine of its dependence on the 
American market and relocate business to India (an important buyer of 
Melees), Brazil, and countries in the Middle East. Diversifi cation was now 
linked to the need that the PDMA should rid itself of its exporting func-
tion and allow exporters and merchants develop their own.61
A step in that direction was made by the DCB in late 1943 when an 
independent organization of Palestine’s Jewish diamond exporters was 
created, and for the fi rst time since 1940 merchants and Diamond Club 
members, who were not necessarily diamond cutters or manufacturers, 
could export diamonds. This did not include, however, free importing of 
rough stones (and from non–Diamond Syndicate sources such as British 
Guiana) and thus the opposition to the PDMA’s monopoly was joined 
now by many diamond merchants.62
Matters came to a head when “supply politics” were at their peak and 
when a PDMA delegation was sent to London to present its case before 
the MEW and the syndicate. “The members have no trust [in Ben-Ami] 
regarding his capacity to fulfi ll a trustworthy mission in London” said the 
suit tabled by Schein and the opposition to an internal PDMA inquest in 
October 1943, “because there is a confl ict of interest between his private 
interests and the interests of the members. . . . [He] used methods of ter-
ror. . . . Among his actions there are those that have a criminal character.” 
Running the PDMA as his private fi ef and making certain that the member 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
The Challenge and Its Constraints   |   139
manufacturers were his clientele seemed, according to the suit, to trans-
gress the powers he had been allowed at the start of the project.63
Though nothing came out of the suit (and Ben-Ami’s countersuit for 
libel) the growing confi dence of the opposition in coming out openly 
against Ben-Ami demonstrated that the troubled relations with London 
were making a deeper impact on the PDMA’s organizational culture. Ben-
Ami, his supporters in the PDMA and the British authorities stood at one 
camp upholding centralization, regimentation, and freedom of Jewish cap-
ital to act without the supervision of Zionist national institutions. On the 
other camp were the Tel Aviv diamond manufacturers, the Jewish Agency, 
and some diamond experts and merchants who ardently propounded the 
need of private capital to be of service to Zionism and be submissive to the 
national institutions. Increasingly the latter camp founded its criticizing 
of the state of the PDMA on a depoliticized professional language and on 
the professional and managerial experience they had cultivated since the 
establishment of the industry. The terminology mixed the quest to uphold 
the past traditions of diamond cutting with a purist wish for a decentral-
ized industry based on personal trust and less on bureaucratic control. 
The way to achieve that was through further specialization, meticulous 
training, absolute quality control, and better selection of new manufac-
turers. These emphases would divert attention from the less-important 
issues of prices, wages, and industrial relations to the more crucial issues 
of professionalism, skill, and responsibility for the quality of the product. 
The language of expertise and free practice found in the opposition to 
Ben-Ami a window of opportunity to reattach the industry to its roots in 
Antwerp and in older production traditions. Moreover, as nothing could 
be advanced in these matters without the British and the DCB, the opposi-
tion now attempted to cause a rift between Ben-Ami and the British on the 
charge of abuse of power. The reasoning of the opposition was that such 
a rift would either bring the intervention of the Zionist institutions or the 
establishment an alternative manufacturers’ association.64
The government initially backed Ben-Ami. Walsh, the DCB chairman, 
argued that the government was not willing to meddle in relations be-
tween the manufacturers and that it counted on the PDMA’s capacity to 
regulate the tensions independently and effectively. Ben-Ami was a col-
league, a member of the DCB, a friend. Ben-Ami himself claimed before 
the DCB that all the accusations were baseless and that they did nothing 
but refl ect larger political opposition to British policy in Palestine. The 
PDMA was a democratic institution, the opposition was a small and vocal 
minority, most of the manufacturers supported him wholeheartedly, and 
the arrangements with London were entirely in accordance with the initial 
British directives and expectations.65
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The quarrels among the members of the PDMA reached such a volume 
in winter 1944 that DCB chair Walsh decided to appoint an inquiry com-
mittee. This was hardly surprising considering the effects of the politics of 
supply on relations among the members and on the increasing threat on 
their business viability. Though never for a moment considering the wa-
vering of the PDMA’s monopoly, Walsh and the DCB felt that because of 
the PDMA’s alleged mismanagement, British interests were at stake and 
that it was time to interfere in order to protect the interests of the PDMA’s 
members. The reputation of Ben-Ami and of the manufacturers that pro-
vided him the majority in the PDMA’s institutions has been questioned 
since the PDMA’s establishment—fi rst by the Tishby-Weiss camp and now 
by manufacturers inside the association who kept close ties with the na-
tional camp. The British were therefore increasingly worried that dissatis-
fi ed members could in the fi nal resort challenge the monopoly itself.66
The three members of the DCB subcommittee were attuned to the need 
to maintain the association, its monopoly, and its symbiotic relations with 
the British—and through them with the syndicate. Fletcher, the controller 
of light industries, was one of the more knowledgeable functionaries in the 
Palestine government regarding these ties. Salomon Horowitz, a promi-
nent Jerusalem lawyer, had been situated for many years at the juncture 
of the ties between the government and the Yishuv; and he served here as 
the legal expert on the PDMA and on the Ottoman Law of Associations 
under which the PDMA operated. And fi nally, banker David Andreson 
(formerly in the Netherlands) knew fi rst hand the operational relations 
between the diamond industry, the banks, and the brokerage company in 
London.67
After three months of testimonies and deliberations (March–May 1944) 
the report of the subcommittee reinstated Ben-Ami’s status as the lead-
ing captain of the industry and thus cemented the PDMA’s hierarchical 
structure. The British authorities were indirectly cleared of corroborating 
with Ben-Ami’s misuse of authority. Moreover, the diamond manufactur-
ers were praised for their social, economic, and political utility, and the 
PDMA’s leadership and pluralist organizational culture were reaffi rmed. 
The committee reasserted Ben-Ami’s singular role in establishing the in-
dustry in Palestine, justifi ed the need at the early stages of the industry 
(in abnormal war conditions) for centralization and authority, and praised 
the Mathias–Ben-Ami axis for Palestine’s success in the politics of supply. 
Furthermore, in responding to allegations against Ben-Ami and his ma-
nipulations in London, the committee ascertained Hennig’s and Prins’s 
clean hands and thus criticized Ben-Ami’s “bitter” opponents. However, 
the committee recommended that Ben-Ami’s “benevolent despotism” 
should be replaced with a more democratic structure. The latter should be 
based on relegation of authority from the president to a business manager, 
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removal of offi ces to Tel Aviv, reworking relations between the organi-
zation and the members, and rewriting the PDMA’s regulations—to the 
point of turning it into a full-fl edged company under the British Compa-
nies’ Ordinance. In the fi nal analysis, Ben-Ami was cleared.68
The opposition could well sense now that the industry, its advance 
and profi ts, were somehow more important than the need to democratize 
the organization. The government, not Ben-Ami, turned the great hero 
of the affair for it taught the manufacturers how the state worked with 
capital. At the same time, however, the report not only cleared Ben-Ami. 
In bringing the PDMA’s Netanya-based stronghold on the one hand and 
the Tel Aviv–based and externally aided opposition on the other to a head-
on confrontation, it drew the limits of Ben-Ami’s power. In criticizing the 
opposition’s weak evidence, the report defi ned the qualities needed for 
membership in an organization in which trust was essential. In examining 
the hierarchy in the PDMA and the decision-making processes, the com-
mittee exposed the implications of excessive managerial power and its 
relations to the monopoly that the colonial regime helped to create. The 
report therefore paved the way to split the PDMA into two manufactur-
ers’ organizations and to gradually transfer power from Netanya to Tel 
Aviv.69
The implications were, however, wider. The focusing on fi nancial mis-
management demonstrated the centrality of personal relations and trust 
in the industry, in particular during the war. That the colonial state was 
central to these relations was crucial not just for the establishment of the 
diamond industry but also for its future after the British withdrawal from 
Palestine. While clearing Ben-Ami of the allegations of fi nancial misman-
agement, the British warned all involved in the industry of the limit of 
their freedom of action. Second, protecting Ben-Ami against the Tel Aviv 
opposition was required because dismissing him would enhance the inter-
vention of the Jewish Agency, something the British were keen to prevent. 
Third, Ben-Ami was warned that mounting PDMA apprehension against 
the stone change and supply policies could be costly. This was why Ben-
Ami and his group accepted the report of the committee with deference. 
It temporarily assuaged the opposition, it provided the PDMA’s leaders 
with enough signals of the international framework in which they oper-
ated, and it left enough room for the industry to keep going. In the fi nal 
analysis, despite tremendous growth, the diamond industry, the manufac-
turers, and the PDMA’s power structure continued to depend on the colo-
nial state. The episode taught all concerned that under normal conditions, 
challenges to the system of trust would cost the local diamond industry 
the delicate relations and networking it would need once Belgium was 
freed and the diamond industry in Antwerp recovered.70
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Illustration 4.3. A diamond cutter at a Netanya factory, 1946. 
Photographer: Anna Riwkin-Brick. Source: CZA, PHR/1174093. Used with permission of 
the Central Zionist Archive.




The diamond industry is now in prosperity. The income of the private 
manufacturers grows progressively, and in comparison with market 
prices before the war this income is almost fantastic. And if in contrast 
we compare the wages of the worker to the average wages in Belgium 
we shall see that such wages were paid in Antwerp only during a slump. 
Should we comply with the fact that a worker must pay from his miser-
able wage a very high payment for the usage of the work tools and for the 
seat in the factory, which anyway remain the owner’s private property? 
. . . And the diamond workers are privileged with another condition, un-
heard of in the civilized world. The workers (even the old-timers) are 
forbidden to move from one factory to another without the employer’s 
permission (there were cases in which one owner bought from another a 
worker in high price). This is slavery in the full sense of the word which 
brings us back to Feudal times.
—A Diamond Worker, “At the Diamond Workers’ Front,” 
Hedei Netanya, June 1941
Actors and Issues
The diversifi cation of the rough diamonds in autumn 1943 emphasized 
the duality in the politics of supply. One the one hand it was the lifeline 
of the industry and allowed the PDMA to maintain its monopoly. On the 
other hand it harbored the seeds of the industry’s containment. This was 
the duality that shaped the character of the diamond industry and its 
practices from start—encouraging its expansion and limiting it at one and 
at same time. Accordingly, the manufacturers who persisted in building 
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the industry’s economic infrastructure, the reputation of its qualities, and 
its fi nancial future had also to calculate their strategies with caution. Dem-
onstrating loyalty to the British and to the needs of the empire would have 
to be coupled with refraining from strained relations with the main artery 
that allowed the existence of the industry. It was a sense of economic real-
ism that the PDMA and the diamond manufacturers were forced to cul-
tivate, a measure of modesty and deference in the face of the power and 
interest that fi nancial and political forces conveyed from London.
Equally ambivalent were the relations that evolved between capital and 
labor. Seemingly these relations lent themselves to control and regulation. 
The PDMA selected the labor force, the workers were entirely dependent 
on the knowledge and experience of their masters (the expert work man-
agers), and union power was continuously kept at bay. While the manu-
facturers could little affect the exogenous sources of supply, they could 
still discipline the workers and delimit their representatives. Moreover, 
the manufacturers could build on the attraction of the industry for Pal-
estine’s youth and workers. It allowed them to mold workers’ loyalty to 
the workshops and, more signifi cantly, to limit the cost of labor that made 
diamond cutting worth it in the fi rst place. However, a discrepancy in-
creasingly yawned between the manufacturers’ self confi dence and what 
they wished would happen in employment relations. In reality the latter 
turned extremely tumultuous, and as the intensity of strikes in the Yishuv 
and Palestine as a whole signifi cantly increased (see table below), they 
attracted the intense attention of public opinion. Moreover, the strikes of-
ten destabilized the balance of power in the diamond industry between 
owners and employees and added to the image of unruliness the British 
increasingly came to hold of their creation.1 
Table 5.1 Strikes and strikers in the Yishuv and in the diamond industry, 1940–




Yishuv strikersStrikes Strikers Strikes Strikers 
1940 93 (4) 3,317 - - -
1941 80 (9) 4,185 2 1,400 33.45
1942 94 (6) 9,258 13 2,613 28.22
1943 131 (8) 15,220 43 5,017 32.96
1944 93 (11) 7,805 16 (1) 4,166 53.37
Note: Most strikes in the Yishuv took place in industry and manufacture. The data was col-
lected by the Histadrut, while government and ILO numbers were slightly different.
Sources: Yeshayahu Etkin, “Sixty Years of Striking in Israel, 1921–1980,” MA thesis, Tel Aviv 
University, 1982, 215, 216, and 233; Aharon Blich, “Jewish Trade Unionism in Palestine,” 
Typed manuscript at the LA library, Tel Aviv, 1945, chap. 5; Sikumim 18 (1946).
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Figure 5.1 Strikers in the Yishuv and in the diamond industry, 1940–1944
Sources: Etkin, “Sixty Years,” 215, 216, and 233; Blich, “Jewish Trade Unionism in Pales-
tine,” chap. 5; Sikumim 18 (1946).
The climate of instability was refl ected in the intensity of work stop-
pages. At least 13 strikes erupted in the factories in 1942 alone, with one 
major dispute in the summer turning into a general all-industry strike in 
which 2,600 workers were involved. In 1943 the number of strikes jumped 
to 43, a third of all the strikes in the Yishuv that year. In 1942 each worker in 
the Yishuv lost 1.45 days of work on average, while each diamond worker 
lost 5.05. In 1943 it was 0.73 and 13.76 respectively. In 1943 61 percent of 
the work days lost in strikes were in diamond strikes, and in 1944 the share 
grew to 73.5 percent. Moreover, the general strikes in the diamond indus-
try in 1942 and 1944 set precedents in Palestine and decidedly shaped the 
war as a formative period in the country’s history of industrial relations.2 
For a new and attractive industry, with workers’ pay levels generally high, 
unions kept frail, and manufacturers and workers deeply aware of the 
concern of the colonial government of industrial unrest during the war, 
why was the industry so volatile? To answer the question we need to fol-
low the strikes as a narrative of collective action, attuned as it was to what 
has been emphasized in the preceding chapters—the expansion of the in-
dustry, the splintered voice of unionism in the diamond factories, and to 
the politics of supplies in London.
*   *   *
From early on the PDMA resolved to ascertain its authority over labor in 
two main ways. One, in order to restrain competition and lowering wages, 
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was to interdict workers’ free movement between the workshops. The sec-
ond measure was the fi xing of a general wage level for diamond cutting, 
a framework within which the manufacturers could freely operate but not 
transgress. The aim was to provide some unity to the industry, quell com-
petition among the manufacturers, and, more signifi cantly, to form the in-
frastructure for a collective agreement between the PDMA and the unions. 
As we saw earlier, the agreement meant to secure a minimum earning for 
the piecework workers who were decidedly dependent on the supply of 
stones, and to prevent industrial unrest. As much as the diamond industry 
succeeded in preventing the Histadrut from achieving hegemony in the 
factories, it also opted for this kind of arrangement in the hope it would 
lessen the impact of the fl uctuations in stone supply and the diffi culties in 
marketing abroad.3
From the start, however, some manufacturers failed to comply with 
these arrangements. Owners and manufacturers of the larger factories 
such as Ophir in Netanya insisted on total distancing of the unions from in-
volvement in wage determination and in the selection of new apprentices 
and they kept themselves generally unresponsive to workers’ demands 
for better conditions. This was true in particular for those manufacturers 
who held traditional liberal and antiunion approaches to employment re-
lations, or upheld the concept of compulsory arbitration propounded by 
the Revisionist movement. The fact that Revisionist-affi liated workers and 
activists of its union, the National Workers’ Federation (NWF), worked in 
their factories hardly made them more attuned to the workers’ demands.
This was the background to the fi rst strike in the diamond industry 
in March 1941 when fi fty-fi ve workers in Daskal’s factory Even-Hayesod 
in Netanya ceased work in protest against the harsh working conditions 
and the material diffi culties of the apprentices. Three aspects in this small 
strike should attract our attention. First, the strike drew the solidarity of 
diamond workers in the factories in Netanya and Tel Aviv, but none of the 
fi ve unions to which the workers were formally affi liated (see Table 3.4 
p. 97) was initially involved. Second, though short lived, the strike forced 
the unions to cooperate in negotiating with the PDMA on a collective 
agreement. Finally, the demands the strikers presented and the unions 
then adopted in the negotiations conveyed the expectation that the manu-
facturers maintain a balance: between the intensity of the cutting process, 
the expectation for high productivity, and the atmosphere of regimenta-
tion on the one hand; and, material improvement and some measure of 
social care on the other.4
The demands would recur time and again in many of the strikes that 
followed. The demand to annul the apprenticeship fee and to secure full 
wages after three months’ training refl ected the need to care for the young 
workers and compensate for the hard training. The demand to reduce the 
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“Platzgeld” (workplace fee), the pay for the usage of the manufacturers’ 
tools, and the obligation to pay for damaged stones aimed to allow more 
workers to be trained without adding too much to the factory’s cost on la-
bor. To these were added the demand for annual leave, medical insurance, 
cost-of-living allowance, workers’ participation in decisions on dismiss-
als, and teaching the new workers all parts and phases of the cutting pro-
cess. In many ways the demands called the PDMA to comply with norms 
that the Labor movement had been advancing in Palestine since the early 
1920s but were hardly applied in the new industry.5
The manufacturers wavered. They agreed to reduce the apprenticeship 
fee, enumerate the workers upon their entry to actual work, pay for medi-
cal insurance, insure the workers in case of accidents, and grant a one week 
of leave each year. At the same time, however, they opposed demands that 
entailed a raise in wages and full obligation to compensate the workers 
for periods of narrower supplies from London, or to paying cost-of-living 
allowances.6 Moreover, the negotiations advanced slowly because they 
were conducted in two separate routes—one between the PDMA and the 
four minority unions (NWF, Hapoel Hamizrahi, Poalei Agudat Israel, and 
Havoved Hatzioni); the other between the PDMA and the Histadrut. For 
the PDMA the double-track negotiations meant a capacity to manipulate; 
for the Histadrut it proved its incapacity to achieve hegemony in repre-
sentation and in infl uencing the selection of new apprentices. For the mass 
of workers, who anyway seemed less concerned with which of the unions 
led the campaign, the PDMA’s procrastination and manipulations only 
provoked further unrest.7
The strike that broke out in August 1941 already mobilized 800 to 1,000 
workers. The British, who were at the time preparing a legal campaign to 
restrict strike action in war-related industries, regarded this tumult with 
apprehension and pressed the manufacturers to discipline the workers. 
Also affecting the situation was the contemporary contention in the Yi-
shuv over the Revisionists’ call for support of the government’s antistrike 
measures and of compulsory arbitration. The tense atmosphere was fur-
ther fueled by some manufacturers who allowed workers to cut diamonds 
domestically so as to balance the fi nancial losses the disputes caused 
them. Others turned to negotiate with their workers without consulting 
the PDMA. Many workers happily used the opportunity, as home work 
earned more, eased the strict factory discipline, and distanced them from 
the quarrels among the unions. The PDMA’s leaders attempted to disci-
pline the manufacturers and incited the workers both against home work 
and the Histadrut. When these strategies failed the PDMA resolved, for 
the fi rst time since its establishment, to lockout the entire industry.8
The move was effective and few days later the workers returned to 
work. Pressed by the British controller, the PDMA agreed to a 20 percent 
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wage increase (10 percent less than demanded by the workers), to pay the 
locked-out some compensation, and to establish a joint arbitration com-
mittee for future disputes. “Negotiation was hard and tiring,” reported 
Ben-Ami to his colleagues, “its details were not connected to conditions or 
to wages—but to hegemony over work and over workers. . . . I hope that 
the tremors besetting our young industry and causing not only fi nancial 
losses but also the slowing down of the tempo of development—will not 
return, and that the lesson of these days will galvanize our power and 
unity—and all together with our workers dedicate ourselves to quiet and 
productive work.”9
Despite the commitment of the workers not to strike for the next six 
months normalization seemed distant. The agreement was signed only by 
the PDMA and the minority unions, and it took only few weeks for strike 
action to resurface. In November 1941, 150 workers at Akiva Pickel’s fac-
tory in Tel Aviv “Yahalomim” started a strike in which they renewed older 
demands for a 30 percent wage increase, abolishment of the Platzgeld, and 
the fulfi llment of the PDMA’s promises of compensations for the lockout. 
The Histadrut, after rejecting the four unions’ rapprochement with the 
PDMA, hurried to get involved. It established a new organ—the Diamond 
Workers’ Union (DWO)—and focused its campaign on challenging the re-
strictions the PDMA placed on apprentices the Histadrut wanted to select 
for the factories. In conjunction, typical Histadrut schemes were drawn—
to recruit reliable workers from the Kibbutz movement to the factories, es-
tablish (with government help) a Histadrut training school, and subsidize 
workers’ accommodation. In return the trainees were obliged to stick with 
the Histadrut when they would become full-fl edged workers and join the 
Histadrut campaign for collective bargaining in the industry.10
The Histadrut considered the strike a test of its power, in particular be-
cause the factory annulled the contract with the workers. For the workers 
the strike expressed the wish that gains the manufacturers were making 
should be more equally distributed. The PDMA in contrast perceived the 
strike as a scheme to destabilize the industry and called all the factories to 
unite in backing the Pickel factory.11
After two weeks the strike fi nally ended through a proposal by the Jew-
ish Agency for arbitration. The arbitration—in itself signaling a growing 
involvement of the Jewish Agency in the diamond industry—ended the 
strike with signifi cant gains for the workers. At fi rst the PDMA rejected ap-
plication of the gains in the entire industry. However, mounting pressure 
from workers in other factories convinced the PDMA that the prospect of 
a general strike and growth of domestic work were more dangerous and 
it must give up.12 The victory of the Pickel workers and of the Histadrut 
was partial, however, because the six-month collective agreement signed 
in August 1941, which aimed to cover all the factories, was left unaltered, 
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and some factories kept resisting its full enforcement. Unrest could there-
fore resume any moment, in particular because the industry was expand-
ing and making huge profi ts.13
Further expansion resulted in further militancy in winter 1942, mainly 
among the unorganized. Consisting of half of the labor force, it was a het-
erogeneous group of workers, selected by the PDMA without the unions 
and thus bearing no commitment to any of them. They were mostly lo-
cated in Tel Aviv where the factories were distant from the regimented 
frameworks prevalent in the PDMA’s stronghold in Netanya. Their pref-
erence for piecework and free movement between the factories distanced 
them from the formal unions and the bureaucracies that demanded mem-
bership dues and union solidarity. Evidently some were members of the 
leftist oppositions in the Histadrut; some were close to the Palestine Com-
munist party (PKP).14 Others were liberal oriented, objecting to affi liation 
with either the Socialist-Zionist Labor movement or the Revisionists. If 
anything provided some integrity to this group, it was their detestation of 
political regimentation of the workplace and their professed commitment 
and pride in their skill and high-quality work. In January 1942 they or-
ganized themselves, placed at their head the Supreme Committee (see p. 
100), and began pressing for improvement and larger shares in the manu-
facturers’ gains.15
As the Histadrut and the other four unions resisted the new body and 
as the PDMA totally ignored it, the nonaffi liated workers were pressed 
to act. In mid-January they started a strike in six factories in Tel Aviv, de-
manding a variety of improvements in pay and working conditions.16 In 
reaction the PDMA’s secretary protested to Smagarinsky at the Diamond 
Workers’ Organization “that the workers stopped the work in an irrespon-
sible manner,” and that the two weeks was “wild and unruly”, and that 
“in such atmosphere and under such pressure there is not any possibility 
to have talks that may bring mutually satisfying conclusions.” Therefore 
our executive decided to notify you that regrettably it could not enter any 
negotiation.” The PDMA’s insistence not to negotiate with the workers’ or-
ganizations “as long as a strike still prevails” was further buttressed by the 
Histadrut’s refusal of the Supreme Committee’s request to lead the strike. 
The energy of the strike thus gradually waned. Sensing an opportunity to 
spread its infl uence among the workers, the Histadrut’s DWO (represent-
ing a third of the organized diamond labor force) obtained from Ben-Ami 
a promise that the striking workers would not be harmed and convinced 
the Supreme Committee to call off the strike. After three weeks the work-
ers resumed work and left the DWO to conduct the negotiations.17
The negotiations on a new collective agreement that started in March 
1942 refl ected the imbalance between the PDMA’s power and the divided 
workers. The PDMA set up a special committee and asked Benyamin Avn-
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iel, the labor relations specialist from the Palestine Manufacturers’ Asso-
ciation, to serve as an advisor. This in itself was a novelty as it signaled a 
thaw in relations with the PMA and the PDMA’s growing need for a wider 
Yishuv backing. The fi ve unions were called in to negotiate, and split as 
ever, they created two parallel routes. One was the PDMA’s negotiations 
with the Histadrut, the other with Revisionist NWF and the other minority 
unions. The Supreme Committee, now a full-fl edged independent union 
of the nonaffi liated, was still held responsible by the PDMA for the Janu-
ary strike and thus was excluded from the talks.18
In both tracks the PDMA supported a two-year and all-encompassing 
agreement. Industrial stability and workers’ restraint were paramount 
now in particular because of the pressure from London to limit the expan-
sion of the factories and the export of diamonds. As a precondition for 
the entire process, the PDMA therefore demanded each worker and each 
union to commit themselves to refrain from industrial action until the new 
agreement expired.19 The unions disagreed. The liberal and the two reli-
gious unions blamed the Histadrut and the Supreme Committee for the 
unrest and were willing to commit themselves to a two-year agreement. 
The NWA and the Histadrut in an uncharacteristic consensus opposed 
the idea. They insisted that the PDMA’s policy to employ unorganized 
workers was the reason behind the deterioration, that a single route for 
bargaining was essential, and that they could not vow that workers not 
affi liated with them would not strike. At the same time the Supreme Com-
mittee announced that neither the PDMA nor the unions were realistic 
and that neither they nor the workers would be obliged to bow to the 
forthcoming agreement.20
The reality that the nonaffi liated workers wished the negotiators to be 
exposed to was the structural tension that beset the industry from start. 
On the one hand the PDMA advanced the conception that the factories 
should bring the workers as close as possible to the levels of productivity 
in Antwerp before the war (measured in quantity of stones polished daily 
by a single worker). Without such achievement Palestine would not be 
competitive and able to withstand the pressures expected upon the termi-
nation of the war situation and Belgium’s recovery. On the other hand, the 
circumstances in the factories, the size of the labor force, and the chain sys-
tem made any attempt to resemble the traditional industry in Antwerp un-
realizable. While workers’ relative earnings were high, the price they were 
required to pay in such a pressing work regime was simply too heavy in 
relation to their real income. Both employers and workers shared the wish 
to see a viable and competitive industry. However, to effectively assure 
sustained growth, only one of two options was possible. One was for the 
manufacturers to expand the industry and pay the workers more, which 
entailed the risk of a harsh reaction from the British and the Belgians. The 
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other option, at the hands of the workers, was to raise productivity and 
accept the regimentation in the factories without expecting to be better 
remunerated. The negotiations over these options were the prelude to one 
of the largest strikes to erupt during the Mandate.21
The First General Strike
The tension between labor and capital over profi ts and remuneration 
turned the bargaining intractable. Three issues were the thorniest. The 
fi rst was the movement or wandering between the factories. For the work-
ers the ability to move and change employers was an expression of their 
skill and social capital, of the autonomy that the investment in the acquisi-
tion of the skill promised, and of their expectation for material well-being 
that fi tted their status. The manufacturers refused to permit unauthorized 
transfer of workers from one factory to another claiming that in contrast to 
Antwerp, where new apprentices worked without pay for twelve months, 
in Palestine workers were paid after a few weeks of apprenticeship, and 
that compensated for relinquishing free movement. The latter aggravated 
intrafactory competition, threatened to put out of business less-produc-
tive and less-successful factories, and resulted in the loss of the human 
resources they, as manufacturers, invested in. 
A second and graver issue was the Platzgeld and the rent (LP 2 monthly) 
paid by workers for use of the machines. These fees, many workers ar-
gued, bonded the workers to the factory, exerted a heavy burden on the 
apprentices and slowed down the progress of the accomplished worker 
to earn well and spread the reputation of his skill. The manufacturers on 
the other hand opposed abolishing the fee for fear that it would seriously 
raise their costs and decrease profi ts. 
The third issue, minimum wage, was problematic of all. The workers 
demanded a principled recognition in a minimum wage to express their 
investment of time and money in acquiring the skill and to recognize their 
share in the increasing profi ts. Moreover, the minimum wage should be 
complemented with a periodic increase in cost-of-living allowances (be-
tween 45 and 70 percent depending on the changes in standards of living). 
For the manufacturers these demands meant again higher costs, but also 
an obligation that in times of declining demand for polished stones might 
place them in high risk.22 They thus totally rejected the demands and also 
the neutral arbitration that the unions proposed.23
Exogenous circumstances that emerged in spring 1942 turned these is-
sues into a showdown. First was the growing fear at the MEW that Ger-
many was able to obtain diamonds through Middle Eastern channels—a 
prospect that became ever more serious because of the menace (increasing 
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since mid-1941) of a German invasion of Palestine. Consequently Control-
ler of Light Industries John Fletcher ordered the manufacturers to have a 
stricter accounting of their reserves and refrain from transferring more di-
amonds than was required for two weeks’ work in the factories. The post-
ing of new supplies from London was slowed down by order of the MEW 
so as to hammer home this point. Second, demand for polished stones in 
the US decreased, apparently following American government policy to 
reduce individual investment in luxury consumption. Consequently the 
absorption of new apprentices in the factories contracted, and the PDMA 
began to consider following the British and South African example and 
lockout the factories as a preventive measure.24 The manufacturers’ profi ts 
began now to be affected and another strike was on the way. “The tem-
porary depression in the diamond market,” Ben-Ami later reported to the 
British, “which resulted in a suspension of operations in the diamond cut-
ting establishments in England and in South Africa did not pass with-
out serious repercussions on the Palestine industry. The tense relations 
which prevailed between masters and men in this industry deteriorated 
rapidly.”25
The fi ve-week general strike of summer 1942 taught Yishuv society 
the impact that the wartime boom capitalist expansion had on the bal-
ance of power between capital and labor. The beginning of the strike in 
the second week of June marked as usual the paralysis of communica-
tion lines between the PDMA and the unions, except for perhaps Ha-
oved Hatzioni, the small, liberal-oriented union that was the closest to 
the progressive liberals, Ben-Ami’s political party. After securing coop-
eration with the other three unions, David Remez, the Histadrut general 
secretary, decided to transfer the management of the strike from the frail 
DWO to the more experienced Tel Aviv labor council. Aharon Becker, the 
council’s chief union specialist, took the leadership and in well-organized 
assemblies of diamond workers began to spread the reasoning behind the 
coming strike. Last-minute attempts to thwart strike action were made 
in a meeting between the PDMA and the Histadrut. The sides seemed to 
agree to transfer many issues to arbitration. The Histadrut was even will-
ing to narrow down the demands for wage increases to the amelioration of 
just the diamond bruiters, the group that suffered most from intermittent 
work and incapacity to pay back apprenticeship tuition and various fees. 
However, once the Histadrut realized that the PDMA would not budge on 
the issue of workplace fees, and even intended to lower wages for some 
groups of workers so as to balance its expected losses from the raising of 
wages for others, it decided to call the strike. The other unions, as well as 
the nonaffi liated, quickly joined in, and on June 12th some 2,600 work-
ers stopped work in the 33 factories in Netanya, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and 
Ramat Gan.26
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The breakout of the strike signaled in fact that the contested issues of 
free movement, workplace fees, and minimum wage could now be wid-
ened to include additional demands. Among the latter were a two-week 
annual leave, greater cost-of-living allowance, participation of the em-
ployers in a workers’ provident fund, recognition of the employers of the 
hard and nerve-wrecking nature of diamond cutting, and the like. Taken 
as whole the demands refl ected the realization of the workers and their 
representatives of the great advance the industry had made, and the great 
profi ts of the manufacturers. Moreover, in shaping the campaign the His-
tadrut attempted to do what it had failed to since the establishment of 
the industry—to educate the manufacturers and the PDMA’s chiefs to the 
norms of the “triangular thread” prevailing in the Yishuv of consensual 
industrial relations, neutral arbitration, and clear hegemony of the His-
tadrut and Mapai in the Yishuv’s industrial sector.27
The manufacturers’ response was negative only in part. The demands 
would increase their cost on labor during this period of contracting Amer-
ican demand. The workers were paid well, and arbitration would intrude 
on their managerial autonomy. Moreover, the strengthened presence of 
the unions in the daily work at the factories would in the last resort force 
upon the factories union participation in selecting new workers and dis-
missing the old. Blaming the Histadrut for leading an unnecessary strike, 
the PDMA called for immediate talks. The PDMA turned to the workers 
to realize the limits of the manufacturers and the danger that the strike 
portended to the factories. It was important for the PDMA to demonstrate 
to the British its resistance to what was perceived as a contest over power. 
Moreover, up to a certain point the prolonged strike may even have served 
the manufacturers as a temporary rationalizing check, conveying to the 
British their capacity to halt the industry’s expansion and correct the im-
age of an industry in chaos. This was perhaps the reason why for some it 
seemed that the PDMA was strangely refraining from immediate resolu-
tion of the crisis.28
The material effects of the fi ve-week strike were harsh. The factories 
were paralyzed, uncut diamonds were returned to the banks’ safes, and 
only the last quantities of fi nished stones could be exported. The extent of 
loss of hard currency to the Palestine economy was never reported, but it 
was clearly on the minds of the British, who were preoccupied at the time 
in detecting diamonds that reached the Germans from the Middle East. 
The manufacturers were severely hit. Some had to hand over stones for 
domestic cutting despite the PDMA’s warnings that home work would 
further harm the factories. Others were made idle and busied themselves 
in debating the crisis, maintaining the factories, or negotiating with the 
workers. The workers were equally hurt. Some 83,000 working days 
were lost, causing many workers to lose their piecework wages and to 
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reconsider, despite the arduous training, shirking the industry altogether. 
There is no clear evidence of the extent of support of the workers by the 
Histadrut’s strike fund, but at the time it was known that some workers, 
in particular Histadrut members, were transferred to work in agriculture 
in Labor’s cooperative settlements and kibbutzim where they could be 
given shelter and food. As an urban affair the strike occasioned an odd as-
sembly and protest. Its noise was heard less in the factories and the streets 
and more in the press. The strike was widely reported and the politically 
oriented press was strongly manipulated to impact public opinion and 
the negotiations. Evidently the press amazed many with the effect that the 
advance of capitalism in the Yishuv was making on employment arrange-
ments in the Jewish industrial sector and on social relations as a whole.29
Serious negotiations began only after a month of sporadic contacts 
and futile attempts by the Jewish Agency to mediate between the PDMA 
and the unions.30 First the PDMA proposed to hand over all questions 
of employment relations to a form of arbitration known in Jewish Law 
as “Zabla,” a procedure in which the PDMA and the unions would both 
name an arbitrator and those two arbitrators would then select a third. 
The Histadrut rejected the proposal claiming that basic demands, such as 
minimum wage and workers’ pay during the strike, could not be negoti-
ated. After excruciating debate the manufacturers proposed another form 
of arbitration—a committee of Yishuv dignitaries. Initially the Histadrut 
rejected the idea but after realizing that the other four unions were willing 
to accept the proposal, it withdrew its objection. In practice many conten-
tious issues were resolved even before the arbitration began its work. And 
once the unions gave up the demand for strike pay, the strike was over.31 
Valid until March 1943, the agreement provided for a wage increases rang-
ing from 40 to 60 percent. A minimum wage for apprentices was fi xed 
and a progressive scale of cost-of-living allowances for all workers was 
established. Also provided were extended annual holidays and leaves, an 
unemployment insurance fund, and arrangements for transfer of workers 
from one workshop to another.32
The strike refl ected the realization of the Histadrut of the limits of its 
power. Lacking control over the entry of workers to the factories, over the 
funding of the trainees, and over the evasion of owners from fulfi lling their 
commitments, it was pushed “from below” to conduct a general strike it 
did not really want. Whatever the achievements of the strike, its power 
in the workplaces was still limited. For the PDMA, on the other hand, the 
strike and its disastrous toll were a telling lesson in the need to replace 
one-sided control of employment relations with collective bargaining and 
arbitration. “The disturbance it caused,” wrote Ben-Ami, “and its serious 
after-effects were such as it is hoped will serve as a warning not to make 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Labor Unrest   |   157
use in any dispute that might occur in the future of a strike as a means of 
settlement of industrial differences.”33
In reality the strike’s resonance stemmed from its length, the extent of 
participation, and the persistence of the workers. It thus demonstrated that 
in a short period the diamond workers turned into one of Palestine’s most 
militant group of workers, and quite unexpectedly, a clear voice against 
capital. Moreover, the lengthy arbitration that terminated only in late 1942 
turned into one of the foundations of the increasingly widespread Yishuv 
system of labor-capital arbitration.34 No wonder the PDMA chose now to 
formally affi liate itself as a member of the Palestine Manufacturers’ As-
sociation, the backing of which it needed, and that it fi nally accepted the 
cost-of-living allowance system customary in the Yishuv. From a wider 
perspective these steps refl ected the veering of the industry to acquies-
cence with the “triangular thread,” the Yishuv’s national institutional 
system.35
Labor-Capital Rapprochement
It took long weeks before the reconciliation between the PDMA and the 
unions materialized. The joint committee on workers’ wanderings—one 
of the outcomes of the general strike—started working only in late 1942.36 
The arbitration itself was completed only a month later.37 Sporadic strikes 
erupted in between. In Sam Moed’s factory workers stopped work in No-
vember after being accused of stealing diamonds and after the owners 
searched the workers without the workers’ committee present. In the Ha-
kochav factory, workers opposed the employer’s intention to deduct from 
their wages a Yishuv tax destined to support the families of workers who 
were recruited to the British Army. Such disputes showed that despite the 
general strike and the arbitration, disputing became a routine, and work-
ers and union leaders alike sensed that fundamental issues were far from 
resolved.38
Ben-Ami asked the British to intervene and implement the strike law, 
which came into effect in Palestine in early 1942. “The diamond industry 
was excluded from the scope of [the Trade Disputes Order],” wrote Ben-
Ami in October 1942 to the British authorities, 
and we had thought at the time that both the relatively peaceful atmosphere 
in our relations, and the “light” character of our industry, warranted such ex-
clusion. Experience, however, has proved that there is every justifi cation for 
including our own industry within the scope of this legislation. This later im-
pression is justifi ed not only by the unfortunate labor disputes which have dis-
turbed our progress, but, above all, by the fact that our diamond industry has 
been recognized as one of importance to the economic war effort. Our submis-
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sion is, therefore, that the Palestine Government might be moved to extend 
the scope of the Trade Disputes Order to all diamond-cutting establishments. 
The regulation of man-power in Palestine makes such inclusion all the more 
imperative.39
For both capital and labor it was a moment of reckoning. The PDMA 
recognized that the multiplicity of unions—in itself a product of the PD-
MA’s initial ideological-oriented labor-control schemes—may have kept 
the power of the Histadrut at bay, but was far from quieting the young 
workers. On its side the Histadrut fully accommodated itself to the reality 
of its nonhegemonic power over the workers and looked up to the PDMA 
to create some minimum conditions for cross-class cooperation. “There 
is not one diamond factory without tense relations between the work-
ers and the employers,” contended Ben-Ami to the representatives of the 
unions in December 1942, “[and despite the July agreement] there were 
work stoppages. Work cannot be done in such an atmosphere. It is tiring.” 
Smagarinsky, the DWO secretary, retorted that the problem lay not with 
the organized workers but with the unaffi liated whose number increased 
beyond control, recklessly employed the strike weapon and who refl ected 
the blame of the PDMA for the imbalance between the organized and non-
organized workers. Furthermore, Smagarinsky argued, there were manu-
facturers who still opposed the presence of a workers’ committee in their 
factories, ignored the joint PDMA-union committee on resolving disputes, 
and paid less than determined by the agreement. The only solution was 
PDMA-unions cooperation. Eliezer Shostak, the Revisionist NWF leader, 
and Zeev Fisherschein (Zohar) of Poalei Agudat Israel concurred: the 
problem lay with the individual manufacturers who tended to despise the 
PDMA’s authority and the consensual regime the agreements created, and 
what was needed was cooperation between the sides in forcing workers to 
affi liate themselves with one of the unions. Ben-Ami promised to cooper-
ate but insisted that the workers and their unions should always remind 
themselves of London’s concern of Palestine’s growing threat to the future 
recovery of Antwerp and of the limit this implied for the further expan-
sion of the local diamond industry.40
Coloring the entire climate of employment relations in the diamond 
industry, the warning noted a change in the PDMA. The diversifi cation of 
the stone supply forced it to seek cooperation with labor and to recognize 
the role of the unions in pacifying industrial unrest. Moreover, the adapta-
tion of the industry to the stone change meant not only retraining but also 
dismissals; not only increased labor productivity but also stricter tuning in 
to the requirements of the international diamond market. Collective bar-
gaining would facilitate the overcoming of these diffi cult issues and the 
new collective agreement that was destined to be signed in March 1943 
would have to take these issues into consideration.41
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The Histadrut also wished to cement the rapprochement, and in winter 
1943 the DWO proposed to PDMA a new scheme for organizing the work-
ers and the calming down the endemic militancy. The scheme aimed to 
give the Histadrut control over the selection of new apprentices and over 
the recruitment of apprentices from the other unions. It would help the 
PDMA regulate the movement of workers and it would participate with 
the manufacturers in bipartite committees to resolve disputes. In return 
the PDMA would be helped by the Histadrut in restraining the workers 
and in particular the pressures stemming from the unaffi liated and their 
militant organizations.42
In reality the bipartite committees that began operating in winter 1943 
in Tel Aviv and Netanya turned into tense contestation sites, and conveyed 
to the workers a strong sense of the precariousness of labor-capital coop-
eration. The compliance of manufacturers with the recommendations of 
the committees was only partial, the impact of the committees on higher-
level negotiations remained minimal, and a vacuum emerged in anticipa-
tion for the real confrontation expected in the negotiation over the new 
agreement.43 Evidently they could not prevent the reeruption of strikes 
and the renewal of the “war of nerves” (as Ben-Ami called it) between the 
PDMA and the unions. In the Ophir factory in Netanya, seventy workers 
stopped working in protest against the owner for not compensating them 
for a one-day lockout he decided on unilaterally. A few weeks later the 
diamond sawyers in Ophir started their own strike in demand for a wage 
increase in association with the stone change. In another factory in Ramat 
Gan workers stopped work for a month in demand for wages not paid to 
them for strike days in 1942. In various factories protests mounted against 
manufacturers canceling working days in order to decrease labor costs 
and against manufacturers’ attempts to refrain from paying cost-of-living 
allowances.44 No wonder PDMA functionaries felt that some of these dis-
putes and short work stoppages were premeditated by the unions in order 
to set the agenda for the coming negotiations, and warned the diamond 
manufacturers not to surrender to workers’ demands or negotiate with 
them individually. For the PDMA the problem lay in the workers and their 
unions focusing on minimum wage and cost-of-living allowances instead 
of the industry’s real problems—its technological advance, the related 
rate of productivity, and competitive capacity. For the unions and the His-
tadrut in particular, the issue was the workers’ share in the profi ts of the 
manufacturers, the abuse of authority in the workplace, and the freedom 
of the workers within the regimented atmosphere of the industry.45
Negotiations started on the expiry of the agreement in mid-March 1943 
while some strikes were still unresolved and new ones starting. As usual 
the four unions and the Histadrut handed in their demands separately. 
The Histadrut’s DWO presented the demand for a year-long collective 
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agreement expressing the wish that negotiations would not procrastinate 
as happened the previous year. The older demands for a minimum wage 
and the abolishment of workplace fees resurfaced in addition to new de-
mands such as a substantial raise in basic wages, investment in provident 
funds, extra pay for extra hours of work, and the like. The four unions 
presented some similar demands regarding conditions of the workplaces 
and slightly different pay demands, and they generally preferred to focus 
on the need for arbitration. Finally, the unaffi liated workers, always suspi-
cious of the unions’ control of the workers’ committees, called for a gen-
eral assembly to defi ne in a democratic way the contours of the bargaining 
with the employers.46
The double-route negotiations took three months to conclude. The 
PDMA adamantly objected to the demands for raising the labor cost for 
the manufacturer; the unions were split and the nonaffi liated workers 
rejected the compromises the unions offered. However, the extent of the 
raise in wages and the demand to abolish the Platzgeld kept the PDMA 
and the unions apart. Once these were resolved, so the unions believed, 
the rest of the issues would follow and the unaffi liated would concur.47
Three sources thawed the stalemate. One was the economic pressure 
on the manufacturers stemming from declining prices for polished stones 
on the American market, which in turn threatened to narrow down Dia-
mond Syndicate supplies to Palestine. The second was the pressure of the 
occasional strikes that erupted during the negotiations and were associ-
ated with the manufacturers’ decision to disregard demands until the new 
agreement was signed. Closely related to this was the decision by the gov-
ernment, which was increasingly worried about the endemic unrest in the 
industry, to direct all unions to notify the government’s diamond control-
ler on any dispute so as to allow preemptive mediation. The third source 
was again the unaffi liated workers, who gradually realized that an agree-
ment was close and that the formal unions were about to compromise.48
In mid-June the collective agreement was fi nally signed. “We must,” 
concluded Ben-Ami, “uproot the opinion prevailing in the Yishuv that we 
all must ‘grab and eat’ for we do not know if this industry will survive 
in Palestine also after the war and the diamond workers would have to 
move to another job. This feeling must be uprooted because it might ruin 
the entire industry; the fate of thousands of young people is linked to it.” 
The agreement was a great achievement, added Moshe Shapira of the 
Histadrut executive who was deeply involved in the negotiations: “The 
worker . . . has but just one demand—not to force him to work under con-
ditions he does not want.”49
The agreement was indeed impressive, in particular after so many 
failed attempts to reach collective agreements in other segments of the 
Yishuv and after the opposition of some manufacturers to concede their 
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liberty to shape their factories’ own working conditions and pay levels. 
Workplace and tool-usage fees were abolished, thus doing away with one 
of the main features in the traditional diamond cutting industry in Bel-
gium. Training fees were annulled and older related debts were abolished 
as well. Workers were given assurances that they would be paid during 
declining supplies and contraction of the piecework. The controls over 
workers’ movements were uplifted. The basic wages and cost-of-living 
allowances were increased although to a lesser rate than demanded in 
the fi rst place. And fi nally, a series of improvements in working condi-
tions such as employers’ participation in medical insurance and provident 
funds were granted. No wonder many contemporaries perceived in the 
agreement a signifi cant victory for the workers and an effi cient means of 
maintaining industrial peace in the diamond industry, as well as a lesson 
for the Yishuv as a whole.50
While the new agreement was to remain valid until summer 1944, it 
hardly narrowed down the number of strikes. Workers at the Dankner’s 
Almaz diamond factory started a strike in mid-July 1943 in protest against 
forcing them to sign an obligation not to strike. At Feldman’s diamond 
factory in Jerusalem, Poalei Agudat Israel workers went on strike in July 
1943 against the refusal of the owner to comply with the collective agree-
ment and his authoritarian attitude towards the workers. Some 120 clerks 
in the administration of the diamond industry who were at the time or-
ganizing their own union started a strike in protest of the PDMA’s refusal 
to negotiate with them a separate collective agreement. On 12 August the 
entire industry went on a half-hour solidarity strike with the workers at 
Feldman’s factory.51
The causes for the wave of strike lay fi rst and foremost in the diffi -
culty of the manufacturers to fulfi ll the collective agreement, blaming the 
low prices for polished diamonds on the American market and the risk to 
their profi ts. Second, a decreasing polishing quality was registered by the 
American buyers, which brought down sales of the Palestine product and 
consequently the contraction of the amount of work supplied to the work-
ers. Third, international concern began to increase from mid-1943 regard-
ing the future recovery of the diamond industry in Antwerp and revival 
of the German cutting industry, which in turn threatened the expansion of 
cutting in Palestine. Finally, many workers, in particular among the unaf-
fi liated, refused to respect the verdict of the agreement and its compro-
mises. Particularly detested was the forcing of each worker to sign the 
agreement and thereby commit himself to refrain from strike action. By 
autumn 1943 it was clear, therefore, that the threat on the June agreement 
was becoming widespread. The number of small factory-specifi c disputes 
increased and the PDMA formed a special fund to support manufactur-
ers against fi nancial losses. “The strikes in the diamond industry are very 
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numerous,” warned R. K. Saunders of the government Labor Department. 
“Last year 100,000 workdays were lost. These numbers are relayed by the 
department of statistics to the government in London. The matter could 
infl uence its attitude to the industry.”52 More than anything, however, the 
change of stones in autumn 1943 made it harder for the individual manu-
facturers to cope fi nancially and the PDMA was therefore triggered to call 
for adapting the agreement to the new circumstances.53
In these conditions labor activists felt the whole project of the diamond 
industry was shaky. The information on the change of supplies was ini-
tially perceived by the unions as a maneuver by the PDMA to justify 
violations of the June agreement, but it was now clear that it made the 
manufacturers search for reductions in the costs of workers’ retraining. 
In Netanya people felt that unemployment among diamond workers was 
growing and that the attraction of workers to the small town was weak-
ening. In early October the DWO notifi ed the PDMA that it would not 
continue negotiations unless the June agreement was fully complied with 
and renewed contacts with the minority organizations on the need for a 
wider campaign.54
Employment relations in the industry were thus entering a new phase. 
“We have before us a principled question,” Ben-Ami told the manufactur-
ers, “that stems from the new situation in the industry and that requires 
serious discussion which is the adaptation of the labor wage to the new 
reality. In the future we would need to work types of rough stones that ac-
cording to the labor contract it would be impossible to sustain the industry. 
The question is whether we could infl uence the workers and the unions to 
realize that something has changed. We move from a period of war to a pe-
riod of peace, and the transition could be long. If we do not hold on during 
this transition period we will not be able to sustain the industry. A general 
reorganization of labor relations and work conditions would be therefore 
needed. The workers and we share the same goal—to sustain the industry 
and therefore work would have to be adapted to the new conditions. A 
joint committee would have to sit and check the factors and make a plan. If 
the workers show understanding and we fi nd a common language—good; 
otherwise they would force us to make the change real.”
Indeed, in autumn 1943 the close association of industrial unrest with 
the politics of supply reached a dramatic peak when the diamond manu-
facturers began to turn back on their commitments in the collective agree-
ment. Claiming that the economic circumstances had changed, the prom-
ised cost-of-living allowance of 46 percent was now refused, and other 
items relating to improved working conditions and benefi ts were violated. 
In practice this about-face was the immediate outcome of the change in 
supplies; and the consequent need for immediate retraining of the work-
ers, formerly apprenticed in cutting Sand, to the production of Melees. Sup-
plies and its politics were therefore at the heart of the cutters’ unrest.55 
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Propensity to Strike
Any explanation of the relatively high strike propensity of the diamond 
workers during the war must start by seeing the relations that had evolved 
between the manufacturers and the workers as a social pact. On one side of 
the pact there was an intensely expanding stratum of workers. They were 
mostly young and eager to work in a venture that seemed much more at-
tractive than other available jobs. They quickly became highly skilled, and 
in comparison to the majority of Jewish industrial workers in Palestine 
their skill was rooted in tradition, knowledge, precision, and dexterity. On 
the other side of the pact were the diamond manufacturers, the provid-
ers of the economic opportunity and of the novel economic attraction in 
the Yishuv. The employment structure they created, described earlier as a 
Taylorized-style chain system, and its foundation on a mix of piecework 
and collective bargaining was conducive to high levels of effi ciency and 
productivity. Long hours of work and high pressures on the immobilized 
body of the workers and on their penetrating eyes were coupled with an 
atmosphere of regimentation and recurring worries over losing stones or 
harming them. These were balanced by relatively high wages which were 
partly protected by an all-industry collective agreement, a strong sense of 
workplace solidarity, and pride in skill and in the worldwide reputation 
of the quality of their work. The diamond workers therefore felt their com-
monality much more through the labor process and work experience than 
by organizational framework, union affi liation, and presence of union ac-
tivists. This was often refl ected in their allegiance to the manufacturers 
and to the workplaces, the basic ingredient of any such social pact.56
The diamond workers became strike prone more because the social 
pact with the factories was regularly under stress and often violated and 
less because of traditions of militancy. After all, the legacy of strike action 
among diamond cutters and polishers in prewar Europe and the US was 
hardly of one of adversity and militancy. The radicalism of the cutters and 
polishers in Amsterdam and Antwerp expressed itself less through strike 
action and more in robust organization, in the attainment of improved 
pay and working conditions, through piecemeal organizational (and edu-
cational) action, and composed demonstration of power. What the widely 
known leaders of the diamond workers’ unions —from Henri Polak and 
Piet van Muyden in the Netherlands and W. V. Daems and Frans Schoeters 
in Antwerp to William Jacobs in England and Meyer Andries in New 
York—had in common was labor’s reformism and gradualism. Much of 
their organizational energy in their respective countries was spent on con-
structing consensus with the diamond manufacturers and employers and 
less on fi ghting them. This was part of their defi nition as “labor aristoc-
racy,” a term usually connoting highly skilled jobs and workers. The re-
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spect of the employers for the leaders of the diamond workers and to their 
organizations (e.g. the ANDB in the Netherlands, the ADB in Belgium, or 
the Protective Union of Diamond Workers in the US) testifi ed not only to 
the sense of occupational commonality but also to the need to maintain 
industrial peace and large areas of consent.57
It is diffi cult to substantiate why these reformist and nonradical lega-
cies found less expression in Palestine, where so many of the traditions of 
the industry kept on feeding the daily life in the diamond workshops of 
Tel Aviv and Netanya. Perhaps it was due to the fact that those arrived in 
Palestine were diamond experts and not workers or union activists, and 
therefore the continuity of labor traditions of collective action was dis-
rupted. It could have been also affected, as we saw earlier, by the PDMA’s 
insistence on not allowing the Histadrut, evidently a nonradical union, to 
become the hegemonic representative of the workers and overshadow all 
other minority unions. Whatever the reasons, the diamond manufactur-
ers in Palestine, some of them eager to reproduce the Belgian model of 
employment relations, repeatedly bemoaned the failure of the Low Coun-
tries’ legacy of restraint to take root.58
In the manufacturers’ perception, the social pact as practiced in their 
factories was under constant threat because of the high exposure of the 
manufacturers themselves. On the one hand they were dependent on the 
regular supply of rough stones from London. The high irregularity of sup-
ply was a corollary not only of the war conditions but of the distributive 
policies of De Beers and the DTC, themselves infl uenced by fl uctuation in 
demand for raw materials, and by the British policy towards the Belgian 
pressure to contain the expansion of the new cutting centers. The irregu-
larity of stone supply could be expressed in varying size of stones sent 
for cutting in Palestine, but mainly in the constant thirst of the factories 
for more raw materials. On the other hand the reserves the manufactur-
ers kept were under a constant threat of dwindling because of overpro-
duction, low replenishment, or uneven distribution by the PDMA of the 
rough diamonds arriving from London. Each manufacturer in Palestine 
was therefore inclined to keep reserves to preempt irregularity.
Furthermore, for his guarantee the manufacturer had in parallel to cut 
on his costs on labor. He could do this by decreasing the distribution of 
stones to the workers, by decreasing the number of apprentices in his fac-
tory, or simply by tampering with workers’ pay (cutting it, postponing it, 
and the like). All these the manufacturer could employ to a certain limit. 
He had to be careful not to harm the workforce he took so much care 
to cultivate and on whose trust and loyalty he so much depended. He 
had also to take into consideration the collective agreement the PDMA 
signed on his behalf, which obliged the manufacturers to guarantee work-
ers’ pay during times of decrease in supply of stones or forced temporary 
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closure of the factory. The manufacturers often preferred not to harm their 
workers and instead digressed from the PDMA’s pay policies and collec-
tive agreements with the unions. In more extreme cases the manufacturer 
chose to lock out the factory for some time, drastically decreasing activ-
ity and renewing it when profi t levels again allowed. All in all therefore 
the diamond manufacturer was incessantly calculating the extent of his 
exposure to his sales levels in the US, to London’s policy regarding the 
distribution of stones, and to the PDMA’s collective pay directives. His au-
tonomy and freedom of action, so cherished by all the liberal-oriented dia-
mond manufacturers, were therefore limited, and on encountering these 
limits he would opt to cut labor costs, otherwise it would not be profi table 
for him to go on. This was a permanent source of pressure on relations 
with the workers and it was often enhanced by the manufacturers and the 
PDMA who exaggerated the extent of these dangers to the press.59
In this way the world of booming diamond production unraveled itself 
not only as an attractive source of income, occupational attainment, and 
mobility for the young diamond workers in Palestine. It was also unstable, 
fl uctuating, and laden with threats to shatter the system of trust and co-
alescence of interest they shared with the manufacturers, the experts that 
taught them their skills, and the workplace that provided them with a 
sense of social order and economic future. The backing that could have 
been provided to them from outside by the presence of a solid union or-
ganization and a Labor movement were frail. Furthermore, the PDMA’s 
successful splintering of labor organization in the factories discouraged 
the traditional restraining barriers usually placed by the Labor movement 
on the social unrest of the urban workers.60 
The age of the workers was indeed a crucial factor in explaining their 
propensity to strike. Upon entry to apprenticeship at a young age, the 
workers expected to start earning after three months. Despite the regi-
mentation and arduous conditions of the work, they enjoyed the benefi ts 
that piecework accrued to them. Willingness to work for hours on end, 
the lack of familial commitment (other than to parents whom they could 
quickly provide for), and fl exibility in their adaptation to changes in sup-
plies and in sizes of stones all made them also susceptible to spontaneous 
action. They could be children of members of one of the four or fi ve unions 
but were hardly satisfi ed with the collective agreement in the industry or 
paid little respect to the unions’ restraining attempts. For the Histadrut 
activists they seemed an unruly lot, wholly dedicated to work and un-
easily recruited to union work, distant from values of loyalty to a Labor 
movement and much more prone to organizational independence than to 
traditional union frameworks.61
The Labor department of the Palestine government was aware of these 
characteristics. In the department’s logic the propensity of the diamond 
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workers to strike was related to the large number of unions in Palestine, 
and to the effect of the expansion of the industry on the entry of large 
numbers of unaffi liated workers. These explanations may have had a ring 
of truth to them but they ignored the relation between the entry of the 
unorganized and the PDMA’s worker-selection policy. Furthermore, they 
overlooked the relation between the great number of unorganized and the 
fact that in times of low unemployment, Histadrut members could have 
preferred not to enter the diamond industry because they disliked its char-
acteristics (long hours, the employers, the instability of the industry, etc.) 
despite the relatively higher pay rewards.
Clearly the multiplicity of strikes was related to the breakdown of ne-
gotiations on collective agreements and to the workers’ consciousness of 
the increasing prosperity of the industry and active desire to have a share 
in it. The young diamond workers interpreted the recurrent intermissions 
of supplies and consequent changes in work schedules as a taken-for-
granted feature of their work experience that turned work stoppages into 
routine. Manufacturers who wished to maintain rough stones in reserve 
instead of distributing them for cutting were quickly blamed for breach-
ing their commitments to the apprentices and workers. Fluctuations in 
supply, and intermittent attempts to cut labor costs and to empty collec-
tive agreements of their original contents portrayed the manufacturers as 
unwilling to share their high profi ts from the industry. The workers’ pride 
in acquiring a craft, in their technological adaptability and in the culture 
of the skill they cultivated, deeply affected this portrayal.62
The impact of the persistent propensity of the diamond workers to 
strike and of the weakness of the labor organizations to restrain strike ac-
tion was hardly confi ned to employment relations. In the fi rst place the 
strikes added to the anxiety of the manufacturers regarding the steady 
supply of raw material from London as an element of instability. The latter 
contrasted to the image that the PDMA and its members wished to mar-
ket (in particular to the British authorities and the Diamond Syndicate) 
of a viable industry and one that stood in service of the war effort and 
the empire. Second, the recurrent strikes exposed the weakness of those 
in the government and in the PDMA to fully control the industry, and 
thus added to the threats posed by the movement of experts between the 
factories and by the persistence of home work. Third, the strikes forced 
the manufacturers and their organization to take into account the chronic 
industrial unrest in their business-expansion strategies. This was clearly 
seen in their growing willingness, after three to four years of operation, to 
attenuate their principled objection to the presence of the labor organiza-
tions and—without precedence in Palestine—to a branch-wide collective 
agreement.63
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The strikes had a deeper effect on the labor organization, in particular 
on the Histadrut. To the PDMA’s attempts to prevent a meaningful pres-
ence of workers’ representation in the labor process, the strikes added a 
from-below challenge to the organizations themselves. Naturally this re-
sulted in a growing effort to widen union infl uence over workers and in 
a concerted action by the Histadrut to unite the organizations under its 
umbrella and to discipline the workers through the cultivation of loyal 
workshop workers’ committees. At the same time the strikes emphasized 
the partial effectiveness of these attempts and made the Histadrut recog-
nize the limits both to its hegemony in the industrial sector in the Yishuv 
and to its capacity to advance accommodation with private capital.64 
The sense of a limited power produced among the Histadrut’s union 
ideologues negative images that coupled the diamond workers with all 
the wrongs of capitalism and unorganized labor. Focusing on the “pathol-
ogy” of workers’ attraction to personal profi t and defi ance of organization, 
the images reproduced the traditional arsenal of social objection that since 
the 1920s Zionist-Socialism cultivated against capital and the unaffi liated. 
The imagery never excluded a national-oriented reasoning of Labor’s 
need to cooperate with Jewish industrialists and capitalists; neither did it 
weaken the Histadrut’s quest to widen its bases by tempting those object-
ing to organization. Nevertheless, uncontrolled militancy in the diamond 
industry signifi ed for the Histadrut that its ambivalent language towards 
both capital and the unorganized remained ineffective. The militancy tes-
tifi ed to the wider, menacing problem that the Histadrut was too weak to 
overcome of workers whose working conditions and power in the work-
place improved by wartime boom, and who consequently defi ed Labor’s 
authority and collective interests. The tactics used by Mapai and the His-
tadrut leadership to contain these better-off workers could not work in the 
diamond industry because of the piecework character of the labor process 
and because the PDMA and the manufacturers took care to keep workers’ 
representation at bay. The Histadrut had nothing left but to recognize its 
failure, to divert its best forces to other industries, and to hope that rela-
tions with the industry and its workers after the war would correspond to 
the presence of organized labor it was used to before the war.65
The impact was, however, wider. As a part of a state-building project 
the Zionist Labor movement in Palestine promoted the autonomy of the 
Yishuv economy and the preference of Jewish over Arab workers in all the 
workplaces in that autonomy (known as the struggles for Hebrew labor 
and the conquest of work). Many labor disputes and strikes against Jewish 
employers in agriculture, construction, and industry revolved around this 
issue. Moreover, many disputes over improvement of conditions were no 
less immersed in Zionist terminology—the employers claiming the work-
ers were disrupting their national-capitalist operation and labor arguing 
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that the Jewish capital owners and employers were more capitalist than 
Zionist. This “Zionization” of the culture and language of capital-labor ne-
gotiation and of the repertoire of collective action did not mean that class 
issues were absent. Rather, they were overshadowed by an agenda that 
argued for the primacy of a political struggle and for the hegemony of the 
Zionist-oriented Histadrut in the labor market in providing the employ-
ers with a labor force, in participating in fi xing wages, and in regulating 
the structure of the workforce. In the latter part of the Mandate period the 
contestation in the workplaces and the labor market became increasingly 
class based. The national agenda continued to infl uence the segmentation 
of the economy and the organizational segregation of the workforce. How-
ever, when the diamond workforce was created in the early stages of the 
war and during the booming of the economy during the war, the balance 
was already tipping away from the national politics of the labor market 
toward the social politics of relations between capital and labor.66
The diamond workers clearly became the leading force in this gradual 
veering of relations from national-segregationist aspects of strike action to 
economic and social ones. For an industry and a workforce hardly exist-
ing before the war and representing just one type of manufacturing, such 
levels of confl ict—an average of 34 percent of the strikers in the Yishuv—
were remarkable. Even more signifi cant was the fact that the diamond 
industry was Jewish-only, and that from the start it did not experience the 
labor market competition between Arabs and Jews that was so infl uential 
in social and employment relations in the Yishuv.67
While the effects of the strikes on the manufacturers and on organized 
labor were direct, militancy had another, less blatant consequence. The 
close association in Palestine between the instability of supply of rough 
stones and industrial unrest made many aware of a similar association in 
the African diamond mines between the regulated punctuation of min-
ing and the working conditions of the South African and Sierra Leonine 
miners. As global diamond mining and trade never knew a suprana-
tional workers’ organization (similar to the Universal Alliance of Dia-
mond Workers, which referred to cutters and polishers) this awareness 
never expressed itself in an organized international solidarity. However, 
the fact that the stones polished in the various centers originated in those 
African mines provided a sense of “imperial connectivity” that the war 
strengthened through the increasing importance of noncombatant regions 
for international politics. The effect of stone supply on the multiplicity of 
strikes made this connectivity another aspect of an imperial social forma-
tion that tied the experiences of diamond miners in Africa to those of the 
cutters in Palestine. This was partly refl ected in the growing awareness 
by the PDMA of information on the tribulations of the diamond industry 
in other parts of the globe. It was also expressed by diamond workers in 
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Palestine who saw that apart from their participation in the local national 
project, they were also part of an empire, of a colonial network, and of an 
international war effort that crossed national borders. In the last year of 
the war this awareness of the relations between the postwar international 
arrangements, the plans for economic development, and their potential 
infl uence on the international division of labor in the diamond industry 
deepened.68
The Long Showdown
The adaptation in the factories was a major effect of the stone change of 
autumn 1943. As almost all production focused on cutting and polishing 
eight-cuts, many of the workers would now have to be retrained, adapt 
themselves to new types of stones and cutting, and cultivate new special-
izations. Many workers would become unemployed in the process; some 
would have to leave the industry altogether. Those workers who could 
handle a variety of stones and sizes would become more secure and privi-
leged. In turn relations with the unions had to change and items in the col-
lective agreement would have to be renegotiated with the Histadrut. The 
latter gained quite a lot from the process. It was necessary to protect the 
redundant workers and formulate the demands that fi tted the change in 
production. This empowerment was closely associated with the fact that 
the immediate effect of the change was a vigorous revival of militancy at 
the end of 1943 and again in spring 1944.69 
Table 5.2 General strikes in Palestine’s diamond industry, 1942–1946
Workers Affected Working Days Lost
Average Intensity 
(Days lost per striker)
Jun. 1942 2,500  82,500 33
Dec. 1943* 2,000  24,000 12
Mar. 1944** 3,250 182,000 56
Jan. 1946*** 4,320  56,160 13
*Partial Strike; ** Referendum taken among all diamond workers; *** Stoppage of Work.
Source: Histadrut, The Diamond Worker, 12–13.
Strikes in the diamond industry have always been associated with the 
state of supplies, with the fl uctuating relations between the MEW and the 
PDMA, and practically with factors that were exogenous to the industry’s 
system of employment relations. Prior to the stone change in autumn 1943 
these relations were straightforward: supplies slow to arrive decreased 
the amount of work, the latter decreased piecework remuneration, and 
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workers demanded more work or compensation. The supply crisis that 
had been unfolding since the end of 1943 and through the fi rst months 
of 1944 changed the order of the process: supplies decreased, employers 
violated the collective agreement, and strike action followed, without the 
renewal of supplies really mattering. This change was part of the grow-
ing awareness of the workers and their unions, in particular following the 
stone change, that the PDMA and the diamond manufacturers could not 
be spared a second front. One front—that of the struggle for supplies in 
London—could not be used anymore to justify social peace in the industry, 
and a parallel battle had to be waged to “educate” the manufacturers that 
in calculating their moves the workers had to be taken into account.70
The fi rst signs of this aggravation of employment relations emerged at 
the end of 1943 when the manufacturers began turning back on the June 
collective agreement.71 In early November the diamond cutters and their 
representatives were informed that pay envelopes for November would 
not include the war bonuses given during the past eighteen months—46 
percent of salaries over LP 3,500 in addition to the regular allowances of 
100 percent of the rise in the cost-of-living allowance index. The PDMA’s 
notice, which was attributed to decreased business, surprised the workers 
and protest meetings were hurriedly organized. Workers in the diamond 
factories in Netanya who were affi liated with the Revisionists and the IZL 
and LEHI Jewish underground organizations handed the manufacturers 
an ultimatum, and once rejected they started, still without the participa-
tion of Histadrut, a forty-eight-hour strike.72 The Jewish Agency tried to 
mediate, but to no avail. Workers affi liated with the minority unions in Tel 
Aviv and Jerusalem followed suit and joined in what soon seemed to be 
turning into a general strike. The strike ended, however, after two weeks 
because the Histadrut did not join in, and because the PDMA promised 
the minority unions to reconsider its retreat from the 1943 collective agree-
ment. The workers achieved nothing, and the procrastinated negotiations 
in January 1944 over the fulfi llment of both the June and the December 
1943 agreements seemed to confi rm what all sides knew all too well: that 
the unfavorable atmosphere in London and the fear of declining profi ts 
on the American market caused the manufacturers to make the workers 
pay the price.73
For all intents and purposes employment relations in the diamond in-
dustry in winter 1944 were only formally functioning in a double frame-
work of a collective agreement and piecework payments, that is, accord-
ing to the amount of diamond cutting and polishing done. In practice the 
collective agreement was never fully complied with. Hovering over this 
grey area was the consistent threat of crisis, and it was further aggravated 
on the opening of discussions over a new collective agreement for 1944. 
The new agreement could not ignore the changes in the types of the rough 
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diamonds and the retraining and adaptation of the production process to 
the new stone regime. Many workers feared they would be soon out of 
work and they had to confront in the negotiation rooms panicked manu-
facturers who feared the collapse of their business. In this atmosphere the 
tension between the diamond workers and their union representatives in-
creased, refl ecting as it did a deeper confl ict over a place in the industry 
and over the legitimacy of the unions as representatives of the workers 
during the transformation that the industry was now experiencing.74
Following the PDMA’s decision to stop paying the workers the cost-of-
living allowances, in early March the workers’ factory committees gave 
the manufacturers an ultimatum. They demanded full compliance with 
the collective agreement within a week, the payment of the promised cost-
of-living allowance (of 46 percent), and manufacturers’ consent to arbitra-
tion by the Jewish Agency. If a strike broke out the manufacturers would 
have to pay for the lost days and an additional 4 percent of a worker’s 
wage for a strike fund. The unions were forced to join the ultimatum and 
the PDMA, hoping to avert the strike, succumbed to the pressure. In prac-
tice the unions and the PDMA joined hands here against the militancy of 
the workers, and attempted to reach a compromise before the work stop-
page initiated from below.75 
The arbitrators, Itzhak Grinboim and Avraham Wertheim of the Jew-
ish Agency’s Department of Labour, proposed to reduce the allowance 
demanded from a monthly addition of 46 percent to 20 percent to be paid 
only for the next three months (60 percent altogether). Sensing that the 
arbitrators were taking into consideration the supply situation, the PDMA 
agreed at once. The workers, however, took some days to consider the of-
fer, and then in a meeting of delegates of diamond workers’ committees 
it was decided to extend the ultimatum for a few more days and to have 
a mass workers’ meeting to have its fi nal say. Consequently a split took 
place. Some workers, mainly in Netanya, stopped work for two days in 
protest against the postponement of the ultimatum, while others, mainly 
in Tel Aviv, agreed with the unions to allow the Jewish Agency another 
chance of mediation. Moreover, the PDMA and the unions composed a 
joint proposal for an agreement that was supposed to serve as a basis for 
negotiations and to avert the strike. The tension between the workers and 
the workers’ committees on the one hand, and the unions who sought to 
extend the ultimatum and were criticized of curtailing collective action on 
the other, climaxed now, exactly when negotiations over supply in Lon-
don reached their most sensitive stage.76
This pressure from below was depicted at the time as a rebellion of 
the workers and the workers’ committees against the secretaries of the 
unions. It mounted now because of the fear of further reduction of rough 
materials and further dismissals. Consequently the workers’ committees 
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demanded that the workers themselves voice their opinion and that the 
unions follow their say. A workers’ referendum thus followed, organized 
by the labor councils and diamond unions in Tel Aviv and Netanya. It was 
fi rst of its kind in the diamond industry and a clear demonstration of the 
challenges the political unions were facing during the war. Out of 3,600 
diamond workers, 2,861 participated in the referendum, 1,953 voted to 
start a strike (1,524 in Tel Aviv and 429 in Netanya), and 859 voted for an 
agreement (684 in Tel Aviv and 175 in Netanya).77
The strike that broke out in mid-March 1944 was a corollary of the ad-
aptation of the factories to the change in supplies on the one hand, and of 
the excruciating negotiations in London that caused shortages of rough 
diamonds in Palestine on the other. For the PDMA’s leaders the strike was, 
as some manufacturers vehemently protested, like sticking a knife in the 
back of the manufacturers’ delegates who were desperately attempting to 
secure the continued existence of the industry. “We see in this illegal and 
wild strike,” wrote one of the PDMA’s functionaries, “an intention on the 
part of the workers to prove that they and only they can determine what 
was right and what was wrong and they did not recognize any neutral au-
thority and not even the unions who are party to the agreement.” On their 
part the workers saw the strike as a means to restore rights they felt had 
been wrested from them. In reality the strike refl ected the price the sides 
paid for keeping the Zionist institutions at distance.78
Hardly anyone suspected the strike would last so long; defi nitely not 
the British, who found it a puzzling phenomenon in such straining times 
of trouble in supplies and reorganization of economic priorities. The 
unions themselves were dumbfounded in the face of the preparedness of 
the workers to carry the material burden for such an extended period. 
Both owners and workers seemed adamant in their decision to continue 
the strike until one or the other would give way, and the labor department 
at the Jewish Agency found it hard to bring the sides to talk. What seemed 
to bring a thaw in the stalemate after a few weeks was the fact that work-
ers were severely hit, materially and mentally, and, as reported by the ac-
tivities of the strike fund, the unions jointly established the number of 
workers in need for fi nancial assistance, which grew by the day. This was 
corroborated by the exponent increase in domestic work and in informal 
employment relations outside the factories. Second, the shared sense that 
the Palestine diamond industry might be dismantled at the end of the war 
brought the sides closer. This shared economic nationalism was in fact the 
concept around which the Jewish Agency arbitrators sought to weave an 
understanding, practically a refl ection of what was earlier defi ned as the 
logic of the “triangular thread.”79
However, as many items not complied with in former agreements had 
to be reopened, and as the workers were unwilling to forgo their demand 
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for compensation for the days lost in the strike, it took the Jewish Agency 
fi ve weeks to renew the arbitration. The arbitration itself took another 
four weeks to conclude. The 46 percent cost-of-living allowance was re-
duced to 40 percent, the manufacturers agreed to pay the workers half 
of the wages they lost during their forced unemployment (itself caused 
by dearth of supplies), and the unions, to the dismay of many workers, 
agreed to replace their demand for a fi xed minimum wage with a graded 
scale that promised to help the lower-paid workers but earned the better-
off much less.80
The signifi cance of the agreement was wider. It ended a very long con-
fl ict of nine weeks that involved 33 factories, more than 4,000 workers, 
and 170,000 to 180,000 work days lost—considered at the time one of the 
biggest in the history of strikes in modern Palestine. The exports of pol-
ished diamonds decreased tremendously, which threatened to reverse the 
continuous economic success of the industry. Because of the size of the 
workforce in diamonds in Netanya, the entire town was deeply involved 
in the strike and suffered substantially from the decline of workers’ pur-
chasing power. While the strike expressed worker resistance to abolishing 
their previous achievements, at the same it also pinpointed the employers’ 
diffi culty to adapt. The change from Sand to Melees required much less 
labor and brought the manufacturers less income. The narrowing down of 
supplies that followed the change of stone decreased the amount of work 
needed, and the workers clearly felt they had to resort to a temporary 
paralysis of the industry in order to force the manufacturers to protect 
them from the effects of the change. The tension this strategy caused be-
tween the workers and the unions, and the pressure the workers’ com-
mittees exerted on the unions not to shorten the strike, taught the unions, 
and in particular the Histadrut, of their need to be more attuned to their 
organizational weakness among industrial workers. This would soon be 
refl ected in the strengthening of cooperation among the fi ve unions and in 
the enhanced power of the Histadrut among the diamond workers. Fur-
thermore, it brought some unity to the front that stood against the PDMA 
and the manufacturers who from start wished to keep labor representa-
tion splintered.81
The boundaries the workers set for the manufacturers during this 
period of intensive supply politics, and the emphasis of the unions on 
respecting collective agreements, enhanced the voices inside the PDMA 
calling for further rapprochement with the Zionist institutions. The tight-
ening of these relations was refl ected in the assistance given by the Jew-
ish Agency to the industry in summer 1944 in surveying and advising 
on the workers’ pay structure. Signifi cant too was the strengthening of 
ties between the agency’s Department of Trade and Industry with Hennig 
& Co., the PDMA’s brokers in London. Indeed, if the Zionist institutions 
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could be part of the campaign of the diamond industry to improve the 
supply position of the industry, they could well help to bridge over em-
ployment confl icts in the industry in Palestine itself. This growing Zionist 
rapprochement would become clearer after the war.82
Illustration 5.1. Diamond cut. Source: Heinrich Goldmann, The Diamond and its Making. 
Tel Aviv, 1946.
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Illustration 5.2. Diamond workers at a Netanya factory, 1946. Source: CZA/PHR/1174096. 
Used with permission of the Central Zionist Archive.
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An industry born and nurtured in such abnormal circumstances is ill 
equipped to face world competition . . . without some measure of guid-
ance and control. . . . Newcomers avid to participate in the profi ts of the 
diamond industry without proper regard to the changed conditions . . . 
might well endanger the whole future of the local industry unless prop-
erly controlled. At the same time the maintenance in a sheltered position 
of some 33 factories who happened to be established when an embargo 
was placed on expansion is diffi cult if not impossible of justifi cation now 
that the peculiar conditions necessitating the embargo no longer apply. 
[December 1945]. 
—Government of Palestine, Report of a Committee Appointed by Govern-
ment to Examine the Question of Post-war Regulation of the Palestine Dia-
mond Industry, 1946, 8.
Contrasts at War’s End
The evolution of the diamond industry has so far been shown to have 
been less a straightforward transplantation of expertise and occupational 
culture and much more a turbulent adaptation. In the technological make-
up of the industry, in the organization of business, in relations with the 
sources of the diamond material and in the social unrest in the “diamond 
community”—in all these levels an intensive negotiation had been unfold-
ing between the external and the local, the imported and the vernacular, 
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between the diamond industry as an occupational specifi city and its dy-
namic as a social and political happening. Affecting this turbulence was 
the atmosphere surrounding the industry—its dramatic growth, its am-
bivalent absorption in a society not habituated to capitalist spurts, and in 
the organizational presence and power Jewish capitalists introduced to 
Palestine’s urban economic scene.
The accommodation by local and nonlocal forces to the novelty of the 
industry and its claims and challenges was fi ttingly rugged and testing. 
On the one hand the industry experienced fi erce “politics of supply” in 
London that forced it, even though Belgium was still under German occu-
pation, to limit itself and to diversify its production process. On the other 
hand adversarial employment relations in the factories aggravated, and 
caused the manufacturers to reevaluate their apprehension of organized 
labor and their rejection of intervention by the Zionist institutions. These 
intertwined processes elucidated the complex nature of the industry: a 
capitalist venture with strong Zionist commitments, driven by the war 
and backed by the diamond cartel, dependent on and serving Palestine’s 
colonial ruler, and experiencing in the midst of war and the genocide of 
the Jews in Europe the throes of its dependence on European and imperial 
considerations.1
The resumption of work in the factories after the long strike and the 
clearing of Ben-Ami took place against a growing awareness among the 
British diamond-control functionaries that something was fundamentally 
problematic in the logic they drew for the diamond project in Palestine. 
The project was a success and the capacity of the factories to adapt to 
the change to cutting bigger stones seemed to progress well. While the 
adaptation was forced upon the industry by a mixture of political and 
economic motivations, it brought out a technologically focused adaptive 
capacity instilled in the industry by the inventiveness of the experts and 
the sheer hard work of the workers, no less by shared expectation of the 
manufacturers and workers for increasing profi ts. The numbers refl ected 
this well: while the number of factories and workers employed did not 
change between 1943 and 1944, the import of rough diamonds grew from 
LP 1,1125,000 to LP 1,550,000, and exports of polished diamonds from LP 
2,600,000 to LP 3,300,000. And while the share of diamonds in Palestine’s 
industrial produce declined from 35.5 percent in 1943 to 32.6 percent in 
1944, the role of the industry in the economy, in the country’s exports, and 
in its American dollar income ($22 million in 1942–1944) was undoubted. 
The forced stone change in autumn 1943 therefore taught the manufactur-
ers that they still possessed the advantage of the absence of competition 
from Belgium and Germany and the persistence of American demand for 
stones for engagement rings. Learning to work a variety of stones was 
imperative and the British witnessed how all sides joined in an enthu-
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siastic drive to assure the industry’s survival and the maintenance of its 
advantages.2
However, this sense of a fruitful structuring of the industry confl icted 
with what the MEW recognized as a failure of control.3 This was fully 
exposed during the visit to Egypt and Palestine in June 1944 by a mission 
headed by Joseph Lewis Reading (1907–1980) and the MEW’s Diamond 
Committee. Reading’s visit to African and Middle Eastern countries at-
tempted to follow the trail of diamond smuggling. Examining closely the 
Middle East Supply Center in Cairo and the diamond factories in Netanya, 
Reading realized that British economic warfare was far from effective. Too 
many diamonds reached the Germans via Syria and Turkey, and the avail-
ability of large quantities of diamonds in Palestine helped maintain the 
smuggling networks. The visit consequently ended with the PDMA being 
forced to sign an agreement with Reading that conditioned further sup-
plies to Palestine on the PDMA’s commitment to send back to the Dia-
mond Syndicate in London all the material unsuitable for cutting—the 
crushed diamond powder and unmarketable stones that potentially could 
be used by the German war industry.4
But could this tension between Palestine’s fulfi llment of the role as-
signed to it on the inception of the industry and British larger war aims 
and economic interests be relieved by these measures? The problem, as 
the exiled Belgians in London and the advisors on diamonds at the MEW 
recognized all too well, was that the industry in Palestine has long ceased 
being a mere alternative to Antwerp. Despite its dependence on external 
supplies, despite its need to diversify the stones it cut and the markets 
to which it sent the fi nished product—and more signifi cantly despite the 
certainty of Belgium’s future recuperation of its world supremacy in dia-
monds—the local industry had grown and matured. It stood on its feet, 
technologically and organizationally, and the four thousand employees 
showed energy and viability befi tting an industry that ceased serving only 
war aims and had turned into a dynamo of economic growth, as the econ-
omies of Tel Aviv, Netanya, and Palestine as a whole proved.5
Increasingly this ripening was accompanied by economic nationalism. 
The industry cherished the independent space it carved for itself in world 
diamond cutting and in the Yishuv. And it cultivated an image of service 
to the Zionist project through the economic infrastructure of the Jewish 
polity, its export capacities, and industrial diversifi cation. This self-legiti-
macy and claim for a role in the Zionist project was further based on the 
argument that after the war Palestine did not intend on competing with 
Antwerp but on “inheriting” the German diamond industry that before 
the war had been so threatening to Belgium.
During 1944 the idea of “inheritance” became the current catch phrase 
in PDMA circles, in its dealing with the Zionist institutions and in the poli-
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tics of supply in London. If Germany and the rise of Nazism set the stage 
for the emergence of the diamond industry in the late 1930s, now they pro-
vided the fodder for its justifi ed existence, viability, and sustenance in the 
face of both international pressure and internal turmoil. For the British to 
justify the limitation of the Palestine industry they had now, in the midst 
of the German extermination campaign, to counter this national logic, and 
they readily excluded this option.6
When the MEW and the Palestine government were placed in a similar 
dilemma in early 1940—namely, how to encourage the birth of the indus-
try and also limit its expansion—their strategy was to entrust an indus-
trial monopoly in the hands of an interested private entrepreneur, Oved 
Ben-Ami and to back his capitalistic autonomy from the institutions that 
ran the Zionist project he himself was very much a part. This strategy 
was now progressively becoming irrelevant because of the pressures on 
the PDMA from diamond manufacturers and merchants demanding more 
freedom of action, and from workers seeking a larger profi t share and se-
cured employment.7
No less infl uential was the rapprochement between the industry and 
the Zionist institutions that the British opposed from start. Between au-
tumn 1943 and the summer of 1944, with the stone change forcing adapta-
tion, supply politics becoming fi ercer, and strikes becoming longer and 
ever more destabilizing, the trust in the PDMA’s leadership weakened 
and the industry looked for external help. It therefore softened its antago-
nism toward the “triangular thread” and began to make more use of Zion-
ist institutions for politics in London, for arbitration with workers in the 
factories, and assimilate more deeply in Yishuv society.8
The thaw in relations between the diamond manufacturers and the Zi-
onist institutions was closely associated with the question of the indus-
try’s freedom of action during the war. The war produced an informal 
agreement of mutual gain between the British as the colonial rulers of the 
“Mandate state” and the Jewish diamond manufacturers as owners of pri-
vate capital. In this agreement the former enjoyed an expansive addition 
to the Treasury’s coffers, industrial means in the anti-German economic 
warfare, and a spirit of cooperation from the De Beers diamond cartel. The 
diamond manufacturers on the other hand gained the authorization to op-
erate and export and exclusive opportunity for exponent profi ts. Couched 
in the agreement was a framework of action that limited purchase of raw 
materials in the free market, disallowed free merchant activity, excluded 
Arabs, and put a cap on the number of licensed manufacturers. This war-
induced understanding contributed to the economic buildup of the Yishuv 
and its increasingly advantageous position vis-à-vis the Arab economy. At 
the same time, however, it effectively distanced the involvement of the 
Zionist institutions in the industry. Resembling the role of the state in the 
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formation of capitalism in various parts of the Middle East, the model of 
relations between state and capital created here for the private diamond 
manufacturers was indeed ambivalent: supportive and defending and at 
the same time regimenting and limiting.9
In the new atmosphere of Zionist rapprochement and the increasing 
palpability of the Zionist commitments of the diamond community, the 
British—the midwife of the industry—had to opt therefore for another 
strategy. Wholly oriented toward the future economics and politics of the 
postwar period and strongly guided by their relations with Belgium, the 
Belgian Congo, and the US, the strategy was nothing less than to usher 
the Palestine diamond industry to “normalization.” Until now the condi-
tions in which the industry sprouted had been abnormal—war, distraught 
trade, government protection. In this climate a monopoly was sine qua 
non, and dependent and reciprocal relations between the colonial state 
and capital were fully acceptable. For the British the time came now to 
undo this peculiarity. And it was timely because the watershed event that 
was about to unfold now in Europe, namely, the freeing of Belgium from 
German occupation, was hoped for by many in the diamond industry in 
Palestine but also feared.10
In summer 1945 the wartime boom in Palestine’s economy gave way 
to a cyclical downturn and to the reemergence of widespread unemploy-
ment. The rising standards of living induced by wartime military demand 
now encountered decreasing wages and serious absorptive problems for 
ex-servicemen and for Jewish refugees from Holocaust Europe. Moreover, 
after the war Palestine entered a period of political destabilization caused 
by the aggravating tension between Arabs and Jews, British reconsidera-
tion of their presence in the Middle East, and the onset of the Cold War 
in Europe. No less dramatic was a contrasting vector of hope and aspira-
tion. It was fed primarily by the political rise of Labor in Britain in July 
1945 that began Clement Attlee’s majority government (to last until 1951), 
by the international mobilization of resources for the postwar economic 
recovery, and not least by the proliferation of international organs of eco-
nomic cooperation and confl ict resolution. Caught in between these two 
trajectories, Palestine society would be soon facing the onset of a postco-
lonial situation in which not only its political future was determined but 
also its economic character and the mode of operation of its capitalist and 
public economic agents. The diamond industry was an aptly instructive 
prism for this drama, and in particular for the reshaping of the existing 
model of state-capital relations.11
For the Palestine diamond manufacturers and workers the war ended 
twice. The fi rst ending was on 4 September 1944, when following the rout 
of the German armies from Normandy, Allied forces surged eastward 
from France into Belgium and the city of Antwerp fell to the British. Five 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
182   |   Diamonds and War
days later the exiled Belgian government returned from London to Brus-
sels, signaling the nearing transition of the gravity center of diamond sup-
ply politics to Antwerp, where the “diamond community” would soon 
be rebuilt. The news provoked mixed feelings in the diamond factories in 
Tel Aviv and Netanya. The relief felt by the end of the four-year German 
occupation was coupled with the awareness that the distancing of the Bel-
gians from London would not ease the pressure the Belgians exerted on 
the supply policies of the syndicate. On the contrary, the rehabilitation of 
the diamond-cutting and -trading center in Antwerp (after being heavily 
plundered by the Germans) would divert attention from Palestine. Anxi-
ety was further stirred by the wish of some diamond experts who had 
been absorbed in the diamond-cutting diasporas to return to Antwerp and 
to reinstate themselves in the occupational world their fellow Jews lost in 
May 1940. The number of the Jews in Antwerp, which stood at 29,500 in 
1940, increased slowly from 800 on the liberation, to 1,200 at the end of 
1944 and to 2,000 in August 1945 upon the return of Holocaust survivors. 
Despite the slowness, the recovery of the diamond business seemed as-
sured. This was CODFI’s fi nest hour; its reserves began to be used from 
winter 1945 in the gradual recuperation of the diamond industry. Though 
quicker recovery was hampered by the massive German bombardment 
that lingered until March 1945, the liberation was a harbinger of the change 
that the industry in Palestine was about to experience. This was even truer 
upon Germany’s fall in May 1945, the actual end of the war, which situ-
ated the diamond industry in totally different circumstances.12
That the liberation of Belgium evoked mixed feelings can be seen from 
the need felt among decision makers at the Diamond Syndicate to give 
assurances to the manufacturers that Palestine would not be injured by 
the pending revival of diamond cutting in Antwerp. Adding to this at-
mosphere was the decrease in demand in the US for polished diamonds, 
apparently because of the approaching end of the war and because many 
who planned their return to Europe sold diamonds to fi nance their per-
sonal recuperation. “The Liberation of Belgium,” Ben-Ami telegrammed 
Ernst Oppenheimer in September 1944, “has placed bulk of markets [for] 
our fi nished stones in state of suspense which has considerably added to 
[the] diffi culties of our industry.”13 Panic spread in the PDMA’s offi ces and 
the unions’ secretaries were hurriedly called in for consultation. “[As] a 
result of the new situation created by the changes in the war front,” Ben-
Ami told then, “it is clear we shall be facing a crisis. How we overcome 
it is diffi cult to determine and we must act so that the industry does not 
collapse. The crisis is serious and aggravating. It is diffi cult to know what 
the opening of the industry in Antwerp brings. We shall face changes in 
raw material and in adapting the wages. . . . We must take steps against 
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the expected trouble . . . [and] for the time being work only three days a 
week until the situation is clarifi ed.”14
Some manufacturers suggested to cease work altogether because of 
the expected shortage in supply of raw materials and reduction in prices. 
Others called to strengthen the PDMA’s marketing campaign in India so 
as to counter the expected competition with Belgium over the American 
market. Palestine’s brokers in London thought it was essential that a del-
egation came from Palestine to discuss the situation face to face with the 
syndicate and the Colonial Offi ce. DCB chair Walsh was equally alarmed 
and emphasized that all involved in the industry should take into account 
that the approaching competition among the cutting centers would neces-
sitate further effi ciency and increase in productivity and would inevitably 
entail dismissals.15
The Belgians, for whom the recovery of the diamond industry was 
nationally paramount, were naturally agitated. The industry suffered a 
severe blow by the expropriation, deportation, and extermination of Ant-
werp’s Jews, and its recovery would have to be based on newcomers that 
would have to be trained and continuously supplied with rough stones 
from London. Palestine was considered, despite the curtailment of half 
of its small-stone production, as a competitor and a real menace to the 
Belgian marketing potential in the US. The massive mining in the Belgian 
Congo—now safely back under direct Belgian rule—would have to be 
used, so the Belgians realized, as a lever against England and De Beers in 
case they sustained their support of Palestine. After all, the Belgian Congo 
was a convenient lever that supplied the uranium for American atomic 
bombs. As a national asset, diamond cutting and trading in Antwerp sym-
bolized the country’s victory in the long battle against the Germans, and 
Jewish diamond experts and merchants who populated the cutting cen-
ters in Palestine, London, Cuba, and New York (mostly non-Belgian citi-
zens before the fl ight) were expected to return.16
The diamond manufacturers realized now that the conditions in which 
the diamond industry in Palestine had spurted were about to change. The 
fact that the syndicate freed for COFDI the stocks of small stones that were 
destined for cutting in Antwerp was only the fi rst worrying sign. Though 
few in number, the manufacturers, experts, and merchants who moved 
from Belgium to Palestine in 1936–1940 might want to return to Antwerp, 
to what they had for long seen as the main world center of the industry. 
De Beers was likewise worrying, and despite the fact that Palestine had 
been one of the cartel’s most loyal customers with LP1.5–2 million an-
nual purchasing of rough diamonds, it concurred with Belgium’s need 
to recover its industry. The Belgian Congo was the main source for the 
cartel’s operations and profi ts, and the recuperation of the trading and 
cutting center in Antwerp would take care of the rough diamonds the 
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cartel was distributing. Palestine, according to De Beers, would not have 
to close down but downsize its activities, readapt itself to the changing 
circumstances of postwar Europe and to the changing needs of the cartel. 
The American market for the Sand small stones would need to reorient 
itself back on Belgium’s hegemony, and Palestine could therefore keep on 
thriving on the production of Melees. Sales of diamonds might decrease 
now because of the change in consumers’ behavior that the ending of the 
war might bring about. Belgium’s recovery was therefore higher on De 
Beers’s business preferences, much more than Palestine’s steady growth, 
and thus a negative turn against Palestine in the politics of supply might 
be expected.17
From a local perspective the PDMA feared that new applicants to join 
the industry might endanger the monopoly. No less worrying were manu-
facturers wishing to free themselves from the PDMA and British control, 
merchants aspiring for full liberalization of controls, Arab diamond mer-
chants who wanted to do away Jewish exclusiveness, and experts and cut-
ters who developed home work. Diamond workers became equally anx-
ious for the future of the industry and their employment. The expected 
change was even deeper. “It will be necessary to reduce our production 
costs as soon as Antwerp resumes exports on a larger scale,” wrote one 
diamond business expert in December 1944. 
Diamond cutting in Belgium before the war was a largely home industry and 
we shall not only have to reduce wage rates which are particularly high but also 
employ all modern methods of workshop management. It may be necessary 
too to revise the structure of the industry as a whole and to concentrate work-
shops in larger units. Experts consider it necessary to improve the training of 
the workers, whose present apprenticeship lasts only a few months, so that Pal-
estine need not confi ne itself to small stones of the eight-corner type but might 
handle the larger and more valuable cuts and industrial diamonds as well.18
Clearly the defeat of Germany created a climate of material change, 
but also one of anxiety that could be allayed only through international 
cooperation, reliable state backing, and relaxed politics of supply. How-
ever, uncertainty overshadowed the politics of supply, in particular be-
cause pressure from the Belgians was only slowly building up. The extent 
of recovery of the diamond industry in Antwerp as well as the number of 
diamond manufacturers and merchants who returned to Belgium was un-
clear to the manufacturers in Palestine. More than 30,000 diamond cutters 
in Europe ceased work in the wake of the war early in the decade and the 
resumption of activity of those that survived was yet unknown. Equally 
enigmatic was the future behavior of the consumers of diamonds, whose 
demand during the war favored Palestine and for whom the transition to 
peace was fi nancially bewildering.19
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Perhaps more signifi cant was British ambivalence. Their interest in the 
recovery of the Belgian industry was unquestionable. Diamond mining 
in Sierra Leone was important for them and they wanted a stake also in 
the Belgian Congo, in particular in the context of British relations with 
the Americans and the latter’s total opposition to cartels. The support in 
De Beers and the syndicate was essential for the British fi nancially, and 
no less so if they wanted to develop a viable diamond cutting center in 
England itself, something they failed to do during the war. And the lat-
ter could be harmed if Belgians exiled in London were now forced to re-
turn to Belgium because England was committed to help the revival of the 
Belgian diamond industry. Moreover, too uncontrolled competition in the 
diamond world might harm the image of diamonds as an investment and 
their prices might consequently be hurt and the cartel harmed. Continuity 
in support of the diamond industry in Palestine seemed therefore assured, 
but its excessive expansion and competitive power had to be curtailed so 
as not to hamper Belgium’s recuperation. This was also the logic drawn by 
Mathias and the Colonial Offi ce on the eve of the German occupation of 
Belgium in 1940 when Germany’s quest for diamonds was a real threat.20
To ease the tense atmosphere Ernst Oppenheimer, the syndicate, and 
the British organized a conference in London in December 1944. The oc-
casion allowed Oved Ben-Ami and Albert Ehrenfeld to try to gain the 
consent of the Belgians and the syndicate on distribution of raw materi-
als and on the level of wages paid to the diamond workers. During the 
conference a meeting was held between Frederick Mathias, the advisor 
on diamonds for the Americans Sidney Bull, and John Fletcher of the Pal-
estine government to discuss diamond control. The system in Palestine 
(the PDMA being the sole importer, the Diamond Syndicate the sole seller, 
and the government and the MEW in London as the licensing authority) 
seemed to the participants to be successful in preventing diamonds leak-
ing to Germany and Japan. Control was not to be relaxed, therefore, until 
the war was over, as long as the threat of leakage continued and unli-
censed manufacturers threatened to enter the scene. It was decided that as 
long as Belgium and Holland did not fully recover, it was the PDMA, as 
the effective means in British hands that should restrain on behalf of the 
British authorities the expansion of the industry while expanding the in-
come of American dollars. Control of diamond exports was to be retained 
so as to prevent the fl eeing abroad of capital from Palestine and in order 
to maintain currency control over exports. All in all, the participants in the 
meeting surmised, the PDMA’s future should not be compromised and 
massive unemployment in the diamond industry should be prevented 
until normal conditions resumed in the Low Countries. Conceived now 
as replacing the prewar German diamond industry, Palestine was assured 
of De Beers’s supplies and was even allowed to buy a small amount of 
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rough diamonds from non–Diamond Syndicate sources. The British were 
clearly thinking of how not to threaten Belgium’s capacity to recover. At 
the same time, however, they continued to care for the stability of the dia-
mond industry in Palestine, for its service to British interests, and thus for 
the PDMA’s power.21
It was in this context that the London conference advanced—months 
before the formal ending of the war—the concept of deregulation. The 
concept was aired earlier by both people in the industry and government 
offi cials who envisioned a competitive postwar economy and who sought 
to advance liberal notions of lessened state control. Ideas and policies on 
economic deconcentration became prevalent in Europe at the close of the 
war and undoubtedly had their impact. The British Economic and Indus-
trial Planning Staff, an interdepartmental body set up in the government 
in London in early 1944 to study the economic plans for liberated or oc-
cupied territories in Europe and in which the MEW played a leading part, 
further contributed to crystallizing the concept. Accordingly the future 
of the industry and of the diamond monopoly would be normalized and 
judiciously planned and the planning would be drawn jointly by all in-
volved in the industry—the manufacturers, the organizations, the British, 
and even diamond merchants whose freedom of trading activity had been 
heretofore restricted. The diamond industry, Britain’s “special native,” 
whose development was directed from above from start, was therefore to 
plan its own restructuring and prepare its own normalization. If in early 
1940 the principles formulated by Frederick Mathias gave the industry 
its basic form, and if in the course of the war they had been challenged 
(by the spurt of the industry, the failure to totally secure diamonds reach-
ing the Germans, and by the persistent turbulence in industrial relations), 
now the emerging peace in Europe required a further adaptation of the 
original assumptions and structures, and the full participation of all those 
concerned with diamonds in the transformation.22
Evidently, there was in this normalization concept a sense of the future 
viability of the diamond industry, and that the fears of pending collapse at 
least in the short run were exaggerated. The British continued to support 
the PDMA and the manufacturers and they kept on enjoying the massive 
gains of hard currency Palestine’s diamond exports were producing. The 
government also considered the industry a potential absorber of ex-ser-
vicemen in the Palestine economy, a thorny social and economic issue that 
they had to handle after the war, in particular because as a Jewish-only 
industry they did not mean it to cater Arabs as well. Moreover the local 
diamond industry seemed to the British to be a proper counterbalance 
to the potential revival of the diamond industry in Germany. The cartel 
itself, as Ernst Oppenheimer and the syndicate repeatedly stressed, was 
still interested at this point of time in a strong diamond-cutting indus-
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try in Palestine that until Belgium’s fuller recovery would be a consistent 
buyer of its rough diamonds. Such an outlet served the cartel well as the 
mining companies in the Belgian Congo were promised unmitigated sales 
through their relations with the cartel.23
These myriad interests resulted in a comforting agreement signed at 
the conference in January 1945. The agreement supplied Palestine, in ad-
dition to the Melee and Sand quotas, with a variety of rough diamonds 
that allowed the industry to diversify and specialize in cutting and polish-
ing larger stones. The PDMA was allowed to expand its membership and 
the new members were assured of receiving supplies. Furthermore, the 
Palestine factories could now maintain the existing cutting and polishing 
labor force and even train and employ a limited number of cleavers—a 
highly skilled diamond-splitting occupation that had hitherto been absent 
from Palestine. Even more signifi cantly the conference agreed to liberal-
ize controls—Palestine could add other sources for the rough diamonds 
it purchased from the syndicate, notably from South Africa, and it could 
expand the marketing of the stones polished in Palestine to Middle East-
ern and other Asian countries. The conference thus assured the continued 
operation of the Palestine factories: it freed its long-standing focus on the 
single market of eight-cuts marketed in the US, and it did so without com-
promising Antwerp’s recovery of its prewar hegemony. Instead of compe-
tition, so the conference hypothesized, Palestine and Belgium were now 
to cooperate, to supplement one another in supplying the world markets 
that seemed now to offer ample room for both. In these new circumstances 
the PDMA would have to change and liberalize, but it could still reserve 
its powers and preside over the liberalization process and initiate the in-
dustry into the circumstance of the peace.24 No wonder that the PDMA 
and the diamond manufacturers perceived these assurances not only as 
an expression of gratitude for war service but as virtually placing Pales-
tine on an equal footing with any other diamond industry in the world. 
Praised by the Hebrew press for the achievements in London, the dia-
mond manufacturers could now sense the extent to which their industry 
was progressively expressing a national asset and contribution to the Zi-
onist project in Palestine.25
The favorable atmosphere the British and the Diamond Syndicate cre-
ated for the Palestine manufacturers in winter 1945 was obviously backed 
by the chaotic conditions in liberated Antwerp that hampered quicker 
resumption of Belgian production and export. Romi Goldmuntz arrived 
back in Belgium only in March 1945 and the distribution of CODFI’s re-
serves among the dealers and manufacturers would start only few weeks 
later. The transition from British control over the diamond industry and its 
revival to the Belgian Diamond Offi ce (fully completed in July 1945) was 
cumbersome. Compared to the thousands of diamond cutters employed 
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in Antwerp before the war, by the end of spring 1945 only 5,600 diamond 
cutters resumed work, and the city’s diamond exchanges would fully re-
sume their activities only in early 1946.26 This lag between liberation and 
recuperation allowed Palestine to exploit the reputation it had acquired 
in the American diamond market during the war. Consumption patterns 
among the American middle classes reacted slowly to the transition from 
war to peace and could thus contribute the persistence of growth in Pal-
estine’s diamond output and exports. In May–December 1944 alone, Pal-
estine doubled its exports of polished diamonds, and between 1944 and 
1945 its exports increased from 79,000 carats to 138,000.27
The situation in the Tel Aviv and Netanya factories seemed equally en-
couraging. While in summer 1943 some 3,800 workers were employed in 
thirty-three factories, in spring 1945 the number increased to 4,000 workers 
and few months later to 4,500.28 The expansion of the labor force followed 
the adaptation of the industry to the earlier change in small diamond pro-
duction. However it also refl ected the training of workers and ex-service-
men who were absorbed in the industry between the end of the war in 
May 1945 and early 1946 despite the anxiety over Belgium’s recovery. En-
capsulated in the phrase “peace scare,” this contrast between growth and 
an escalating sense of foreboding was the reason why the end of the war 
was more crucial for the diamond industry than the liberation of Antwerp 
few months earlier. Only now would the conditions of emergency and 
noncompetition begin to change, and the fate of the diamond-cutting dia-
sporas that were born in the wake of Antwerp’s paralysis would be tightly 
linked to Antwerp’s return.29 
Incipient De-Control
The immediate impact of Belgium’s liberation and the end of the war on 
the diamond industry was not expressed in short-term material effects 
but rather in the assembly of exogenous and local forces that coalesced in 
the second half of 1945 around the consensus on the normalization of the 
industry, its deregulation, and practically its architectural restructuring. 
The British-Belgian-De Beers axis was the main force. 
In June Mathias paid a crucial visit to Belgium, still a military zone, and 
prepared an agreement between the British and the Belgians to forestall 
the menacing revival of the German industry. The Belgians succumbed 
to the British demand that the entire industry in Antwerp should stick 
to a one-channel supply—that is, to purchasing rough stones only at the 
syndicate—and that London should remain the world center of distribut-
ing the raw materials. “This agreement, we think, will go further than the 
mere selling of Belgian diamonds through London,” emphasized Math-
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ias. “It may probably ensure that all future productions shall come direct 
to London and be sorted here instead of, as was the practice before the 
war, in Belgium.” In return the British promised the Belgians full com-
mitment to the recuperation of their diamond industry and the revival of 
their prewar world hegemony. The logical consequence of this reciproc-
ity was restraining the expansion of the diamond industry in Palestine.30 
“The industry which has sprung up in Palestine appears to be the bone of 
contention,” added Mathias. 
It was explained to the Minister of the Colonies at the offi cial reception, and later 
to a general meeting called by the Minister for Economic Affairs, that the devel-
opment of the industry in Palestine was a consequence of the chaos produced 
by the war. England at the time stood alone facing bankruptcy so far as foreign 
currency was concerned, and we were compelled to use diamonds in order to 
better our fi nancial position. Palestine was at present restricted to 3,500 work-
ers which represent only about half of the number employed by Germany prior 
to the outbreak of the hostilities. Palestine further realized that their long-term 
policy must be one of full employment and was under no illusions that certain 
considerations militated against the further expansion of their industry.
Mathias then listed the considerations: First, the limited supplies of 
suitable rough diamonds available. Second, the possibility of removing 
diamond control in Palestine with the result that small manufacturers 
and private individuals would start up competition with the bigger fi rms. 
Third, British commitment to “the status of the industry in the Low Coun-
tries,”; and fourth, the growth of the industry in other parts of the world. 
Mathias then concluded that in order to secure recovery, the Belgians 
would to attempt “to recall their nationals to further their own industry 
and this they proposed to do by sending an offi cial delegation to various 
countries with a view to encouraging the return of these ex-patriots.”31
Aspiring to reinstate their hegemony, the Belgians were naturally con-
cerned with the state of the diamond diasporas, in particular the Cuban 
and the New York centers because of the large number of refugees from 
Antwerp who settled there. Palestine was, however, their main problem, 
realizing all too well that only the British and the Diamond Syndicate that 
made the industry thrive could reshape it. Their interest in the return of 
diamond manufacturers and experts from Palestine to Antwerp further 
dictated their preference for a nonconfl icted approach with the British, 
De Beers, and Palestine itself that owed much to their traditions and oc-
cupational culture.32
The British and De Beers concurred with this consensual approach, in 
particular after witnessing the aggressive politics of COFDI during 1943–
1944. Palestine seemed to the diamond cartel to be a long-standing, loyal 
consumer of its rough diamonds and a sort of backing against antitrust 
proceedings in the US, and against Belgian usage of the mines in the Bel-
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gian Congo as a lever. It adapted to the cartel’s policies during the war, its 
ethnic insularity proved effi cient and reliable, the brokers that represented 
it were among the pillars of the trade, and it agreed to the arrangement 
to limit its purchase outside the syndicate to the necessary minimum. 
For both the cartel and the British, Palestine’s runaway expansion could 
threaten Antwerp, but it should not be totally done away with because the 
PDMA’s monopoly position and dependence on the British and the syn-
dicate were essential to the restraint of competition against Belgium and 
to the absorption of ex-servicemen in Palestine itself. Thus, the only way 
to resolve the invigorating confl ict between the expansion of industry and 
the need to promote Belgium’s recovery was “normalization.”33
The pressures to move in this direction came also from other sources, 
in particular from groups that heretofore were kept outside the industry. 
One was the Zionist institutions who at this period of political transition 
were deeply engaged with economic planning and institutionalization 
of their power. Normalization of the industry was in line with the more 
general work of the industrial planning committees of the Jewish Agency 
and with its quest to reshape the relations of the diamond industry with 
the Yishuv. Another more vocal group was the diamond merchants. Arab 
merchants gathered around the Nablus-based Johar Company pressed the 
British to free the entry of non-Jews into the industry.34 Jewish diamond 
dealers and traders who were traditionally close to the Tishby-Weiss camp 
and the Diamond Club (see chapter 1) and lost ground to Ben-Ami and 
the PDMA’s monopoly in 1940 pressed now for deregulation and direct 
exporting ties with New York and South Africa. One such body, the Dia-
mond Traders Association, which consisted in summer 1945 of fi fty-eight 
licensed diamond exporters, emphasized free trade and severing trading 
from the PDMA’s control. Common to all these forces was the deepening 
sense of dissonance between the climate created by the approaching end 
of the war and the controls that the British and the PDMA operated.35
Support for the merchants sprang from within the PDMA. The in-
quiry committee that in June 1944 exonerated Ben-Ami of misbehavior 
restrained the voice of the opposition, but not for long. Upholding the 
message of democratization of the PDMA’s structure and organizational 
culture, the opposition led a campaign to transform the constitution of the 
manufacturers’ association, to decentralize the organization and recover 
the PDMA from collusive fi nancial operations. Unsurprisingly the cam-
paign, which paralleled the bewilderment caused in diamond circles by 
Belgium’s liberation, also protested against that distancing of the industry 
from the old, established Belgian traditions. Furthermore, the opposition 
sought the support of the Jewish Agency and the Palestine Manufactur-
ers’ Association, which seemed, at least in principle, a force the PDMA 
needed in the politics of supply. Abolishing the monopoly and the com-
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pulsory membership of diamond manufacturers in the PDMA brought 
these forces together.36
These pressures forced the PDMA to propose in June 1945 to trans-
form state control of the industry into regulation and to assure that the 
new mechanism would not in any way challenge British support for the 
recovery of the industry in Antwerp. The argument was that the British 
were so instrumental in the establishment of the industry, its linkage to the 
syndicate, and its success that it should continue perceiving the industry 
as serving a British interest and thus persist in regulating it and prevent-
ing its demise. The state, as the interwar period taught, was instrumental 
in protecting industries from fl uctuations and shocks and now, in the new 
postwar conditions, such protection should be expressed also in economic 
planning. The planning should indeed allow the diamond manufacturers’ 
freedom of action, but the factories should still remain as members in one 
association and manufacturers would still have to be licensed by the gov-
ernment. As the diamond industry yielded so much, the state must be in-
terested in its normal and healthy growth (especially now upon Belgium’s 
return to business) and it must therefore make it its concern and not leave 
it only to those that profi t from it. The purchasing of the rough diamonds 
could be also from non–Diamond Syndicate sources but would remain 
centralized. A special diamond-manufacturing regulatory board should 
make the new regulation of diamond production operational and act as 
an offi cial channel between the government and diamond-producing or 
-buying countries and the cartel. The PDMA would, however, maintain 
its dominance. It clearly wished for attenuated regulation and “a gradual 
transfer to deregulation,” not the total abolishment of control that might 
have endangered the industry altogether.37
Led by Moshe Offen, Zeev Nagler, Asher Daskal, and Zvi Rosenberg, 
the opposition reacted with a fi rmer liberal approach. They argued that 
they saw the compulsory membership in the PDMA as a temporary gov-
ernment measure. The threat of diamonds reaching the Germans was over 
and there was no need to maintain the PDMA’s centralized structure and 
forced membership. Why bar a manufacturer or an expert who was active 
in diamonds abroad? Why should a mature diamond industry be con-
trolled from above and the fi nished stones supervised at all? Why should 
factory force to retrain a worker to work on stones dictated by the syndi-
cate and why not allow him to be hired concurrently by more than one 
employer? Why limit the expansion of the industry at all by disallowing 
its turning to non–Diamond Syndicate sources of raw materials? Before 
the war the industry in the Netherlands was severely restricted and that 
in Belgium was freer—the fi rst failed and the latter succeeded. Even if 
control were needed, why should it be enacted by the government and not 
by an exogenous body? “In our view” concluded the opposition, “there is 
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no justifi cation whatever in allowing the destinies of capitalists, experts 
and workmen to depend on the whims and ambitions of a group of per-
sons who are mainly guided by what they regard as their own interest.”38 
“In peace time diamonds are a 100 percent non-essential commodity,” ex-
plained diamond merchant, Norbert Guttenberg in autumn 1945. “Who 
then is interested in the regulation and control? Certainly not the popula-
tion at large and not the government. . . . The only small and insignifi cant 
part of the population who will benefi t from such control and whose only 
aim is to benefi t from such control are the owners of the existing diamond 
factories in Palestine, at the expense of all other persons interested in that 
industry, including the diamond traders and workers.”39
The Histadrut was also suspicious of the PDMA’s proposal. It feared 
that deregulation would bring wages down and thus harm the industry 
and the workers, but also help the Belgians and the workers in Antwerp 
who backed the world hegemony of their industry and joined in calling for 
Jews to return to Antwerp. Deregulation would mean that anyone could 
buy and sell diamonds and thus (similar to what happened in prewar An-
twerp) the industry would splinter into small units, domestic work would 
fl ourish, family and child exploitation would be rampant, union member-
ship decline, and collective (and strike) action made impossible.40
The British reacted to the proposal with an uncharacteristic hesitation. 
Since the end of 1939 they cultivated special relations with Oved Ben-Ami 
and the PDMA, and guarded the monopoly through a multitude of direc-
tives and orders. Even when they acted to restrain the industry’s expan-
sion they never gave up the diamond production and exporting system 
they created with Ben-Ami and the PDMA’s fellow manufacturers. If 
they wanted to put an end to the industry in Palestine so as to facilitate 
Belgium’s recovery and to encourage Belgian refugees to return to their 
prewar businesses, they could have done so swiftly by drying up Pales-
tine’s rough diamond resources or by allowing total freedom to buy, pro-
duce, and sell diamonds. Why therefore, the British pondered, give up a 
fi nancial resource that was so essential to the Sterling Bloc countries? Why 
not keep on using Palestine as a warning to the Belgians not to alienate 
themselves and the Belgian Congo from London? Germany would now 
want to resume its own diamond industry that had fared so well before 
the war—why not therefore give the diamond manufacturers in Pales-
tine what they wanted, which was “to inherit Germany”? Furthermore, 
harming the industry in Palestine might harm the syndicate. De Beers was 
aware of the slowness of recuperation of diamond cutting and trading in 
Europe, and Oppenheimer, De Beers’s chief, was after all an ardent sym-
pathizer of the industry in Palestine that was still a serious buyer of rough 
diamonds. The British oscillation refl ected, therefore, a wider transitional 
phase both Europe and Palestine were undergoing. In Europe it was not 
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clear yet what would be the tempo of Belgium’s economic recovery and 
what were the best means to prevent German reindustrialization and re-
militarization. Equally perplexing was the British capacity to withstand 
anticolonial pressures in Palestine in a period when the position of the 
Middle East in the incipient Cold War was becoming essential.
If in winter 1940 the calculations made by Frederick Mathias, and the 
advice he gave to the MEW, suffi ced to decide on the establishment of the 
industry in Palestine, the questions the British were now busy with were 
to be handled differently. First, from around spring 1945, the British aired 
the idea that the capacity of the diamond industry to survive in the com-
petition expected to be renewed in the postwar period, and it should be 
deregulated. Second, in order to materialize the new organizing principle 
and do away with the oscillation, the professional opinions of the entire 
diamond industry in Palestine, including those knowledgeable about dia-
monds and not part of the monopoly and the Ben-Ami clientele-like sys-
tem, were now to be probed.41
The fi nal move was made by the DCB where Walsh, Fletcher, and Eh-
renfeld, the actual controllers of the industry in Palestine, advanced the es-
tablishment of an inquiry committee to decide on the extent and mode of 
deregulation. They agreed that the government should help the industry 
in coming out of its monopoly state, in particular as nowhere in the em-
pire was there control over a commodity that was not the natural product 
of the country exercising control. On the other hand a certain measure of 
state control should still be maintained for it could advance the reputation 
of the industry, its workmanship, and fi nancial orderliness. Furthermore, 
the nature of deregulation should be decided upon only after the inquiry 
committee heard all the forces in the industry, in Palestine, London, and 
even in Antwerp. After all, Palestine was destined to adapt itself to Bel-
gian traditions and to the needs entailed by its recuperation. Indeed the 
committee established on 22 August 1945 was not to become a fi ercely 
debating site between supporters and opponents of deregulation. Rather 
its fi ndings would turn into a policy of bringing together the various parts 
of a jigsaw puzzle the British had gradually concocted since early in the 
year and would complete and turn into a policy when the British, largely 
following an investigative visit of Geoffrey Walsh to Antwerp in spring 
1946, gave the inquiry’s report their formal blessing.42
While the inquiry committee was making its initial steps, a sudden 
and dramatic reduction of rough supplies to Palestine was announced. 
The reason for the urgency was the growing pressure of the industry in 
Antwerp on the syndicate to secure more supplies. Infl uential too was 
a periodical slowdown in diamond mining mainly in the Congo, which 
raised prices for the buyers of rough stones at the Diamond Syndicate and 
narrowed down production. An atmosphere of invigorated competition 
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among the diamond centers was noted by the press, and Ben-Ami’s and 
Ehrenfeld’s achievements in securing supplies in winter 1945 seemed fu-
tile. Palestine’s annual exports of polished diamonds showed a decrease 
from LP3,325,117 to LP2,808,433.43 Consequently the PDMA discouraged 
new applicants and the British again rejected the application of the Arab 
merchants at the Johar Company. Diamond cleavers, only recently allowed 
to operate in Palestine, were threatened to be left without jobs, and ex-ser-
vicemen and refugees from Europe seeking training in diamond cutting 
were turned away by the manufacturers. Reaching an understanding with 
the cartel on the one hand, and with the Belgians on the other, became es-
sential now.44
The International Diamond Conference that assembled in London in 
September 1945 became a crucial site for Palestine to discuss these issues. 
The conference was aimed at creating a World Society of Diamond Manu-
facturers. It signaled the governments of the participants that as much as 
each center was advanced and protected as a dollar earner and a national 
asset, some cooperation was still possible. Its common ground would be 
the support of the revival of the Belgian diamond industry and the quelling 
of the German one. Other guiding principles for the postwar period were 
advanced as well—international accommodation of supplies of rough 
stones, workers’ wages, relaxation of trade restrictions, and freedom of in-
ternational trade. In this atmosphere the PDMA’s entire rhetorical arsenal 
was employed so as to allay Belgian resistance to Palestine and promote 
the notion that, rather than aiming to compete with the Belgians, Pales-
tine was the legitimate successor of the Germans, in particular now when 
the full extent of the Holocaust became clear. Convinced on these moral 
and political grounds, the syndicate fi nally promised to supply Palestine 
with rough diamonds for six months and to negotiate on future supplies. 
However, it was clearly the narrowing of mine production and growing 
Belgian pressure for a larger share of rough diamonds (so as to allow a 
quicker recovery) that were behind this decision. Moreover, the syndicate 
made it clear that Palestine must further specialize in stones bigger than 
Sand—the small stone on which the recovery of Antwerp depended.45
From London, Ben-Ami rushed to Brussels in mid-October 1945 to fi nd 
further support for Palestine in the convention of diamond manufacturers 
and merchants. It was here that Ben-Ami heard again the Belgian demand 
that Palestine should not expand production and exports until Belgium 
recovered, and that wages and prices should be internationally coordi-
nated. The agreement signed at the convention between the PDMA and 
the Belgian manufacturers coordinated the opposition to the revival of 
the German industry, dictated similar wage structures in the diamond 
industries of the two countries, and, signifi cantly, included the obliga-
tion of Palestine not to accept new apprentices for training.46 In the fi nal 
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analysis these international strictures on Palestine weakened the PDMA 
and cemented the campaign in London and Palestine to do away with the 
monopoly. The Histadrut, fl abbergasted at the PDMA’s acceptance not to 
absorb more workers, now supported the deregulation of the industry. In 
the PDMA itself it was felt that without restructuring the monopoly and 
liberalizing the industry, the search for non–Diamond Syndicate sources 
for rough stones and new markets to sell the polished stones would be 
futile. Ben-Ami himself realized now that the PDMA could not remain a 
state-backed monopoly forever.47 
Deregulation
This certainly infl uenced the members of the Inquiry Committee and its 
deliberations. Geoffrey Walsh, the government’s chief economic advisor 
and the head of the DCB, chaired the committee. Next to him was John L. 
Fletcher, the manager of customs, DCB member, and formerly the control-
ler of light industries; and L. D. Watts, an expert accountant. The secretary 
of the committee was B. G. Bourdillon, the assistant to the government’s 
chief secretary. Most of what has remained of the committee in the archives 
are the PDMA’s preparatory notes, the report the committee’s members 
wrote at the end of December 1945 on the basis of some sixty testimonies, 
the reactions the committee solicited in order to produce a fi nal version, 
and the related visits to Belgium in spring 1946 after which the commit-
tee’s report was made public. Most of the deliberations did not survive 
the fi res that erupted at the offi ces of the controller of light industries in 
Tel Aviv in November 1945, and on the bombing of the King David Hotel 
in August 1946 in which Walsh and Bourdillon were killed. These materi-
als enable us, however, to understand the various conceptions of postwar 
industrial planning of the British and the Yishuv, and more crucially the 
reshaping of the place of private capital and capital’s relations with the 
structures of the state after the war.48
The clearest statement of the committee was its emphasis on the need 
for the diamond industry in Palestine to change. The industry grew in 
“extraordinarily favorable conditions due entirely to the war.” First and 
foremost it enjoyed “the complete absence of competition from the im-
portant and old established diamond cutting and polishing industries on 
the continent of Europe.” Second, because rough diamonds were “so eas-
ily transported across the most closely defended of frontiers and of great 
potential value to the enemy” an extremely close control was necessitated. 
To these two “peculiar features” was added the forwarding to “the infant 
industry in Palestine” of supplies of rough diamonds that would have 
been “normally” allocated to the older centers. Fourth, once it was real-
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ized that the local industry turned into a serious “dollar-earner factor” in 
Palestine’s export trade balances, it became in the interest of the British 
authorities that supplies be maintained, the operations safeguarded from 
misuse, and the industry developed “on sound lines with due regard to 
the eventual return of Belgium and Holland to the fi eld of competition.” 
Fifth, the resulting structure of operation was the confi ning of raw mate-
rial supply to one source (the Diamond Syndicate) and the confi ning of its 
distribution to “one narrow channel” (the PDMA). The consequent sixth 
aspect defi ning the anomalous operation of the industry was that as a con-
sequence of its closure to new manufacturers, the cutting factories reached 
high levels of prosperity, “extremely good profi ts,” and “high wages to the 
workers.” Clearly, stated the report, “an industry born and nurtured in 
such abnormal circumstances was ill equipped to face world competition 
in the fi elds of procurement of the rough or in the disposal of polished dia-
monds.” The report stated therefore that it wished the industry to develop 
along healthier lines and that “the aim of the Government should be the 
eventual freedom of the diamond industry from all control.” In the transi-
tional period some regulation would be maintained—that is, until normal 
conditions returned and the local industry adapted to the inevitable shock 
of reduction of supplies and to the reappearance of world competition.49
But how was the new form of control to be achieved? British control of 
the diamond industry refl ected government intervention in the economy 
and in Palestine’s civil society in general because it was, above all, a web 
of threads and links. Walsh and Fletcher worked to link the PDMA and the 
associated banks with London, with the Colonial Offi ce, and fi nally with 
De Beers. Ben-Ami’s contacts were often made through the government 
controller, and Palestine’s high commissioner could design an economic 
policy in relations to this war-essential industry by counting on the reports 
discussed together by control and PDMA offi cials. More signifi cantly, con-
trol meant inspection of quotas, regulating imports and exports, licensing 
and selection of the diamond manufacturers, and no less so exhibition 
representation in fairs and shaping of a language that was destined to mir-
ror a supposedly imperial achievement. The entire structure was formal-
ized within the government’s Defense Regulations, a legislative project 
that endowed the PDMA with the power and authority it enjoyed during 
the war. The committee asked therefore how to restructure the industry in 
such a way that it could survive without harming Belgium and without 
suffering from competition with a recuperated German diamond indus-
try. How to end the wartime umbrella the state gave the industry without 
creating an anarchy that could both endanger the industry and the care for 
Belgium’s recovery?50
The division of opinions among the witnesses and members of the 
committee over the nature of the new form of control refl ected the power 
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structure. One group of witnesses were the PDMA representatives, wor-
ried that import, cutting, and export functions would be severed and that 
the British umbrella was about to be taken away, but keen to adapt the 
monopoly to the inevitable change. The second group consisted of the ex-
perts in cutting and trading, partly involved in the industry but mainly 
kept aside for being involved with the “national camp” earlier in the de-
cade or for simply unwilling to accept the PDMA’s rules. Perceiving them-
selves as standard-bearers of occupational and organizational traditions, 
they constituted an opposition to the PDMA’s hierarchy and were eagerly 
awaiting a climate of less-politicized and -militarized industry and one 
of more focused occupational culture. The third group gathered all sorts 
of newcomers who wished to integrate with the industry and join in its 
“celebration” of profi t and provision of luxury. Finally there were the mer-
chants, wishing to specialize in import and export, proud in their world 
connections and, after being restricted during the war, seeking a free post-
war world of trade.51
Clearly the last three groups had in common their wartime exclusion 
from the monopoly, their incessant patrolling of the industry’s boundar-
ies. Moreover, it was the differences between the fi rst two groups over 
the supply and distribution of rough diamonds and over licensing new 
manufacturers that made them two distinct schools of thought. In the 
name of effi ciency and specialized manufacturing, the experts’ camp op-
posed the monopoly of the Diamond Syndicate and of the PDMA, called 
for licensing specialized exporters and for obtaining the rough stones also 
from sources outside the syndicate. These proposed actions would mean 
signifi cantly decreasing the intervention of the government in the indus-
try. The PDMA’s representatives agreed with the call for further effi ciency 
but opposed an outright opening of the ranks. Safeguarding their own in-
terests as manufacturers and experts, they wished to see the government 
protecting their status albeit with a softer version of control and with eas-
ing the single-path dependency on the syndicate.52 The fi nal word of the 
committee was that eventually the industry ought to be freed of govern-
ment control and the PDMA should be transformed from a compulsory 
association to a voluntary one. Import of rough diamonds would have to 
be opened to importers outside the PDMA and new factories would be 
permitted to operate. However there should be must be a transition pe-
riod of regulation until normal conditions resumed and the government 
and the industry fully adapted to them. Government control would be 
therefore maintained so as to ensure both the industry’s healthier devel-
opment and that the industry would survive the crisis expected to follow 
after the reduction of supplies and reemergence of world competition.53
The committee’s report was concluded in December 1945 but not made 
public. For all intents and purposes it turned now into a battleground. 
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Many in the PDMA who supported liberalization still feared losing the 
monopoly. Jewish diamantaires abroad who wanted to immigrate to Pal-
estine preconditioned it on changing the PDMA’s authoritative structure. 
The pressure from the supporters of freer trade remained frail because 
the PDMA, still backed by Walsh and the CO, could still pull the strings. 
Moreover, the government itself conveyed the message that the conditions 
for implementation of deregulation had not ripened yet. On the other 
hand, many forces that pushed for deregulation and abolishment exerted 
concerted pressure to advance the process. Among them were the Export-
ers’ Association of Palestine Polished Diamonds (79 members in spring 
1946), the Palestine Diamond Club (125 members), the Diamond Traders 
Association (importers, 39 members), and the Palestine Cleavers’ Orga-
nization (39 members). These groups were, however, rejected by the gov-
ernment in the claim that as the industry was now battling to get supplies 
and position itself in the new conditions of Belgium’s return, freeing the 
industry of its monopoly structure would only bring chaos, uncontrolled 
home production, and unemployment.54
While the orientation of the report was already clear to diamond cir-
cles, in Palestine it was felt in the government that the committee’s recom-
mendations had to be checked against the models of diamond production 
and government control that were now evolving in Belgium, and against 
the tension between the cutting centers. For this reason Geoffrey Walsh, 
one of the main architects of government’s economic policy and a key 
fi gure in the development of the diamond industry, was sent to Europe. 
Walsh’s own report was added to that of the committee’s so that the CO 
and the government would better understand how a diamond industry 
could practically operate without government control. Walsh admired the 
Belgian model in which diamond dealers and manufacturers gathered in 
a Diamond Club—a keeper of high professional standards and a moral 
barrier against malpractice. The club cooperated with a Diamond Offi ce, 
which was government controlled and which inspected the import of the 
rough diamonds and the export of the product. It was a liberal and plural 
model, but at the same time by interdicting the fl ight of diamantaires’ cap-
ital abroad it harnessed the industry to the needs of Belgium’s recupera-
tion. The model did not entirely exclude governmental presence but was 
based on a subtle cooperation. Walsh saw here an apt example of how a 
control-free industry could still serve both imperial needs, refl ected in dol-
lar income, and local-developmental ones, namely, Palestine’s economy. 
Furthermore, Walsh saw the model as another application of a European 
fi nancial culture to be introduced in the Middle East where suspicion of 
the way business was conducted was part of the British experience and 
paternalist approach. Finally, though the model allowed purchasing raw 
diamonds from more than one supplier, in practice the De Beers monop-
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oly remained unchallenged and thus the relaxation of controls was some-
what mitigated. Consequently in early June 1946 the government decided 
it was time to make the recommendations of the committee public.55
It would take some time for the full effects of deregulation to show their 
mark. The industries in Belgium, the UK, and the US were at this point in 
time much more deregulated than in Palestine, where deregulation mainly 
took the form of freer imports of the rough diamonds and gradual separa-
tion of imports of the rough stones from actual cutting.56 Still, the publicity 
of the report and its much-debated recommendations for a freer industry 
made liberalization irreversible. The reasons were clear. First, in a reversal 
of the 1940 principles, the policy that followed the committee was now of 
doing away with the PDMA’s monopoly and allowing new manufacturers 
and capital owners to join in. Second, trade was made freer, as exempli-
fi ed by the opening of the diamond exchange in Tel Aviv. Third, exporters 
could now operate more freely, organize themselves separately from the 
manufacturers, and cultivate ties with manufacturers in other countries. 
In common these immediate effects of deregulation constituted a transi-
tion from state-sheltered capitalism to a more independent one.57
More than any immediate consequences, deregulation meant a change 
in the basic assumption shared by anyone producing or dealing in dia-
monds in Palestine since the mid-1930s: that as private and capitalist pro-
ducing and dealing in diamonds has always been, it has never been free 
of dependence on the state or of state intervention. Even if formal autho-
rization to anyone wishing to be active in diamonds were successfully 
bypassed and informal activity was practiced, the transgressor’s concern 
would always be there that at one point or another he would tackle a de-
limiting state authority or the PDMA as its proxy. The obligations to be a 
PDMA member, to buy rough diamonds only from the syndicate, and to 
export all the fi nished product were the formal expressions of what turned 
into a distinct social reality of a Jewish-only industry. The later was deeply 
protected and manipulated by the interests of the British and the syndi-
cate, heavily guarded by the Ben-Ami citadel-like administration of the 
industry, and abnormally restricted regarding free trade. This was now to 
change.
That the British actually administered the deregulation was not surpris-
ing. After all, they provided the legal and political status of the PDMA’s 
monopoly, they oversaw and controlled the purchasing and exporting of 
the diamonds, and entry to the industry and trade was largely depen-
dent on their consent. If anything deregulation was a weakening of their 
central position in the industry. However, one cannot ignore the fact that 
deregulation was an intervention in an industry that was so much part 
of the Yishuv, its groups of capitalists and workers, and that any restruc-
turing would entail changes in relations among the manufacturers and 
between them and the workers. In this sense the British explicated, again 
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as they had done since the 1920s, their crucial role in shaping Palestine’s 
industrial scene and even its post-Mandate future. That this process rip-
ened in spring 1946 when the Anglo-American committee completed its 
deliberations on the political future of Palestine demonstrated the extent 
to which the political and the economic aspects of the British regime were 
intertwined.58
Two areas of infl uence should be stressed in particular. One was the freer 
operation of importers of rough diamonds. This meant not only a gradual 
decrease in the dependence on the syndicate for supplies but also the free-
ing of the individual manufacturers from total dependence on the broker-
age axis run by the PDMA and Hennig & Co. The latter would therefore 
entail decentralization in the industry, a weakening of Netanya’s position 
as the main stronghold of the industry, and last but not least resumption of 
merchants’ activities and of a trading culture that had been quelled since 
early in the decade. The second area of infl uence of deregulation was the 
labor process. Deregulation meant that the individual manufacturer and 
its team of experts and managers could shape more independently the 
character of the factory’s production: the stones cut, the local division of 
labor, and the degree of upholding or distancing from traditional produc-
tion processes. Perhaps this was the deeper meaning of the normalization 
of the industry: not just undoing the wartime strictures on the industry 
but also creating the possibility for change in workplace relations. As we 
saw earlier (see chapter 3) the formation of the industry in Palestine was 
also an adaptation to national and local needs. Deregulation was closely 
associated with reverting back to the Belgian model and with the need to 
adapt the local specifi city to the postwar circumstances of renewed Bel-
gian hegemony. After all, many thought this was the model in which Jews 
historically mostly succeeded.59
Strengthen pluralized foci of power was a crucial effect of deregulation. 
One power was the traders (importers and exporters) who rallied around 
their older demand for independence and free trade and cultivated these 
ideas in organization. They were fi rst recognized by the British and then 
gradually, in particular following the report, were legitimized by the 
PDMA. This plurality of interests affected Ben-Ami and his supporters. 
In reaction to the process, in spring 1946 this “old guard” tried to run 
the PDMA in such as a way as to monopolize all imports of rough stones 
and thus preserve power. This turned into a serious point of contention, 
pitting the exporters’ association and the importers against the monop-
oly and in support of free movement and action. The campaign, greatly 
energized by the decontrol process, peaked in spring 1946 and virtually 
caused Ben-Ami to back away from too-personalized dealing with the 
syndicate. Furthermore, the campaign was greatly helped by the growing 
black market in diamond trading and production in Palestine since early 
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1946, which exposed the growing irrelevance of total monopoly control in 
the industry.60
Closely associated with liberalization and the weakening of the PDMA’s 
monopoly position was the establishment of the bourse. In late March 
1946, the Palestine Diamond Exchange was founded under the presidency 
of Ben Schafferman (1896–1974) as a stock company in Tel Aviv. In fact it 
was a company of 180 importers, manufacturers, and traders, and its main 
purpose was to create the exchange. The bourse did not have trading halls 
at its disposal, and its members’ activity was conducted at the Diamond 
Club, the Palatine café, and the Bank Igud hall—all in Tel Aviv’s main 
commercial center. In the “Memorandum of Association of the Eretz Israel 
Diamond Exchange (31 March 1946)” the composition of the company’s 
share capital was determined, as were its twenty goals, showing the solid 
and visionary basis that its founders lay. Among these goals were to form, 
within the framework of the company, special committees for the purpose 
of managing a diamond bourse, manage suitable buildings for the pur-
poses of the diamond bourse, resolve differences of opinion among the 
bourse members, institute arbitration courts, set honest and just principles 
in the diamond trade, and maintain unity in the rules, instructions, and 
customs of the diamond trade. In fact a circle was closed in bringing the 
adoption of the Belgian model and also the Dutch one to fruition.
From the perspective of the thirty to fi fty diamond traders, deregula-
tion was more than a mere economic blessing. They could now revert 
to the short period in 1938–1940, between the reduction of customs and 
the barring of independent trade, and revive the global contacts that fed 
their businesses. On the return of the importers, exporters, and middle-
men to business, they witnessed the change that totally transformed the 
manner of their fi nancial transactions. Some were keen to see Belgium 
recover; some even looked for dealing again with the cutting industry in 
Germany. Others preferred cultivating a diamond trade from the new dia-
mond centers in Palestine, intertwining a sheer search for renewed profi ts 
with a fervent sense of Zionist state building.61
The effects of deregulation were, however, deeper. A wave of offers to 
sell factories emerged. As running a factory was possible only by holding 
a government license and with membership in the PDMA, full deregula-
tion was expected to empty the licenses of their value. Consequently many 
owners quickly placed offers on the market, trying to seize the moment as 
much as they could and putting many workers at risk. At the same time, 
however, the sales of factories or shares in ownership facilitated the emer-
gence of the Histadrut as a potential buyer, and as we shall soon see, it 
began setting up diamond cooperatives through its holding company.62
Furthermore, domestic work was back now in full force. Similar to the 
cheaply paid cutting in Belgium’s rural Flanders, here too, in Netanya and 
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Tel Aviv, layers upon layers of small and large middlemen transferred to, 
operated, and encouraged a culture of small-scale, artisan-based home 
work that wrongly seemed to have vanished from the industrializing 
landscape of wartime Palestine. This was truly uncontrollable, and the 
PDMA’s attempts to discipline the wave seemed ridiculous as the orga-
nization’s members themselves now “sinned” in this way. The factories 
seemed now to contract; the workplace effect of concentration, singing, 
and solidarity seemed to evaporate, replaced as they were by the indi-
vidual and his family. No organizational power could stop this. In early 
or mid-1946 manufacturers even started to send stones for cutting from 
Palestine to Belgium. It would be cheaper.63
Deregulation thus reemphasized the centrality of British rule. If in the 
early 1940s it accommodated private industry to the needs and conditions 
of the war, now it was the primary force behind its adaptation to the new 
postwar conditions. Deregulation fi tted British liberal visions of economy 
and society, but it also matched its stately interests and goals: assure the 
recuperation of the Belgian industry, cooperate with the cartel in shaping 
the postwar diamond mining in the Congo and distribution in London, 
hamper the revival of cutting in Germany, and keep good relations with 
the Americans in the context of the emerging Cold War.64 The gradual un-
doing of the monopoly, the easing of entry barriers for new manufactur-
ers, and the freeing of diamond importers and exporters from the throngs 
of war restrictions and thick bureaucratic controls constituted in the dia-
mond industry a legacy for many years to come. Distancing itself from 
control and moving towards regulation, the government signaled the limit 
of its intervention in industry, to its protectiveness, in particular as its dis-
mantling of its rule in Palestine seemed close than ever, but more so as its 
interest in relations with Belgium, De Beers, and the Belgian Congo would 
now surpass its Middle East crown colony. As much as freeing the indus-
try of the constraints forced upon it by the war strengthened the private 
sector in Palestine, it was also a state project and served well in blurring 
the dividing lines between privately owned industries and the state.
In an ironical twist of history, deregulation and the further integration 
of particular cutting and trading centers in a postwar world system har-
bored also economic-national dimensions. The recovery in Belgium was 
made part of the Belgian postwar national project and British strategies 
were obviously part of the economic nationalism espoused by the Atlee 
government. In Palestine the linkage between liberalization and national 
considerations took a specifi c form. The presence in the diamond indus-
try of Zionist institutions gradually increased, and Zionist state-building 
considerations emerged more forcefully. Second, the voice of the His-
tadrut gradually increased, refl ecting as it did the postwar strengthening 
of cooperation in the Yishuv’s industrial sector between Mapai-led Jewish 
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Agency and organized labor. The testimonies in the deregulation inquiry 
committee and the moves made in practice in spring 1946 demonstrated 
that the more the British thought of liberalizing the diamond industry and 
signaled that they were about to distance themselves from it the more in-
vigorated was the presence of Zionist institutions. The question was not 
anymore whether there would be Zionist-public intervention in the affairs 
of the diamantaires but when and in what volume. Many months before 
the British withdrawal from Palestine, this interconnectedness between 
one state power withdrawing and another emerging became ever more 
apparent.65
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The diamond is a much more complicated commodity than bread or ra-
dio. The diamond is a peculiar creature. You can compute more or less 
precisely what would be the consumption of bread in the town tomor-
row or in a month. It is possible to reach accurate calculations how many 
radios or refrigerators this country or another would absorb annually. 
But who knows how many diamonds and brilliants would the American 
luxury dealers buy in 1947? And calculation must be made in the wake 
of a possible new crisis in the New York stock exchange where the small 
savings owner loses his savings to the point of not being able to buy his 
wife a diamond-set ring for the silver wedding. And the competition of 
the Belgian industry must be taken too into account. The combination of 
all these factors is not a simple mathematical exercise.
—Yosef Yambor, “Boom and Tide in the Diamond Industry,” 
Mishmar, 5 November 1946. 
Reversal of Fortunes
In early September 1946 some diamond manufacturers signalled the alarm 
that the industry was on the verge of crisis. They accused the PDMA of try-
ing to hide the information from workers in Palestine and buyers abroad 
and insisted that the main economic indicator—the unabated decline 
since the early summer in prices for Palestinian-polished diamonds in 
the US—foreshadowed a real disaster. Some 50,000 thousand carats from 
Palestine were waiting now to be sold in New York and the quantities 
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of stones in the hands of exporting merchants were accumulating alarm-
ingly. The problem was graver, they said, than the occasional and tolerable 
downturns in supplies of rough stones from London to which they had 
been accustomed to since 1941. Albert Ehrenfeld, soon to become chief 
government advisor on diamonds, confi rmed the reports that the Ameri-
can market was fl ooded with diamonds, goods were lying unsellable in 
the safes of the American consignees, and that the entire cutting operation 
in Netanya and Tel Aviv was about to stop. The daily Hebrew and English 
press in Palestine began reporting on declining income of the factories, 
incapacity to order and pay for rough stones, wages unpaid and cessation 
of work. Even robberies increased now, following the rumors that unsold 
polished diamonds amassed in the factories. A group of ex-servicemen 
tried to disrupt a meeting at the PDMA’s offi ces in demand for work and 
Ben-Ami and the manufacturers were put under siege. The PDMA’s ex-
ecutive quickly announced that it could not absorb more ex-servicemen 
and refugees from Europe, called for an urgent change in pay and benefi ts, 
and practically called for the cessation of all work. Some labor organizers 
interpreted these signs as just a periodical downturn in the American mar-
ket, typical of the end of the summer season, or simply marketing tactics 
of the diamond agents in New York. Others perceived them as ploy of the 
manufacturers and the PDMA to harm workers’ past achievements. By 
early October, however, all became aware of the fact that the industry was 
sinking into a catastrophe of yet unknown proportions.1
The two main expressions of the crisis—the drastic reduction in em-
ployment and the contraction of diamond imports and exports—seemed 
by the end of 1946 already irreversible, and when they both peaked in 
January–March 1947 they indicated a clear a reversal of the industry’s pre-
ceding take-off:
Table 7.1 The diamond industry in Palestine 1944–1949
Factories Workers
Import of rough 
diamonds in thousands 
of US dollars 
Export of polished 
diamonds in thousands 
of US dollars
1944 33 3,750 7,000 9,240
1945 33 4,000 12,600 16,520
1946 34 4,500 12,600 15,372
1947 *30–45 2,000 1,260 1,680
1948 30 800 700 840
1949 *50 2,800 5,118 4,100
* The interim growth in the number of workplaces refl ected the crisis-related splintering of 
the factories into smaller production units and the proliferation of small diamond-cutting 
cooperatives.
Sources: Avraham Friedman, “The Diamond Industry in Palestine’s Economy,” Hameshek 
Hashitufi  (23 February 1947); Oved Ben-Ami, “Die Diamantindustrie in Palastina,” Schweizer 
Goldschmied 5 (May 1948): 32–33; Hayahalom 154 (June 1988).
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Figure 7.1 The diamond industry in Palestine 1944–1948
Sources: Avraham Friedman, “The Diamond Industry in Palestine’s Economy,” Hameshek 
Hashitufi  (23 February 1947); Ben-Ami, “Die Diamantindustrie in Palastina,” 32–33.
The crisis reaffi rmed the characteristic fl uctuations in the diamond 
industry throughout its history as well as the turbulent emergence and 
development of the diamond occupational community in Palestine. It 
decreased the overall value of the Palestine’s exports and increased the 
rate of business bankruptcies in the Jewish community. It expanded un-
employment and cut the volume of industrial unrest from 16.9 workdays 
lost per striking worker in 1946 to 3.1 in 1947, and completely destabilized 
the fragile economy of Netanya that had come to depend so heavily on 
diamond cutting. More signifi cant was the impact of the crisis on the rela-
tions between state and capital, deepening as it did the trend marked by 
deregulation and bringing the intervention of the Zionist institution in 
the affairs of this privately owned industry to a new level. The crisis thus 
defi ned the transition period from British Mandate rule to Israeli sover-
eignty not only as a political and military transformation but also as an 
economic one.2
Contemporaries used the term crisis with no hesitation and hardly dis-
agreed on its immediate causes. Although the Histadrut-affi liated union 
of diamond workers, and even more so the political Left, argued that the 
manufacturers exaggerated the extent of the downturn in order to justify 
layoffs and wage reductions, the consensus was widely shared and widely 
known in Antwerp, London, and New York. In the collective memory of 
the diamond industry the crisis and the agreement over its causes were 
much more solid than the usual contesting narratives relating to the birth 
of the industry in the late 1930s, the character of its management, or the 
role of the industry during the war. Furthermore, it was uncontested that 
the crisis was far from a local affair.3
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The crisis was fi rst and foremost a corollary of the transition from war 
to peace; in particular from an economy that harnessed human and ma-
terial resources to the needs of the war to one oriented toward recovery 
and normalization. The entire diamond industry was affected, from the 
mining fi elds in Sierra Leone and the Belgian Congo to the syndicate’s 
distribution center in London, from the newly created cutting centers in 
Netanya, San Jose and Havana to the traditional ones in Antwerp, Amster-
dam, and even the American zone in occupied Germany. The restrictions 
on the diamond trade were gradually lifted. Others were forced afresh, in 
particular those relating to trading in industrial diamonds with former en-
emies and those that attempted to forestall the revival of the German dia-
mond industry. A great part of the European diamond labor force that had 
been recruited to military service or made idle by the war was now able 
to go back to mining diamonds and the cutting tables. In the recuperated 
cutting centers many were Jews who returned to Europe from Cuba, Latin 
America, and Palestine. Those that were killed in the Holocaust were re-
placed by Christians, thus coloring the transition to a peace economy as a 
human and social transformation that impinged on the diamond industry 
for many years to come. For Palestine this context meant increasing de-
pendence on the economic progress of the Belgians. After all, the entire 
Palestine diamond project was built on the absence of competition from 
Antwerp and the crisis was a direct outcome of its resumption.4
A related but more specifi c cause of the crisis was the change in the 
American demand for polished stones. Since the end of 1940 stones cut in 
Palestine were almost entirely dependent on the American market. The 
British made diamond export to the US a precondition for their consent 
to allow the development of the industry, and the dollar income the Brit-
ish accrued from the export to New York continued to determine British 
policy throughout the war. The demand in the United States for diamonds 
was relatively steady from the American entry to the war in late 1941 to 
the last months of the war. Then in a matter of few months the demand be-
gan to decrease—fi rst, because consumption was diverted to other more 
essential articles typical for the postwar years, and second, because of the 
decline in popularity of diamonds for investment and as an infl ationary 
hedge. By spring 1946 the new pattern of demand for polished stones 
seemed irreversible. The diamond market was fl ooded, huge quantities of 
fi nished diamonds remained in the hands of the dealers, and prices fell. 
Soon the dealers in New York reduced the import of stones from Pales-
tine. The factories in Tel Aviv and Netanya were consequently told to de-
crease production, and the workers, mostly working by piecework, were 
left empty handed. India, Palestine’s other main exporting destination of 
cut diamonds, was beset with political disturbances in 1947 and thus the 
gradual loss of the American market put the entire diamond project in 
Palestine as risk.5
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Figure 7.2 Annual change of rough diamond import, 1940–1947
Sources: Avraham Friedman, “The Diamond Industry in Palestine’s Economy,” Hameshek 
Hashitufi  (23 February 1947); Ben-Ami, “Die Diamantindustrie in Palastina,” 32–33; Hayaha-
lom 154 (June 1988).
Belgium’s return to trading in and cutting diamonds and the advan-
tage it created vis-à-vis the industry in Palestine was evidently a primary 
cause of the crisis. The reorientation of the Diamond Syndicate’s distribu-
tive policies on Belgium weakened Palestine in the politics of supplies. 
Moreover, Belgium was also winning in sales of polished stones in the 
American market, which was now fl ooded with cheaper and lower-qual-
ity diamonds arriving from Antwerp.6 In contrast to Palestine, Belgian 
manufacturers could purchase rough stones outside the syndicate and at 
lower prices. Furthermore, the number of domestic workers in Belgium 
increased in late 1946 and early 1947 to six thousand in Antwerp and nine 
thousand in the rural areas. This home industry was based on piecework 
but also on a minimal tariff that kept pay much lower compared to Pal-
estine. The unemployment wage customary in Palestine was absent in 
Belgium and the diamond workers in Antwerp enjoyed only half of the 
social benefi ts paid to workers in Netanya and Tel Aviv. As long as the war 
and the paralysis of the Low Countries provided Palestine with hothouse 
conditions and thus high profi tability, high labor costs and the associated 
striking activity could be tolerated.
Belgium’s return to business turned workers’ achievements in the Pal-
estine factories (epitomized in the annual collective agreement) into a se-
rious obstacle to their competitive capacity. Belgium produced therefore 
at less cost, and more than half of the Belgian produce was sold in the 
black market (partly encouraged by the Belgian government) and at much 
better prices (20 percent more than the formal market). Cheaper produc-
tion methods, cheaper workplace management, and the fl ourishing of the 
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black market defeated Palestine and other cutting centers as well. “The 
only industry left on its feet till today,” one report claimed, “is the Pales-
tine one and on its neck too hung the sword of its extinction.”7
The diamond industry seemed therefore increasingly dissociated from 
the war economy. The contraction of demand in the US wrested its main 
exporting destination, and Belgium’s competitive advantage and support 
of the cartel was now reproducing its prewar hegemony. Britain, guided 
by its interest in the Belgian Congo and in European integration, was keen 
to support the recovery of Belgium’s diamond industry even at the cost 
of the survival of the cutting centers it helped establish during the war. In 
these conditions the capacity of Palestine to compete in exporting small 
stones to the American market seemed slim indeed. It had had the ca-
pacity to adapt, it developed an independent technological infrastructure 
to show the greatest advances in cutting and polishing, but it was losing 
ground in the politics of supply and in the protection of and representa-
tion by the British state it enjoyed so steadily during the war. The British 
presented deregulation as a means to make Palestine’s diamond industry 
healthier, able to grow without the caring umbrella of a state power. But in 
the fi nal analysis a combination of forces in Europe and the United States 
made this maturation seriously questionable.8
The harshest test came in late summer 1946. Once the American de-
mand for the Palestine polished stone continued to fall, many of the own-
ers and manufacturers began to sell their properties and shares. The buy-
ers—with hardly any experience in diamond making—searched for quick 
recovery. The impatience drove them to more-extreme moves in particular 
because of the atmosphere of open war with the Belgian exporters. The 
incomes of the factories declined, quarrels in the PDMA over allocation 
of rough diamonds intensifi ed, and the larger factories began to disinte-
grate. Palestine’s exports to the US and India were now drastically cut, 
and the factories could not pay for their orders or their workers. The banks 
became gradually more cautious in providing credits for the manufactur-
ers and the syndicate would not ship more rough diamonds without a 
promise for payment. As the PDMA’s relations with the government dete-
riorated (because of invigorating anti-British politics in Palestine and Brit-
ish interests in good relations with the Belgian Congo), there was nobody 
to turn to. And as the collective agreement with the diamond workers’ 
unions committed the manufacturers to pay at least 80 percent of normal 
wages during idle periods, the losses mounted. The black market in dia-
monds expanded, theft of stones became widespread, and many workers 
began working domestically and illegally. Mutual recriminations between 
the manufacturers and the workers over the responsibility for the crisis 
began to collapse the understandings that had been so painstakingly built 
during the boom. Many manufacturers who were now facing the weaken-
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ing of their workplace authority panicked and aspired to close down the 
industry until the troubles were over.9
The crisis lasted until spring 1947. Supplies did continue to arrive to the 
factories but in decreasing amounts. Manufacturers increased the draw-
ing of their reserves of unpolished diamonds, but the latter quickly dwin-
dled and the residues were withheld from the cutting tables in expectation 
for a change for the better. The regular operation of the factories ceased 
functioning and various services provided to the factories by suppliers 
followed suit. In the small town of Netanya, with an economy that was 
as dependent on diamonds and on the factories as consumers of services, 
this was felt even more harshly than in Tel Aviv.10
The silencing of the factories indicated a graver symptom of the destabi-
lization. The weakening of capital and its capacity to expand the factories 
did not mean complete evaporation. Some manufacturers began selling 
their factories, some joined in ownership with others, while some shared 
their factories with Histadrut-inspired workers’ cooperatives (dealt with 
below). Some of the diamond experts and manufacturers who arrived 
from Antwerp in 1940 returned to Belgium to take part in the recuperation 
of the Belgian hegemony in cutting and trading. Others sought to reach 
New York, the diamond trading capital. Many of the owners who lacked a 
pre-1940 background in diamonds left the occupation altogether. 
The fragmentation of the factories and the movement of capital were 
naturally more felt among the cutters and polishers themselves. Reminis-
cent of the dramatic expansion of the industry in 1941–1943, the multi-
faceted movement intensifi ed by the crisis was no less dramatic. Many 
were dismissed; others sought a new occupation independently, only to 
return to the industry a few months later with the fi rst signs of recovery. 
Evidently the industry was restructuring itself both in terms of ownership 
and human composition.11
It was, however, the informal layer of the industry that the crisis made 
much more explicit. The shadow of unregulated home diamond cutting 
and the black market accompanied the industry from the start. As we saw 
earlier, the potential of its increase was one of the reasons why the Brit-
ish and the PDMA took pains to mold a centralized, structured, and su-
pervised factory-based industry. As long as the industry was profi table 
and supplies were continuously pouring in from London, the incentive 
to develop an informal, domestic cutting operation was not high. Evi-
dently during prolonged strikes or lockouts or when supplies contracted, 
illegal home work sprouted. The liberalization of controls intensifi ed the 
phenomenon, and though government licensing was still required, it was 
worth the while of the manufacturers to support work outside their fac-
tories at lower prices and often with lower quality. The crisis made the 
phenomenon widespread. Many workers who left the factories turned 
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into self-employed cutters and tried to live off the reserves of rough dia-
monds found at the collapsing factories. Freedom of movement sharply 
contrasted now with earlier regulation, and workers’ fl exibility seemed 
to become a norm. Diamond experts turned into domestic workers and 
surviving factories distributed work to homes and makeshift ateliers. The 
capacity of the British and the PDMA to bring the spread of illegal, infor-
mal, and domestic work to a halt was minimal now, and one could often 
sense that both the government and the PDMA were keen to use it to keep 
the industry alive. In this sense the industry was restructuring itself—seri-
ously decreasing the cutting and polishing in the factories and reverting 
to home-based or workers’ cooperative operations that characterized part 
of the prewar diamond industry in the Low Countries.12
This tumult of human movement and activity of informal production, 
provoked early on by deregulation, now climaxed. It increased the frag-
mentation of ownership of the factories and brought about further splin-
tering of the PDMA’s social basis that would impact the industry for many 
years to come. This weakening of capital was refl ected fi rst in the contrac-
tion of the factories into smaller units of production and in the capacity 
of the large-size fi rms to place large orders of rough diamonds. Second, 
the invigorating drive to sell factories and machinery lowered the cost 
of entering the diamond industry—spent on hiring buildings, purchasing 
tools, and technical services. Consequently, and despite the ongoing crisis, 
the number of owners per unit multiplied. In turn production and wage 
policies became a tense negotiation grounds between the owners, and fac-
tory life was destabilized. The third expression of the weakening of capital 
was the decreasing capacity of the (still active) factories to bring the cut-
ting processes to fi nish. Consequently exporting decreased, profi tability 
was lowered, and fi nally the capacity to pay wages dwindled. Taken to-
gether the impact of these aspects in such a short time added signifi cant 
social dimensions to the economic havoc of the crisis. The cohesion and 
even solidarity among the diamond manufacturers that accompanied the 
birth of the industry and its take-off began to evaporate, competitiveness 
intensifi ed, and the sense of confi dence in the industry and its viability 
disintegrated.13
The rise of the home industry and the black market shattered the PD-
MA’s doorposts. The ability of the organization to maintain its regimenta-
tion and direct the actions of its members weakened. This was refl ected 
in the increasing use by manufacturers of the home industry, the liberty 
they felt to obtain rough diamonds on the black market, and the diverting 
of exports from the US to local and regional Middle Eastern marketing. 
The laxity of control was naturally a corollary of the liberalization effected 
before the crisis. It now signaled, however, the fragility of the manufactur-
ers’ organization and the ominous endangering of the PDMA’s relations 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Crisis and Restructuring   |   215
with the syndicate, its main source of rough diamonds. Thus the crisis 
began to fulfi ll the potential of the forces that had since the end of the war 
pushed to transform the way the industry was run and managed.14 
National Intervention
The main site where this ripening took place was evidently the industry’s 
relations with state authorities—the British and the embryonic Zionist-
state institutions. During the war the symbiotic relations between capital 
and state were ambivalent but they never threatened to cause severance 
of ties. Even when the PDMA and Ben-Ami realized the clear orientation 
of the British and the Diamond Syndicate on the Belgians, interest over-
shadowed anticolonial anger. Deregulation—that is, the postwar process 
that relaxed the entry threshold to the industry and its trading mecha-
nisms—was a state-directed process and the industry still depended on 
state authority in executing the relaxation of controls. Already before the 
crisis capital-state relations gradually deteriorated, as demonstrated in 
the receding backing of the British in the politics of supply in London, 
in the decided siding with Belgium and the Belgian Congo, even in the 
weakening intervention of the DCB in the industry in the latter part of 
1946. However, the British hardly lost interest in the industry and in the 
dollar income the diamond industry brought to Palestine and to the Ster-
ling Bloc. The Belgians themselves realized that the British still waived the 
Palestine fl ag as a reminder and even a threat to the manufacturers in An-
twerp that they would need British and syndicate support and therefore 
should agree to favor them in the Belgian Congo.15
What did change was the political context. During the discussions on 
deregulation in early 1946, the political tension in Palestine increasingly 
affected the relations between the industry and the authorities. The fac-
tories in Tel Aviv and Netanya were frequently visited by British soldiers 
and policemen looking for active members of the IZL and LEHI under-
ground organizations and for hidden arms.16 In the summer IZL mem-
bers intensifi ed their raids on the factories, aiming to steal diamonds and 
further fi nance anti-British operations. The King David Hotel bombing 
on 22 July 1946—in which Geoffrey Walsh, the economic advisor and dia-
mond controller, and Bernard Bourdillon, the secretary of the 1945 inquiry 
committee on diamonds, were killed —clearly added to the atmosphere of 
political instability.17
Robberies of diamonds from factories and merchants and even of 
workers’ cash wages became a common and fueled the atmosphere of 
chaos caused by the rising terror and the crisis itself. The heists fascinated 
the press. Their audacity was often depicted as a contrast to the clumsi-
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ness of the factory owners and to the sense of surprise at the crime rate 
in Yishuv society. In many reports the acts seemed to ridicule the British 
authorities, their incapacity and indifference. The diamond robberies were 
often committed by the members of the right-wing undergrounds who 
wished to cause havoc and disruption. Many of them worked in the dia-
mond factories (using the lack of Histadrut control of the selection of the 
diamond labor force), and though many of the manufacturers they robbed 
openly supported their anti-imperialism and objection to British anti-Yi-
shuv measures, they resented the excessive profi ts made in the industry 
and thought it was only natural that the manufacturers should be levied 
a sort of tax for the national anti-British cause. In some cases the robbers 
gave a warning that they did not mean to harm the manufacturers and the 
workers but rather the British companies that insured the factories and the 
diamonds. The LEHI underground even offered the PDMA to disentangle 
the factories from the British insurance companies, transfer the insur-
ance amounts to LEHI, and in return the underground would provide the 
manufacturers and the merchants some protection. The agreement never 
materialized because the Haganah (the Yishuv’s largest national self-de-
fense organization) discovered the plot and opposed it. However while it 
was the Haganah organization that now placed protection over the small 
diamond exchange in Tel Aviv, the robberies of the factories persisted. The 
consequent threat of the insurance companies to stop providing services 
to the industry refl ected the increasing exposure of the manufacturers and 
portended the approaching disengagement of the government.18
The overall result of the robberies, terror, and exposure of the diamond 
industry to political and military tension was the increasing estrangement 
of the British authorities. The close government intervention and control 
that characterized the 1940–1945 years turned in 1946–1947 into external 
policing and (often futile) attempts at regimentation. This deterioration 
in relations created a vacuum that was reminiscent of the prewar period, 
before the British intervention and the provision of state backing, when 
Belgian hegemony in world diamond cutting and trading restrained all 
others. When the crisis peaked in winter 1947, the threat harbored in this 
retreat of the Mandate state from the industry seemed more real than 
ever.19
In these simultaneous contexts of economic downturn and destabilized 
relations with the British the notion of the “triangular thread” resurfaced. 
This system of understandings within the Yishuv between the Zionist in-
stitutions, capital, and labor was only slowly making its presence felt in 
the diamond industry during the great debates on decontrol in late 1945 
and early 1946. The focusing at the time of the Jewish Agency on indus-
trial planning (as a part of its state-building project) alluded to the impor-
tance of the industry and to the need for cooperation with labor and the 
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Jewish Agency—but this was never translated into a signifi cant presence. 
The political debate on the future of Palestine during 1946 did bring the 
industry and the Zionist institutions closer, but only to a limited degree. 
The industry was still holding on to its independence and ties with the 
British. Even the call of the Zionist institutions after the King David Ho-
tel bombing to not cooperate with the British on the Diamond Control 
Board remained unheeded; the main argument advanced was that such a 
move might convince the British to let Arabs enter the industry and undo 
its Jewish exclusivity. The change fi nally came in October 1946 with the 
growing awareness among PDMA members and the labor unions of the 
crisis and the shared need felt by many to consider a preemptive closure 
of the factories. The Haaretz daily fi ttingly chose to justify this need for a 
tripartite national cooperation by titling one of its reports “The diamond 
industry is expecting a Holocaust.”20
The discussions on the crisis between the PDMA, the unions, and repre-
sentatives of the Jewish Agency were quickly given an institutional expres-
sion—a committee established to propose what to do with the collective 
agreement. Evidently, the agreement neared its termination in December 
and the crisis made its renewal practically impossible. Shortening the 
work week to counter the low labor costs in Belgium or closing down the 
industry temporarily entailed destabilization of the manufacturers’ prof-
its and workers’ pay and thus seemed to all involved to require national 
intervention.21 Without the latter, the manufacturers would not be able 
to fulfi ll their fi nancial obligations to the syndicate and to their workers. 
The committee consisted of major fi gures in the Yishuv’s fi nancial and 
banking establishment who were well versed in Palestine’s economic re-
lations with the outside world: Eliezer Siegfried Hoofi en, the manager 
of Anglo-Palestine Bank; Eliezer Perlson, deputy mayor of Tel Aviv; and 
Yosef Sh. Shapira, manager of the Palestine electricity company. This fur-
ther refl ected the integration of the industry within the decision-making 
frameworks of the Zionist institutions. Thus, what began in 1939 as a rift 
and enmity between a private sector protected by the Colonial Offi ce and 
the forces in the Yishuv that cooperated in recruiting the industry to the 
Zionist cause came now full circle.22
Following the testimonies of the PDMA and the unions, the committee 
defi ned two alternatives.23 The fi rst was to close the factories temporarily 
as the manufacturers suggested and pay the workers for unemployment. 
This alternative harbored the danger of irreversible harm to the industry 
and great losses to workers who spent time and resources acquiring their 
skills and had reached top wages in the industrial sector. The second al-
ternative, closer to what the unions proposed, was to operate the factories 
at capacity, shorten the work week, and pay the employees as required by 
the agreement. In this way the industry would still earn and the workers 
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would share the burden during the critical period without losing their 
past material achievements. Aspiring to cater to both sides, the commit-
tee recommended that in the last two months of 1946 the factories should 
reduce work hours to three and a half days a week and thereby get in line 
with the Belgians who had reduced the work week to three days. Further-
more, during this period the workers would be paid 60 percent of their 
regular wages and not receive full unemployment compensation for the 
idle days. Practically, the shortening of the week would reduce the pay by 
a third. The idea according to committee was to prevent further aggrava-
tion of the crisis and enable the industry to compete with the Belgians 
through effi cient production and reduction of labor costs.24
The PDMA accepted the recommendations and was grateful for the 
aid the Jewish Agency was now giving to diamond merchants who immi-
grated to Palestine; as well as for the contacts with the Jewish communities 
in New York, Havana, and Johannesburg, where diamond-cutting com-
munities mushroomed during the war. The PDMA also acknowledged the 
praise of performance the Jewish Agency gave the diamond industry in 
the British and UN inquiry committees on the future of Palestine. More 
specifi cally, the PDMA direly needed the help of the Jewish Agency in 
enabling manufacturers to pay their debts to the syndicate and through 
Jewish Agency loans to purchase rough diamonds and pay wages. While 
mutual suspicion still existed and criticism at the Jewish Agency was per-
sistently voiced against the independence of the PDMA and the excessive 
profi ts of the manufacturers, the crisis brought the sides closer than ever 
and increasingly materialized the Zionist intervention in the industry. 
Furthermore, the unions tarried in responding to the proposals and the 
PDMA was able to use the delay to strengthen the ties with the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry and through these ties press the unions. In 
this way former opponents—the PDMA and the Jewish Agency—cooper-
ated now on national-economic grounds to delegitimize the position of 
the unions and of the Histadrut in particular. Both the PDMA and the Jew-
ish Agency agreed with the unions that the recommendations amounted 
to violation of the employers’ obligations to the workers but they jointly 
justifi ed the violation when the total collapse of the industry became a real 
possibility.25
There was not much the unions could do against this new alliance. Not 
only was the terminating collective agreement violated but a new one was 
hardly conceived of and the employment of many workers seemed gravely 
at risk. The Histadrut attempted to infl uence public opinion. It claimed 
that while Belgian competition with the Palestine industry seemed menac-
ing enough, it was also a healthy restraint on the capitalists’ profi ts. The 
PDMA’s monopoly was to be abhorred, claimed the Histadrut, and its past 
successes in splintering labor’s voice and the Histadrut’s quest for hege-
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mony had had to be countered. In a sense the Histadrut attempted now 
to associate itself with diamond manufacturers and workers in the infor-
mal market to weaken the power of the PDMA, and, aspiring to organize 
the domestic workers, it proposed to help them against diamond owners 
and manufacturers who seemed to care little for workers. No wonder the 
Yishuv’s rightist liberal press condemned the Histadrut that its perception 
of the positive sides of competition and its resistance to the national con-
sensus between the PDMA and the Jewish Agency amounted to “national 
treason.” It was this pressure of public opinion and the anger of the Jewish 
Agency at the procrastination of the unions that led the PDMA to decide 
on 6 November 1946 that the only way to press the unions to accept the 
proposals of the Jewish Agency committee was to lock out the factories.26
The shutdown of the industry and the cessation of work of its 4,500 
workers enhanced the role of the Jewish Agency as a mediator between 
capital and labor. In itself the lockout negated the recommendations made 
by the committee and only aggravated workers’ opposition. The pressure 
turned back now on the manufacturers. During the three-week closure 
their losses increased, many more could not pay the syndicate, and the 
risk that supplies from London would be cancelled increased. The fear 
that the PDMA was disintegrating was widespread. The atmosphere of 
trust among the diamond manufacturers seemed to wane and Ben-Ami’s 
leadership was questioned. Consequently the PDMA was forced to re-
vise its position and proposed to resume work. The unions also softened 
their opposition for fear that weeks of working without pay would set the 
workers against them and that the impoverished manufacturers would 
not be able to pay compensations. Despite widespread workers’ support 
of resisting the manufacturers, the unions proposed now as well to accept 
the committee’s recommendations and reopen the factories. The PDMA 
answered that it would consider reopening the factories only if the or-
ganizations accepted the Jewish Agency’s recommendations without 
qualifi cations.27
In this climate of mutual recrimination and indecision, disintegration of 
both the PDMA and workers’ solidarity, and the no less menacing signals 
from the syndicate that supplies might be stopped because of manufac-
turers’ debts, the Jewish Agency again stepped in. Through continuous 
mediation between the sides and willingness to revise its own recommen-
dations, it emerged now as the main authority to which both capital and 
labor could turn to at this bewildering crossroad. By the end of November 
1946, therefore, the mediators of the Jewish Agency convinced the two 
sides to resume work without agreement and to temporarily lay down 
their arms. The factories reopened and soon after the manufacturers were 
notifi ed that the Jewish Agency was willing to allocate half a million dol-
lars to help the industry purchase raw materials. However, in late De-
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cember a message arrived from Hennig and Co. that no further stones 
would be sent to the PDMA before all previous debts and payments for 
(already made) orders by the manufacturers were paid. In these circum-
stances the role of the Jewish Agency in handling the crisis became ever-
more central.28
Labor’s Moment
The cessation of supplies and the stalemate between the diamond manu-
facturers and the workers brought the industry to a standstill in the begin-
ning of January 1947. The crisis now reached its peak and it would take at 
least three long months before subsiding. During this period the industry 
was further restructured. So far, the recuperation of the Belgian diamond 
industry and the beginning of the crisis pointed to the destabilization and 
weakening of the diamond manufacturers, to the gradual distancing of 
the British from the industry, and to the enhanced intervention of the Zi-
onist institutions in the affairs of the industry. Now it was the presence 
of the Histadrut that had been invigorated, transforming its traditionally 
feeble status in the diamond industry into a power to be reckoned with. 
In a moment we shall see how this change was refl ected in the role the 
Histadrut came to play in the negotiations with the PDMA and the Jewish 
Agency over the crisis. However, it must be fi rst contextualized in three 
linked developments.29
The fi rst took place on the international level. It was part of the efforts 
made in Belgium to get the diamond industry going again and regain its 
prewar world hegemony that union leaders of the diamond workers in 
Antwerp attempted to invigorate the regulation of international competi-
tion between the cutting centers. In early September 1946 the Universal 
Alliance of Diamond Workers (UADW) organized a conference in Ant-
werp in which representatives from various diamond-cutting and -trad-
ing centers participated, including a delegation from Palestine. “We must 
guard against one thing,” claimed Piet van Muyden, the chairman of the 
alliance, “not to consider each other as competitors. The old centers wish 
to reestablish again and take back what they have lost under so cruel cir-
cumstances; the new centers also wish to hold to their own. A broad un-
derstanding of each other’s different viewpoints is necessary, although 
these differences need not exclude a close cooperation.” Palestine’s par-
ticipation in the scheme was imperative in the eyes of these union activists 
(who represented three times more diamond workers than the unions in 
Palestine) because of the world position the Palestine cutters acquired, 
and the dominance of Jews in the various diamond diasporas. Further-
more, the UADW had for long supported the concentration of union ac-
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tion in the Palestine diamond industry under the aegis of the Histadrut 
and Pinchas Smagarinsky, the secretary of the Histarut’s DWO. Union 
splintering in Palestine seemed to the Belgians unclear and pathological, 
a real disruption of concerted international action and an obstacle to in-
ternational regulation of work hours and wages. Aware of this support, 
the Histadrut was more than willing to cooperate with the UADW and 
thereby present itself to the PDMA and to the Jewish Agency as a power 
to be reckoned with.30
The Histadrut perceived international activity as a fi tting stage for tak-
ing the lead among the unions in the industry in Palestine itself. Though 
in the previous two years it had succeeded in slightly increasing the num-
ber of diamond workers affi liated to the Histadrut union, it could not 
weaken the right-wing union whose members were affi liated to the Re-
visionists, or the unorganized, the workers who were loosely represented 
by the various independent groupings. The contrast between the strength 
of the Histadrut among Jewish industrial workers in the Yishuv in general 
and in diamond cutting, or between the Histadrut supremacy in “red” 
Haifa and liberal and more Revisionist Netanya and Tel Aviv, continued 
to worry the leaders of Histadrut. These contrasts refl ected, however, a 
thornier problem with which Mapai and the Histadrut were preoccupied 
at the time, namely, their weakened infl uence over better-off and strong 
workers. Spreading the infl uence of the Histadrut among diamond cut-
ters—a long-standing cause of labor activists in Palestine’s industrializing 
towns—was imperative. Politically it would help to curtail the bases of 
the Right among the workers. From an economic and social perspective it 
would expand the tax-paying ranks of the Histadrut and at the same time 
set a challenge to private capital.31
If the Histadrut was unable to achieve union unity under its leader-
ship in Palestine, perhaps it could do so in Antwerp. To achieve that end 
the Histadrut delegation joined hands with the secretariat of the Antwerp 
conference in rejecting a splintered delegation and in gaining recognition 
(naturally without the consent of the other Palestine unions) as the only 
legitimate representative of Palestine. In return the Histadrut seconded 
the resolutions of the conference drawn by the Belgians. On their face the 
resolutions aspired for international cooperation among diamond work-
ers and unions, for controlling the admission of new apprentices to the 
industry (in order to prevent unemployment), and for leveling hours of 
work and wages so as to prevent competition. The resolutions even called 
diamond manufacturers and merchants and the Diamond Syndicate itself 
to prevent the revival of the German cutting industry and refrain from 
trading with German manufacturers who did return to business in the 
American zone of occupied Germany (with no little help from the Ameri-
cans themselves). However, the resolutions refrained from formally pro-
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claiming the right of the Palestine center to be considered a legitimate heir 
to the prewar industry in Germany. The demand was aired by the other 
union representatives who came from Palestine and was based on the 
moral grounds that in inheriting the Germans’, the diamond industry in 
Palestine was not only refraining from competition with the Belgians but 
also participating in Germany’s deindustrialization and demilitarization. 
That the Histadrut shied away from promoting the issue and at the same 
time agreed to limit the addition of apprentices was considered by NWF 
and the minority unions to be a betrayal of the Zionist cause and a means 
to achieve, with the help of the Belgians, hegemony in representing the 
diamond workers in Palestine itself.32
Though transferring the struggle over union power away from Pales-
tine was of little consequence, the affair provided the Histadrut activists 
with the growing confi dence that in international circles and at the PDMA, 
and obviously in the eyes of the Jewish Agency, it was now considered the 
leading power among the workers. This was signifi cant for the Histadrut 
because after the congress and with the peaking of the crisis, relations 
between the Histadrut and NWF, the two main unions in the diamond in-
dustry, deteriorated. The dramatic contraction of the diamond labor force 
in the factories during the peak of the crisis in winter 1947 and the fl our-
ishing of the black market in diamonds and of domestic diamond cutting 
hit the unions and the contacts between them hard. In the eyes of many 
diamond workers, the economic downturn exposed the incapacity of the 
unions to cater for their needs, and the culture of collective bargaining 
that was reproduced every year seemed futile. However, it was exactly 
the peaking of the crisis that impacted another change in the power of the 
Histadrut in the industry.33
The second development had largely to do with strike action. The prev-
alence of striking among the diamond workers had hardly been affected 
by Belgium’s recovery and the onset of deregulation. On the contrary, in 
1945–1946 the industry witnessed some of its fi ercest disputes over pay 
and working conditions and in particular over the demand that the manu-
facturers should not hoard uncut diamonds in their safes and should use 
to the full the reserves that were waiting to be cut and exported. 
Moreover, the month-old strike in the diamond factories in early 1946, 
which broke out because of the manufacturers’ procrastination in signing 
a new collective agreement (for 1946), demonstrated that the Histadrut 
could well orchestrate strikes in order to gain power at the workplaces. 
Such was also the case in the March 1946 strike of the clerks and manag-
ers who, with the help of the Histadrut and its affi liated clerks’ union, 
demanded that the PDMA formally recognize their organization and 
their entitlement for a collective agreement.34 The crisis, however, totally 
changed this picture. Some one hundred strikes were recorded in Pales-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Crisis and Restructuring   |   223
tine in 1946, sixteen of which took place in the diamond industry. In Janu-
ary–September 1947 the number of strikes in Palestine was almost halved, 
and those in diamonds were reduced to three. The respective number of 
strikers in the diamond industry (above fi ve thousand in 1946 and little 
more than three hundred in the following year) illustrates the depth of the 
change.35
The decrease in the number of strikes in the industry and their inten-
sity (average work days lost per striker) was part of the larger impact of 
postwar political change and aggravating national confl ict on quelling 
industrial unrest in Palestine. However, in the diamond industry the de-
crease was much more dramatic because of the turbulent industrial rela-
tions from 1942 to 1945. Second, the crisis ruled out the use of labor strikes 
by the Histadrut as a means to mobilize the workers, organize them and 
advance their cause. On the contrary, its was the abating of strike action in 
the context of the harsh crisis that magnifi ed the role of the Histadrut in 
restraining the workers, brought it closer to the PDMA, and made work-
ers’ organization much more acceptable in the industry. When at the end 
of 1946 the Histadrut joined forces with the other four unions in establish-
ing a committee to fi ght the black market in diamond production, it was 
hailed by the PDMA (and by the Jewish Agency) as a signifi cant contribu-
tor to keeping the industry organized and safeguarding it from total an-
archy. Compared to its relatively feeble status during the war, that it was 
now to be considered a force that could improve the state of the industry 
on both the international and local arenas seemed to the activists of the 
Histadrut to be an epochal change.36
It was, however, the third change in the presence of the Histadrut in the 
diamond industry—namely, the establishment of cooperatives—that was 
the most profound. The Histadrut had for long been involved in urban 
workers’ cooperation, but in the diamond industry it had always been 
thought of as a futile venture. Among the thirty-three factories, only one 
cooperative of diamond cutters (the Bukhara diamonds) managed to en-
ter the ranks of the private owners and their organization in the PDMA. 
It was largely based on ethnic exclusion and a familial authority struc-
ture and it hardly associated itself with the Histadrut or the Labor move-
ment in general. The diamond manufacturers had for years succeeded in 
preventing the Histadrut from gaining power in the industry, in workers’ 
organization, and in infl uencing workers to consider economic coopera-
tion. The capital needed to start a cutting business was too great for even 
the most skilled of workers. Creating a leveled structure of production 
and pay in this skill-specifi c industry had always been problematic, and 
the equal sharing of profi t had always been a diffi cult task to calculate. 
The piecework system and workers’ relatively high incomes were overly 
infl uential barriers.37
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The change came in summer 1946. The liberalization of controls enabled 
various forces to join the industry, and those in charge of the economic 
wing of the Histadrut began to consider the option. The involvement of 
the Histadrut in an internal arbitration over splitting of ownership at the 
Bukhara cooperative further encouraged the Histadrut to join in, fi rst as 
a partial owner in the Bukhara cooperative itself and from January 1947 
also in others. In the fi nal analysis the latter was made possible by the 
crisis itself, the bankruptcies it provoked, and the fl urry of factory-owner-
ship changes. When the crisis peaked in winter 1947 and factories’ owners 
were desperately looking for a fi nancial outlet, the Histadrut’s holding 
company (Hevrat Haovdim jointly with AMPAL) turned into a key buyer 
of shares of factories. Through these purchases workers of the same fac-
tories turned into co-owners, in some cases with their former owners and 
employers. By the spring of 1947 the six diamond cooperatives (and their 
three hundred workers) constituted a fi fth of the factories—“a healthy 
capitalist-laborer element,” in the words of Oved Ben-Ami.38
The Histadrut-backed initiative in establishing cooperatives in di-
amond cutting (see appendix table A.7) was part of a wider wave of a 
revival of urban producing cooperatives in the Jewish economic sector 
during 1946–1947. Refl ecting a postwar downturn, collective initiatives by 
Jewish ex-servicemen, and an attempt by the economic institutions of the 
Jewish Labor movement to widen its activities in the private sector, the 
wave well exploited the crisis in the diamond industry. In reproducing 
an earlier cooperative experimentation in Jewish manufacturing two de-
cades earlier, the diamond cooperatives were practically a labor response 
to a capitalist crisis. In fact it was a return to the presence of the Histadrut 
during two earlier economic crises that took place in Palestine in the late 
1910s and in the mid-1920s. A severe down-turn of private capital and of 
privately owned industrial ventures brought about a fervent cooperative 
activity by organized Labor, mainly in Tel Aviv and Haifa. In reproducing 
the pattern, the cooperation in diamonds refl ected a from-below pressure 
of diamond workers asking to avoid the unemployment and occupational 
retraining that the crisis ominously eventuated. However, it also refl ected 
the attempt of the Histadrut to fi nally show its presence and power in an 
industry that consistently hampered its hegemony among the factories 
and the workers. This was also the basis for the Histadrut’s insistent claim 
that in resolving the crisis and in the postcrisis reorganization of the in-
dustry diamond circles in Palestine and abroad should take its voice into 
consideration.39
The peak of the crisis was refl ected fi rst and foremost in a ten-week 
shutdown of the factories and the collapse of the entire system that factory 
life encapsulated: training new workers, purchasing the rough stones, cut-
ting diamonds, exporting the polished products, and paying the syndi-
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cate, the experts, the clerks, and the workers. During these long weeks, 
adjacent manufacturers and suppliers (machinery, technical support, and 
the like) suffered as well. Shops that relied on the consumption of the dia-
mond workers, in Netanya in particular, reported declining sales, and the 
silence of the factories was equally refl ected in the many workers moving 
out of the town. The ordinary communication with the brokers and the 
syndicate in London was totally destabilized and the export to the US 
dried up.40
At the same time, however, the diamond industry hardly ceased func-
tioning. During these three months the informal industry in homes and 
makeshift spaces boomed. Manufacturers, experts, and skilled workers 
informally employed many workers in what was known at the time as 
‘Mulot Shchorot’ (black cutting tables), and the latter complemented their 
domestic operations with odd jobs. The black diamond market—in par-
ticular in Tel Aviv, where a noninstitutional diamond industry was more 
likely to spread than in Netanya, turned into a surrogate network to the 
diamond factory system.41
The collapse of factory life and the concomitant “informalization” of 
the industry quickly led to the breakdown of ordinary relations between 
capital and labor. The manufacturers were forced to cut labor costs, and 
once they realized the resilience of the diamond workers’ unions they in-
creasingly turned to home work and low-pay cutting. The unions and the 
Histadrut in particular could not ignore the “black industry” because it 
came to replace factory production and because so many workers were 
now in this no-man’s-land between organizational affi liation and unor-
ganized work. Pay levels were now set more outside the factories and 
outside the negotiation rooms and more on the streets and at the home 
production sites. The culture of collective bargaining and the ordinary ex-
pectation for collective agreements simply withered away. The splintering 
of union representation during the war gave way to the fragmentation of 
the labor force who faced now many more employers and would-be em-
ployers—themselves former work managers or skilled workers. In these 
conditions the reserves of uncut diamonds in the hands of the diamond 
manufacturers were emptying dramatically, and their capacity to pay for 
orders, to employ, and to pay wages decreased. Moreover, the govern-
ment, fully committed to deregulation of the industry, persisted in provid-
ing licenses to new owners and manufacturers, which in turn produced 
competition over resources. Consequently three distinct systems came 
under threat. One was the manufacturers’ monopoly—their cooperation 
in purchase, production, and export and their dependence on each other 
for information, labor exchange, and cost regulation. The second was the 
collectivity created by the merely spatial concentration of the workers in 
the factories that was now giving place to a fragmented home-based and 
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even street-based manufacturing and trading. The third was the system 
of relations between the PDMA and the unions that, as much as it har-
bored confl ict and adversarial positions, grew since the establishment of 
the industry into normalized and accepted routes of communication and 
confl ict resolution.42
The positions the two sides presented to the committee that the Jewish 
Agency established to resolve the crisis were fi ttingly wide apart.43 The 
Histadrut was now the leading force among the unions and perceived by 
all as the main representative of the organized diamond workers. It wished 
to restructure the industry in such a way that the share of the workers in 
the industry’s profi ts would expand. It wanted to base the industry on 
collective bargaining (including a stable machinery to secure cost-of-liv-
ing allowances). At the same time collective bargaining would give the 
Histadrut what it really aspired to—majority among the unions. More 
specifi cally it demanded that the manufacturers resume the operation of 
the factories, pay for idle days, and compensate the unemployed. Finally, 
it wished to see that the diamond cooperatives that operated under its 
auspices became equal members in the manufacturers’ organization.44
The PDMA was in graver trouble. It could not vie for its members’ debts 
to the Diamond Syndicate, nor could it commit itself to paying the workers, 
compensating the unemployed, or signing a collective agreement with the 
unions that would be impossible to fulfi ll fi nancially. The comparatively 
lower labor costs of the Belgian diamond manufacturers hardly made it 
worth their while to resume production. The PDMA wanted the industry 
to be organized again, and while it reluctantly accepted (and temporarily 
even encouraged) the informal industry, it also wanted to revive its mo-
nopoly powers. In the perception of the PDMA’s leadership, for its mem-
bers to be able to pay the debts to the syndicate, to replenish their rough 
diamond reserves, and to restart the operation of the factories so as to be 
competitive to Antwerp, the workers and their unions must alter their de-
mands for pay, compensation, and equal membership.45
The sides were far apart, claimed the committee. 
Any attempt to decrease the labor wage to such a degree that this reduction 
could balance most of the other negative factors would bring wages to such a 
level that would not allow the workers to pursue working in the industry. . . 
. Those among the manufacturers that have thought that they could solve the 
crisis in the market by lowering working conditions would certainly be disap-
pointed. Those among the workers that have thought that the industry could 
go on without a fundamental change in the conditions created during the boom 
period and without taking out from the occupation those who had not the ca-
pacity to work with rational productivity—they too would be disappointed. 
In these circumstances we fi nd the reason for which the two sides have not 
found the way to reach an agreement. The manufacturers have the exaggerated 
tendency to seek salvation in mere changes in working conditions. The work-
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ers, apparently, do not recognize yet the full gravity of the crisis and its drastic 
consequences.46
In these adversarial circumstances, themselves aggravated by the strain-
ing political relations between the British and the Yishuv, the dependence 
of capital and labor on the Jewish Agency increased. The government was 
still formally the controller of the industry and the Jewish Agency could 
do little to control the manufacturers and the veering of many of them to 
informal operation and domestic production. Though the Yishuv had po-
litical authority, it equally had little power to infl uence the black market, 
the home industry, and the hub of cutting and trading activities that went 
on in private and surreptitious spaces. What the Jewish Agency could do 
was to framework the problems of the industry within the Zionist system. 
That is, it could provide a variety of backings to the manufacturers and the 
workers from Zionist and Yishuv resources and thus socialize the industry 
further in the Zionist national economy.47
These resources were much more infl uential than any of the failed at-
tempts at mediation. Indeed, the resolutions the Jewish Agency Commit-
tee recommended in February 1947 were hard to digest, and it is no won-
der it took many days of deliberation and winding negotiation to thaw the 
stalemate. The two sides were called to make sacrifi ces in order to rehabili-
tate the industry and to be aware of the fact that the industry could not be 
the same as before. The conclusions called for immediate resumption of 
work and compensation for workers for their losses during the shutdown 
and signifi cantly favored some of the manufacturers’ demands, such the 
annulment of all social benefi ts and the freedom given to the manufactur-
ers to dismiss workers without prior consent from the unions. At the same 
time the conclusions dealt a severe blow to the workers—a recommended 
reduction of 25 percent wages compared to 1946, the annulment of unem-
ployment compensation by the employers, and a drastic reduction in pay, 
in particular for the less skilled who were essentially asked to leave the 
industry.48 Consequently both the PDMA and the Histadrut rejected the 
resolutions—the former for fear of fi nancial loss and the latter for sacrifi c-
ing so many workers and the threat on the cooperatives it backed. Both 
wanted work to resume but the terms the committee set were in the fi nal 
calculation too costly.49
The turning point resulted, as usual in the diamond industry, from in-
tertwined exogenous and local pressures. Following the decision of the 
government in February 1947 to turn the mandate of Palestine over to the 
United Nations, the British institutionalized military rule and employed 
occasional curfews. The military pressure brought the sides closer behind 
a national resolution on the confl ict and thus softened their opposition to 
the recommendations of the Jewish Agency committee. Second, prices for 
polished stones in the US reached low levels, and the only way the dia-
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mond manufacturers in Palestine could resume operation seemed to be 
the reaching some sort of a nationally backed modus vivendi with labor. 
Third, and crucially, the syndicate kept on refusing Palestine (since Janu-
ary) the supply of rough diamonds without the payment of the manufac-
turers’ debts. Relations with the syndicate were alarmingly strained now 
because of expanding purchases by Palestine diamond manufacturers 
from non–Diamond Syndicate and much cheaper sources.
Table 7.2 Imports of rough diamonds to Palestine, January–March 1947
Sources In carats In pounds sterling
DTC (purchased by PDMA) 12,055  94,317
Outside DTC 22,127 104,230
USA  3,995  26,639
UK 13, 735  71,392
 South Africa  4,094  4,002
 British Guiana  303  2,197
Source: PDMA, Activities of Palestine Diamond Industry, January to March 1947, submitted 
9 July 1947, NCA, G/85/572.
The change of sources meant primarily that most of the rough diamonds 
would be absorbed in the home industry, thus further weakening the orig-
inal factory system. However, it also widened the split between solvent 
manufacturers who sought a separate arrangement with the syndicate 
and those still in debt and who relied more on other cheaper sources. In 
such circumstances of political pressures, grave supply problems, and an 
inner PDMA split, the Jewish Agency appeared as an essential savior.50
Advised by Albert Ehrenfeld, the general manager of the Palestine Cor-
poration, the Jewish Agency took two steps. First it allocated the industry 
half a million dollars from Zionist funds. Second, it guaranteed loans to be 
made to the industry by the Anglo-Palestine Bank and the Palestine Cor-
poration. The sources aimed to help the manufacturers to buy diamonds 
on the free market (non–Diamond Syndicate sources) and for the PDMA 
to pay the debts to the syndicate. If the Histadrut was now more confi dent 
in its attempt to expand its cooperative holdings in the diamond industry, 
the PDMA was now freer in its dealings at the syndicate and in obtain-
ing raw materials. The arrangement allowed the PDMA and the unions 
to agree on resuming work on the basis of individual factory-based agree-
ments, and towards the end of March the syndicate renewed supplies. 
Though this reawakening of the industry was partial, the atmosphere of 
despair began giving way to guarded optimism. Tied now to the udders 
of Zionist public resources, the industry was gradually led out of the crisis 
and made able to rebuild its competitive capacity versus Antwerp.51
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In providing fi nancial backing, in the mediation it offered, and in its im-
pact on the Histadrut to allow rapprochement with the PDMA, the Jewish 
Agency served therefore as a surrogate to the British. It began replacing 
the withdrawing authority of the government and fi lling in the institu-
tional gap that would soon characterize a wider bureaucratic area in the 
post-Mandate period. Notwithstanding the crisis in the industry, a new 
set of relations was now being established that totally transformed what 
in the early war period was an institutional and cultural enmity between 
the diamond industry and Zionist institutions.52
Indeed, the withdrawal of the British from the industry was becoming 
evident already at the end of winter 1947. In mid-March Mathias strongly 
recommended overcoming problems of overproduction and low prices by 
aiding the industries in the Low Countries and curtailing those in other 
centers, especially Palestine. The policy was adopted by the Colonial Of-
fi ce in May, and also affected the managers at the syndicate who were 
enraged by the increasing acquisition of Palestine manufacturers and mer-
chants from non–Diamond Syndicate sources. The partial recovery of the 
industry in the late spring was negatively affected by British emergency 
laws and curfews.53
In summer 1947 the diamond industry further deteriorated for reasons 
not directly related with business or labor. Following the spread of Zionist 
anti-British operations and the widespread arrests the British conducted 
at the end of June, the violence reached its peak. In mid-July the Irgun 
(IZL) underground captured two British sergeants. Two days later on 14 
July, Netanya was put under martial law, which curtailed all efforts to 
bring supplies of rough diamonds to polishing in the town. Meanwhile 
the robberies of diamond factories and dealers by the Irgun continued. A 
few days later the bodies of the two hanged sergeants were found near a 
deserted diamond factory in Netanya (Feldman’s). On 5 August Ben-Ami 
was arrested with thirty-fi ve other Zionist leaders, and the entire network 
of relations was paralyzed.
Ben-Ami’s arrest completely collapsed the complex web of relations 
that he and Walsh had woven since the early 1940s. Ben-Ami’s admiration 
of the British, their appreciation of his war service, and the close relation-
ships developed between him, Hennig and Co. and De Beers were now in 
grave crisis. In a letter from the Latrun detention camp (near Jerusalem) 
where he was held, Ben-Ami compared his arrest with his father’s in Petah 
Tikva by the Turkish police some thirty years earlier for supporting the 
British effort to free Palestine of the Ottoman yoke. It was another symbol 
of the British retreat from Palestine but a crucial one because it marked the 
dissociation of the imperial power from the local circles of private capital 
that served it so well.54
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Indeed, the government washed its hands of the tribulations of the 
manufacturers and workers. In July 1947, with the diamond industry al-
ready in deep crisis, the British boasted to the UN special commission on 
Palestine on the latter’s economic growth during the war and the par-
ticular role of the diamond industry in the export spurt. Emphasizing its 
nature as an “All-Jewish industry” that had replaced Palestine citrus fruits 
as “the country’s most valuable export,” the government thus affi rmed its 
role in shaping the advance of the local diamond industry and its ethnic 
specifi city—but also hid its part in the industry’s crisis. It was perhaps 
the latter that helped transform the language of imperial service that was 
current in the diamond industry of the early war years into anti-British 
sentiment.55
Freed in October 1947 from his incarceration by the British authori-
ties Ben-Ami, the founder and president of the diamond manufactur-
ers’ association, saw an industry in a state of disarray. Just as the British, 
nearing withdrawal, placed Palestine betwixt and between, so was the 
diamond industry in late 1947 between recovery from its grave down-
turn and a looming civil war between Palestine’s Arabs and Jews. The 
diamond manufacturers were now distanced from the uncompetitive and 
protective environment created by the conditions of the war. And their 
experiences in fi nancial instability and bankruptcy caused some to leave 
diamond production or Palestine altogether. Some returned to Belgium; 
some found their way to New York or South America where they more 
often than not changed from cutting and polishing to dealing and trading. 
The opposite direction was no less populated. Some diamond people who 
survived the Holocaust asked to become absorbed in Palestine in the occu-
pational world that was shattered in 1940 with their families and homes in 
Amsterdam and Antwerp. Others from Rio de Janeiro, Havana, London, 
and New York wished to be part of the Zionist project. The ranks of the 
local diamond industry were, however, still dwindling and soon the 1948 
war would further depopulate them through mass mobilization. From his 
seat at the Netanya Municipality, Mayor Ben-Ami could do nothing but 
sense the great contrast between the intensive times of the industry’s take-
off in 1941–1945, “the fat years” in his expression, and its pale state in 
1947–1948.56
.
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Illustration 7.1. Workers at Yahalomei Zfat diamond cooperative in Safed, 1949. Source: 
CZA/PHKH/1280083. Used with permission of the Central Zionist Archive..
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 




Further deterioration in the situation of the world diamond markets is 
recently felt, in particular in the United States of America. . . . The com-
petition lowers diamond prices. . . . The development of the diamond in-
dustry in Germany is renewed, and with lower wages. . . . The producer 
in Israel is left with no profi t. . . . Considering that the industrialists suf-
fer these loses for already four months most of them would cease work 
if government assistance is not provided or the situation improves. In 
practice many enterprises would shut down but for their hope for gov-
ernment help. 
—Jacob van Amerongen, Record on the crisis in the diamond industry, 
8 March 1949, ISA/RG/48/90/23.
State of Transition
The effects of the crisis in the diamond industry accentuated its exposure 
and fragility. Fluctuations had always been an integral part of diamond 
production and trade long before the industry was founded in Palestine, 
and after the war they recurred with no less force. The downturn in Pal-
estine was therefore not an unknown fact for the manufacturers and ex-
perienced dealers, and perhaps their adaptability to the vagaries of the 
postwar period was a clear proof of this accustomed fact. Furthermore, the 
shifting map of cutting centers was also a historically recurring phenom-
enon. Antwerp surpassed Amsterdam largely following the First World 
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War. The German cutting industry knew well how to exploit the world 
depression of the 1930s to create a strong competitive center that threat-
ened to replace Antwerp. Palestine itself was a schemed alternative to the 
paralysis of the polishing centers of the Low Countries; and the centers in 
Havana, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose, Johannesburg and New York, could not 
have thrived without the war-provoked fl ight of Jewish refugees. Pales-
tine’s decline in 1947, which was strongly affected by the intersection of 
Belgium’s return to business and the enhanced role of diamond industries 
as national-economic assets, was part of these shifting gravity points of 
the preceding decades.1
Still scarred by the crisis, the industry now entered the transition phase 
from British Mandate rule to Jewish sovereignty in the state of Israel. The 
transition was fourfold. First was the state-like role assumed by the Jew-
ish Agency. Largely a military and an institutional process, it manifested 
itself in the role played by the agency and its departments of trade, in-
dustry, and labor in facilitating the diamond industry’s recovery from the 
crisis. Refl ecting the growing centrality of the Zionist institutions in the 
economic preparations of economic fi rms to the watershed political tran-
sition that was about to take place in 1948, the role of the Jewish Agency 
was based on direct economic assistance, on relaxing the tense relations 
between capital and labor, and on making the industry aware of the new 
government in charge.2
The second process was the British retreat that followed the UN resolu-
tion for the partition of Palestine in November 1947 and was completed in 
mid-May 1948. This process gave the transition immense geographic and 
political import. For the diamond industry, the retreat manifested itself 
in the exclusion of Palestine in February 1948 from the Sterling Bloc and 
in the institution of new government-like control. Moreover, the British 
departure harbored deep political and institutional implications for the 
population, the bureaucratic structures that regulated daily life and the ex-
pectations the Arab and Jewish communities were accustomed to from the 
colonial regime. For the diamond industry the impact was overwhelming. 
The industry had been born and reared by the British Mandate state, by 
the authorities in London (the CO, MEW and the like), and by particular 
regime-related personalities that weaved the network between the PDMA 
and De Beers. A series of thorny questions would be raised now, touching 
upon the policy of rough diamond supply, relations with Antwerp, local 
control, and government support of the private sector. The institutional 
vacuum that emerged already in summer 1947, and its supplanting by the 
new state in the course of 1948, was reminiscent of the previous and no 
less dramatic intervention of the Mandate in the daily operations of the 
diamond industry eight years earlier.3
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The third major aspect of the transition was the Arab-Israeli war that 
erupted in spring 1948 and ended with the armistice agreements between 
Israel and the Arab states in summer 1949. While the diamond industry 
emerged in 1939–1940 largely due to the war in Europe, now it became an 
integral part of a war that brought about dramatic human cost and institu-
tional change. The 1948 war prolonged the recovery of the industry from 
the crisis and at the same time embedded it, as it did the entire Jewish pri-
vate sector, in the Israeli state-building process. The fourth and fi nal aspect, 
the actual establishment of the state of Israel in May 1948 as a sovereign 
political entity, brought these processes to a climax. The emergence of the 
state was so cataclysmic demographically, politically, and economically 
that it took many years for the historiography of the transition period to 
acknowledge the tremendous impact and legacy of British Mandate rule. 
In 1940 the British government bureaucracy and military forces in Pales-
tine transformed the institutional infrastructures of earlier Mandate rule. 
The handling of the diamond industry and its relations with the Diamond 
Syndicate, the MEW, and the Belgians was part of this transformation, and 
they were refl ected in particular novel forms of state intervention in civil 
society and in industry. In a sense the diamond industry was not just a 
“war-industry”; rather it was a state-capitalist sector, the two sides living 
off one another and developing mutually dependent relations. The state 
of Israel, with its emphasis on the need to fi nance the 1948 war and absorb 
Jewish immigrants through a “managed economy,” marked a direct con-
tinuity in this reciprocity and gave the involvement in the recuperation of 
the diamond industry new dimensions.4
Shaping this intervention, and practically coloring the entire system of 
relations between the state and the industry, was the contrast between 
world trends in the diamond industry and local performance. The two fac-
tors on which the diamond operation in Palestine depended—the steady 
Diamond Syndicate sales of rough diamonds and the demand in the US 
for fi nished stones—seemed at the end of the decade to provide a favor-
able climate for the expansion of the local cutting centers. Between 1947 
and 1951 DTC sales doubled, and, in particular, the sales of rough stones 
for jewelry diamonds rose at the expense of industrial diamonds. More-
over, diamond imports from the syndicate to the US resumed their war-
time levels—from $64.2 million in 1945 to $118 million in 1946, declining 
only in 1947 to $43.5 million.5
In clear contrast to these favorable conditions the diamond industry in 
Palestine (and Israel from 1948) found it hard to recover. The number of 
workers employed in the industry decreased dramatically, and its share 
in the overall polished diamonds imports to the US declined from 27.5 
percent on the year World War II ended, to less than half of that share at 
the turn of the decade. Evidently, the recuperation of the Belgian diamond 
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industry accentuated the contrast. From accounting for less than a third of 
the imports of fi nished diamonds to the US in 1945 the Belgian industry 
climbed in the early 1950s to half, leaving Israel behind with only half of 
that Belgian share. 
Table 8.1 Imports to the US of polished diamonds, 1945–1951 
Sources: Albert Ehrenfeld, “Israel Diamond Industry,” Israel Economist Annual—1952 
(Jerusalem, 1953), 138; Albert Ehrenfeld, “Israel Diamond Industry in 1953 and 1954,” Israel 
Economist Annual—1954 (Jerusalem, 1955), 111–13; “The Diamond Industry,” in Israel’s 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Israel’s Industrial Future: Outlook 1960–1965 (Jerusalem, 
1965), 228–32; Hayahalom 154 (June 1988): 62.
Figure 8.1 Share of imports of polished diamonds into the US from Belgium and 
Palestine/Israel 1945–1951 
Sources: Albert Ehrenfeld, “Israel Diamond Industry” Israel Economist Annual—1952 
(Jerusalem, 1953), 138; Albert Ehrenfeld, “Israel Diamond Industry in 1953 and 1954,” Israel 
Economist Annual—1954 (Jerusalem, 1955), 111–13; “The Diamond Industry,” in Israel’s 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Israel’s Industrial Future: Outlook 1960–1965 (Jerusalem, 
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1945  64,185 14,621  520 17,685 27.5 170 4,100
1946 117,968 51,150 7,724 24,972 21.2 195 5,000
1947  53,472 30,368 3,743  4,298  8.1 154 2,000
1948  56,245 31,476 5,110  4,139  7.3 145  800
1949  41,428 19,582 3,202  5,402 13.0 124 1,000
1951  58,525 29,115 4,845  6,834 11.7 119 2,200
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The contrast was obviously a refl ection of the lingering effects of the cri-
sis.6 The prolonged stoppage of factory production and the related growth 
of home production harmed the quality of polished diamonds and the 
reputation of the industry among dealers and merchants in New York. 
The concurrent contraction of the workforce in Palestine, and expansion 
of that in Antwerp, added to the decline in reputation. The superior capac-
ity of Belgian manufacturers to obtain rough diamonds from the syndicate 
(but also in lower prices from the US) was indicative of the effects of the 
crisis on previous marketing advantages that Palestine enjoyed during the 
war and immediately after.7 Moreover, the ability of the manufacturers to 
pay for their orders of rough diamonds improved a little in the latter part 
of 1947 but not enough to regain the trust of the brokers and the syndicate 
in London. The fi nancial guarantees the PDMA was forced to promise the 
manufacturers in order to balance the growing mistrust heightened ten-
sion among the members of the organization, and between the PDMA and 
the banks that were its sources of credit. The diamond cooperatives, par-
tially replacing the private factories during the downturn, could hardly 
expand their production and bear the increasing insurance costs.
The reestablishment of Antwerp as a center for sales and gathering of 
foreign buyers stressed the physical injuries the crisis caused. India was 
Palestine’s main alternative outlet to market its produce (other than the 
American one that the Belgians controlled); but it was caught in a civil 
war that hampered import of polished diamonds. The closure of the In-
dian market to Palestine diamonds from early July 1947 resulted in a sub-
stantial defi cit in Palestine’s balance of trade.8 As the Belgian industry en-
joyed more favorable exchange rates of foreign currency than Palestine, 
the competition with Antwerp was indeed fi erce. Compared to Palestine 
the Belgians could lower wages, save more on labor costs, and press the 
syndicate more successfully to favor Antwerp over other cutting centers. 
Moreover, world competition would include now also the diamond-cut-
ting industry in Germany, which reemerged after the war (with the aid of 
the Americans) and, albeit more modestly, of the Dutch industry as well. 
In this competition the role of the Diamond Syndicate was crucial. Wish-
ing to secure the diamonds mined in the Belgian Congo, it favored the 
industry in Antwerp and thus narrowed down signifi cantly the supplies 
to other centers. These advantages were also used in blatant attempts to 
attract refugees to return to Belgium. The picture was therefore reversed: 
Palestine diamond cutting could take off in the early 1940s because of An-
twerp’s paralysis, and now, with the Belgian diamond industry dynami-
cally recuperating, it had to face again limitations similar to those set by 
the Belgian hegemony in the 1930s.9
Adding to the fragility of the industry was the fact that the PDMA itself 
was still recovering from the organizational blow it suffered during the 
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crisis and from Ben-Ami’s internment. Many in the industry sensed this 
leadership crisis and its consequent effects on the position of Palestine in 
the politics of supply in London and on Ben-Ami’s ability to pull the old 
strings. It was perhaps one of the long-term impacts of the crisis that, de-
spite the resilience and solidarity cultivated among the diamond owners 
and manufacturers during the happier times of boom and world success, 
they were now overshadowed by distrust and organizational limpness 
that would heal only years later.10
The political and military upheaval from late 1947 to summer 1948 and 
the economic disruption it wrought on the country accentuated the linger-
ing effects of the crisis and added new ones. The disruption of air com-
munications slowed down the supply of rough diamonds. Manufacturers, 
workers, and dealers alike were mobilized, and those that maintained the 
operation of the factories knew well that, unlike the war that gave birth 
to their industry, this one was not conducive to production and export of 
luxury items. For the diamond industry it meant fi rst of all partial loss of 
communication with the world outside Palestine and with the syndicate. 
The disconnection of Palestine from the Sterling Bloc in February 1948 
threatened to have serious consequences on negotiations over the supply 
of rough diamonds, on trade and consequently on profi tability. Moreover, 
rough diamonds, which were supplied in meager quantities since early 
March 1948, could not reach Palestine regularly, and the export of the 
polished stones that depended on the Clipper airplanes was destabilized 
after the takeover by the Jordanian Legion in June of the Lydda airport. 
Insurance companies were more reluctant to cooperate with the industry 
or virtually became unbearable for the individual manufacturers and mer-
chants. It was for these reasons that more than half of the rough diamonds 
the industry in Palestine obtained during this period came from informal 
(non–Diamond Syndicate) and illegal sources.11
Institutional uncertainty was no less destabilizing. The communication 
between the industry and the British government was disturbed and the 
control over imports and exports almost collapsed. The manufacturers 
feared that the retreat of the government would cut off the import of sup-
plies, and the political vacuum seemed to the syndicate in London to be 
a potential menace. The industry already had its established sightholders 
on whom it could count to receive the rough stones from the Diamond 
Trading Company in London. But the retreat from the Mandate seemed to 
harm the enormous help the diamond industry received from the British 
in the struggle for supplies, in exerting pressures on De Beers, and in as-
suaging the Belgians. Unsurprisingly the diamond manufacturers would 
now do their utmost to secure the interest in and attention of the Jewish 
Agency to the role of the industry in building the state. Not many years 
back, the Zionist institutions worked relentlessly to infl uence the industry 
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and delegitimize its robust assertion for institutional and economic inde-
pendence. Now the two sides would join together in a concerted effort, 
and strongly nationally motivated, to reproduce the state-capital relations 
shaped earlier with the British.12
The breakout of the 1948 war in May brought further aggravation. The 
war engulfed the urban areas where the diamond industry was located. 
The syndicate stopped sending supplies and 1,200 of the 2,000 workers 
employed in the factories (apart from 800–1,000 in the home industry) 
were called up for military service. The remaining 800 remained confi ned 
in the thirty factories under a special arrangement granted by the defense 
authorities so as to keep exports going. But because of the suspension of 
postal services and malfunctioning of government departments, all mar-
keting and export was disorganized, probably allowing for more chaotic 
business. Most of the exports during the fi rst months of the war found 
their way out by private arrangements. Consequently the value of im-
port of rough diamonds between July 1947 and July 1948 (LP 2.5 millions) 
was three times higher than the value of export of polished stones (LP 0.7 
Millions).13
The trend was accentuated in autumn 1948 by the decision of the syndi-
cate, clearly provoked by the Belgians, to further cut down rough supply 
to Israel, and by the insistent demand at the syndicate that the industry 
should pay for its orders in hard currency. Another fall in demand for pol-
ished diamonds in the US at the end of the year caused a further decrease 
in prices and accumulation of stocks at the hands of American import-
ers. The competition from the German diamond industry in the American 
zone intensifi ed, largely resulting from low costs paid on labor and from 
the willingness of British and Dutch diamond dealers to send Germany 
their rough diamonds for cutting and polishing. Unfavorable exchange 
rates between the Israeli Lira (LP) and the American dollar were infl u-
ential too, as well as the expectations of American buyers that polished 
stones could be now obtained much more cheaply in Germany and in 
Belgium than in Palestine.14
By the end of the 1948 war the industry was still only a fi fth of its size 
at its peak in 1945–1946, the gain it accrued from exports was small, and 
overall salaries paid to workers averaged 40 percent lower.15 The accumu-
lating effects of the crisis, Belgian competition, the war, and the supply 
policy of the syndicate signifi cantly limited the capacity of the industry to 
take off again and further splintered the veteran factories into small-size 
undertakings and production units.
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Tel Aviv 18 2,657 66 1,060
Netanya 11 1,585 21 616
Jerusalem 2 350 7 102
Ramat Gan 1 * 4 24
Petah Tikva 3 19
Bnei Brak 1 * 1 7
The Negev 1 18
Total 33 4,592 103 1,846
Notes: * included in Tel Aviv 
The 1,846 workers in 1951 were divided into sixty factories with 486 employed, thirty-fi ve 
with 934 and eight employed 426. This was a signifi cant reduction in fi rm size compared 
with an average of 139 workers per factory in 1946. 
Sources: Minutes of the fi rst meeting of the central committee of the National Organization 
of Diamond Workers, 9 December 1946, LA/IV-208–1-4551; The 1952 Israel’s Industrial 
Census as summarized in Yaakov Arnon, “The Diamond Industry,” Haaretz, 8 June 1955.
The diamond industry was a “war baby” as many defi ned it, it was 
used to disruption, and its adaptability was renowned. Moreover, political 
uncertainty and Belgian competition that narrowed down supplies may 
have kept alive a black market, and even increased demand for locally 
marketed diamonds as an infl ationary hedge. However, as restructuring 
of the factories demonstrated, the protracted recovery from the crisis and 
the 1948 war virtually brought its transformation.16 
The Pact
It was against this background of war, political change, and aggravating 
competition among diamond-producing centers over the American mar-
ket that a new pact emerged in spring 1948 between the state, the industry, 
and the workers. The rapprochement was already in the making upon 
the intervention of the Jewish Agency in the attempts to resolve the crisis. 
Following the British decision in spring 1947 to hand over the Palestine 
question to the UN and the arrest of Ben-Ami in the summer, the Jewish 
Agency intensifi ed its involvement. The decision on the partition of Pal-
estine and the beginning of military recruitment of workers following the 
spread of hostilities in early 1948 gave this institutional involvement its 
formal countenance.17 
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Let us fi rst look at the actors that took part in the process. In Febru-
ary 1948 the leaders of the Jewish Agency resolved to help the industry 
protect itself against increasing attacks on the factories by the LEHI un-
derground. In parallel it set up an advisory committee on diamond affairs 
aimed to resuscitate the industry and counter the Diamond Syndicate’s 
policy to stop sending supplies of rough diamonds to Palestine. Albert 
Ehrenfeld of the Palestine Corporation and the main advisor on diamonds 
to the British, the Jewish Agency, and the PDMA itself was appointed dia-
mond controller. Jacob van Amerongen (later Arnon), a central fi gure in 
the Dutch diamond industry and the Jewish community in Amsterdam, 
was nominated as Ehrenfeld’s deputy.18 In April 1948 the two established 
the Department of Diamond Control under Minhelet Haam, the “People’s 
Administration” that ran the affairs of the Yishuv on the eve of the estab-
lishment of the state of Israel.19 On the formal establishment of the state 
in May, diamond control was incorporated into the Department of Trade 
and Industry, headed by Peretz Bernstein,20 one of the central fi gures in 
Dutch liberal and Zionist politics and formerly the director of the Jewish 
Agency’s Economics Department. In addition an advisory committee on 
diamonds was established in the Ministry of Trade and Industry that prac-
tically replaced the British diamond control (the DCB). It was here that 
Minister Bernstein, the two diamond controllers, and the representatives 
of the industry, including Ben-Ami, convened to shape diamond policy. 
The move was further backed by the renewing the coordination between 
the PDMA and the association of Jewish industrialists (formerly the PMA). 
By the end of May 1948 the entire system of authorization of diamond im-
ports and exports and of the formal relations between the industry, the 
state, and the banks was institutionalized, and the State of Israel formally 
replaced the British in regulation of the industry.21
Bernstein, Ehrenfeld, and van Amerongen (Arnon) epitomized the state 
entity in the making. Bernstein was in charge of industrial policy in the 
transitional administration, while Ehrenfeld and van Amerongen handled 
the transfer of diamond control from the British to the new sovereign. The 
three knew each other well from prewar Amsterdam. Ehernefeld and Van 
Amerongen had deep backgrounds in diamonds and diamond banking 
and trade in the Low Countries, and they shared with Bernstein a mix 
of a liberal economic approach with a commitment to state building and 
to the need of a state-managed economy. Their recruitment refl ected the 
state’s mobilization of professionals who were not well versed in the trade 
but schooled in relations with state bureaucracies. Ehrenfeld worked in 
diamond control under the British authorities and from his pivotal posi-
tion in the Palestine Corporation he handled the credit policy of the bank-
ing system in 1940s Palestine vis-à-vis the diamond manufacturers and 
the PDMA. Van Amerongen was closely connected to the diamond world 
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through his family and the diamond fi rm he ran in Amsterdam in the 
1940s. A renowned economist and a prominent leader in the Dutch Zionist 
Movement, he seemed fi t to join Ehrenfeld in shaping the diamond-con-
trol policy of the new state while maintaining the continuity of the close 
association of the diamond industry with state authorities. Together they 
expounded the intertwining of industrial recovery, loyalty to occupational 
traditions, and state building and came to represent during the transition 
from Mandate to state the needs and interests of both the state and the 
private industrial sector: higher foreign-currency earning, absorption of 
occupationally focused Jewish immigrants, and transferring the industry 
from the  black market and home production back to formal production, 
the diamond factories, and untarnished trading.22
The second actor in shaping the pact was the industry itself. It was now 
a mixed composition of manufacturers, master craftsmen, and merchants. 
Many of the larger factories they were part of only few years ago that had 
many capital owners without prior background in diamonds had been re-
placed by small-sized factories that worked on a diversifi ed array of stones 
and thus were more professionally focused. The diamond manufacturers’ 
association and the Diamond Exchange (which included the Diamond 
Club) provided this contracted group with some cohesion. However, they 
mostly perceived themselves as less committed to organization as they 
had been in the early days of the PDMA monopoly. In the latter part of 
1949 the monopoly of the manufacturers’ association over the reception of 
supplies of rough diamonds from London ended following the recommen-
dation of the syndicate,23 and the establishment of a new manufacturers’ 
organization— the “Diamond Cutting Works Federation”—was in pro-
cess. Consequently, the transfer of the institutional power of the industry 
from Netanya to Tel Aviv was now completed, the latter town inhabiting 
in 1952 66 percent of the 103 factories and 70 percent of the 2,195 diamond 
workers. However, it also refl ected the decline of Ben-Ami’s power in late 
1949, in the wake of the ending of the monopoly and his resignation from 
the presidency of the diamond manufacturers’ association that followed 
in early 1950. The transformation largely refl ected the retreat of the Brit-
ish from Palestine and the concurrent cooperation of Eherenfeld and Van 
Amerongen in the state’s diamond control with the DTC in London on the 
one hand and with the Tel Aviv manufacturers on the other.24
If anything, what the diamond manufacturers had in common was 
their search—vented by the crisis, the British retreat, and the impact of 
the war—for the umbrella of the new state. Perceiving the new govern-
ment institutions as an expression of Jewish sovereignty and a successor 
to previous state-capital cooperation, they happily lent themselves and 
their capital to serving state building. Palestine’s expulsion from the Ster-
ling Bloc and the association of competition with Belgium with foreign af-
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fairs shaped their need for government backing. More crucially, the posi-
tive reception of independent Israel in diamond circles worldwide—at De 
Beers in London, among merchants in New York, among Jews in the Low 
Countries—was an essential lever for this private sector. Ben-Ami himself, 
so tightly entangled in relations with the British in land, municipal, and 
diamond affairs, wanted to see such continuity from the British protection 
to that of the state he so cherished, even though he may have been suspi-
cious of overintervention from the new diamond control. The opposition 
of some manufacturers to his authoritarian rule in the PDMA—composed 
as it was of the old opposition camp and the Histadrut-oriented coopera-
tives—was even a greater supporter of a pact with the state and with the 
approach that upheld a managed and national-oriented economy.25
As happened to other groups in Yishuv society, the 1948 Arab-Jewish 
war made the Zionism of the diamond manufacturers, workers, and mer-
chants more explicit and blatant. Earlier occupational and cultural aspects 
of that nationalism were refl ected in the felt presence in the diamond in-
dustry of Revisionists and the right-wing underground organizations, 
and of the liberal Zionism espoused by the leaders of the industry. The 
economic nationalism that was expressed in the competition with other 
diamond-cutting centers, the barring of Arabs from the industry that was 
greatly helped by the British, and the moral justifi cation to inherit the Ger-
man diamond industry were equally essential ingredients in this national 
vocabulary. The industry recruited itself to the war effort and contributed 
to it fi nancially. And in asking to exempt some of its workers it stressed 
the importance of keeping alive an industry that could gain hard currency 
and global trading connections for the Jewish polity. Hard hit by the crisis 
and the straining relations with the syndicate, the diamond manufactur-
ers were held now together not just by their occupational commonality 
but also by the state, the state’s backing of the industry, and the state-
building project to which the diamond manufacturers expressed their full 
commitment.26
The diamond workers were the weakest actor in the pact, though their 
participation was essential. One of the long-term effects of the crisis and 
the protracted recovery of the industry was the contraction in the size of 
the diamond factory. This was well refl ected by the increase in the number 
of diamond-cutting production units from 33–35 in 1940–1946 to 130 in 
1952. Caused by the fl ight of workers away from the occupation, workers 
moving to the informal market, and not least by the fi nancial demise of 
the industry, this sizing down was extremely infl uential. In splintering 
the workers into multiple workplaces, potential workers’ solidarity was 
hampered. Union representation was further decreased and consequently 
the propensity to embark on strike action weakened. By the late-1940s 
half of the diamond workers became to an increasing extent an incoherent 
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grouping. Some—in particular, cooperative members—were represented 
by the Histadrut-affi liated diamond workers union (the DWO, still led 
by Pinchas Smagarinsky) and they generally espoused solid support of 
state presence in the industry. Other workers who swarmed the informal, 
home-based diamond industry aspired to independence though they too 
sought the protection promised by the pact between the new state and the 
industry.27
 At the outbreak of the 1948 war the one thousand registered workers 
in the diamond industry was a mere fi fth of the labor force in the peak 
years of 1944–1946. A third of them, three hundred to four hundred 
strong, worked in the diamond cooperatives and the rest in the older fac-
tories that had survived the 1947 crisis. The number of the unregistered 
and unorganized was much higher, however, consisting of self-employed 
workers, casual workers employed by contractors who themselves were 
only recently diamond workers, and many others for whom cutting and 
polishing diamonds at home or at a makeshift establishment was a mere 
addition to other employment. This human landscape of the diamond in-
dustry was naturally the accumulated outcome of crisis and war, and its 
increasingly unorganized and unrecorded character was itself a symptom 
of the contrast with the boom years of the war period. The nature of the 
work done during these years was equally less clear. The transition from 
Sand to Melees was a long process, and the shrinking of large-sized work-
ing forces in the factories made the industry less focused on technological 
advancement and quality control.28
At the same time, however, the chaotic conditions in the industry al-
lowed the expert workers to freely develop independent reputations and 
maintain a level of production that would later allow them to expand and 
establish a new generation of experts and workers. Likewise, the postwar 
immigration of diamond cleavers and the focused project of the Jewish 
Agency to train cleavers so as to fi nd new venues for the diamond indus-
try allowed a new occupational tradition of diamond cleavage to establish 
in Israel during these years that had been absent before 1946. Despite their 
ordeal, the diamond workers in the late 1940s were still relatively well off. 
They might have worked less continuously, but the exemption of many 
among them from conscription (granted by the new state authorities) al-
lowed continuity in earnings, and the home industry provided them with 
substantial additional income.29 Cutting and polishing were still attractive 
occupations, and the reason why it took them few more years to expand 
had less to do with the material conditions of the workers and more with 
the limits of competitiveness and expansion that were set by international 
interests and forces.30
The strengthening of the presence of the Histadrut in the diamond in-
dustry in 1947, largely on the basis of the diamond cooperatives (25 percent 
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of PDMA membership), was far from an all-country success. In Netanya, 
the power center of Ben-Ami, only three cooperatives were established; 
and when the fourth was about to be established in winter 1948, with the 
active support of the Histadrut, the PDMA used all the means to thwart 
the plan. The PDMA was still aiming at delimiting the power of the His-
tadrut so as to prevent the recreation of an all-industry regime of collective 
bargaining.31 However, neither the diamond cooperatives that solidifi ed 
the Histadrut’s presence in the industry, nor even Mapai, the leading party 
of the Labor movement that was now running the government, could help 
organized labor strengthen its position in the industry in any signifi cant 
way. The effects of the crisis on the dispersion of the workers and on the 
employment arrangements of workers outside the factory workplace took 
their heavy toll. As the new state-capital pact was concocted between dia-
mond control and the PDMA, the notion of the competitive capacity of 
the diamond industry through wage restraint was greatly advanced. The 
voice of organized labor in the diamond industry seemed at the end of the 
decade to turn into nothing but a shadow of its presence during the mas-
sive strikes just a few years earlier.32
The complex of actors and subgroupings in the diamond industry reaf-
fi rmed the long-term effects of deregulation and the crisis. But it also ex-
plained why the industry became ever more dependent on state bureau-
cracy. Earlier in the decade it was the war that shaped this dependence of 
the diamond manufacturers and experts on the colonial power and on the 
cooperation of the government in London with the diamond cartel. To re-
vive itself, the industry had to again lean on economic and political power. 
Evidently the reciprocal agreement it struck now was reminiscent of the 
understandings and assumptions harbored in the wartime pact orches-
trated by the British, the PDMA, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare. 
British colonial rule asked to expand the industry and at the same time 
to limit its expansion. The state of Israel, seeking in the early 1950s to re-
cruit private capital to the national cause, would now undo this structural 
contrast by linking the support it gave to the industry’s expansion to state 
building and social formation.
First and foremost it was an economic pact. It was based on the prem-
ise of the economic leaders of the new state that the diamond industry 
was to serve as the chief source of hard currency and therefore had to 
be inspected but also developed. To be urgently assisted diamond con-
trol was therefore quickly organized. The licensing of diamond importers 
and exporters was started and an aggressive campaign against the black 
market in diamonds was planned so as to increase the state’s revenues. 
More signifi cantly, the state began allocating credit and foreign currency 
to manufacturers so they could purchase rough diamonds to get the in-
dustry going again. Moreover, the factories would from now on be regu-
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larly inspected, the number of workers and quantities of stock would be 
recorded, and the Diamond Syndicate could be assured that the industry 
was taken care of to become reliable again. In return the Department of 
Trade and Industry made certain that all the returns in foreign currency 
from the export of diamonds were handed over by the diamond manufac-
turers to the state’s treasury. No parcel of rough diamonds was released 
by the state’s customs unless the importer signed a commitment to 
transfer to the Israeli Treasury a specifi ed amount in hard currency at the 
date of release out of the diamond exports within three to fi ve months 
after the date of the release. PDMA members were allowed to buy rough 
diamonds only according to the working capacity of their factories and 
only by proving previous earnings. As all diamonds were to be exported 
(similar to the British 1940 directives), the state’s treasury could keep now 
close control on the amount of foreign currency spent by each manufac-
turer for the purchase of raw materials. The dollar earnings from exports 
were checked to make sure that none of the fi nished diamonds “leaked 
out.” Furthermore, diamond control virtually intervened in the economic 
rationalization in the factories and in the efforts of the factories in saving 
on production costs. This reordering of industrial activity was further ac-
companied by the state’s direct assistance in competing with the Belgians 
by fi nding new markets for polished stones outside the American sphere. 
Clearly Ehrenfeld and van Amerongen were structuring state-capital re-
lations on the models they knew from the Low Countries, creating trust 
relations between the two sides but also mobilizing the industry for the 
needs of the new state.33
However, motivated to help the diamond industry recover and enhance 
the foreign currency earnings, the state exceeded the support of the Brit-
ish in its economic aid to the industry. One expression of this support was 
the consent of the state to exempt diamond workers from military service. 
Basing their production on highly skilled workers and the labor process, 
on complicated induction and on lengthy cultivation of trust, the diamond 
manufacturers were allowed to keep many diamond workers outside the 
battles of the 1948 war and “barter” conscription for gaining hard cur-
rency for the state. Military recruitment was replaced with obligatory con-
fi nement of the workers to the workplace and attenuated the decrease in 
the number of the employed. Moreover, the decrease from two thousand 
diamond workers in the factories in May 1948 to eight hundred in August 
created a severe shortage that was to be balanced by increased admission 
of new immigrants. The entire process seemed, at least in the short run, 
to revive factory work at the expense of the home industry because un-
recorded workers in the informal industry could not be bureaucratically 
freed from recruitment.34
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Further state intervention seemed necessary following the failure in the 
fi rst part of 1949 to successfully compete with the Belgians and to with-
stand the low wages paid to diamond cutters in Germany, which in turn 
increased the reserves of rough diamonds in the hands of the manufactur-
ers. The state therefore offered to buy the manufacturers’ unsold diamonds, 
to reserve them for times of better of marketing conditions, and help them 
sell diamonds abroad through centralized machinery. The manufacturers 
were offered increased export premiums and were allowed to sell reserves 
of rough and unpolished stones abroad. In return the foreign currency ac-
crued from these sales was handed over by the manufacturers to the state 
but also served to buy rough diamonds for cutting and polishing. In the 
latter part of 1949 this assistance was crucial because of the drastic nar-
rowing of supplies from the syndicate to the Israeli diamond industry and 
the consequent search for alternative sources. The system was perfected 
by Van Amerongen by introducing currency switching—using the income 
accrued from the difference between the British pound and the American 
dollar to fi nance further purchases and settle the manufacturers’ fi nancial 
obligations. These arrangements were to be handled in 1950 by a private 
company in which the state participated and that was to be entirely un-
der state control. The owners and stockholders of the company, Chevrat 
Pituach (literally “development company”), were no others than the two 
diamond controllers Ehrenfeld and Van Amerongen; they were joined by 
Jack Brin, the general manager of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and 
Yosef Pick who in 1949–1950 was in charge of export and trade agreements 
in Israel’s Ministry of Finance. During the 1950s the company was instru-
mental in fi nding new sources of rough diamonds in Africa and Central 
America for the industry, in making the industry more competitive, and, 
more crucially, becoming a lever in national-oriented mobilization of the 
diamond industry in establishing factories in Israel’s new development 
towns.35
Closely associated with the economic aspects of the pact, and in partic-
ular with the question of international competition among the diamond-
exporting countries, was Germany. Palestine had long shared Belgium’s 
fear of the revival of the German diamond-cutting industry. Arguing con-
sistently that Palestine did not pose a competitive threat to the recuper-
ating diamond industry in the Low Countries, it asked to be regarded 
as a legitimate “heir” to the fl ourishing diamond production in Germany 
before the war. In introducing the language of victims’ rights and inter-
national morality, the leaders of the industry undertook to represent not 
only Palestine but the Jewish diamond cutters and dealers in Amsterdam 
and Antwerp who during the war suffered confi scation, forced work, and 
extermination by the Germans. Belgian memory of the German aggressive 
competition in the 1930s over obtaining rough diamonds and its disas-
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trous effects on the industry in the Low Countries served well in softening 
Belgian fear for its hegemony. Allaying Belgian fears of competition was 
therefore closely associated with the larger Zionist quest for international 
legitimacy during the transition from Mandate rule to sovereign state in 
1947–1949. The De Beers cartel and the Antwerp-based Universal Alliance 
of Diamond Workers were crucial sources of such legitimacy, and cooper-
ating with the Belgians against the Germans helped to give these sources 
further assurances.36
At the end of 1948 some four hundred cutters were formally work-
ing in the American and French zones in Germany. German diamond 
manufacturers were clearly reproducing the prewar tactics of paying low 
wages and dumping diamond prices. Remembering well the failure of 
the attempt to boycott the German diamond industry in 1939, a new in-
ternational boycott campaign was organized by Belgian manufacturers, 
workers, and merchants to combat the German industry by depriving it of 
rough diamonds. By late 1948 Israel was a crucial actor in this campaign.37 
In summer 1950 the International Diamond Manufacturers Association of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, the US, Israel, and South Africa decided to in-
tensify the boycott policy on German fi nished diamonds because of the 
continued German dumping strategies, the disparity in wages and work 
hours, and the growth of the illegal diamond trade that swept Europe 
during this period. An international convention of diamond workers in 
Amsterdam in June 1950 lent support to the move and even suggested to 
organize the German diamond workers so as to have them join the inter-
national effort against competition and maintenance of equal levels of pay 
across the centers so as to prevent unemployment. Both bodies supported 
the idea to refrain from a formal supply of rough diamonds to Germany 
and a formal purchase of its cut and polished stones.38
The failure of the boycott—largely because the Americans were keen to 
help the Germans resuscitate their industry, and because of Israel’s search 
for reparations—hardly devalued the reciprocal gain that the cooperation 
in the boycott campaign brought to the state of Israel and the local dia-
mond industry. The role both played in the attempt to thwart the reemer-
gence of the German cutting industry was symbolic. After all, the industry 
in Palestine was born in the wake of Fascism, it responded to the fears of 
the Allies and De Beers of German competition, and it certainly reacted 
to the occupation of the Low Countries. In an ironical twist of history, 
the Israeli diamond industry campaigned now against a country that it 
asked to inherit, that it asked to be excluded from a system that the Israe-
lis wanted to see as open to all. Moreover, the attempt by the diamond 
industry to curtail the revival of Germany played a role in ushering in the 
secret negotiations between Israel and West Germany on restitution and 
compensation that were fi nalized in September 1952.39
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Epilogue
In the fi nal analysis, the economic and moral-political pillars on which 
the pact between the state and the industry stood in the late 1940s and the 
early 1950s incorporated a national dimension. The diamond industry was 
clearly a major ingredient in the economic nationalism of the new state. 
Similar to postwar trends in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom, this economic nationalism asked the private sector to take part 
in economic recuperation and its gains were sought after as levers for 
further economic growth and competition. Defi ning the Israeli diamond 
industry as a national resource was, however, particular, as economic na-
tionalism has always been. First, it was a mobilization of the private sector 
to state building and to making the new managed economy viable and 
sustainable. Second, the diamond industry was, as were other privately 
owned ventures, part of an immigrant-absorptive economy. It was to par-
ticipate in absorbing immigrants from North African and Middle East-
ern countries as well as from Poland and Hungary through its particular 
emphasis on acquisition of high-skilled occupations and on socializing 
the immigrants into the organized world of factory work and effi cient 
production.40 
Furthermore, the migration of diamond experts and manufacturers 
from Belgium, and to a lesser extent from the Netherlands, Brazil, the 
US, and Cuba, was now encouraged. Since liberation, Belgium applied 
a similar policy of promoting the return of refugees and the gathering of 
experts, merchants, and workers who populated the diamond industrial 
diasporas created in the wake of the war. In 1949–1950, the campaign in 
Israel focused on the Zionism of diamond manufacturers, merchants, and 
workers, and on the role of the newcomers in solidifying the standing 
of the Israeli diamond industry in the face of growing Belgian pressure 
against the renewed expansion of the industry in Israel. The campaign 
further encouraged the arrival of the highly-skilled diamond cleavers, 
who were direly needed in the Israeli diamond industry and whose sig-
nifi cance for the production diversifi cation had been already noted by the 
British authorities at the end of the war.41 Moreover, the prospective im-
migrants were allowed by the state of Israel to bring over their reserves of 
rough diamonds without formal screening and supervision so as to free 
them from the need to get hard currency in Israel for their further work. In 
this way the government continued the Jewish Agency’s postwar policy to 
bring over to Palestine Jewish technical experts and professionals, and at 
the same time asked to assist in maintaining the long-standing historical 
association between Jews and diamond manufacturing and trading.42
The pact had, however, a more long-term expression. In a few years 
the industry joined in a state-planned scheme to found new develop-
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ment towns on a sound economic basis, and to harness the particular 
characteristics of the diamond industry to cultivate an occupational cul-
ture that has historically been perceived as ethnicity specifi c. The project, 
signifi cantly spreading in many areas from the mid-1950s, involved the 
establishment of diamond-cutting factories in the development towns in 
Israel’s peripheral regions in the south and north of the country through 
the fi nancial support of the government and the private initiative of the 
diamond manufacturers. As diamonds were easily mobilized, the product 
would connect the fi nancial center with the periphery, and the labor cost 
should be economical enough to sustain an industry that placed so much 
importance on craft and labor. The national ideology immersed in this 
logic mixed the wish to cater to the economic needs of the inhabitants of 
the towns with the search of the diamond industry for low-cost workers. 
Isreal didn't have to face much concern for the Jewish control of the in-
dustry;  instead it could now allow itself to focus on making the industry 
more viable by combining low-cost  labor with developmental ideas.
Moreover,  the ideals  of  training Jewish workers  in a traditional in-
dustry merged here with “productivization” of the immigrants and with 
the economic advance of the newly built towns.43
Thus, the circle that opened in the early 1940s in the derogation and 
suspicion in the industry of its loyalty to the British and distance from 
the Zionist “triangular thread” was now closed. Since the early rise of 
manufacturing in Palestine in the mid-1920s, the central economic role of 
private capital and its social acceptance had been gradually advancing, 
despite contemporary ambivalence toward the Jewish participation in a 
capitalist economy and toward the urbanization of the Zionist project. It 
further intensifi ed during the invigorated industrialization of the fi rst half 
of the 1930s, as refl ected in the parallel ripening of the industrial activity 
of the private sector in Palestine’s towns, the rhetoric of the national role 
that capitalism came now to fulfi ll, and the recognized capacity of capi-
tal to work for the “Zionist social good.” With state building becoming 
a reality in the early 1950s, the national legitimization of private capital, 
the withering of the outcast image, and the sense of marginality of the 
diamond industry in particular were complete.44
At the same time, however, national legitimacy was not only facilitat-
ing the recovery of the diamond industry from its long, drawn-out ordeal 
of economic contraction and the loss of more than half of its workforce. 
Rather, it was also part of a wider process of the gradual unshackling of 
private capital in the new state, and the acceptance of the frail status of 
organized labor and the Histadrut in Israel’s private industrial sector. The 
vocabulary that this process encouraged both supported service to state 
building and the merits of the private-capital road to the materialization 
of Zionism. Both were cultural means for securing the state’s sheltering 
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and espousal of capital, but also of socializing the Histadrut in the new 
reality of the pact between the two. More specifi cally, the terminology re-
vered entrepreneurial capital and its independence to the point of actu-
ally becoming level with, if not surpassing, other social forces as the main 
builders of Zionist sovereignty. Not interrupting capital’s way; enabling 
its ambitious search for markets and skilled work; culturally legitimizing 
its social individualism, institutional independence, and high living stan-
dards—these were increasingly becoming routine claims and accepted 
norms.45 Indeed, the national-oriented derogation of the diamond indus-
try of the early 1940s completely faded, and its transnational networking 
and cosmopolitan image would be conveniently adapted by the state of 
Israel to national use. Hardly being able to emerge again without the state, 
the diamond industry would soon be part of the way paved for Israel’s 
later liberal-ideological and social shifts.46
As a capitalist sector that sprouted in symbiosis with the interests and 
policies of the De Beers cartel, British colonialism and the war against Fas-
cism, the diamond manufacturers wished to show their commitment to 
the state, and in particular to state building following the 1948 war. This 
was refl ected in participation in military-oriented production, confi ning 
workers to the workplaces during the war, and pronounced self-mobiliza-
tion in the struggle of the new state against economic illegality (the black 
market, tax evasions, unreported exports, and the like). But these national-
oriented commitments should be understood in yet another perspective. 
The main part played by the diamond industry in the pact was in the co-
operation with the state in the actual recovery of the industry, and in the 
understanding that the recovery was not only a private and individual is-
sue. Israel as a diamond cutting and trading center was to be maintained, 
invested in, and advanced.47
The 1947 crisis, the slow recovery from the crisis, and the abrupt col-
lapsing of some of the diamond-cutting centers that sprouted around the 
world during the war cannot be ignored in deciphering this logic of the 
diamond capitalists. The options of closing down the industry in Israel, 
of transferring manufacturing and trading activities to Antwerp or New 
York, and of succumbing to the forces that harmed the viability of the 
Israeli center were always there and were not taken. These options and 
decisions go a long way to explaining the role of the diamond people in 
the pact, far from a mere capitalist support in state building. Was it the 
Holocaust, the Jewish experience in occupied Belgium, the wish to sus-
tain an ethnic occupational specifi city in the new conditions of a political 
sovereignty of Jews? It is diffi cult to ascertain. Nevertheless, during the 
1950s capital-state understanding and coalescence of interest clearly had 
an enormous impact on role of private capital in the managed economy 
that characterized Israel’s state-building process.48
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Figure 8.2 The diamond industry in Palestine/Israel, 1940–1949
Source: Hayahalom 154 (June 1988).
At the start of that decade the map of diamond-cutting centers unrav-
eled the story of World War II in clear, graphic terms. Antwerp’s supremacy 
in diamond cutting and trading was revived. Some 16,000 diamond work-
ers populated its factories and workshops, but with only a fraction of the 
thousand Jews that served as the industry’s social basis prior to 1939. The 
German diamond industry, the great menace of the late 1930s, was also 
recuperating. In 1951 between 3,000 and 4,000 workers were employed in 
the industry, and despite the deep scars left by the Allies on German dia-
mond production, it easily surpassed the Netherlands (1,400 workers) and 
the US (1,700). The diamond diasporas established by the many who fl ed 
Belgium and the Netherlands were contracting now—some like France 
and Brazil almost completely dismantled. The industry in Israel, absorb-
ing as it did in the late 1940s only a small number of diamantaires, cleav-
ers, and cutters, and reaching some 2,000 workers, was still recovering 
from the harsh ordeals it experienced in 1947–1948.
The relocation of the diamond-cutting centers brought about by World 
War II was therefore only partially undone. And only in 1960, when the 
number of employed in the Israeli diamond industry increased to 5,000, 
similar to the peak of spring 1946, did the marks of the wars and political 
changes in Europe and in Palestine begin to fade.49 That the reciprocal re-
lations between the diamond industry and the state of Israel had a crucial 
role in withstanding these lingering effects brings us back to the initial 
trigger for unraveling in this book of the formation of the Israeli diamond 
industry.
While seeking for clues to the social history of economic boom in World 
War II Palestine and to the high propensity of the diamond workers to 
strike, I realized the need to explain the centrality of three state structures 
in the social organization of the private sector in pre-1948 Palestine. One 
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was the British colonial regime, without which the diamond industry and 
the local initiative to transfer it from Antwerp, let alone the obtaining of 
the raw materials from the diamond cartel, would not have materialized. 
The second was the state-like presence of Zionist institutions and the 
Jewish Agency. Suspicious and alienating at fi rst, these institutions sub-
sequently enabled the diamond industry to survive the grave crisis that 
beset it following the freeing of Antwerp from German occupation. The 
third was the state of Israel that reproduced previous state backing, and 
without which the withstanding of world competition over resources and 
markets would have brought the Palestine diamond industry to resemble 
the demising cutting centers after the war.
The question of the historical predominance of Jews in the world dia-
mond industry has been posed many times in the past. Often it evoked 
the economic advantages of an ethnic group that could mobilize its inner 
mechanisms and social institutions to cut commercial transaction costs and 
advance a highly profi table trading business based on informal dimen-
sions of reputation and networks of trust. While the notion of trust relates 
to diamond trading in these discussions, and to capitalism’s search for 
effi cient middlemen groups to maintain global low-cost commerce, it also 
affected diamond production itself. The disciplinary systems developed 
by owners and manufacturers to oversee the cutters and control the pol-
ishing labor process testifi ed to the failure to replace trust as the defi ning 
factor in the ecology of the diamond workplace. In the same vein the ties 
and “reputational knowledge” that workers and experts wove and cre-
ated during their apprenticeship and work experience served them well 
when they later turned to business and trading and to creating familial 
lineages of diamond merchants and bourse traders. In this sense the pos-
sibility of a diamond-cutting center that the British allowed to materialize 
early in the war reproduced the social basis of a Jewish diamond-trading 
group that would later cultivate the older reliance on communal ties and 
trustworthy relations.50
However, beyond these aspects of the diamond-trading culture and the 
economic advantages Jewish diamond dealers have traditionally enjoyed, 
it must be remembered that the diamond industry in Palestine started 
fi rst and foremost as a diamond-cutting and -polishing center and that 
the world trading prowess of the Palestine and Israeli diamond-merchant 
community developed only much later. That the Israeli community of dia-
mond dealers and merchants and the national involvement of the state of 
Israel in its affairs were a corollary, not the precondition, of the country’s 
production center and its backing by the De Beers cartel and the British 
government problematizes the origins of such commercial networks.51
The presence of the colonial state in the formation of the diamond in-
dustry closed the circle opened in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
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by the increasing dependence of capital in diamond mining, production, 
and trading on imperial infl uence and state powers. It also brought the 
penetration of state structures into civil society and capitalist activity, 
which began in Palestine during the late Ottoman period, to a new climax. 
However it also affected the dual identity of the Jewish diamond manu-
facturers in Palestine and the practice of their capitalist activities. On the 
one hand they were tied to, depended on, and committed to the British, to 
the empire, and to the relational network of diamond making the British 
wove between Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Without this commit-
ment of the diamond manufacturers and their monopoly organization, the 
initial emergence of the industry in Palestine would have been inconceiv-
able. In this sense British rule in Palestine was deeply immersed not only 
in impacting the urban economy (as the development of Netanya and Tel 
Aviv demonstrated) but more signifi cantly in the social formation of a sig-
nifi cant representative of the Jewish (and later Israeli) middle class.52
On the other hand, the diamond industry became increasingly com-
mitted to Zionist state building. And it was directly and indirectly part of 
the economic infrastructure that enabled the empowerment of the Jewish 
economy in Palestine and its later transformation into the state of Israel. 
After all, without this national commitment to the business ideology and 
political language of the diamond manufacturers, the rebirth of the indus-
try in the 1950s would have been equally unimaginable. The crucial role 
played by colonial rule in social formation was therefore continued by the 
economic policies and social ideology of the political elite in the state of 
Israel.
In this context of state intervention in the private industry and capital’s 
alignment with state structures, the Jewish diamond workers in 1940s Pal-
estine underwent a portentous experience. They fl ocked to the expanding 
industry in hundreds, turned into better-paid workers, and changed the 
industrial scene, union map, and human landscape of Netanya and Tel 
Aviv. They took part in one of the earliest examples of the Zionist-related 
effi ciency drive in the Yishuv, and at the fall of the industry in the lat-
ter part of the decade they sophisticated home work practices and infor-
mal employment that colored later developments of the Israeli working 
classes. Their labor experiences told, however, of the deepening weakness 
of union organization in the private sector. From the moment the diamond 
industry in Palestine was entrusted to the hands of an organizational mo-
nopoly, and was literally enclosed to unselected member-entrepreneurs, 
labor was isolated as well. The ties that bound the few diamond workers 
in prewar Palestine to the Zionist-Socialist Labor movement were severed, 
and organized labor was kept out of the selection of the workers. The facil-
itated entrance of many workers from non-Histadrut labor organizations 
prevented the Histadrut from achieving the organizationally hegemonic 
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position it had enjoyed in the rest of the industry in the Yishuv. Piecework 
distanced the diamond workers from the more-organized workers, and, 
more importantly, their high wages placed them apart. The luxury items 
these workers were producing may have added to the general imagery, 
bringing them closer to mere gain seekers than to the laboring classes so 
central in the ideology of Zionist state building. While collective bargain-
ing lingered on in the diamond industry, accompanying as it did the fun-
damental piecework structure of employment in the industry, the assump-
tion of union frailty and absence of strikes turned routine and increasingly 
unspoken. The balance of power between capital and labor, to which the 
bulk of workers during the Mandate period became accustomed, was 
clearly tipping now in capital’s favor.53
Thus, the story of the formation of the Israeli diamond industry told in 
this book well refl ected the shaping of relations between state and capital 
in Mandate Palestine. The reciprocal uses made of each other exposed a 
mutual system that hardly existed in the country under Ottoman rule and 
fl ourished after the British left it. In this system the national language of 
private capital and the liberal language of the state were but symptoms of 
the material reality of reciprocal relations that in the fi nal analysis enabled 
private capital to become such a powerful force in Israeli society and har-
bingered the decline of organized labor. That the process took off during 
the 1940s and then accelerated during the transition from British rule to 
Israeli sovereignty—under Labor’s political hegemony, and in the context 
of the postwar transformation of the British Empire and the world dia-
mond industry—pointed to a historical continuity that deserves further 
scholarly attention.
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Table A.1 Explanation of names of diamond factories in 1930–1950 Palestine
Factory Meaning
Almaz Jewel or diamond, in Russian
Almog Coral
Anbar Amber
Bahat Alabaster or porphyry
Bareket Agate, emerald, one of the gemstones on the Ephod, the breastplate of the 
high priest representing the Tribe of Levi
Barik Variation on the Hebrew word Barak for sparkle and shine
Even Hayesod The foundation  stone in the Holy of Holies, the most sacred part of the 
Temple in Jerusalem
Even Chen Gemstone or precious stone
Even Sapir Sapphire, one of the gemstones on the Ephod, the breastplate of the high 
priest representing the tribe of Issachar
Even Shoham Onyx, one of the gemstones on the Ephod, the breastplate of the high 
priest representing the Tribe of Yoseph
Haeven Stone
Hakochav Star
Hayahalom Diamond or beryl, one of the gemstones on the Ephod, the breastplate of 
the high priest representing the Tribe of Zebulon
Kohinoor In Persian, Kohinoor is Mountain of Light—the name of one of the largest 
known diamonds, at 105 carats 
Maskit Image, ornament
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Factory Meaning
Nofekh Emerald, one of the gemstones on the Ephod, the breastplate of the high 
priest representing the Tribe of Judah
Nova A star that suddenly fl ares up in brightness
Ophir The seaport in Yemen from where King Solomon received a cargo of gold 
and  precious stones
Orion A bright constellation on the equator, between the stars Aldebaran and 
Sirius, containing a visible nebula
Rikuz Concentration, assemblage
Orah Light
Paldico Abbreviation of Palestine Diamond Company 
Palnat Abbreviation of Palestina-Netanya
Shamir A greenish substance or worm with power to alter stone and iron, used in 
the construction of Solomon’s Temple
Tarshish Chrysolite, one of the gemstones on the Ephod, the breastplate of the high 
priest representing the Tribe of Asher
Yahalomim Diamonds. Yahalom is beryl, one of the gemstones on the Ephod, the 
breastplate of the high priest representing the Tribe of Zebulon
Yahel To shed light, to illuminate, to shine
Yashfeh Jasper, one of the gemstones on the Ephod, the breastplate of the high 
priest representing the Tribe of Binyamin
Zaharir Small lines (or fragments) of light
Zenith The point on the Celestial Sphere that is directly overhead
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Table A.4 Diamond factories (PDMA membership), Palestine November 1944 
Tel Aviv (16) Netanya (13) Jerusalem (2)
Barik Ltd. 
Beit Mann-Berman, Salameh 
Street
Anbar Ltd. Industrial Zone Joseph Feldman & Sons 




Diamond Industry) Ltd. 
(Feldman works), 4 Mikveh 
Israel Street
Almaz Ltd. Industrial Zone Bet Yahalomei Yerush-
alaim (Jerusalem First 
Diamond Factory) Ltd. 
Diskin Orphanage 
Building
Gruenfeld & Schieber Ltd. 
21 Petach Tikva Road
Yahalomei Bukhara (Bukhara 
Diamonds) Ltd. Industrial Zone 
Bet
Haeven Diamond Manu-
facturing Co. Ltd. Petach 
Tikva Road (Montefi ori 
Neighborhood)
Even-Chen Ltd. Industrial Zone
Mazur & Paldico Ltd. Beit 
Mann-Berman, Salameh 
Street
Ophir Ltd. Industrial Zone
Sh. Moed Veshutafav Ltd. 69 
Mazeh Street
Even-Hayesod Ltd. Industrial 
Zone
Ramat Gan (2)
Nofekh Diamond Polishing 
Factory Ltd. Neve Shaanan 
Street 




Orah Diamond Cutting and 
Polishing Factory Ltd. 47 
Nakhlat Binyamin Street
Kohinoor Co. Ltd. (Feldman 
works), Industrial Zone
Nova Diamonds, Ltd. 
Pardes Katz
Taasiyat Yahalomim Eretz-
Israelit (Palestine Diamond 
Manufacturing) Ltd. 3 
Hagra Street
Taasiyat Yahalomim Netanya 
(Nathanya Diamond Manufac-
turers) Ltd. Industrial Zone Bet
Rikuz Ltd. 15 Nachamani 
Street
Orion Ltd. Industrial Zone
Even-Sapir (Sapphire) Ltd., 
69 Mazeh Street
Tarshish Co. Ltd. 
Industrial Zone
Yahalomei Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv 
Diamonds) Ltd. 24 Akhva 
Street and 3 Levotin Street
Palnat Diamonds Ltd. Indus-
trial Zone
Hakochav Diamond Co. Ltd. 
47 Nakhlat Binyamin Street
Shamir Ltd. Industrial Zone 
and 3 Levontin Street, Tel Aviv
Yahalomim Pickel (Carol 
Pickel Diamonds) Ltd. 69 
Mazeh Street
Zaharir Ltd. 61 Herzl Street
Arthur Salzmann                           Total =33
Source: Government of Palestine. Palestine Trade Catalogue. Jerusalem, 1944; LA, IV-250–49–
170; NCA, G/119/52.
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Table A.5 Diamond factories (PDMA membership), Palestine November 1946
Tel Aviv Netanya Jerusalem Ramat Gan
B. Shafferman Even Hayesod Fokshaner-Diskin Gutbir
Hakocahv Even Chen Feldman

















20 11 2 1            =33
Source: NCA, G/101/760.
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Table A.6 Diamond cooperatives in Palestine/Israel, 1946–1949
Est. Place Member-Workers
Ovdei Yahalomei Bukhara 1946 Tel Aviv 34
Hevrat Yahalomei Bukhara 1946 Netanya 24   
Yahel 1946 Tel Aviv 50
Bareket 1947 Tel Aviv 28
Shamir 1947 Tel Aviv 22
Shoham 1947 Tel Aviv 30
Maskit 1947 Netanya 48
Tarshish 1947 Netanya 80
Barik 1947 Netanya 36
Kevutzat Kfar-Saba 1947 Kfar-Saba 20
Almog 1947 Petah Tikva 20
Yahalomei Zfat 1949 Safed 15
=12 Total = 407 Total
Note: In 1946 the total number of employed in all factories was ca. 4,500 and in 1949 ca. 
1,000. 
Source: Itshak Avineri, ed. Cooperation in the State of Israel. Tel Aviv, 1948; Merkaz Haco-
operatsia, The Production and Service Cooperation in 1948–1958. Tel Aviv, 1960, 2.
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